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Abstract 
 
 
The criminal defence lawyer is perhaps the most publicly identifiable and controversial 
figure in the criminal justice system, and is considered by many to represent the 
cornerstone of adversarial criminal justice. However, there is significant evidence that 
the context within which criminal defence lawyers operate in England and Wales is 
rapidly, and fundamentally, changing. Using a wide range of theoretical literature and 
commentary, the thesis begins by exploring theoretical constructions of the defence 
lawyer's role, and proceeds to an assessment of whether the traditional, theoretical, 
conception of the role remains relevant and useful in the context of the 21st century.  It 
continues with an extensive exploration of modern, formal, regulation governing 
criminal defence lawyers in England and Wales, including relevant legislation, case law 
and professional conduct rules.  The thesis aims to explore ethical conflicts in criminal 
defence work by identifying and analysing tensions between the various obligations 
owed by the defence lawyer.  All of these issues are explored in the context of ‘real-life’ 
criminal defence practice through an empirical study, using the novel ‘vignette 
technique’ to simulate ethical conflicts that defence lawyers might face.  Having 
explored theoretical, formal and practical conceptions of the defence role, the thesis 
draws conclusions about the usefulness and relevance of theory to the modern role, 
whether that theory is reflected both in formal regulation and in practice, and whether 
ethical conflicts pose a significant barrier to the functioning of the defence lawyer's 
role.  Finally, using the research data, the thesis raises questions about the continuing 
validity of adversarial conceptions of criminal procedure in England and Wales, and 
makes proposals concerning the future of theoretical debate relating to the role of the 
criminal defence lawyer. 
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Statement of Objectives 
 
 
The thesis aims to broaden knowledge of and interest in the work of criminal defence 
lawyers. 
 
The thesis aims to delineate the role of the 21
st
 Century criminal defence lawyer 
working in an adversarial context and consider how it has changed in recent years.   
 
The thesis aims to explore whether a coherent 'theoretical' conception of the role 
(consisting of traditional, ideal obligations described by academic theorists) can be 
identified.  
 
The thesis aims to establish a link between traditional theory and the modern role by 
exploring whether recent regulation and current practice reflect any theoretical 
conception. 
 
The thesis aims to explore the role that ethical conflict plays in the working life of the 
criminal defence lawyer.   
 
The thesis aims to utilize appropriate empirical methodology to further analysis of role 
of the criminal defence lawyer.   
 
The thesis aims to consider what implications recent changes have for the future of 
theorising in this area and for English and Welsh adversarial criminal justice in general. 
 
 
The author would like to acknowledge the use of all of the materials listed in the 
bibliography.  He would also like to acknowledge the invaluable support and assistance 
of Professor Ed Cape and Dr Ben Pontin, the advice of Dr Stewart Field, the help of the 
participants in the ‘pilot’ of the empirical fieldwork, and finally the candidness and 
cooperation of the respondents interviewed for the empirical fieldwork. 
 
This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that 
no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
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Glossary of Terms 
 
 
 
ABS – Alternative Business Structure 
 
BSB – Bar Standards Board 
 
BVC – Bar Vocational Course 
 
CJSSS – Criminal Justice: Simple, Speedy, Summary 
 
CPD – Continuing Professional Development 
 
CPR – Criminal Procedure Rules 
 
EU – European Union 
 
ICC – International Criminal Court 
 
ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
 
LDP – Legal Disciplinary Practice 
 
LPC – Legal Practice Course 
 
LSC – Legal Services Commission 
 
MOJ – Ministry of Justice 
 
PACE – Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
 
SRA – Solicitors Regulation Authority 
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1. Introduction 
 
The criminal defence lawyer exists to advance and protect some of the most 
fundamental rights of citizens in liberal democratic societies, and is considered a vital 
aspect of an accused person’s right to a fair trial.1  It is likely that most people in 
England and Wales automatically assume that, should they get into trouble with the law, 
they will be provided with a lawyer to defend them.  It is also probable that citizens 
assume that said lawyer will be on ‘their side’, that he or she will be suitably qualified 
and competent to protect their interests, and that they will work diligently for them and 
them alone.  Defence lawyers are entrusted with critical responsibilities within the 
criminal justice system; yet, those who require their services are unlikely to fully 
question their role or duties.  Equally, as this thesis will demonstrate, few British 
academics have devoted attention to scrutinising the nature of the criminal defence 
lawyer’s role, which is multi-faceted, complex, uncertain and debatable.  Its definition is 
layered and derived from many sources.  Furthermore, the role has been the subject of 
significant change in recent years.  This thesis aims to examine the role of the 
adversarial criminal defence lawyer in depth, by critically analysing both academic and 
regulatory expressions of the role and empirically exploring the duties and dilemmas 
attached to this most ancient and unique symbol of adversarial legal culture. 
 
2. Why explore the role of the criminal defence lawyer? 
 
It is at least arguable that most practitioners working in the criminal justice system, and 
academics studying it, recognise the defence lawyer as a crucial component in an 
effective justice process.  Yet, it is also arguable that a majority of those outside of this 
narrow section of the legal-academic community misunderstand and undervalue the 
importance of the role.  This is particularly the case amongst the public: 
 
"A Delegate of the Estate of Real People would probably ask "Aren't most good 
lawyers 'bad people.' Don't they represent horrible clients and use clever 
technicalities to thwart true justice?"
2
 
 
                                                 
1
 In England and Wales, this is guaranteed by Article 6 of the ‘European Convention on Human Rights’, 
which has effect through the Human Rights Act 1999. 
2
 Brown R. (1999) The ‘Good Person’ Question: Valid Query or Hobson’s Choice? – 2 J. Inst. For Study 
Legal Ethics, 154. 
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Many in the 'estate of real people' have little or no notion of what duties and obligations 
bind defence lawyers.  The Roman poet Horace stated that "[l]awyers are men who hire 
out their words and anger",
3
 and such sentiments summarise the prevailing attitude of 
outsiders to lawyers.  This animosity is even more acute when applied to criminal 
defence lawyers.  As men and women paid to shield potential offenders, criminal 
defence lawyers are regarded almost as traitors to justice who "do a job that few people 
understand and many people revile."
4
  Raymond Brown described the profession as 
"disdained, mocked and unappreciated in both the popular and the legal culture".
5 
 
 
There appears to be at least some truth in these claims.  Images of and references to the 
criminal defence lawyer are, and have been, part of popular culture for generations, 
depicting this iconic figure in a variety of ways, sometimes misleading, contradictory 
and confusing.  Fictional American defender Perry Mason would almost always emerge 
victorious in trials, proving his client to have been falsely accused, something that is 
rare in reality.  Mason described how rivals called him “a dangerous antagonist”6 and a 
“shyster”,7 but claimed to “have never stuck up for a criminal”8 being only interested in 
“the orderly administration of an impartial justice”.9  Whilst Perry Mason appears to be 
an heroic protector of the innocent, other examples are much less favourable.  The 
classic thriller ‘Cape Fear’ tells the story of a criminal defence lawyer who is stalked by 
his former client because he deliberately botched the client's defence at trial.  The film 
suggests that the lawyer, in betraying his client, was not only treacherous and cowardly, 
but in some ways responsible for his own plight.   Yet, viewers are also encouraged to 
empathise with the lawyer; his actions caused the insane client to be incarcerated, which 
might be interpreted as a noble act.  Another example is criminal justice drama ‘Law 
and Order UK’, in which one defence barrister is portrayed as “devious and without the 
burden of principles”10 who “uses every trick in the book to get his client off”.11  This 
image of the “louche, self-serving defence barrister” was described as being a “typically 
                                                 
3
 Quotations of Wisdom:  Horace - http://www.quotationsofwisdom.com/view/Horace/6060.html: Last 
accessed 13/08/2010. 
4
 Arguedas C. (1996-1997) Duties of a Criminal Defense Lawyer – 30 Loy. L.A.L. Rev., 9. 
5
 Brown R. (1996) A Plan to Preserve an Endangered Species:  The Zealous Criminal Defense Lawyer – 
30 Loy. LAL Rev., at p.21 
6
 Gardner E.S. (1933) The Case of the Velvet Claws. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Gardner E.S. (1943) The Case of the Drowsy Mosquito. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 ‘Law and Order UK: Season 1 Episode Guide’ - http://www.universal-playback.com/law-order-
uk/season-1: Last accessed 13/08/2010. 
11
 Ibid. 
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British legal-drama trap”.12  In contrast, recent BBC drama ‘Garrow's Law’ portrayed 
defence lawyer William Garrow as righteous, brave and ethical, as well as stubborn and 
disobedient.  These fictional examples have helped shape the public image of the 
criminal defence lawyer.  They are dramatic exaggerations of certain aspects of criminal 
defence, which is to some extent understandable.  However, the majority tend to 
perpetuate the enduring image of defence lawyers as deceptive, untrustworthy and 
enemies of real justice, stifling more balanced and realistic accounts of the work of 
criminal defenders.  In addition, this negative conception of the defence lawyer 
discourages people from learning more about their role - they are simply dismissed.  
This situation should be redressed. 
 
Alongside the general public are the worlds of legal practice and legal academia.  
Outside of the circles of specialists in legal professional ethics and criminal justice, one 
would strongly suspect that there is a lack of detailed knowledge about the role of the 
criminal defence lawyer.  In England and Wales, this has been perpetuated by a lack of 
focused research into criminal defence lawyers and their work.  American writers have 
dominated the debate about legal ethics.  David Luban, Monroe H. Freedman and 
William H. Simon, amongst others, have written extensively on the obligations and 
duties of adversarial lawyers over the past forty years.  Of those, only Freedman has 
written with specific reference to criminal defence lawyers, a seminal example being 
‘Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer:  The Three Hardest 
Questions’.13  In addition, no concerted attempt has been made to espouse a robust 
framework of principles defining the role.
14  
In contrast, few British academics have 
endeavoured to explore the concept of the criminal defence lawyer, resulting in a 
severely under-developed body of academic discourse.  In their exploration of ethics 
and ideals central to the adversarial legal profession, Donald Nicholson and Julian 
Webb
15
 stressed that "[i]n order that these principles do not remain at the level of pure 
aspiration without much meaningful content, they need to be fleshed out by 
commentaries setting out their rationale and underlying values."
16  
That is a primary aim 
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of this thesis. 
 
The criminal defence profession itself has, to an extent, contributed to this situation by 
failing to educate outsiders about the role they play.  It has been suggested that "[t]he 
typical practicing lawyer barely has time to breathe much less the leisure to contemplate 
abstract theoretical questions"
17
 and "that questions about the moral conduct of lawyers 
and broader issues affecting the entire justice system are frequently evaded."
18
  
Arguably, this has allowed popular misconceptions about defence lawyers to germinate 
in the minds of the public and the broader legal profession.  More crucially, a lack of 
self-definition has granted government the opportunity to shape the future of criminal 
defence with little resistance from anyone outside of the criminal defence profession; 
this is well-exemplified by the raft of high-profile legislation, such as the Criminal 
Procedure Rules 2010, which has directly affected criminal defence work.  As such, it is 
argued that "[t]he thinking criminal lawyer must reject the notion that she lives in a 
separate, self-governing ethical world".
19
  The days of exclusive self-regulation by the 
legal profession are long dead, and if defence lawyers are to counter-act any detrimental 
change to the nature of their work, then they must take responsibility for defining their 
role.  I hope that this thesis will promote debate about the criminal defence lawyer's role 
and encourage this sort of action, by both academics and professionals. 
 
The criminal defence lawyer's role has undergone significant change, particularly in the 
last decade.  To some extent, this has generated confusion and uncertainty about what 
the defence lawyer's role is in the 21
st
 Century.There are now more potential ethical 
conflicts for defence lawyers to resolve than ever before.  Some academics have also 
suggested that many of the changes to the defence lawyer's role herald a shift away from 
an adversarial criminal process, towards a more inquisitorial, continental style of 
criminal justice.  Whether such claims have credence or not, it seems timely to explore 
the modern defence lawyer's role and assess whether it has altered and what the 
implications of any change are.  Moreover, the broader question of whether 
adversarialism is being undermined in England and Wales is undoubtedly worthy of 
attention.  This thesis aims to shed some light on these issues. 
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3. Research Questions 
 
This thesis has one overarching question: 
 
What is the role of the criminal defence lawyer in the modern era? 
 
In answering this, I have identified three guiding research questions: 
 
1. Is there a coherent 'theoretical' conception of the role of the adversarial criminal 
defence lawyer? 
 
- In relation to this question, I intend to explore three issues: why one should look 
at 'theoretical' conceptions of the adversarial of the role; where one looks for 
'theoretical' conceptions of the role; and what principles define any coherent 
'theoretical' conception of the role.   
  
2. Does any coherent 'theoretical' conception constitute a useful and relevant 
reflection of the role of the modern practitioner? 
 
- In relation to this question, I intend to explore six issues: what 'formal' 
conceptions of the role exist in England and Wales; how do 'formal' conceptions 
compare with any 'theoretical' conception of the role; do 'conflict points' exist 
within 'theoretical' and 'formal' conceptions of the role; are any 'conflict points' 
resolved by regulation in England and Wales; what 'practical' conceptions of the 
role exist in England and Wales; and how, if at all, do practitioners resolve any 
'conflict points' in their everyday role.   
 
3. What implications do my findings have for any 'theoretical' conception of the 
role? 
 
- In relation to this question, I will consider what the future of theorizing the 
criminal defence lawyer’s role holds and explore what implications my findings 
have for the wider adversarial tradition in England and Wales. 
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4. Thesis Structure 
 
Answering these research questions will involve five stages, spread over seven chapters: 
 
- STAGE 1 - Chapter 2 will propose and critique a coherent, theoretical 
conception of the role; this framework of ideal principles is entitled the ‘zealous 
advocate’ model.  The model will be a foundation for the rest of this thesis, 
acting as a reference point for examination and analysis of formal and practical 
conceptions and conflict points. 
 
- STAGE 2 - Chapter 3 will examine formal conceptions of the role; formal 
regulation will be compared with the ‘zealous advocate’ model, with the aim of 
assessing whether formal duties and obligations reflect theoretical ones. 
 
- STAGE 3 - Chapter 4 will explore tensions between the principles of the 
‘zealous advocate’ model, referred to throughout this thesis as ‘conflict points’.  
The chapter will examine conflict between the theoretical principles and whether 
they are resolved by academic discussion.  Second, the chapter will examine 
conflicts between the principles as manifested in formal regulation, and whether 
these conflict points are resolved. 
 
- STAGE 4 – Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will focus on an empirical study aimed at 
assessing how defence lawyers conceive of their role in practice and how, if at 
all, they resolve practical conflict points.  Chapter 5 will explain the 
methodology employed in the study.  Chapter 6 will analyse the opinions of 
practitioners about the duties that define their practical role, and compare their 
practical conceptions with both the theoretical model and formal conceptions.  
Chapter 7 will analyse the approach of practitioners to conflict points and will 
compare this with theoretical and formal resolutions. 
 
- STAGE 5 – Chapter 8 will draw conclusions based on the research questions 
identified in this chapter; it will also outline implications for future theorising of 
the role of the criminal defence lawyer. 
 
This thesis will focus on the importance and efficacy of 'theory'.  In exploring this, it 
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can be said that three ‘layers’ of the criminal defence lawyer’s role are examined – 
theoretical, formal, and practical. 
 
5. 'Theoretical' conceptions of the role of the criminal defence lawyer 
 
Theoretical conceptions of the role embody what might be called the ‘soul’ of criminal 
defence work.  Theoretical duties and obligations are historic, traditional and abstract; 
they represent an ideal version of the role of the criminal defence lawyer, rather than an 
accurate account of the reality of the role.  Theory is not meant to be prescriptive in the 
same way that codes of conduct or legislation are; theoretical discourse does not bind 
defence lawyers.  Theoretical discussion is therefore normative, setting standards that 
are intended to shape and influence the regulation and practice of criminal defence 
work.  It is designed to provide practitioners and academics with a knowledge and 
appreciation of the fundamental values underpinning the criminal defence role.  The 
importance of the theory underlying the criminal defence lawyer's role is 
underestimated.  Theory has defined and documented values which remain fundamental 
to criminal defence work today.  On some level, all of the principles in this thesis 
pervade the modern regulation and practice of criminal defence lawyers.  Theory is the 
foundation.  For practitioners to only be aware of and refer to formal regulation is "to 
suggest that they function in a closed system that adequately defines their roles"
20
 and 
as such "isolates them from the important ethical debates of the day."
21
  The role of the 
criminal defence lawyer does not operate in a vacuum.  As Albert Alschuler suggested, 
"a system of justice must depend in substantial part on norms that cannot be captured in 
either procedural rules or rules of professional conduct"
22
 and quoted Lord Moulton, 
saying: 
 
"True civilization is measured by the extent of obedience to the 
unenforceable."
23
  
 
The development of the criminal defence lawyer’s role has been and should be 
influenced by theoretical, academic discussion.  William Simon asserted that adversarial 
advocates have "a duty to understand the practices of advocacy in the light of their 
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underlying principles and to re-shape the practices to keep them consistent with these 
principles in the particular contexts in which the lawyer finds herself."
24
  This thesis 
aims to promote such understanding.  Its exploration of theory and its search for a 
coherent theoretical conception are designed to foster debate amongst academics and 
practitioners, in the hope that awareness of underlying theoretical values might 
strengthen criminal defence lawyers’ sense of identity and act as an anchor during the 
role's inevitable evolution.  Debate about theoretical legal ethics makes a positive 
contribution to the improvement of legal regulation and practice.  Geoffrey Hazard 
suggested that the alleged public view that "lawyers are simply a plague on society"
25
 
was the result of the belief that "[l]awyers should have 'better' ethics".
26
  He believed 
this could be achieved through "more-exacting requirements for education in 
'professional responsibility'", "burgeoning of legal ethics as a subject of judicial 
decisions", "legal treatises" and "academic discourse".
27
  Again, this thesis attempts to 
engage in this kind of debate.   
 
Beyond theoretical discussion, the comparison of theoretical conceptions with formal 
regulation and practice is also important.  Doing so represents a holistic approach to the 
study of the role of the criminal defence lawyer.  It endeavours to integrate all potential 
definitions of the role, treating theoretical, formal and practical conceptions of the role 
as inter-related.   It also recognises the importance of studying the influence of 
theoretical conceptions on the formal regulation and everyday practice of criminal 
defence work.  In relation to social work professionals, Tom Wilks argued that 
"[q]uestions about the nature of the relationship between values and action are central to 
the study of social work ethics".
28
   
 
Similarly, Hugman and Smith suggested: 
 
"Value statements may draw upon abstract or ideal notions, but at the same time 
they necessarily carry with them implications for the way in which individuals 
act".
29
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This thesis adopts a similar approach, seeking to understand the often unrecognised 
relationship between theoretical ideals, formal conceptions of the role and practice.  
Wilks continued:  
 
"A certain philosophical perspective generates certain moral principles. These 
principles are then adopted as part of a system of operating rules by social 
workers, incorporated into their belief system, their thinking about what is right 
or wrong, and then used as guides for action."
30
 
 
The above process reflects the 'layers’ explored in this thesis: a 'philosophical 
perspective' (theoretical conceptions) filters down to a 'system of operating rules' 
(formal conceptions), which are 'used as guides for action' (practical conceptions).  In 
exploring the influence of theoretical conceptions on formal rules and everyday 
practice, it is important to remember that theoretical ethics are not necessarily the sole 
or even the primary driver behind formal or practical conceptions of the role.  It would 
be naïve to expect rules to entirely reflect ideals; the two are distinct.  In comparing 
theory with rules and practice, the influence of other factors, such as politics and 
economics, should be borne in mind.  However, this thesis works on the premise that 
modelling formal and practical conceptions of the role on theoretical values is a 
beneficial pursuit, even if it is not entirely achievable.  Exploring theoretical 
conceptions of the role is thus an important, interesting, influential and dynamic 
contribution to the clarification and improvement of criminal defence work. 
 
6. ‘Formal’ conceptions of the role of the criminal defence lawyer 
 
Formal conceptions of role exist in regulatory resources such as legislation and codes of 
conduct.  Hazard argued that "traditional norms have undergone important changes . . .  
[o]ne important development is that those norms have become 'legalized'".
31
  This 
"legalization process"
32
 and the division it has arguably created between formal and 
theoretical conceptions are significant subjects of discussion.  ‘Legalization’ translated 
traditional values and principles into finite, binding rules governing the work of 
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criminal defence lawyers.  As Zacharias and Green summarised, "code drafters 
undertook the task of memorializing professional norms almost from scratch".
33
  This 
thesis intends to assess whether elements of these theoretical norms have been lost in 
translation, and whether, as Hazard argues, this has resulted in "the disintegration of the 
profession's sense of self and of the 'narrative' that helped to define and defend its social 
boundaries."
34
  In exploring the formal conception of the role of the defence lawyer, this 
thesis will focus on England and Wales.  No jurisdiction operates a 'pure' adversarial 
system, but several can be classed as belonging to an adversarial tradition.  Formal 
regulation varies between different adversarial jurisdictions; professional codes of 
conduct in the United States are not the same as those governing English and Welsh 
defence practitioners, even if they do have similarities.  To consider the many 
jurisdictional variations of formal regulation would be untenable in terms of both space 
and time, thus it is necessary to focus on a specific adversarial jurisdiction.  England 
and Wales is generally regarded as the archetypal adversarial system; it was therefore 
logical to focus on formal conceptions of the role in the jurisdiction that might be 
deemed the home of adversarialism.  England and Wales was also a pragmatic choice, 
linguistically, financially and geographically. 
 
Over the last 50 years, the legalization of traditional, theoretical norms has been the 
primary example of the regulation and definition of the role of the criminal defence 
lawyer and continues to be today.  Hazard acknowledged this situation in 1991, stating 
that: 
 
"'Legalized' regulation will undoubtedly continue to dominate the normative 
structure of the legal profession, through court-promulgated rules, increasingly 
intrusive common law, and public statutes and regulations. As a consequence, 
the dominant normative institution for the legal profession will no longer be . . . 
the profession as a substantially inclusive fraternal group."
35
 
 
He continued by suggesting that "[i]n the emergent 'legalized' era, increasingly 
dominant power reposes in government regulatory authorities, including courts, 
legislatures, and disciplinary agencies."
36
  These public and private regulatory bodies 
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are to some extent officially designated with the regulation of the legal profession.It is 
important to explore formal conceptions of the role because they represent a collection 
of authoritative definitions, both explicit and implicit, of the duties of criminal defence 
lawyers.  Formal regulation goes beyond commentary; it is largely prescriptive, 
requiring certain behaviour of defence lawyers, and is intended to have practical 
application.  As such, it would be remiss not to place formal conceptions of the role at 
the centre of any analysis of criminal defence work. 
 
7. ‘Practical’ conceptions of the role of the criminal defence lawyer 
 
Practical conceptions are not derived from written sources, but from the accounts of 
practitioners, that is, the everyday, real-life duties and obligations that they identify as 
describing (or prescribing) their working role.  In this thesis, practical conceptions were 
explored through an empirical study, involving interviews with a sample of practicing 
defence lawyers.  Further details of this study will be discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
Exploring practical conceptions recognises that theoretical and formal conceptions do 
not necessarily reflect reality.  It cannot be assumed that the requirements of codes of 
conduct or the principles in academic commentary carry into practice.  Several 
questions may be answered by an exploration of the reality of criminal defence: do 
practical conceptions of the defence role reflect traditional conceptions?  Is day-to-day 
practice influenced by such principles?  Do practitioners have a sense of the theoretical 
roots of their profession?  How different, if at all, are formal rules and real-life practice?  
Do practitioners encounter ethical conflicts and can they resolve them?  Comparing 
theory and formal regulation with practical conceptions is a crucial test of their 
relevance and usefulness.  After all, if they bear no resemblance to practice, then 
normative debate and ‘binding’ rules are essentially insignificant.  Furthermore, the 
inclusion of a practical perspective in this analysis grounds theoretical and formal 
conceptions in reality.  This makes them more relevant to some of the people this thesis 
is directed toward, including academics, legal practitioners, legislators, regulators and 
ordinary people with an interest in criminal justice issues.  Examination of practical 
conceptions forms a link between the abstract and the concrete.    
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8. ‘Conflict points’ 
 
In Chapter 2, I will construct a framework of principles representing a single, coherent 
account of the duties and obligations which make up the traditional defence role.  
Equally, this theoretical model will be used as a basis for comparison when exploring 
formal and practical conceptions of the role.  The 'conflict points' that I identify are 
inconsistencies and clashes between these principles.  The different principles are 
comparable with tectonic plates; when plates collide, the result can be destructive.  
Similarly, where principles contradict each other, the result can be counter-productive 
for the defence lawyer, defendant, court, the public and other affected parties.  Conflict 
points have significant implications for theoretical, formal and practical conceptions of 
the criminal defence lawyer's role; what that role is depends on whether such conflicts 
can be resolved and, if so, how.  Where the duties of the defence lawyer are undisputed, 
the role is clear.  This allows easy comparison of theoretical, formal and practical 
conceptions of the role.  However, where a conflict exists and its resolution is uncertain, 
defining the defence lawyer’s role is more difficult.  Furthermore, conflict points 
represent weakness in the integrity of the theoretical model; as in physics, placing a 
structure under pressure reveals its true strength.   
 
Conflict points represent pressure points in the role and are signifiers of what is truly 
required of criminal defence lawyers.  Wilk explained, "[i]t is the moral decision that 
reveals the nature of the values that underlie it . . . [m]oral dilemmas have therefore 
been regarded as key in understanding social work ethics".
37
  They have influenced the 
direction of academic debate about the defence lawyer's theoretical role, and should 
continue to do so.  Conflict points affect each conceptual layer of the role, but have 
essential practical significance.  The identification of unresolved ethical conflicts should 
undoubtedly inform any future changes in legislation, professional codes, and 
regulatory materials which affect the role of defence lawyers in England and Wales.  
Formal guidance should make the role clearer and defence work easier to perform - 
vague or contradictory obligations are counter-productive in this sense.  Practitioners 
must balance a variety of duties, like spinning plates: attending to all and dropping 
none.  Conflict points present a direct challenge to this task and demand attention.  
Additionally, attempts at resolving ethical conflicts arguably represent a changing 
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attitude toward the core adversarial principles in England and Wales, and a "weakening 
of the professional autonomy of defence lawyers".
38
  It is now uncertain how far a 
defence lawyer can push the boundaries of rights such as the presumption of innocence 
and the right against self-incrimination to aid their client.This thesis will engage with 
the vital debate about the implications of conflict resolution for these rights. 
 
9. Methodology 
 
9.1 The Thesis Process 
 
The thesis process has been evolutionary, originally taking a cross-jurisdictional 
approach aimed at capturing a multi-traditional snapshot of the defence lawyer's role.  
The thesis was also intended to focus more on formal regulation and definition of the 
role.  However, as I undertook primarily preparatory research into the theoretical roots 
of adversarial and inquisitorial defence lawyers, my interest in and appreciation for the 
depth of the debate grew.  Gradually, focus shifted toward an exploration of theoretical 
conceptions of the role, inspiring the desire to identify a coherent set of traditional 
principles underpinning the criminal defence role.  My starting aim was to assess the 
role across two traditions and multiple jurisdictions using both black letter and 
empirical methodology.  It became clear this would be practically difficult.  I thus took 
the decision to concentrate on the adversarial tradition in one jurisdiction – England and 
Wales.  Despite the narrowed scope, I believe this thesis has benefited; the analysis is 
richer, the range of materials and issues examined broader, and the questions posed and 
raised more incisive.  Exciting as the original approach was, it was wise to choose 
pragmatism over idealism in researching one of the most fascinating figures in the 
criminal justice system. 
 
9.2 Overview of Methodology 
 
In approaching the task of characterising the role of the criminal defence lawyer in an 
adversarial system, I aimed to acquire as full a picture as possible.  I wished to go 
beyond a mere recital of rules of conduct and statutes.  In formulating the methodology 
for this research project, I paid attention to the advice of other academics on the pitfalls 
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of legal scholarship.  Terence Daintith criticised legal education for creating mechanical 
scholars, unable to look beyond legislation and case law: 
 
"Students are able to refer to whole catalogues of new legislation . . . [but] are 
incapable of reflecting on their activities at a theoretical, comparative and 
historical level."
39
  
 
This observation is particularly relevant to this thesis, given its extensive theoretical and 
historical basis, and its original focus.  I did not want to become 'trapped' within the law 
in studying the criminal defence lawyer.  For example, a positivist approach works on 
the premise that "law is autonomous, that there are discernible boundaries between law 
and morality, law and politics, and law and other disciplines" and that "law is a self-
referential system that is capable of producing 'right' answers."
40
  A positivist approach 
would provide only a partial insight into the role and might "fail . . . to capture the 
pragmatic, the instrumental, the institutional, and the bureaucratic elements that shape 
the law in action."
41
  The latter phrase summarises the focus of the empirical study, 
which was designed to capture the defence lawyer 'in action'. 
 
One could describe this thesis as a form of ‘gap study’.  Roger Brownsword asserted 
that “gap studies focus on the ways in which the law-in-action deviates from the law-in-
the-books (that is, from the image of law that is projected by the law-in-the-books)."
42
  
Gap studies can expose "that the de jure position is one thing, the de facto practice 
sometimes quite another story",
43
 and appropriately, Brownsword described how "the 
major contributions made by gap studies have been to highlight the gap in relation to . . 
. the practice of officials, regulators, and the like (where one might expect there to be a 
culture of compliance)."
44
  This thesis aims to explore whether 'gaps' exist between 
different conceptions of the defence lawyer's role; the role in theory, the role in formal 
regulation and the role in practice.   
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The methodology used to achieve this drew on social science research, as described by 
Nigel Gilbert: 
 
"There are three ingredients in social research: the construction of theory, the 
collection of data and, no less important, the design of methods for gathering 
data."
45
 
 
Similarly, I constructed a theoretical framework and collected data about formal and 
practical conceptions in order to assess whether any gaps exist.  The third 'ingredient' 
was pervasive, guiding the entire research process.  However, my approach was more 
ad hoc than it was designed.   
 
It is perhaps worth quoting Brownsword again, who in some ways describes the process 
in this thesis:   
 
"Legal researchers rarely start with a sharply specified research question; they do 
not have some hypothesis to be tested; they do not have a clearly articulated 
methodology; and they do not have a clear sense of where their inquiry might 
lead. Much of the time they are reacting to a rapidly changing legal landscape 
and trying to say something helpful or interesting about what is going on; but 
they will often be able to put their research into some recognisable mould only 
when they have pretty much completed their inquiry.
46
 
 
The research process comprised three, broad methodological approaches:  Doctrinal, 
socio-legal and empirical.  Doctrinal, or 'black-letter', scholarship primarily involves the 
"exposition and analysis of legislation and case-law, the integration of statutory 
provisions and judicial pronouncements into a coherent and workable body of 
doctrine."
47
  Its focus is on the strict letter of the law and the extraction of principles 
from it.  As Brownsword explained: 
 
"So-called ‘black-letter’ lawyers stick pretty close to the primary source 
materials, to the Constitution (where legal systems have one), to legislation 
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(statutes, statutory instruments, and so on) and to the leading case decisions (the 
precedents)."
48
  
 
Doctrinal analysis was mostly limited to Chapter 3 – the examination of formal 
conceptions of the role.  Socio-legal research is "guided by a multi-disciplinary 
perspective"
49
 and as such "may be more complex than traditional legal analyses".
50
  
Other disciplines include sociology, economics, political science, psychology, history, 
anthropology and others.  In 1983, Harris noted that a burgeoning socio-legal 
community had been using "sociological methods of research . . . to study the legal 
profession"
51
 as well as "the provision of legal services",
52
 and claimed that "[t]here is 
still considerable scope for empirical, sociological studies of the legal profession".
53
  
This thesis reflects that tradition; much of the research conducted in the following 
chapters involves historical and moral perspectives on the role of the criminal defence 
lawyer.  Importantly, Brownsword underlined that socio-legal studies "advocat[e] . . . 
empirical engagement with legal practice".
54
  This thesis involved an empirical study of 
practical conceptions of the role, utilizing a method known as the ‘vignette technique’, 
which will be fully discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48
 Ibid., 4. 
49
 Selznick, P. (2003) Law in Context Revisited - 30 Journal of Law and Society 2, 179. 
50
 Ibid. 
51
 Harris D. (1983) The Development of Socio-Legal Studies in the United Kingdom – 3 Legal Stud., 320. 
52
 Ibid., 321. 
53
 Ibid. 
54
 Brownsword R. (2006) An Introduction to Legal Research –
http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/groups/corporatesite/@msh_grants/documents/web_document/wtx03
0897.pdf: Last accessed 16/08/2010, 19. 
 27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 - Theoretical Conceptions of the Role of the Criminal 
Defence Lawyer:  The ‘Zealous Advocate’ Model 
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1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will propose that one can identify a single, coherent theoretical conception 
of the criminal defence role in an adversarial system, embodied in a framework of 
traditional duties that the ‘classical’ criminal defence lawyer should uphold.  Titled the 
‘zealous advocate’ model, it is based on ethics and obligations discussed in a wide range 
of academic literature from adversarial jurisdictions (primarily the USA and UK).  The 
‘zealous advocate’ model has been built around the "standard conception"55 of the 
defence lawyer's role, a theoretical construct emphasising the importance of loyal and 
non-judgmental defence of a client, otherwise known as "neutral partisanship".
56
  The 
‘standard conception’ forms the core of the ‘zealous advocate’ model.  The term 
‘zealous advocate’ derives from the body of doctrine urging defence lawyers to 
vigorously and single-mindedly pursue client interests, as espoused by Lord Brougham 
(see below at section 2).  This aspect of the theoretical role is central.  However, the 
‘standard conception’ is in some respects a narrow interpretation of the traditional role 
ascribed to defence lawyers, only describing more widely recognised aspects of criminal 
defence theory.  This chapter argues that other elements demand to be included in any 
theoretical conception of the defence lawyer’s role.  Furthermore, no attempt has been 
made to construct a single, coherent model describing the traditional criminal defence 
role.  Thus far, the ‘standard conception’ and other disparate theoretical ideas have 
simply constituted "fragmentary conceptions of the lawyer's role vying inconclusively 
for dominance".
57
  The ‘zealous advocate’ model aims to draw together all theoretical 
conceptions of the defence lawyer’s role, describing a robust set of traditional 
principles.  The model thus aims to expand upon the foundation of the ‘standard 
conception’.  Whilst accepting that academic discussion and normative frameworks are 
always subject to debate, this chapter intends to challenge the notion that theory is 
inconclusive. 
 
It seems imperative to define certain terms and expressions that will be used throughout 
this thesis.  ‘Criminal defence lawyers’ are any qualified professionals engaged to 
advise or represent clients suspected of or charged with criminal offences.  The terms 
‘criminal justice’ and ‘criminal justice process’ include all situations where a criminal 
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defence lawyer might be required to provide representation and advice to a client, for 
example a police station or trial.  The ‘adversarial' legal tradition is an ‘ideal’ 
conception.  Classical adversarial systems, best exemplified by England and Wales and 
the USA, are based on the concept of a contest between "two equal parties, seeking to 
resolve a dispute".
58
  Each side presents a partisan account of the events in open court 
after which a tribunal of fact will decide which version they believe to be the truth.  This 
contest is ‘refereed’ by a neutral and passive judge, whose role is to ensure that the rules 
of the contest are respected.  The rationale behind this system is that through "free and 
open competition of the facts"
59
 the jury can reach the right decision.  The adversarial 
culture assumes that "real equality of parties and the dialectical process of persuasion"
60
 
regulated by objective enforcement of the rules, will lead to ‘the truth’. 
 
2. The Historical Foundations of Theoretical Conceptions 
 
The ‘zealous advocate’ model is derived from the modern (20th and 21st Century) and 
historical commentary and opinion of academics, philosophers and legal practitioners.  
It is important to consider the historical literature, statute and cases which first 
established the principles that are today regarded as vital to the effectiveness of criminal 
defence, and which started a lengthy and spirited debate about legal ethics.  The concept 
of the criminal defence lawyer was a necessary development in the adversarial culture 
of two opposing parties and the English legal system represents the oldest, archetypal 
model.  Involvement of defence counsel is a relatively recent feature of adversarial 
justice; as Langbein states, "the lawyer-conducted criminal trial appeared late in English 
legal history, and quite rapidly".
61
  Throughout most of the 17
th
 Century, representation 
by "defence counsel was still forbidden . . . [and] . . . prosecution counsel was virtually 
never employed".
62
  Yet, some of the founding duties of defence lawyers were openly 
discussed.  In 1648, Law Commissioner Whitelock stated that the duties of an advocate 
". . . consist in three things; secrecy, diligence and fidelity."
63
  He elaborated, describing 
‘secrecy’ as a duty to act as someone to whom a client could "lay open his evidences, 
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and the naked truth of his case",
64
 ‘diligence’ as the requirement to give "a constant and 
careful attendance and endeavour in his clients’ causes"65 and ‘fidelity’ as a duty to act 
as someone "the client trusts with his livelihood".
66
  This early, definitive statement laid 
the foundations for emerging theoretical conceptions of the role of defence counsel.  By 
the late 17
th
 Century, a series of treason trials saw innocent defendants convicted due to 
judicial impartiality and perjury, leading to the conclusion that the accused should have 
"partisan helpers".
67
  The resultant Treason Trials Act 1696 allowed the accused, under 
s.1, "to make his full Defense, by Counsel learned in the law", but in treason trials only.  
This symbolised a significant rejection of the rationale that defence counsel "would 
interfere with the court’s ability to have the accused serve as an informational 
resource"
68
 and leant weight to the importance of the duties identified by Commissioner 
Whitelock. 
 
By the 1730s, defence lawyers were allowed in common felony trials, a policy designed 
to "correct the imbalance that had opened between the unaided accused and a criminal 
prosecution that increasingly reflected the hand of lawyers and quasi-professional thief-
takers".
69
  The approach of defence lawyers became aggressively partisan and "[this] 
growing intensity of counsel’s activity bespoke a changed ethos of defensive 
representation".
70
  This also saw the emergence of conflict between the duty of fidelity 
to the client and "[the] view of advocacy in which fidelity to the truth should have 
placed bounds upon counsel’s service to the client."71  The rise of the partisan defender 
was exemplified by William Garrow, described as "one of the finest criminal lawyers of 
the day."
72
  Garrow spent 10 years at the Old Bailey in the 1780s establishing a 
notorious reputation, "especially as a defense counsel."
73
   
 
Garrow was "the archetype of the contentious advocate, zealous on his client's behalf 
and merciless to his opponents",
74
 adopting an approach to criminal defence which 
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"helped to establish a new tone, a new intention, in the defense of prisoners in the 
criminal courts in this period."
75
  Garrow would defend a prisoner "with impressive zeal 
and vigor"
76
 and rarely hesitated in using "brutal and nasty tactics to advance a client's 
cause."
77
  On occasion, Garrow did recognise that he owed duties not only to the client 
but to the court, accepting in one case that "he had acted ‘with improper zeal on the part 
of my client’ but he had intended no disrespect to the ‘great and brave and venerable 
and learned judges of the law of England’".78  Garrow’s legacy was his single-minded 
and unyielding defence of those accused of criminal offences, which represented "the 
clearest demonstration that adversarial attitudes and methods had come to dominate the 
courtroom."
79
   
 
The now renowned words of Henry Lord Brougham are widely regarded as the "classic 
articulation"
80
 of defence advocacy, and permeate all modern descriptions of the role of 
the traditional criminal defence lawyer: 
 
"[An] advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the 
world, and that person is his client.  To save that client by all means and 
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to 
himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard 
the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others.  
Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless 
of the consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his country 
in confusion."
81
 
 
Brougham was charged with the defence of Queen Caroline, the estranged wife of 
George IV.  On ascending to the throne in 1820, the King sought to have Caroline 
stripped of her title by introducing the Bill of Pains and Penalties in the House of 
Lords; the ensuing debate in the House is popularly referred to as 'the Trial of Queen 
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Caroline'.
82
  Brougham, acting as the Queen's counsel, conducted her defence against 
accusations of adultery.  The above statement "has stood as the ideal of zealous 
representation for English and American lawyers for almost two centuries since then",
83
 
and has undoubtedly coloured academic commentary, case law and legislation relating 
to criminal defence.  For example, in Queen v. O’Connell84, defence counsel were 
required to exercise zeal as "warm as [their] heart’s blood"85, whilst in Kennedy v. 
Broun
86
, they were described as being bound to "exert every faculty and privilege and 
power in order that [they] may maintain [their] client’s right".87 
 
The philosophy has attracted criticism as well as praise.  Ray Patterson described it as 
having done "more to corrupt the concept of the lawyer’s duty to the client than any 
other single comment"
88
 while Dos Passos believed that "the great name of Lord 
Brougham is still used . . . to sustain many ridiculous and false positions of 
advocates."
89
  David Field described it as "unsound in theory and pernicious in practice" 
and concluded that "a more revolting doctrine scarcely ever fell from any man's lips".
90
  
Claude Savage questioned the single-minded nature of Brougham’s philosophy in less 
dramatic fashion, claiming that "[the] viewpoint, with the greatest respect, cannot be 
accepted in its entirety without any reservation or delimitation."
91
  Gerald Gold 
concluded that Brougham’s philosophy was "not in the mainstream of English thinking 
even in 1846".
92
  In 1859, Brougham himself described his famous speech as "anything 
rather than a deliberate and well-considered opinion.  It was a menace, and addressed 
chiefly to George IV".
93
  Some theorists
94
 have interpreted this as a retraction of the 
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ethic of partisanship, arguing that, "[it] surely sounds like a repudiation, not an 
endorsement".
95
  In contrast, Freedman argued that "the fact that the statement had been 
delivered as a ‘political menace’ was precisely what made it so powerful and, at the 
same time, demonstrated just how far a lawyer should be prepared to go on behalf of the 
client."
96
  However, Brougham later restated his philosophy in his autobiography with 
slightly different, but significant, wording.  He seemingly retracted the claim that 
protection of the client was "his first and only duty", replacing it with the phrase, "the 
highest and most unquestioned of his duties".
97
  This telling departure seemed to be a 
fairly unambiguous signal that Brougham regarded the traditional role of the criminal 
defence lawyer as comprising several duties – not, as has been suggested many times, 
singular fealty to the client. 
 
By the early 19
th
 Century, theoretical conceptions of the role of the criminal defence 
lawyer as a ‘zealous advocate’ were well developed.  The criminal trial had become 
much more than "an opportunity for defense counsel to test the prosecution case";
98
 it 
was an arena for vigorous and steadfast defence advocacy on behalf of the accused.  
However, it is arguable that the concept of the ‘zealous advocate’ had only partly 
evolved.  As the criticisms of Brougham's philosophy indicate, theoretical obligations to 
justice and morality were emerging alongside those owed to the client.  The American 
case of Rush v. Cavanaugh
99
 "helps explain early developments in professional 
responsibility."
100
  The attorney, Rush, prosecuted a third party for forgery on behalf of 
Cavanaugh.  However, at an early point, Rush concluded that Cavanaugh's accusations 
were false and consequently withdrew the forgery charge.  Cavanaugh branded his 
lawyer a "cheat"
101
 and Rush commenced slander proceedings against his former client.  
At the crux of Rush v. Cavanaugh was the issue of whether the latter was justified in 
calling the former a ‘cheat’, a matter which hinged upon how well Rush had fulfilled his 
role as a prosecutor.  Although the case applies most directly to prosecutors, 
Pennsylvanian Chief Justice John Gibson's words have application to the legal 
profession generally.  He suggested that "[i]t is a popular, but gross mistake, to suppose 
that a lawyer owes no fidelity to any one except his client; and that the latter is the 
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keeper of his professional conscience."
102
  Gibson described the lawyer as being 
"expressly bound by his official oath to behave himself in his office of attorney with all 
due fidelity to the court as well as the client",
103
 suggesting an equal, if not paramount, 
duty.  He went further, implying that lawyers must discharge their duties in accordance 
with acceptable standards of morality and empathy, explaining that "[t]he high and 
honourable office of a counsel would be degraded to that of a mercenary, were he 
compelled to do the biddings of his client against the dictates of his conscience."
104
  The 
introduction of such language into descriptions of the lawyer's role was influential, 
particularly in application to criminal defence lawyers. 
 
George Sharswood borrowed the above quotations from Rush v. Cavanaugh in 
discussing the importance of morality in the advocate's role.  In his 1860 work, "An 
Essay on Professional Ethics",
105
 Sharswood suggested that it was "an immoral act to 
afford . . . assistance, when [the lawyer's] conscience told him that the client was aiming 
to perpetrate a wrong through the means of some advantage the law may have afforded 
him",
106
 and that instead a lawyer should "throw up the cause, and retire from all 
connection with it, rather than thus be a participator in other men's sins."
107
  In referring 
specifically to "the mode of conducting defence",
108
 he stated: 
 
"Counsel . . . may and even ought to refuse to act under instructions from a 
client to defeat what he believes to be an honest and just claim, by insisting upon 
the slips of the opposite party, by sharp practice, or special pleading – in short, 
by any other means than a fair trial on the merits in open court."
109
 
 
Although respectful of Brougham's defence of Queen Caroline, Sharswood believed that 
he was "led by the excitement of so great an occasion to say what cool reflection and 
sober reason certainly never can approve."
110
  That being said, Sharswood recognised 
the importance of the defence lawyer's role as a partisan for the defendant.  He stated 
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that "the great duty which the counsel owes to his client, is an immovable fidelity",
111
 
and criticised the suggestion that vigorously defending the guilty was immoral: 
 
"It is not to be termed screening the guilty from punishment, for the advocate to 
exert all his ability, learning, and ingenuity, in such a defence, even if he should 
be perfectly assured in his own mind of the actual guilt of the prisoner."
112
 
 
The publication of David Hoffman's ‘Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional 
Deportment’113 represented a landmark in the development of legal ethics generally.  It 
described a collection of ideal principles that should guide the conduct of practitioners, 
several having particular relevance to criminal defence.  Resolution I supported 
criticism of Brougham's philosophy, stating, "I will never permit zeal to carry me 
beyond the limits of sobriety and decorum".
114
  From the outset, Hoffman suggested that 
limits should apply to partisanship.  Resolution II indicated that a lawyer should remain 
emotionally detached in conducting their work, saying, "I will espouse no man's cause 
out of envy, hatred or malice, towards his antagonist."
115
  Hoffman also asserted that a 
defence lawyer should refrain from exploiting the mistakes of opponents, stating, "[n]o 
man's ignorance or folly shall induce me to take any advantage of him".
116
   
 
Other rules introduced duties of honesty, truthfulness and justice which seemingly 
outrank the obligation to defend a client 'at all hazards and costs': 
 
"Should my client be disposed to insist on captious requisitions, or frivolous and 
vexatious defences, they shall be neither enforced nor countenanced by me." - 
Resolution X
117
 
 
"If, after duly examining a case, I am persuaded that my client's claim or defence 
. . . cannot, or rather ought not, to be sustained, I will promptly advise him to 
abandon it.  To press it further in such a case . . . would be lending myself to a 
dishonourable use of legal means" - Resolution XI
118
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More compelling still was Resolution XV, addressing the morality of defending 
"[p]ersons of atrocious character, who have violated the laws of God and man":
119
 
 
"When employed to defend those charged with crimes of the deepest dye, and 
the evidence against them, whether legal or moral, be such as to leave no just 
doubt of their guilt, I shall not hold myself privileged, much less obliged, to use 
my endeavours to arrest or to impede the course of justice, by special resorts to 
ingenuity- the artifices of eloquence- to appeals to the morbid and fleeting 
sympathies of weak juries".
120
 
 
This doctrine stands in contrast to that of single-minded partisanship, even suggesting 
that testing a prosecution is unacceptable where the client is undeserving of "special 
exertions from any member of our pure and honourable profession".
121
  Indeed, 
Hoffman later contradicted the suggestion that lawyers should remain detached, 
claiming: 
 
"Counsel, in giving opinions, whether they perceive this weakness in their 
clients or not, should act as judges, responsible to God and to man, as also 
especially to their employers, to advise them soberly, discreetly, and honestly, to 
the best of their ability – though the certain consequence be the loss of large 
prospective gains." - Resolution XXXI
122
 
 
However, to some extent Hoffman reflects the ethic of Brougham, stating, "[t]o my 
clients I will be faithful; and in their causes, zealous and industrious."
123
  Although an 
important theoretical milestone, these resolutions were not "didactic rules"
124
 binding 
practitioners, thus distinguishing them from modern professional regulation. 
 
Hoffman and Sharswood started a debate that continues to divide academic opinion 
today:  "[The] question as to the duties of an advocate in foro conscientiae – his ethical 
as distinguished from his forensic duty, and whether the two are reconcilable or 
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mutually exclusive."
125
  The criminal defender's duties in foro conscientiae ('before the 
tribunal of conscience') potentially conflict with his or her obligations not only to 
zealously defend a client but to even represent them; which of these obligations prevails 
was subject to vociferous academic argument in the 19
th
 Century.  Both sides of the 
conflict were well-documented in Showell Rogers' 1899 work, ‘The Ethics of 
Advocacy’.126  Several commentators quoted in the article argued that it was not the 
place of the defence lawyer to engage in moral judgment of a client or cause.  For 
example, Sir Harry Poland QC stated that a defence lawyer should endeavour "to get an 
acquittal if he can, whatever the merits of the case may be",
127
 while Sydney Smith 
claimed: 
 
"The decided duty of an advocate [is] to use all the arguments in his power to 
defend the cause he has adopted, and to leave the effects of those arguments to 
the judgment of others."
128
 
 
When asked whether one should defend a bad cause, Samuel Johnson famously argued 
that "you do not know it to be bad or good until the judge determines it".
129
  These 
arguments suggest that a defence lawyer should refrain from prejudging a cause or 
client and simply perform the task of defending.   
 
However, it was also contended that detachment and partisanship could not be allowed 
to rule defence advocacy unchallenged by moral standards of righteousness, fairness, 
truth and justice.  Sir Alexander Cockburn, the Lord Chief Justice in 1864, described the 
role of the advocate in a direct response to a speech by Brougham at a banquet for the 
English Bar: 
 
"It is his duty . . . to seek to reconcile the interests he is bound to maintain . . . 
with the eternal and immutable interests of truth and justice."
130
 
 
Rogers himself also identified moral limitations on defence advocacy.  He claimed that 
"[e]very advocate is bound by an unwritten but stringent bond of ethical obligation to 
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take no undue advantage of his tribunal"
131
 and that "[c]ourts . . . are not to be misled 
nor inveigled into wrong judgments by the misplaced ingenuity of advocates in order to 
gain victories for their clients in particular cases."
132
  Rogers believed that were such 
advocacy to prevail, then "truth would be dishonoured and justice dethroned".
133
  He 
urged defenders to remember that "the stream of his forensic eloquence should flow 
from him as through a purifying filter; and it behoves him to guard against opening the 
sluices of words regardless of evil consequences to others than his client".
134
  However, 
Rogers also accepted that sometimes "the suppressio veri (concealment of the truth) 
may not only be well within the legal and moral rights of an advocate, it may even 
constitute his actual duty"
135
 and that a defence lawyer "has no monopoly in truth-
seeking and no certainty that he will arrive unaided at a just conclusion as to the law".
136
  
This sort of academic discourse suggests that theoretical conceptions of the criminal 
defence lawyer's role required a balance between the competing obligations to client, 
court and the public; this balance is an integral part of the ‘zealous advocate’ model.   
 
By the beginning of the 20
th
 Century, a variety of theoretical conceptions of the role had 
been debated and developed.  As the different views expressed above show, there was a 
significant degree of dispute about the ideal, traditional role of the criminal defence 
lawyer.  It was not until 1908 that a comprehensive and consolidated set of ideals was 
issued in the form of the ‘American Bar Association (ABA) Canons of Professional 
Ethics’.  The canons can be distinguished from modern professional regulations such as 
the Solicitors' Code of Conduct, which have formal enforcement mechanisms
137
 and are 
regarded as definitive, explanatory descriptions of the role of lawyers.  The canons were 
described as "a general guide",
138 
"fraternal admonitions"
139
 and "authoritative 
norms",
140
 which explain "what lawyer conduct should be".
141
  They summarise the 
development of the defence role and are "a crucial component in the legal profession’s 
self-conception around the turn of the twentieth century."
142
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Some canons leant support to Brougham's partisan philosophy; Canon 15 stated: 
 
"The lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the 
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and 
ability, to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the 
rules of law, legally applied."  
 
Lawyers were encouraged to take up a client's cause, regardless of its merits: 
 
"No fear of judicial disfavor or public unpopularity should restrain him from the 
full discharge of his duty."  - Canon 15 
 
Canon 5 stated that "the lawyer is bound by all fair and honorable means to present 
every defense that the law of the land permits, to the end that no person may be 
deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law."  However, the phrase 'all fair and 
honourable means' represented an important limitation on over-zealous partisanship, and 
continues to do so today.  Canon 15 further undermined Brougham's philosophy, stating: 
 
"Nothing operates more certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice against 
lawyers . . . than does the false claim . . . that it is the duty of the lawyer to do 
whatever may enable him to succeed in winning his client’s cause." 
 
The canons placed considerable emphasis on theoretical duties to justice and morality.  
The final line of Canon 15 stated that a lawyer "must obey his own conscience and not 
that of his client", suggesting the role involves pursuing the most ethical course of 
action, even if it contradicts the client's instructions.   
 40 
Canon 18 required fair and ethical conduct in cross-examining witnesses: 
 
"A lawyer should always treat adverse witnesses and suitors with fairness and 
due consideration, and he should never minister to the malevolence or prejudices 
of a client in the trial or conduct of a cause. The client cannot be made the 
keeper of the lawyer’s conscience in professional matters. He has no right to 
demand that his counsel shall abuse the opposite party or indulge in offensive 
personalities." 
 
Canon 22 underlined the importance of an honest approach to dealings with the court 
and the opposition: 
 
"It is not candid or fair for the lawyer knowingly to . . . mislead his opponent by 
concealing or withholding positions in his opening argument upon which his 
side then intends to rely . . . These and all kindred practices are unprofessional 
and unworthy of an officer of the law charged, as is the lawyer, with the duty of 
aiding in the administration of justice." 
 
This implied that the traditional role of the lawyer required openness and cooperation in 
progressing justice; for the defence lawyer, putting client interests ahead of this would 
be 'unprofessional and unworthy'.  Canon 32 urged lawyers to "impress upon the client . 
. . exact compliance with the strictest principles of moral law", suggesting that lawyers 
should persuade clients to uphold broadly ethical standards in fighting their cause.  In 
summary, recurring themes can be identified throughout the historical development of 
the defence role and this has continued into modern academic discourse.  The work of 
20
th
 and 21
st
 century academics, influenced by these historic conceptions, can be 
integrated into a coherent framework of principles.  Like the historic debate, the concept 
of 'neutral partisanship' is at the centre of the ‘zealous advocate’ model, but a 
comprehensive theoretical model comprises more than this 'standard conception'. 
 
 41 
3. A Coherent Theoretical Conception:  The ‘Zealous Advocate’ Model 
 
The Duty to the Client 
 
The Principle of Partisanship 
The Principle of Detachment 
The Principle of Confidentiality 
 
The Duty to the Court 
 
The Principle of Procedural Justice 
The Principle of Truth-Seeking 
 
The Duty to the Public 
 
The Principle of Morality 
 
The ‘zealous advocate’ model comprises three 'umbrella' duties:  the duty to the client, 
the duty to the court and the duty to the public.  The umbrella duties summarise the 
general orientation of the underlying principles, which specifically outline the 
theoretical obligations of the criminal defence lawyer.  The derivations of these will be 
explored in full, alongside justifications for their existence.  Rooted in the historical 
foundations outlined above, 20
th
 and 21
st
 Century academics, practitioners and 
commentators have focused and clarified the adversarial criminal defence lawyer's role.  
Based on this extensive, normative discourse, this thesis proposes that a coherent, 
theoretical conception can be identified.  It is important to note that the ‘zealous 
advocate’ model is my interpretation.  It is based on over two centuries of theoretical 
development and debate in written discourse about both criminal defence lawyers and 
lawyers in general. Although the majority of literature and commentaries appear to 
identify with these core duties and principles, they are by no means universally agreed 
upon within the legal and academic community.  As noted earlier,
143
 the model is 
normative and serves as a crucial starting point for exploring the role of the criminal 
defence lawyer as conceived in theory, formal regulation and practice. 
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3.1 The Duty to the Client 
 
The criminal defence lawyer is primarily employed to aid a citizen faced with the most 
punitive branch of the law.  The duty to his or her client is direct and the relationship 
unique.  It is therefore important to define what obligations bind defence lawyers when 
acting for the accused.  The duty to the client consists of three principles – partisanship, 
detachment and confidentiality.  It should be reiterated that these principles are my 
interpretation. 
 
3.1.1 The Principle of Partisanship 
 
"We have one focus, one responsibility, and one loyalty:  it is to our client 
without regard to any other fallout from the result of our case or our actions."
144
 
 
The principle of partisanship is the cornerstone of adversarial justice, exemplifying the 
combative philosophy that underscores accusatorial systems.  It is also at the heart of 
the ‘zealous advocate’ model.  The terms zealous advocacy and partisanship are very 
closely related, and zealous advocacy has strong connotations of vigorous, partisan 
defence for a client.  As such, one might describe partisanship as the primary obligation 
with this model.  However, despite the fact that the ‘zealous advocate’ is led by the 
principle of partisanship, the model recognises that he or she has other duties too.  The 
principle of partisanship asserts that the lawyer’s "raison d’être is to serve client 
interests".
145
  In the case of criminal defence lawyers, this is to act as a devoted partisan 
for the accused.  A plethora of symbolic images have been used to illustrate the role of 
the defence advocate – "fearless knights in shining armour",146 "the gladiator of the 
accused",
147
 "champion in a hostile world",
148
 "a tool",
149
 "hired guns",
150
 and so on.  A 
common thread running through all of these metaphors is the obligation to be loyal to 
the defendant.  At a basic level, this loyalty requires that the advocate present "as 
persuasively as he can, the facts and the law of the case as seen from the standpoint of 
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his client’s interest"151 and "say all that the client would say for himself (were he able to 
do so)."
152
  These obligations are founded on the legal principle, qui facit per alium facit 
per se – 'he who acts through another, acts for himself'.  This summarises the nature of 
the 'advocate'; an agent who presents a defence for the client, where the client is unable 
to do so effectively.  In this sense, the defence lawyer essentially becomes "an extension 
of the client’s will".153  However, the principle of partisanship suggests that fidelity goes 
beyond merely presenting favourable evidence and law.  The duty to the client is a 
"singular devotion"
154
 requiring "wholehearted and unending"
155
 effort for the 
defendant.  Such passionate faithfulness to the client's cause is "not the exception, but 
the rule",
156
 and must be defined by the defence advocate's "surrender [of] his whole 
mental, intellectual, and physical power to his client's cause".
157
 
 
Partisanship is commonly associated with a fearless approach to the defence of the 
accused in hostile circumstances.  Where police officers attempt to extract information 
from a suspect or a prosecutor grills a defendant in the hope of gaining an advantage, 
the defence lawyer is required to act as "both an advisor and an advocate with courage 
and devotion."
158
  In addition to protecting the client from the aggression of the 
opposition, defence lawyers must also advance the defendant's case; this too requires 
fearlessness.  For example, the duty to "defend [a] client vigorously, aggressively and 
completely"
159
 may take time; it may be that "[t]he slow process of a rigorous defense 
may anger the judge by delaying the court's schedule".
160
  A less courageous advocate 
might be deterred from partisan defence, lest his or her reputation with the court be 
damaged.  Thus, the partisan defence advocate finds that "[t]here are many times, 
particularly during a trial, when [they] must be brave, strong and unflinchingly 
confrontational."
161
  Further, partisanship on behalf of the defendant may be regarded as 
distasteful or offensive to a complainant or complainant's relatives.However, this is not 
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the defence lawyer’s concern: 
 
"The role we assign defense counsel is empathy with the client, not the victim, 
and experience has tested the wisdom of our choice."
162
 
 
Partisanship means that a lawyer "must be prepared to do whatever it takes to improve 
the client’s position . . . [t]hat means they may have to offend . . . [t]hey have to do the 
uncomfortable thing."
163
  A partisan defence lawyer "must say the best, and only the 
best, of his own case",
164
 even if this omits salient details that might allow a jury to 
come to a more accurate or just verdict.  Theoretical literature makes it clear that "[i]t is 
not the obligation of defense counsel to seek the truth".
165
  The theoretical role of the 
defence lawyer requires that "[h]e fixes on the conclusion which will best serve his 
client's interests, and then he sets out to persuade others to agree."
166
  Instead of 
working towards the truth, the partisan defender should work towards victory.  The 
principle of partisanship is regularly described as the overriding duty owed by a defence 
lawyer.Loyalty to the defendant has been described as "the virtue that trumps all other 
values and virtues",
167
 thus taking precedence over obligations to the court and the 
public.  The primacy of the client over the court is confirmed by the words of Charles 
Curtis: 
 
"Is not the lawyer an officer of the court?  Why doesn't the court have first claim 
on his loyalty?  No, in a paradoxical way.  The lawyer's official duty, required of 
him indeed by the court, is to devote himself to the client.  The court comes 
second by the court's, that is the law's, own command."
168
 
 
The primacy of the client over the public was hotly debated in the wake of the OJ 
Simpson trial.
169
 Echoing the sentiments of Brougham,
170
 Gerald Uelman concluded 
that "[t]he suggestion that lawyers owe a higher duty to their country than to their client 
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is inconsistent with our adversary system".
171
 
 
Theoretical literature provides examples of tactical choices the defence lawyer could 
rightly make in order to aid their client: 
 
"The defense lawyer who is guided by fidelity will do all sorts of things to 
protect the client from harm, including employing various strategies to produce 
delay, manipulating jury selection to obtain the most favourable jury, using 
evidentiary rules to prevent the admission at trial of information damaging to the 
client, rigourously cross-examining a truthful or sympathetic witness, and 
attempting throughout a trial to move the jury and stir its passions on the client's 
behalf."
172
 
 
Advocacy involving prosecution witnesses is a particularly controversial area.  In cross-
examination, the principle of partisanship requires that a defence advocate "impeaches 
witnesses she believes are truthful and secures an acquittal for a client she believes is 
guilty, and perhaps brutal and dangerous as well."
173
  When faced with a choice between 
the client (whoever he or she may be) and a witness (however honest or vulnerable they 
may be) the defence lawyer's priorities are clear: 
 
"Sometimes it is necessary to ‘go after’ the victim aggressively – to destroy the 
victim's credibility or even reputation – when the alternative is that the client 
will be hurt."
174
 
 
The defence partisan should also be unafraid to 'ambush' the prosecution.  According to 
Greta Van Susteren, "[i]f there is a defect in the prosecution's presentation of evidence, 
you must jump on it and point it out to the jury . . . [t]o look the other way and not point 
it out to the jury is to violate your commitment as a lawyer".
175
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To correct an error that the prosecution has made is worse still: 
 
"It is always the duty of the prosecution, who have undertaken the burden of 
proof, to make out their case; and to suggest that it is the duty of a defending 
counsel to help them to do so in the interests of abstract justice, is not only 
wholly to misconceive the function of an advocate, but to advance a theory that 
is not likely to find support outside the jurisdiction of the courts of Utopia."
176
    
 
All of these tactics may incur the wrath of the court, the prosecutor, the government and 
the public.  Yet, this encapsulates the spirit of the partisan defender - there are "no 
sacrifices which he will not make, and no dangers that he will not incur, to advance the 
success of his employment."
177
 
 
There are some extreme interpretations of what partisanship means in theory, and debate 
about how far the criminal defence lawyer should go in fulfilling such obligations.  For 
some, the function of the defence lawyer is no more than to "translate [clients’] interests 
into legal language that will make sense and hopefully establish legitimacy for their 
claims"
178
 and to "shepherd the client through the courts."
179
  This limited theoretical 
conception of the defender's duty of loyalty is perhaps a minority opinion; it appears to 
be a more widely held belief that more is required of the defence lawyer.  Several 
theorists have argued that the advocate should do "anything arguably legal to advance 
the client’s ends"180 and that the client’s goals should be pursued "no matter how 
immoral or unjust they or the means necessary to achievement may be."
181
  This 
requires the defence counsel to devote "time, passion and resources in ways that are not 
always maximally conducive to the greatest good of the greatest number"
182
 and to 
"acquiesce in mendacity."
183
  Curtis even suggested that "one of the functions of a 
lawyer is to lie for his client . . . on rare occasions".
184
  The latter statement might be 
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regarded as a radical interpretation of the defence role, at the opposite end of the 
spectrum to 'translating' client interests.  This excessive form of defence advocacy could 
be described as "hyper-zeal", a concept explored by Tim Dare in his 2009 work, ‘The 
Counsel of Rogues:  A Defence of the Standard Conception of the Lawyer's Role’.185 
 
Dare describes two "more or less moderate understandings"
186
 of defence partisanship, 
called 'mere-zeal' and 'hyper-zeal'.  The former describes a more compromising 
obligation, expecting a defender to only pursue a client's "legal interests".
187
  This can 
be contrasted with the hyper-zealous advocate, who is "concerned not merely to secure 
their clients' legal rights, but instead to pursue any advantage obtainable for the clients 
through the law",
188
 and strive to obtain for the client, "all that the law can be made to 
give them".
189
  The latter interpretation might be regarded as excessive, in the same vein 
as Charles Curtis' 'lying' advocate mentioned above.  Dare argues that "Brougham's 
classic characterisation of the advocate  . . .  surely takes us beyond mere-zeal and into 
the realm of hyper-zeal".
190
  Dare argues that mere-zeal is a more appropriate and 
accurate summary of the lawyer's obligation of partisanship.  He claims that partisan 
defenders are "under no obligation to pursue interests that go beyond the law",
191
 and 
explains the mere-zealous defence lawyer’s role in the following terms: 
 
"It is often in our interest to have more than we are entitled to under law, and no 
doubt we are often interested in having more than our bare legal entitlement.  
But this is of no moment to the merely-zealous lawyer.  Their professional 
obligation is to pursue the client's legal rights zealously."
192
 
 
However, David Luban appears to disagree with this.  His interpretation of partisanship 
"calls upon lawyers to secure the goals of mere-zeal, the defence of the client's rights, 
by adopting the tactics of hyper-zeal".
193
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This conclusion is based on the following statement by Luban: 
 
"The no-holds-barred zealous advocate tries to get everything the law can give . . 
. and thereby does a better job of defending the client's legal rights than a less 
committed lawyer would do."
194
 
 
This is a compelling argument.  It suggests that offence is the best form of defence, and 
truly demonstrates loyalty to the client.  Further, Dare's argument suggests that the 'legal 
rights' of the client are known quantities - that they are pre-determined.  This approach 
assumes that the court, the jury, the prosecutor and the defendant already know what the 
correct legal conclusion is.  As a result, the criminal defence lawyer should work only to 
secure what he or she knows the defendant is entitled to.  This pre-judges the outcome 
of a criminal process; if the legal rights of a defendant were so obvious, there would be 
little point in having a trial at all.  Furthermore, the police and prosecution cannot 
necessarily be depended upon to only pursue people they know are legally guilty.  As 
such, it is arguably even more essential that defence lawyers overreach in protecting a 
defendant's interests. 
 
The theoretical obligation of partisanship can be justified in two ways.  First, it is 
considered crucial to an effective adversarial system, which is designed to pit two 
competing versions of the facts, presented by two opposing parties, against each other.  
Each party is assigned "the responsibility to present their own cases and challenge their 
opponents";
195
 this is done before a neutral tribunal of fact, with an impartial legal 
expert as arbiter.  In terms of the defence lawyer, this means that "[z]ealous adversary 
advocacy is justified by the fact that the other side is also furnished with a zealous 
advocate",
196
 and a balance is created.  Where the state exerts effort in prosecuting, the 
lawyer must defend with equal force.  This theoretical principle is therefore the linchpin 
of the adversarial system, necessary for it to effectively function.  The adversary system 
has endured for centuries, and the legal determination of guilt and innocence by this 
method is regarded as ethical and fair in itself.  
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 Monroe Freedman justified partisanship on such grounds: 
 
"[T]he adversary system is itself in the highest public interest, that it serves 
public policy in a unique and uniquely important way, and that it is, therefore, 
inconsistent with the public interest to direct lawyers to be less zealous in their 
roles as partisan advocates in an adversary system."
197
 
 
In a sense, one can summarise this justification as 'if the system is moral, the role is 
moral'.  As William Hodes explained, "one may act immorally and antisocially, but still 
ethically, in carrying out one's assigned role, so long as that role itself makes some 
positive contribution to society."
198
  For the criminal defence lawyer, part of that 
positive contribution is enabling the adversarial system to operate. 
 
David Luban labelled the second justification the "criminal defense paradigm".
199
 He 
described partisanship as a "prophylactic protection from the state",
200
 including the 
police, the prosecution and the government, whose overwhelming resources, and 
political and psychological advantages,
201
 create the potential for abuse of the justice 
system.  The 'criminal defense paradigm' has a direct and indirect benefit.  The direct 
benefit is the protection provided by partisanship during the criminal justice process 
itself (for example, in the police station or at trial), which improves the chances of 
innocent defendants being acquitted.  It could be argued that in the majority of cases, 
partisanship provides protection for those who are eventually convicted of an offence.  
However, a long-standing ethic of adversarial justice is that it is "[b]etter . . . that a 
hundred criminals go free than that one person be wrongly convicted."
202
  In addition, it 
has been suggested that partisanship on behalf of the guilty is justifiable on the basis 
that "the criminal justice system is less a device for discovering the truth than it is a 
series of  'screens' designed to make it exceedingly difficult for the innocent to be 
convicted."
203
  The better the 'screen', the higher the chance of the innocent being 
acquitted.  Further, since the principle imposes an obligation to present a strong, 
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partisan defence of the accused, this, in theory, "guarantees a thorough preparation of 
the case, not simply by the defence lawyers."
204
  A rigorous defence should make 
convictions more difficult to obtain and therefore should "force the state to investigate 
cases more thoroughly with a consequent uncovering of more exculpatory evidence and 
ambiguities in superficially strong cases."
205
  In short, the whole process is made more 
expansive and effective.  This not only protects the innocent, but means that convictions 
are based on legitimate, well-prepared and comprehensively tested evidence. 
 
Indirectly, partisanship acts as a form of deterrent.  Without the efforts of partisan 
defence lawyers in criminal cases, the agencies of the state have "far fewer incentives to 
investigate the facts thoroughly, to corroborate a victim's story, to ensure, in short, that 
they are not trying the wrong person",
206
 and would simply be "another thug interfering 
with a citizen’s freedom."207  Dedicated and vigorous defenders for the accused "ensure 
that the state will be loath to indict those whom it knows to be innocent."
208
  This 
rationale lies at the centre of the criminal justice system.  The fact that lawyers assert 
and protect the fundamental rights of clients, such as the right to a fair trial and the 
privilege against self-incrimination, represent "society’s respect for individual 
dignity".
209  
The difficulty in justifying this is that the resultant protection of the 
innocent citizen is a benefit that is "largely invisible."
210
  As Jethro Lieberman 
explained, "[w]e rarely see who is not indicted, we never see those whom a prosecutor, 
or even a governor or president might like to prosecute but cannot."
211
  This, of course, 
does not mean they do not exist, and so this justification should perhaps be underlined 
more than any other. 
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3.1.2 The Principle of Detachment 
 
"The criminal defense attorney in the courtroom with a 'conscience' or the 
criminal defense attorney who worries about reputation is not an advocate."
212
 
 
Together, partisanship and detachment make up the 'standard conception' or "official 
view"
213
 of the criminal defence lawyer's role.  Also known as 'neutrality', the principle 
of detachment "requires a lawyer to practice without regard to her personal views 
concerning either a client's character or the moral status of his objectives."
214
  
Combined, the principles of detachment and partisanship "mean that on the job the 
lawyer's moral universe may be - indeed, must be - defined solely by the law and by 
client interests."
215
  Doing so requires that the defence lawyer separate the professional 
and personal.  As a human being, the lawyer may consider a cause or client 
objectionable, but as a professional, he or she must "momentarily 'suspend' . . . personal 
morality and make a firm commitment to the system of justice."
216
  In short, the "the 
belief of the advocate is wholly irrelevant",
217
 because he or she is just that – an 
advocate.  Thus, defence lawyers cannot restrict themselves to the defence of 'good' 
people or 'worthy' causes based on their own moral compass or indeed that of the wider 
public.  Equally, defending a client who might be considered dangerous or perverted 
does not mean that the lawyer identifies with that client's character or approves of his or 
her actions.  In essence, the criminal defence lawyer is "ethically neutral."
218
  Adopting 
a neutral attitude towards representing questionable people or causes recognises that 
"moral responsibility for the consequences rests elsewhere";
219 
the primary duty of the 
defence lawyer is to serve the client, not to "guarantee that the guilty do not go free or 
that sufficient punishment is accorded the convicted."
220
  That is a concern for the court 
or, more broadly, the government.  The principle of detachment therefore creates a 
moral non-accountability which "insulates lawyers from considerations of morality, 
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justice or politics in relation to [client] ends or the best means to them."
221
   
 
The defence lawyer must 'detach' him or herself from any moral debate surrounding 
representation, and focus on providing an effective and fearless defence.  In contrast, if 
the criminal defence lawyer allowed personal ethics to influence his or her approach to a 
case, "the zealousness of that representation [might] be tempered by the lawyer’s moral 
judgments of the client or of the client’s cause."222  Of course, this would breach the 
duty of loyalty which a defence lawyer owes to the defendant.  The point at which the 
defence lawyer's personal feelings intrude into the lawyer-client relationship is the point 
at which "[t]he advocate has ceased to advocate and has now become the moral as well 
as legal judge of his client."
223
  George Sharswood memorably said: 
 
"The lawyer, who refuses his professional assistance because in his judgment the 
case is unjust and indefensible, usurps the functions of both judge and jury." 
224
  
 
The principle of detachment ensures that a criminal defence lawyer remains an 
‘advocate’ in the literal sense of the word, and enables him or her to remain loyal even 
to "over-privileged or positively distasteful clients."
225
   
 
The principle of detachment affects two stages of the lawyer-client relationship - the 
acceptance stage and the defence stage.  The acceptance stage is self-explanatory.  The 
defence lawyer, in responding to requests for representation from those suspected or 
accused of crime, must remain detached from any personal feelings about the person or 
the charges levied against them.  Acceptance of a request to represent a client should be 
based on issues such as availability, competence and conflicts of interest (for example, 
if the lawyer is representing a client with competing objectives).
226
  Detachment at the 
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defence stage refers to the active pursuit of an accepted client's interests, for example in 
the police station or at trial. This requires an ongoing commitment by the defence 
lawyer to dismiss misgivings about the credibility of a defendant's evidence, the 
righteousness of his or her objectives throughout the process and any potential harm that 
a vigorous defence might inflict upon others.  A prime example of the latter is the 
treatment of prosecution witnesses.  Defence of a client may be contingent upon an 
aggressive cross-examination of an innocent party.  However, concerns about upsetting 
or distressing a witness should not become an obstacle to the defence lawyer performing 
his or her role.  As Smith and Montross summarised: 
 
"If personal feelings of sympathy for the victim influence the attorney's 
representation of the client, the attorney is not acting with fidelity."
227
 
 
The same principle applies to external opinions.  The defence lawyer may fear that he or 
she will be judged negatively by the court, colleagues or the public.  However, Cristina 
Arguedas explained: 
 
"[I]t is not our responsibility to concern ourselves with what society, our friends, 
or our neighbours think or do when we defend our clients."
228
 
 
The reasoning behind such a well-established principle derives from the moral and 
practical imperative of effective resolution of legal issues.  In any society, there will be 
people considered to be outcasts or undesirables, those who do not conform to the 
political, religious or moral expectations of their communities.  However, in a pluralist 
society, deviation from the norm is tolerated.  Where this deviation strays beyond 
reasonable boundaries, for example when a law is broken, it is regulated via the 
mechanism of the legal system.  Adversarial culture recognises that "we do not order 
our communities by direct appeal to any particular view of the good".
229
  As a result, the 
determination of legal issues is based on "decision procedures structured to take all 
reasonable views seriously."
230
  The principle of detachment flows from this systematic 
requirement; all citizens, accused of any offence, should be able to defend themselves 
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before an independent and objective tribunal.  Of course, anyone can do this in theory, 
but the practical complexity of the legal system means that the vast majority of people 
require the help of a skilled professional to do so; it is for this reason that the "right to 
be represented by counsel is as basic as any right".
231  
Since criminal defence lawyers 
are effectively the 'key' to accessing legal rights, this grants them "tremendous 
power"
232
 in deciding who to represent and how much effort to expend on their behalf.  
The fact is that the majority of suspects and defendants would probably be considered 
'deviant', usually because of a past criminal record, poverty, social habits, ethnicity, and 
other factors.  Equally, many offences, particularly the most serious like rape and 
murder, are considered heinous by most people.  If a criminal defence lawyer was 
permitted to refuse to represent someone or provide a less vigorous service for a 
defendant on the basis of personal or social objections, then not only would many 
people be denied access to the law, but the designated system for determining criminal 
justice issues would be circumvented.  Thus, the primary justifications for the principle 
of detachment are that, first, it ensures respect for the rights of individual citizens, and, 
second, ensures respect for the system of due process. 
 
The principle of detachment is based on the premise that all individuals within society 
are equally entitled to access legal rights, regardless of the merits of the person or their 
objectives.  Without it, the individual rights of those arbitrarily considered undeserving 
could be denied and this would "undercut the strategy by which we secure community 
between people profoundly divided by reasonable but incompatible views of the 
good."
233
  The criminal justice system is, in essence, designed to civilise and formalise 
the resolution of serious social conflicts without resorting to the anarchic alternatives of 
violence or irrational squabbling.  In this context, criminal defence lawyers are by no 
means moral crusaders.They are better described as "amoral technicians",
234
 who 
"integrate conflicting elements of society and . . . oil the machinery of social 
intercourse."
235
  Thus, to facilitate access to the law and the execution of these rights for 
all citizens, personal or wider social ethics must be removed from the defence lawyer's 
professional life.  In actually defending an accepted client, the principle of detachment 
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commands that a defence lawyer not hold back on the grounds that the client or cause is 
objectionable to them or the public.  Less diligence or vigour is not acceptable on this 
basis because, again, the individual's rights would be curtailed.   
 
As Charles Curtis summarised: 
 
"[T]hey could not give their clients the full measure of their services if they did 
not keep themselves detached. Thereby they were able to offer their clients what 
they had come to get - advice and counsel from someone above the turmoil of 
their troubles or at least far enough away from them to look at them." 
236
  
 
Detachment also facilitates the execution of an individual's rights because it shields 
defence counsel from criticism for their professional behaviour.  Without its protection, 
defence lawyers might avoid representing any client or cause that society frowned upon 
for fear of personal association, thus frustrating the right to defence counsel.  In short, a 
defence lawyer is not his or her client. 
 
The principle of detachment ensures that actors in the legal system respect adversarial 
due process and recognise it as a better method for determining legal and moral issues 
than their own potentially subjective views.  The defence lawyer is only a part of the 
criminal justice system, which, as outlined above, takes into account a broad range of 
views on any particular matter.  A judge and jury, who have heard and soberly 
considered all the evidence put before them are best positioned to make legal, factual or 
moral judgments about a case.  Due process therefore reasons that "[t]he client is 
entitled to have his or her case determined under the standards and processes duly 
established by law, rather than by the vagaries of the individual conscience of the 
particular lawyer who has taken the case."
237
  A tribunal of fact is designed to come to 
decisions about the merits of a case.  Lawyers have no selected or elected position that 
obligates or entitles them to make judgments in this regard, and to do so goes beyond 
their remit.  To appoint the defence lawyer as gatekeeper, who only grants access to the 
'good' or 'right' would also render the system redundant; why have a tribunal to resolve a 
dispute when there is nothing to dispute?  As Richard Wasserstrom summarised, to 
allow defence lawyers to decide what causes and clients are worthy of protection would 
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"constitute a surreptitious and dangerous shift from a democracy to an oligarchy of 
lawyers."
238
   Moreover, the "consequences of lawyer mistakes are too serious to allow 
them to supplant the courts’ judgment."239  It should be noted that, in reality, the majority 
of criminal defendants are convicted of the offence they are charged with.  However, 
they are still entitled to defence representation until conviction, thus "[l]awyers have to 
assert legal interests unsupported by moral rights all the time – asserting legal interests 
is what they do, and everyone can’t be in the right on all issues."240  It is impossible to 
defend only the virtuous since this would reduce defence lawyers to a very small 
number of cases.  To do so would also contradict the higher social morals of defence 
rights, such as the presumption of innocence and free and fair trial.  These, one would 
think, are morals that most people would rather not sacrifice.  In summary, although 
some commentators criticise the principle of detachment for removing morality from 
the defence lawyer's role, it is quite the opposite.  It appears crucial to a higher 
commitment to free and equal access to justice and as a result is "an important and 
deeply moral obligation."
241
 
 
An issue that should be addressed before moving on is the choice of the term 
‘detachment’.  The rationale behind this choice is the belief that detachment presents 
what I consider to be a clearer and more accurate description of the duty, both 
linguistically and in relation to the nature of the principle.  Two potential alternatives are 
‘neutrality’ and ‘independence’, which I did not use for the following reasons.  Use of 
the word 'neutral' in describing the criminal defence lawyer is potentially confusing.  In 
general life, 'neutral' infers that someone holds no preference for any particular opinion 
or result.  For legal professionals, 'neutrality' is a different concept.  When partnered 
with partisanship, neutrality describes the removal of personal feeling from the job of 
vigorously defending a criminal client.  It does not mean the lawyer is indifferent to a 
client's success or failure.  On the contrary, neutrality enables the defence lawyer to 
perform his or her role without the restraint of personal concerns.  Similarly, 
‘detachment’ has been chosen over ‘independence’ as an obligation incumbent upon 
defence lawyers.  Like neutrality, independence presents semantic difficulties.  
Linguistically, independence is more closely related to the concept of freedom than 
anything else.  It suggests that defence lawyers may exercise choice in their professional 
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work, free from the dictates of higher masters (such as the client).  On this 
interpretation, independence seems more akin to a right of the defence lawyer than an 
obligation. 
 
However, under the model presented in this thesis, I believe that it would be more 
accurate to suggest that both independence and neutrality are elements of the duty of 
detachment.  These are defining factors of the obligation to be 'detached' from any 
external influence, including governmental pressure, financial gain, moral censure and 
personal inclination.  Nicolson and Webb considered that the duty of independence 
required lawyers to “avoid situations that might compromise zeal”.242  Avoiding 
conflicts of interest between clients and ensuring that issues with fees do not affect 
representation are primary examples.  This independence thus requires the defence 
lawyer to free him or herself from external pressures or temptations, which might 
damage the client’s cause.  The defence lawyer must ‘detach’.  Similarly, the adoption 
of a studied neutrality towards the character of the client and the nature of the offence is 
an act of detachment, annexing the professional from the personal in the same way that 
independence does.  The duty of detachment, and its corollary concepts of neutrality 
and independence, not only demands positive acts but instils an attitude or state of 
mind, designed to ensure not only that defendants receive the full measure of 
partisanship, but that all citizens have the opportunity to avail themselves of 
representation.  Since both independence and neutrality require the defence lawyer to 
detach from influences that do not emanate from the client, this principle has been 
entitled ‘detachment’. 
 
3.1.3 The Principle of Confidentiality 
 
"The basis of the attorney-client privilege is to allow freedom of communication 
between client and attorney."
243
 
 
The principle of confidentiality is a "fundamental ethical duty"
244
 incumbent upon 
criminal defence lawyers and lawyers generally.  The basic obligation is that the "lawyer 
must hold in strictest confidence the disclosures made by the client in the course of the 
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professional relationship".
245
  This prohibits the revelation of communications between 
the defence counsel and the client, relating to their professional relationship.  However, 
this does not limit the duty to the duration of the defender's employment by the client.  
The obligation of confidentiality "begins as soon as the attorney confers with the 
accused (even prior to being retained) and continues after the final disposition of the 
case."
246
  Since the defence lawyer is the client's mouthpiece during the criminal 
process, communication between them is perhaps the most important, and vulnerable, 
aspect of the relationship.  Thus, confidentiality is designed to "provide a refuge for the 
client by steadfastly maintaining his or her confidences and secrets, regardless of the 
circumstances."
247
  Although the duty of confidentiality covers a wide range of material, 
it is not absolute and "may . . . be overridden by competing legal duties, duties to the 
court and professional rules of conduct."
248
  This limitation on the defence lawyer's 
freedom to shelter his or her client’s secrets is therefore in balance with other theoretical 
duties owed to the court and to the public.
249
 
 
A broad justification for the principle is that it respects liberal values of personal 
autonomy and privacy, an ethic which pervades most spheres of social life in democratic 
states.  Specific to the defence context, the principle is justifiable based on the fact that 
the defence lawyer is supposed to be a loyal partisan who advances the defendant’s 
case.  Without the binding obligation of confidentiality, "this purpose might be defeated 
if a relevant secret were available to one side merely by calling the opposition counsel 
to testify",
250
 or even if the defence lawyer chose to betray the client.  Therefore, the 
"duty of loyalty demand[s] confidentiality and the duty of confidentiality demand[s] 
loyalty."
251  
The principle of confidentiality is also central to a criminal defence lawyer 
performing the basic function of legal advisor.  In order to provide adequate 
representation, he or she requires as much pertinent information from the client as 
possible.  An obligation to protect communications conveyed to the defence lawyer will, 
in theory, "encourage clients to give their lawyers information necessary for effective 
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advocacy"
252
 due to the guarantee of secrecy.  Without this duty, "a man would not 
venture to consult any skilful person, or would only dare to tell his counsellor half his 
case".
253
  Like other professional relationships such as doctor-patient, confidentiality is 
"regarded as essential to the very existence of the lawyer-client relationship rather than 
a mere optional extra."
254   
 
As with the principles of partisanship and detachment, confidentiality affects how 
willing a defendant is to place his case in the hands of a representative.  The more they 
can trust the defence lawyer, the more likely they are to exercise their legal rights 
through the medium of a representative.  As such, confidentiality "promote[s] the public 
interest in ensuring the efficient working of the adversary system"
255
 and has even been 
called "an ancient right, fundamental to liberty and liberal democratic society."
256
  In 
addition, the principle of confidentiality protects both the defendant and his or her 
lawyer from the inappropriate attentions of the court.  The judge and prosecution may 
attempt, perhaps through the route of disclosure, to extract more information from a 
defender about a client than he or she would like to reveal.  In addition, it is by no 
means an unheard of event for a defence lawyer to be asked about the veracity of his or 
her client's claims by a judge.  Confidentiality grants relief to a pressured defence 
lawyer, allowing him or her to practice "[a]voidance of the enforced pragmatic candor 
of answering the court's improper questions and the forced volunteering of information 
detrimental to a client's cause",
257
 something that "is necessary to continue the adversary 
system in the administration of criminal justice."
258
  Finally, it could be argued that 
confidentiality symbolises traditional 'gentleman’s values' of discretion and promise-
keeping, although these are perhaps a little outdated and informal. 
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3.2 The Duty to the Court 
 
The sustaining institution of the criminal defence lawyer is the court.  This does not 
mean the physical ‘court’; rather, the court represents the legal authorities who 
administer and operate the criminal justice process.  The court, in this context, includes 
the police, prosecution, judges and jurors, and as such the various duties owed by 
defence lawyers to the court stretch beyond the door of the court room itself. They apply 
in any situation where he or she is engaged in the defence of a criminal client before 
'court' officials.  This therefore includes, among other situations, work in police stations, 
in prisons, in probation offices, in negotiations with other counsel and at trial.  The duty 
to the court is thus a duty to justice and the law itself and, within the 'zealous advocate' 
model, comprises two obligations:  the principles of procedural justice and truth-
seeking. 
 
3.2.1 The Principle of Procedural Justice 
 
"The advocate has a duty to assist in ensuring that the administration of justice is 
not distorted or thwarted by dishonest or disreputable practices. To a certain 
extent every advocate is an 'amicus curiae'."
259
 
 
The principle of procedural justice encapsulates the nature of Lord Morris’ amicus 
curiae – ‘friend of the court’.  The principle requires that every criminal defence lawyer 
facilitate the "administration of justice . . . [and] . . . represent clients by fair and proper 
means."
260  
The defence lawyer should respect the procedural requirements of the 
system, refraining from tactics that obfuscate or frustrate the pursuit of justice.  At this 
stage, it is important to explain the distinction between 'justice' and 'truth', as used in the 
‘zealous advocate’ model.  Truth could be defined as the reality of a debated legal issue; 
if a defendant is charged with an offence, the 'truth' is best described as 'what really 
happened'.  This definition accepts that the versions presented by both sides during the 
criminal process may not necessarily represent the truth.  Most academics, lawyers and 
laymen would accept that one of the aims of the criminal justice system is to ascertain 
what the objective truth is.  'Justice' is perhaps a different concept.  Many would 
probably equate truth with justice, but the latter is arguably concerned with the 
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legitimacy and fairness of the system, rather than the result it achieves.  This definition 
accepts that the truth can only be established through balanced, regulated and fair due 
process, if it can be established at all.  Without a just process, the 'truth' may just be 
another subjective version of events.  As Charles Curtis noted: 
 
"Justice is something larger and more intimate than truth.  Truth is only one of 
the ingredients of justice.  Its whole is the satisfaction of those concerned."
261
 
 
Arguably, justice can be achieved without the truth being unveiled, and vice versa.  As 
such, this theoretical model treats the duties of procedural justice and truth-seeking as 
separate, although inter-related.   
 
It can be argued that procedural justice is the paramount duty owed by the criminal 
defence lawyer. The duties owed to the client are "subordinate to the lawyer’s primary 
obligation to the law"
262
 and therefore the "highest loyalty is at the same time the most 
intangible . . . to procedures and institutions."
263
  Although this is true, it is can be said 
that those intangible masters are manifested in the form of the officials mentioned 
above; as a result, the defence lawyer, paradoxically, owes a theoretically higher duty to 
judges, prosecutors, jurors and police officers, who are the administrators of justice in 
adversarial systems.  Like them, the criminal defence lawyer is an "officer of the 
court",
264
 and as such has "professional obligations [which] qualify the lawyer's duties 
as an agent of the client."
265
  The principle of procedural justice instils in defence 
lawyers a fidelity to a fair and balanced criminal justice process.  As well as abiding by 
the rules themselves, defence lawyers must endeavour to "keep clients law-
compliant".
266
  Using "illegal or improper means"
267
 to aid a client "does not promote 
the attainment of justice"
268
 and "breaches the public trust reposed in him by virtue of 
his oath of office."
269
  Of course, this does not mean the defence lawyer is expected to 
fight his or her client's cause with less effort or determination, but "must do so within 
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the framework of the prescribed rules",
270
 meaning that the lawyer cannot do anything 
to win.  It is argued that because the defence lawyer "owe[s] fidelity to the court as well 
as to the client",
271
 he or she "may not do everything legally permissible to promote the 
client's cause."
272
  Some actions, even if they are legally permissible, may betray the 
defence counsel's loyalty to procedural justice. There are various examples of this sort 
of behaviour.  The defence lawyer may seek to manufacture delay in the proceedings, 
perhaps to bulk out a weak case, to buy time for developing a defence, to bury 
unfavourable evidence in a mountain of paperwork or discourage frustrated or scared 
witnesses.  Delays may be achieved by disclosing as little as possible to the prosecution, 
forcing them to 'work harder'; conversely, the defender might deliver "tons of 
miscellaneous documents . . . to conceal a needle in a haystack."
273
  The defence lawyer 
may also attempt to surprise the prosecution with an 'ambush' defence; that is, using an 
unexpected argument or hidden evidence, revealed at a late stage, with the purpose of 
catching the unprepared opposition off-guard.   
 
However, delays and 'ambushes' are strongly discouraged by the principle of procedural 
justice.  As an assistant to the court, it seems that the fact "lawyers have the power to 
delay cases for tactical reasons is not to say that they have the right".
274
Equally, it has 
been claimed that "[t]he 'ambush' defence, perceived as a strategic advantage, denies 
fundamental principles of fairness."
275
  The principle of procedural justice is an attempt 
at balancing fairness in the criminal justice process with the rights of defendant.  The 
role of lawyers, including those defending criminal clients, is "to assist individuals to 
avail themselves of the rights allocated to them by their communities".
276
  Delays and 
'ambushes' essentially create barriers to that process.  Such tactics do not actively 
defend a client - they simply distract from the issues that affect the rights of the client, 
victims, witnesses and the public.  For this reason, the principle of procedural justice 
suggests that "to portray . . . lawyers as being allowed or obliged to use every lawful 
tactic to prevent the legal system addressing a case is simply mistaken."
277
  In balancing 
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the integrity of criminal procedure and the rights of a defendant, the defence advocate 
"must not be blinded by partisanship";
278
 as an officer of the court, "systemic 
imperatives are entitled to weight."
279
  
 
The principle of procedural justice is justifiable on the grounds that, for the legal system 
to work effectively, the actors within the system must themselves keep within the law.  
It is in the public interest that the old maxim, ‘no one is above the law’ is upheld, 
obligating the criminal defence lawyer to assist the court in the administration of justice 
thus "guard[s] against abuse of the powers and privileges entrusted to him".
280  
The 
court, as the embodiment of the legal system, is the master of the defence lawyer.  
Without it, a defendant would have no arena in which to plead his or her case and the 
defence lawyer would have no role.  The court represents the roots and trunk of the 
legal system, and the legal professionals who work within its parameters are, to extend 
the metaphor, the 'branches'.  As such, despite the defence lawyer's duty to the client, the 
court must come first because the said duty "cannot rise higher than its source, which is 
the court."
281
  In the same way that the principle of partisanship acts as a protection for 
defendants in the face of a vigorous prosecution, the principle of procedural justice acts 
as a counter-balancing check on over-zealous defence.  Furthermore, the principle 
recognises that it is "axiomatic that justice must be achieved for society as well as for 
defendants, that a criminal trial is not a sporting contest, and that the fair determination 
of an individual's guilt and the protection of society are both important objectives of the 
criminal law."
282
  The obligation thus reminds the defence lawyer that the core aim of 
the criminal justice system is to achieve a just and fair verdict – not victory at all costs 
for his or her client. 
 
                                                 
278
 Zacharias F., Green B. (2005) Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics – 74 Geo. Wash. L.R., 28. 
279
 Ibid., 9. 
280
 Pannick D. (1992) Advocates – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 121. 
281
 Curtis C. (1951-1952) The Ethics of Advocacy – 4 Stanford L.R., 7. 
282
 Bress D. (1965-1966) Professional Ethics in Criminal Trials: A View of Defense Counsel's 
Responsibility – 64 Mich. L.R., 1498.  
 64 
3.2.2 The Principle of Truth-Seeking 
 
"[The] zeal of the advocate must not tempt him from the path of strict 
truthfulness"
283
 
 
The rationale behind the adversarial criminal process is that the "truth is best discovered 
by powerful statements on both sides of the question".
284
  As an integral part of this 
mechanism, it is arguable that a defender has both direct and indirect duties to facilitate 
the search for the truth.  The indirect duty is to "pursue the process from which the truth 
emerges";
285  
that is, to defend the client resolutely and present the best of his or her 
case. When viewed in this way, one could conclude that it is "not [his or her] job to 
pursue the truth",
286
 per se.  However, it is arguable that the defence lawyer's duty to 
'pursue the process' does not green-light dishonest, deceitful or misleading conduct as a 
means to achieving acquittal for a client.  Actively avoiding such behaviour is the 
defence lawyer's direct duty of truth-seeking, applying to dealings with both the court 
and the client.  In dealings with the court, the most established and concrete aspect of 
the principle of truth-seeking is that the defence lawyer "must never suppress or distort 
the truth".
287
  First and foremost, this prohibits lying for the client or knowingly 
allowing the client to lie to the court.  In this respect, the defence advocate has "a 
primary duty to preserve the integrity of the adversary system by preventing the court or 
jury from being misled by the presentation of false or perjured testimony."
288
 
 
Beyond this, truth-seeking both promotes and forbids (or at least discourages) certain 
conduct in dealing with the court.  For example, the defence lawyer should assist the 
court by ensuring it is aware of all the evidence and law it needs.  It is argued that 
"[c]ounsel should have the obligation of bringing to the attention of the court any 
authority about which he reasonably believes the court would like to know before 
deciding the matter before it."
289
  To allow the defence lawyer to "withhold precedent 
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from the court in the hope of a favorable judgment"
290
 would be to defeat the search for 
the truth.  Additionally, to exploit errors made by the prosecution in presenting their 
case (for example, omitting important evidence or law) simply to advance the 
defendant's cause, is proscribed.  As Kenneth Pye explained: 
 
"The ineptitude or lack of diligence of opposing counsel or of the court is no 
justification for increasing the likelihood that a judge will incorrectly ascertain 
or apply the law. Neither is the understandable attitude of the client that his 
counsel should take no action that ‘will help the other side.’"291 
 
Refusing to correct an obvious or basic mistake purely because it has been made by the 
opposition frustrates truth-seeking; such behaviour could be considered devious and 
underhand.   
 
Some theorists have suggested that truth-seeking would expect defence lawyers to 
refrain from destroying the credibility of an honest witness using aggression or 
chicanery: 
 
"[T]he argument is advanced that a cross-examination may be proper when a 
lawyer believes the witness is untruthful, inaccurate in recollection or narration, 
or has told less than the whole story, but not when the lawyer believes (or 
knows) that the witness has honestly narrated an accurate version of the events 
he perceived."
292
 
 
Dealings with the client should also be driven by the principle of truth-seeking.  
Arguably, defence lawyers should avoid 'selective' questioning of their clients about the 
facts of their case and the nature of their defence.  Bearing in mind that confidentiality 
is designed to encourage the defendant to confide fully in his or her representative, 
some believe that "the lawyer must seek the truth from the client, not shun it."
293
  
Therefore, a defence lawyer should grill the client as a court might, rather than skip over 
difficult or damaging issues.  This expectation accords with the obligation not to lie to 
the court; a full and frank exchange with a client will mean the defence lawyer is better 
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informed, and as a result can ensure that the court will not be misled.  However, it is 
arguable that such an approach is paternal, elitist and arrogant; it automatically assumes 
that a criminal client will lie or attempt to mislead the court, and also suggests that it is 
the responsibility of the defence lawyer to do what is, effectively, the prosecution's job.  
Some commentators have therefore advanced the argument that the duty to seek the 
truth simply requires defence lawyers to "advise witnesses and clients to testify only to 
what they believe in their own minds to be the truth and warn them of the pains of 
perjury and of the danger of effective cross-examination of a witness who is not 
truthful."
294
 
 
The main justification for the duty of truth-seeking is derived from the rationale behind 
the adversary system itself.  It is widely accepted that the "ascertainment of truth 
remains an important fundamental value of our system of criminal justice".
295
  It is 
arguable that truth-seeking is the primary reason for its existence and that everything 
connected to criminal justice flows from this premise.  Defence lawyers must protect the 
interests of a defendant in this system (including those guilty of offences), but it should 
be remembered that they are not assigned their role with the sole purpose of securing 
victory for the accused.  Although adversarial culture works on the basis that opposing 
views of an issue lead to a more accurate result, it is often the case that "[t]he struggle to 
win, with its powerful pressures to subordinate the love of truth, is often only 
incidentally, or coincidentally, if at all, a service to the public interest."
296
  The defence 
lawyer is expected to be a partisan for the defendant, just as the prosecutor is expected 
to be a partisan for the state; however, this clash of opposing forces against each other 
should not perpetuate an "irrational battle",
297 
but work "as a means to accurate fact-
finding."
298
  If one accepts the conception that "sees truth as the central goal of 
adversary advocacy" then defence lawyers "should forgo sorts of conduct incompatible 
with that goal".
299
  This would seemingly rule out the forms of behaviour discussed 
above.  At the most extreme, for a defence lawyer to allow a client to lie to a court and 
excuse it as 'partisanship' would be plainly wrong; as John Noonan stated, "[t]o furnish 
[a court] with a lie is to mock impartiality, to mislead rather than to inform, and to 
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stultify the decisional process rather than to make it an exploration leading to mature 
judgment."
300
   
 
Such tactics might advance a client's cause, but when considered in the context of the 
adversarial truth-seeking process, it seems clear that to some extent "the lawyer’s duty 
to advance his client’s interests must be subordinated to the fundamental purpose of 
truth-seeking which brought the relationship into being."
301  
The principle of truth-
seeking recognises that the partisan defence advocate has a unique power to influence 
criminal proceedings, for better or worse.  Because the defence lawyer primarily works 
with the defendant, who may well demand victory at all costs, "situations . . . where 
zealous representation is synonymous with obfuscating and distorting the truth . . . are 
common."
302
  The principle of truth-seeking, like procedural justice, is a check on that 
power.  They are reminders that the defence lawyer, alongside his or her duty to protect 
the client, is "an officer of the court, participating in a search for truth"
303  
and these two 
duties to the court exemplify the argument that the 'standard conception' is only part of 
the traditional, theoretical conception of the defence lawyer's role.  In summary, the 
defence lawyer is not only employed by the client - he or she has "a prior and perpetual 
retainer on behalf of truth and justice" that is "primary and paramount".
304
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3.3 The Duty to the Public 
 
The legal system, like most state institutions, owes an ultimate duty to serve the public.  
The criminal defence lawyer in particular cannot forget that he or she has a duty to 
promote the interests of the people whom the system is designed to protect.  It is 
arguable that the criminal justice process affects and influences the life of a nation more 
than any other branch of the legal system, and is inevitably interwoven with public 
morality.  The defence lawyer is therefore part of an integral and ancient mechanism 
charged with shaping and defending the moral stance of the criminal law, a subject 
which generates intense passion and controversy.  Consequently, it is suggested by some 
that the criminal defence lawyer has an obligation to the public to uphold certain 
standards of humanity, dignity and respect.  The duty to the public can thus be described 
as a duty of morality, and is aimed at protecting the interests of that elusive concept, the 
‘greater good’. 
 
3.3.1 The Principle of Morality 
 
"[T]he lawyer must act . . . with concern for his own standards as a human 
person, as well as with regard for the requirements of the society which the 
system serves."
305
 
 
The principle of morality is a direct challenge to the more cruel and merciless aspects of 
criminal defence.  The principle consists mainly of obligations which academics and 
commentators believe the defence lawyer should adhere to.  This significantly 
distinguishes it from the more established and accepted principles, such as partisanship 
and confidentiality.  It would be fair to say that the principle of morality is, even at a 
theoretical level, a less robust and defensible duty that the others set out in the ‘zealous 
advocate’ model.  However, debate about the place of morality in the work of the 
defence lawyer is an ancient one, and deserves examination.  The principle of morality 
is informed by the fact that the criminal defence lawyer is, as stated above, a servant of 
the public through the legal system and that one of the aims of that system is to protect 
the public and its values.  The principle of morality is disputed by those who claim that 
morals do not have a place in partisanship; however, as was demonstrated by the 
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historical debate, the principle of morality is not a new concept.  Furthermore, it seems 
that "the dominant tone of current scholarship . . . [is] highly critical of lawyers’ 
seeming ability to remove their 'professional' actions from the scrutiny of basic precepts 
of ordinary morality".
306   
 
The foundation of the principle is that "lawyers should try to act in all of their 
professional dealings as a good person should act."
307  
In representing a client, criminal 
defence lawyers must not “‘degrade’ themselves personally for the purpose of winning 
their client’s case"308 and although they cannot articulate their personal thoughts to the 
judge or jury, "this does not require him to be morally neutral."
309
  In fact, in giving 
advice to his or her client, the criminal defence lawyer "can and should express his 
opinions fully and frankly about all aspects of the case, legal and ethical."
310  
It has been 
argued that defence lawyers who evade this duty by turning a blind eye to the 
immorality of a client's behaviour, opinions or desires, can in fact "make these clients a 
bit worse"
311
 and "can foster a cynical view of human relations and can reinforce selfish 
and manipulative attitudes".
312
  Such behaviour on the part of the defence lawyer 
arguably results from "a fantastic and distorted idea of duty"
313
 that loyalty to the client 
justifies ethically dubious behaviour.  In contrast, it has been asserted that "[l]oyalty 
does not replace the lawyer's conscience with that of his client".
314
  Thus, defence 
lawyers have "a professional obligation to advise a client whenever the lawyer believes 
that a proposed argument or policy is unjust"
315
 and should be open and honest with 
their client and ultimately "advise the client to do what is morally right."
316
 
 
Even as a professional representative, a defence lawyer should remember that he or she 
"is the keeper of his own conscience and any practice of the profession that conflicts 
with his ideas of right and wrong, even though it be sanctioned by custom, should be 
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avoided."
317
  The fact that the defence lawyer is an agent of the criminal client does not 
mean that he or she is "entirely free from all moral responsibility"
318
 and that he or she 
can "submerge his humanity by playing a technician's role."
319
  In short, the behaviour 
of a defence lawyer can and, most likely, will have significant and real consequences for 
other people and society in general.  For defence lawyers to excuse the wrongs caused 
by them or their client by reference to loyalty and detachment is perhaps to deny the  
fact that a defence lawyer is still a human being with a degree of choice.  As such, 
academics have argued that the defence lawyer should "bring his full moral sensibilities 
to play in his professional role."
320
  On this basis, the approach to dealing with other 
parties, for example witnesses, should be tempered by a degree of empathy and 
consideration for their interests.  Although defence lawyers are not expected to 
undermine or damage their own client's case, they must, when advancing it, be aware of 
"the lines . . . that define appropriate behaviour and be willing to go right up to, but not 
over, these lines."
321
  For example, unfairly or dishonourably destroying the credibility 
of a truthful or vulnerable witness purely to achieve victory would be considered 
immoral by many.  Lord Cockburn suggested that "in carrying out the interests of his 
client, the fearless advocate should wield the 'arms of a warrior and not of the 
assassin'",
322
 while Gleason Archer asserted that the defence lawyer "should exercise a 
conscientious regard for the rights of others, to the end that he may be an instrument of 
justice and not a worker of injustice."
323
  It has been argued that a zealous and 
aggressive examination of the prosecution case is the only way that the defence lawyer 
evens the stakes, since the defendant is one person pitted against the vast resources of 
the state.  However, this suggestion does not always hold weight.  Unlike a victim, the 
state does not have to sit in a court and endure embarrassing questions from the lawyer 
of a potential offender; as Ted Schneyer pointed out, "[t]he complaining witness 
humiliated during relentless cross-examination in a rape case is not exactly Leviathan. 
Her interests are distinct from those of the state and deserve to be recognized."
324
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The principle of morality can be justified on the basis that taking the morally correct 
course of action is for the benefit of the greater good which, arguably, is a core purpose 
of the legal system.  The goal of criminal justice is, in part, to prosecute and deter 
criminal, and thus immoral, behaviour.  It could be said that morally dubious conduct on 
the part of legal professionals undermines this goal and reduces it to the status of a 
distant and unobtainable dream.  To relieve defence lawyers of any duty to defend moral 
standards suggests that such values, including honesty, empathy and fairness, become 
irrelevant once the criminal justice process begins - all that matters is which side wins.  
The principle of morality can therefore be justified on the grounds that the legal system 
is not isolated within a bubble, separate and disconnected from broader moral 
expectations; the defence lawyer's role "does not justify his or her departure from 
ordinary social norms of civility and fair dealing."
325
  The integrity and legitimacy of 
the criminal justice process is dependent upon the standards of conduct of those 
working within it.  Since the criminal defence lawyer is an integral and highly exposed 
actor in the system, to behave in a morally objectionable manner undermines the legal 
system and the legal profession as institutions of moral authority.  In addition, for the 
criminal defence role to exist without some form of obligation to morality would be 
unthinkable.  The consequence of accepting an unchecked and unchallenged partisan 
defence, free of moral restraint, was described by Albert Alschuler: 
 
"Imagine a rule of professional responsibility that declared ‘A zealous advocate 
must do everything the law allows to disconcert, distress, divert, disturb, deflect, 
deceive, disorder, delude, dupe and distract his or her opponent and to keep the 
opponent from presenting his or her case effectively.’"326 
 
Thus, the principle of morality exists not only to ensure that the legal system and its 
servants encourage and display fair, moral and civil conduct, but to act as a counter-
balance to the worst excesses of the 'standard conception'. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The development of the criminal defence lawyer’s role was, in historical terms, a late 
comer to the traditional adversarial legal system and has evolved very speedily.  This 
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chapter aimed to summarise and discuss the nature of that role in the form of a coherent 
theoretical conception:  the ‘zealous advocate’ model.  The duty to the client is 
grounded in three long-standing principles; ‘partisanship’, the obligation to be a 
vigorous advocate of the client’s interests; ‘detachment’, the obligation to represent a 
client or case regardless of merit; and ‘confidentiality’, the obligation to keep secret all 
communications between the lawyer and client relating to the case.  This duty represents 
the 'standard conception' of the defence role, but is counter-balanced by the duties to the 
court and to the public.  The former consists of the principle of procedural justice, the 
obligation to aid the administration of justice and adhere to the judicial process, and the 
principle of truth-seeking, the obligation to help the court reach an accurate and fair 
verdict, reflecting the reality of what happened.  The duty to the public subjects the 
defence counsel to only one obligation – to uphold common standards of morality in his 
or her professional conduct.  The rest of this thesis aims to assess how relevant and 
useful the 'zealous advocate' model is, in the context of modern criminal defence 
practice.  The next chapter will take the first step towards this by exploring formal 
conceptions of the role and examining whether the 'zealous advocate' model is reflected 
in modern regulation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will explore formal conceptions of the role by comparing the obligations 
imposed by formal sources with the ‘zealous advocate’ model.  By considering whether 
formal conceptions reflect the theoretical model, I hope to gain an insight into how 
relevant theory is to modern practice; are the principles discussed in Chapter 2 part of 
the modern practitioner’s role, or is the ‘zealous advocate’ model detached from reality?  
The answer to this question may have significant implications not only for the future of 
theorising the role of the criminal defence lawyer, but also for the direction of regulation 
in England and Wales.  The rules and regulations which embody formal conceptions of 
the role have been drawn from four separate categories:  legislation and the common 
law, professional standards, training materials and other relevant standards.  The formal 
obligations drawn from these four categories will be considered using the same 
structure as the ‘zealous advocate’ model.  For example, obligations or duties drawn 
from the Bar Council Code of Conduct (categorised as 'professional standards') which 
reflect the principle of detachment will be described in that context.  Following this 
method allows a simple and systematic comparison of formal and theoretical 
conceptions of the role. 
 
Legislation and the common law comprise the bulk of law in England and Wales.  They 
are legally binding, and a breach of such provisions by criminal defence lawyers can 
have serious outcomes.  For example, a criminal sanction might be imposed by the state 
if a defence lawyer asserts the innocence of a client who claims to be guilty.  Under s.4 
of the Criminal Law Act 1967, the lawyer may be impeding the prosecution of an 
offender and therefore be criminally liable.
327
  A breach can also damage the client’s 
defence; if pre-trial disclosure provisions are not complied with, then a jury may be told 
they can draw inferences adverse to the client’s case.328  Professional standards are 
considered to be "the closest one comes to a collective statement about lawyers’ values 
and ideals",
329
 although they "[do] not constitute the full range of norms that may affect 
the way in which lawyers behave"
330
 because they operate in conjunction with a variety 
of other sources (such as legislation).  They are very influential in defining formal 
conceptions of the role of the defence lawyer and "largely set the tone and determine the 
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content of most other written discourses on professional legal ethics."
331
  Their status as 
a touchstone for understanding the work of the defence lawyer is attributable to the self-
regulatory nature of the professional standards; that is, they are defined and enforced by 
the legal profession itself, although this is no longer entirely accurate in England and 
Wales.   
 
In the wake of recommendations in ‘The Review of the Regulatory Framework for 
Legal Services in England and Wales',
332
 both the Law Society and the Bar Council (the 
representative bodies of solicitors and barristers respectively) created separate, 
independent bodies to deal with the regulation of conduct.  This satisfied the review’s 
recommendation to divide representative and regulatory functions in order to enhance 
the transparency, credibility and neutrality of the regulation of lawyers.  This policy was 
reaffirmed by the Legal Services Act 2007.  This statue created the Legal Services Board 
which sets out requirements ensuring:  
 
"[T]hat the exercise of an approved regulator's regulatory functions is not 
prejudiced by its representative functions, and . . . that decisions relating to the 
exercise of an approved regulator's regulatory functions are so far as reasonably 
practicable taken independently from decisions relating to the exercise of its 
representative functions."
333
 
 
These independent, approved regulators are the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) 
and the Bar Standards Board (BSB), who now issue, with the approval of the Master of 
the Rolls and Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, most professional standards 
for solicitors and barristers.  In addition, both bodies make it very clear that they are 
separate from the bodies representing the legal profession and act "in the public 
interest".
334
  Professional standards are not enforced by the state, but by independent 
bodies and since the legal profession in England and Wales is divided, there are 
different mechanisms for solicitors and barristers.
335
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Training refers to the legally required qualifications a lawyer must obtain to practice and 
the ongoing Continuing Professional Development (CPD) training they must undertake 
during practice.  These include compulsory requirements such as the Bar Vocational 
Course (BVC) and Legal Practice Course (LPC), and other training which can be 
undertaken.  Training materials for these are issued by regulatory bodies such as the 
SRA and the BSB and teach trainee lawyers the standards and duties which, as 
professionals, they are expected to uphold.  These materials therefore have a significant 
impact upon the role of English and Welsh criminal defence lawyers.They "inculcate a 
professional approach to work and . . . develop in students a respect for the principles of 
professional ethics",
336
 affecting how trainees will perform their role in the future.  The 
duties and standards derived from training are not enforced – rather, it is assumed that 
through successfully qualifying, students will obtain a thorough understanding of the 
obligations owed by defence lawyers.  The enforcement mechanism is therefore formal 
examination of students on training courses or schemes.  Other relevant standards are a 
catch-all category for miscellaneous materials which do not easily fit into the other 
categories.  Such standards include leading academic texts and guides,
337
 pre-legislative 
papers, journal articles and official reports.  Many of these sources are regarded in 
England and Wales as important contributors to the regulation of legal practice, but are 
non-binding.  They therefore have no enforcement mechanism other than potential 
moral censure by the legal community or to the extent that they may be used as 
guidance in the enforcement of professional standards or other forms of legal decision 
making (for example, if a defence lawyer were sued for negligence). 
                                                                                                                                               
has occurred, then the SDT may discipline the solicitor by: 
 
"[T]he striking off the roll of the name of the solicitor to whom the application or complaint relates . . . 
the suspension of that solicitor from practice indefinitely or for a specified period . . . [or] the payment by 
that solicitor or former solicitor of a penalty not exceeding £5,000, which shall be forfeit to Her Majesty" 
(Section 47(2) - Solicitors Act 1974) 
 
Barristers’ conduct is regulated by the BSB.  The BSB recommends first raising a complaint with the 
chambers of the barrister in question.  If this does not resolve the issue, the BSB will investigate 
misconduct issues relating to the professional standards, including "[m]isleading the court . . . [f]ailing to 
keep information confidential . . . [a]cting against your [client’s] instructions or best interests . . . [or] 
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2. The Duty to the Client 
 
2.1 The Principle of Partisanship 
 
Legislation and the Common Law 
 
The Legal Services Act 2007 provides a modern example of partisanship as a legislative 
obligation upon the criminal defence lawyer.  The statute created the Legal Services 
Board which oversees the regulation of lawyers in England and Wales; under s.1 of the 
Act, several ‘regulatory objectives’ are outlined, the first of which is "promoting and 
maintaining adherence to the professional principles."
338
  These professional principles, 
which are outlined in the statute, therefore inform the regulation and conduct of all 
lawyers, including defence lawyers.  The third principle states that "[a]uthorised persons 
should act in the best interests of their clients",
339
 which is a basic manifestation of 
partisanship.  How partisan one should be is unclear; theory suggests that criminal 
defence lawyers should be vigorous, fearless advocates for their client’s interests and 
objectives.  In comparison, this legislative provision is somewhat restrained.  It is a 
moderate and vague statement, which hardly reflects the passionate language used to 
describe the traditional defence lawyer.  Additionally, the fourth professional principle 
imposes a "duty to the court to act with independence in the interests of justice".
340
  This 
juxtaposition detracts from any inference that legislation encourages bold and 
uncompromising defence of the accused, as the 'zealous advocate' model suggests. 
 
A direct reference to a criminal defence lawyer’s role as a partisan for the client is 
contained in Practice Code C of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE).  
The code itself is not legislative and should perhaps be classified under ‘other relevant 
standards’.  However, since it was issued under legislative authority, it has been 
included here.  Under s.66 of the statute, the Secretary of State is empowered to issue 
codes of practice in connection with various areas covered by PACE and this power is 
"exercisable by statutory instrument."
341
  Code of Practice C outlines the conduct 
requirements of police officers in the detention, treatment and questioning of suspects.  
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Importantly, it makes reference to the role of the criminal defence lawyer in the police 
station, arguably the most intimidating and critical stage of the criminal justice process.  
However, the reference is brief and contained only in the ‘Notes for Guidance’342 
relating to section 6, which deals with rights to legal advice.  It states that the defence 
lawyer’s "only role in the police station is to protect and advance the legal rights of their 
client."
343
  This statement does not seem to reflect the theoretical portrayal of the 
partisan defender, who protects the client with vigour and aggression, and without 
regard for anyone other than his or her client.
344
  The use of the words 'only' and 'legal' 
are significant; one could say this provision limits the defence lawyer’s role to 
protecting the client’s procedural rights and nothing else, reminiscent of Dare's 
argument.
345
  Since 'legal' rights are determined by the authorities, severe limitations 
can be placed on what the defence lawyer can do for his or her client in the police 
station.For example, the lawyer might wish to advise the client to remain silent, in order 
to hinder the police case.  This is arguably in the client's interest, but provisions set out 
by legislation
346 
now mean that to do so might risk negative inferences later being 
drawn against the client, which would almost certainly not be in his or her interests. 
 
The Criminal Procedure Rules 2010 (CPR)
347
 have fundamentally altered the landscape 
of criminal justice, affecting the duties of parties to the process including the criminal 
defence lawyer.  The rules are derived from a variety of sources which, historically, 
governed criminal justice procedure.  However, under s.69 of the Courts Act 2003, it 
was required that these disparate threads of regulation be drawn together in the form of 
the CPR.  The rules were decided upon by the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee and 
approved by the Lord Chancellor, and were brought into effect by statutory 
instrument.
348
  As a primary obligation of the traditional adversarial defence lawyer, one 
might reasonably assume that the principle of partisanship would be manifested in the 
rules.  Yet, no reference of any kind is made, not even one as basic as that contained in 
Practice Code C.  As a result, this crucial piece of delegated legislation is somewhat 
incongruous with the theoretical principle outlined in Chapter 2.  In contrast to statutory 
law, jurisprudence has frequently referred to the principle of partisanship as a central 
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part of the defence lawyer's role.  In R v. McFadden,
349
 a trial judge attempted to 
financially penalise the defence lawyers in the case for wasting the court’s time.  In an 
addendum to the case report, the Chairman of the Bar “restated the principles which 
govern the conduct of counsel when defending an accused”,350 declaring:   
 
"It is the duty of counsel when defending an accused on a criminal charge to 
present to the court, fearlessly and without regard to his personal interests, the 
defence of that accused."
351
   
 
Nearly three decades later, this statement was echoed in modern case law.  Although a 
case on civil procedure, Medcalf v. Mardell
352
 provides a fine summary of the duty of 
partisanship a lawyer owes to his or her client and its importance in an adversarial 
system: 
 
"The duty of the advocate is with proper competence to represent his lay client 
and promote and protect fearlessly and by all proper and lawful means his lay 
client's best interests. This is a duty which the advocate owes to his client but it 
is also in the public interest that the duty should be performed."
353
 
 
Other cases relevant to partisanship have centred on the issue of whether the defence 
can acquire tactical advantage from errors by the court or prosecution.  In relation to 
mistakes by the court, most notably the judge, it is arguable that the defence lawyer is 
entitled to promote his or her client's best interests through silence.  In R v. Cocks,
354
 
James LJ made the following obiter comment:  
 
"[A] defending counsel owes a duty to his client and it is not his duty to correct 
the judge if a judge has gone wrong".
355
 
 
This comment suggests that in a situation where correcting a mistake by the judge might 
disadvantage the defendant, the defence lawyer would be entitled to remain silent.  
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Arguably, this situation remains unchanged; in Popat v. Barnes,
356
 Buckley J seemed to 
accept the conclusion that "the dictum in Cocks should be taken to represent the law 
until such time as it is expressly disapproved by the Court of Appeal."
357
  This has not 
yet occurred.  
 
Actively exploiting errors by the prosecution is less clear-cut.  In theory, several sources 
suggest that the partisan defender should exploit any opportunity that furthers the cause 
of the client.  In R v. Munnery,
358
 after the close of the prosecution case, the defence 
raised an evidential issue which had not been covered by the prosecution and which the 
defence had not referred to previously.  The prosecution returned with further evidence 
which was admitted and the defendant was convicted.  He appealed on the grounds that 
"the decision of the trial judge to allow the prosecution to call fresh evidence during the 
course of a defence submission of no case to answer amounted to both a material 
irregularity and a wrong decision on a question of law."
359
  In essence, the defence had 
taken advantage of a prosecution error, but had been dispossessed of it by the later 
admission of the evidence.  In considering the importance of such tactical advantages, 
Mustill LJ said: 
 
"What matters is that the judge should have in the forefront of his mind the 
strictly adversarial nature of the English criminal process, whereby the cases for 
the prosecution and the defence are presented consecutively in their entirety . . . 
the defendant may be prejudiced if his advisers have identified a gap in the 
prosecution's evidence, and have drawn attention to it by a submission of no case 
only to find that the judge gives leave to put it right; whereas if they had kept 
silent until the time to address the jury the prosecution would have been too 
late."
360
 
 
This appears to support the contention that a partisan defender can and should exploit 
prosecution mistakes in order to advance the interests of the client.   
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However, the above assertion was tempered by a later statement: 
 
"Tactics are a legitimate part of the adversarial process, but justice is what 
matters: justice to the public, represented by the prosecution, as well as to the 
defendant. Undeniably, if [the court] had declined to admit the evidence he could 
not have been criticised. The question is whether by letting it in he stepped 
outside the reasonable bounds of the discretion and thereby created a real risk of 
injustice."
361
 
 
This creates a different situation.  Essentially, any evidential "lacuna in the prosecution 
case"
362
 may be corrected at the judge’s discretion, if it is in the interests of justice to do 
so and does not cause injustice to the defendant.  The important question is whether 
such tactical manoeuvres represent such an integral part of the defendant’s case, that an 
'injustice' would be perpetrated were prosecution evidence admitted ex post facto.  In 
Khatibi v. DPP,
363
 it was stated that "[a] [d]efendant may demand that the prosecution 
proves its case and keep silent at any prosecution shortcomings until the time when it 
can take advantage of them".
364
  Although this statement seems to reflect the theoretical 
conception of the partisan defence lawyer, it was counter-balanced with a reference to 
the R v. Munnery 'justice' test.  In the case of Leeson v. DPP,
365
 Simon Brown LJ 
responded to the defence's tactical silence about "a purely technical"
366
 prosecution 
omission in the following way: 
 
"[T]he defence stood by watching the point develop, carefully avoiding any hint 
of a defence, let alone any challenge, which might conceivably have alerted the 
prosecution to their failure to comply strictly with all the niceties of these 
prosecutions . . . I do not say that the defence are bound to remind the 
prosecution of all matters required to be proved, but I do say that they can hardly 
complain if, in the result, justices exercise their discretion so as to secure justice 
rather than allow a totally unmeritorious acquittal."
367
 
 
This statement seems to seriously limit the scope of tactical silence and, as a result, 
                                                 
361
 Ibid., 173. 
362
 R v. Leeson [2000] R.T.R. 385. 
363
 [2004] EWHC 83 (Admin). 
364
 Ibid., [17]. 
365
 Ibid. 
366
 Ibid., 392. 
367
 Ibid., 392. 
 82 
undermines the assertion that a criminal defence lawyer is obliged to be a zealous and 
unflinching representative of their client’s interests.  In all three of the above cases, the 
prosecution was allowed to adduce further evidence and thus the defence tactics were 
neutralised.  It seems that, in defending a client, a criminal defence lawyer can employ 
tactics that uphold a 'legitimate' adversarial process, yet should not attempt to secure an 
'unmeritorious acquittal' for their client.  The meaning of such terms is open to court 
interpretation, presumably intentionally.  This case law appears to place significant 
limitations on the freedom of the defence lawyer to behave as a partisan defender and 
presents a picture at odds with the theoretical conception.  In conclusion, legislation, 
statutory instruments and common law appear to significantly underplay the importance 
of the principle of partisanship. 
 
Professional Standards 
 
The principle of partisanship is a prominent feature of the professional standards issued 
by the legal profession’s regulatory authorities in England and Wales.  The BSB Code of 
Conduct (hereafter, the ‘Bar Code’) states that Barristers must "promote and protect 
fearlessly and by all lawful and proper means the lay client’s best interests",368 
exemplifying the duty to the client in balance with the duty to uphold and abide by the 
law.  The code expands on this in significantly stronger language.  It states that fearless 
protection of the client’s interests should be done "without regard to [the barrister’s] 
interests or to any consequences to himself or to any other person",
369
 a rule reminiscent 
of the famous words of Lord Brougham.
370
  The Law Society Code for Advocacy, last 
updated in 2003, is a similar set of rules applied to solicitor advocates and repeats the 
aforementioned provision virtually word for word at Paragraph 2.3 (a).  Similarly, the 
Public Defender Service Code of Conduct, which governs the behaviour of publicly 
funded criminal defence lawyers employed by the Legal Services Commission, asserts 
that "the professional employee shall provide the client with fearless, vigorous and 
effective defence and may use all lawful and proper means to secure the best outcome 
for the client."
371
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The duty to provide partisan advocacy is replicated in the Solicitors’ Code of Conduct 
2007 (hereafter, the ‘Solicitors’ Code’), although in a somewhat diluted and ambiguous 
form.  The code expects solicitors to "act in the best interests of each client"
372
 and to 
make "the client’s business your first concern".373  These appear to be significantly less 
powerful statements of the defence lawyer's duty to the client when compared with the 
other professional standards and the 'zealous advocate' model.  It is unclear whether the 
professional standards consider the duty of partisanship to be the defence lawyer's 
primary obligation.  The Solicitors’ Code describes the client’s business as the 'first 
concern' of the defence lawyer, while the Bar Code asserts that "[t]he guiding principle 
must be the obligation of counsel to promote and protect his lay client's best interests so 
far as that is consistent with the law and with counsel's overriding duty to the court".
374
  
Neither of these statements explicitly states that the duty to the client takes precedence, 
while the latter quote requires that the 'guiding principle' of partisanship be 'consistent' 
with the 'overriding' duty to the court.  From this, one might conclude that the principle 
of partisanship is in fact limited by a higher duty to the court. 
 
Training 
 
The LPC is a pre-requisite to practice as a solicitor in England and Wales.  The 'Written 
Standards' that determine the course structure are issued by the SRA, and are therefore 
an important, early source of training in conduct and ethics.  The 'Written Standards' 
seem to reflect the duty of partisanship; solicitors are expected to adopt an active role in 
developing their client’s case, requiring them to "investigate and identify the relevant 
facts",
375
 "gather and analyse evidence"
376
 and generally "plan the progress of a 
transaction to promote the client’s interests".377  The BVC, the equivalent professional 
qualification for barristers, is governed by a document known as the ‘Golden Book’, 
issued by the BSB.  The 'Golden Book' requires that students are instructed on 
professional conduct and ethics and should "appreciate the core principles" that 
underpin the Bar Code of Conduct.  One of these core principles is described as "loyalty 
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to the lay client",
378
 a fairly explicit reference to the principle of partisanship.  Various 
training manuals are used in legal professional courses like the LPC and BVC, some of 
which also refer to partisanship.  An example is ‘Criminal Litigation in Practice’,379 
which states that "[y]ou are under no duty to enquire in every case whether your client 
is telling the truth".
380
  This reflects the spirit of partisan defence; the goal of the 
defence lawyer is to pursue the interests of the client, and the truth may be a casualty of 
this.  The manual also outlines the approach that a defence lawyer should adopt in the 
event of a confession of guilt, stating "[y]ou must still explore the facts with your client 
. . . [y]our client may believe that he is guilty of, for example, an assault, but it may 
become clear that he has a defence of self-defence."
381
  Again, this advice embodies the 
principle of partisanship.  When presented with a confession of guilt, a less partisan 
defender might simply advise the client to plead.  The principle of partisanship would 
urge the defence lawyer to make assumptions in the client’s favour and explore the facts 
as thoroughly as possible.  The same manual summarises the duty of the defence lawyer 
in the following way: 
 
"Do your job:  Say for your client what he would properly say for himself if he 
had your legal training and expertise."
382
 
 
This statement captures both the nature of the lawyer-client relationship and of 
partisanship; the lawyer is the agent of the client and should do everything the client 
would do, were he or she able to defend themselves.  
 
The Criminal Litigation Accreditation Scheme provides further definition of the role of 
publicly funded criminal defence solicitors, who make up a large proportion of the 
criminal defence lawyers in England and Wales.  In order to practice as a duty solicitor, 
lawyers must undertake two training schemes – the Police Station Qualification and the 
Magistrates’ Court Qualification.  They are now a central part of training for solicitors 
and, importantly, refer to the principle of partisanship.  In relation to the Police Station 
Qualification, solicitors are expected to understand their role and aims in "the probing 
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of the prosecution case"
383
 and must know "how to identify inappropriate behaviour by 
the police and when and how to respond to it."
384
  Both of these suggest an active and 
steadfast defence of the client in the Police Station, where he or she may be most 
vulnerable.  As regards the Magistrates’ Court Qualification, it is stated that a solicitor 
must have an understanding of the "duty to his or her client",
385
 which is a more 
restrained reference to the principle of partisanship.  This is, however, expanded upon in 
the ‘Advocacy Skills’ section, where it is stated that defence lawyers must be able to 
"present a coherent and persuasive case that is consistent with the client's 
instructions".
386
 
 
Other Relevant Standards 
 
In June 2007, the Ministry of Justice and the Legal Services Commission published a 
consultation paper entitled ‘Creating a quality assurance scheme for publicly funded 
criminal defence advocates’.  The paper proposed a scheme for assessing the 
competence of advocates engaged in criminal defence across England and Wales.  This 
was described in a recent discussion paper as "absolutely necessary to ensure [that] 
advocates are suitably qualified, experienced and skilled to represent defendants 
properly at every level of seriousness at which charged" as well as to "prevent those 
who are not good enough to do it thereby jeopardising their client’s interest, the public 
interest and the court process".
387
  The relevance of the proposed scheme to the role of 
the defence lawyer is twofold.  First, both the "discussion paper and the development to 
date [have] revolved around criminal defence advocacy",
388
 and second, the proposals 
outline standards which indicate what is expected of a criminal defence lawyer.  The 
initial consultation paper made a direct reference to the principle of partisanship in the 
proposed 'competency framework',
389
 a set of standards which would be used for 
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assessing the quality of defence advocates.  The original framework required that a 
lawyer: 
 
"Develops and advances the lay client’s case to secure the best outcome for the 
lay client by gaining a rapid, incisive overview of case material, identifying the 
best course of action, communicating the case persuasively, and rapidly 
assimilating the implications of new evidence and argument and responding 
appropriately."
390   
 
The defence lawyer was also expected to "stand up to the judge"
391
 and respond to "the 
needs and circumstances of the lay client (including the lay client’s means and the 
importance of the case to the lay client)".
392 
 However, after a pilot scheme in early 2009 
and a final evaluation of the results by Cardiff Law School in early 2010, the 
'competency framework' had been drastically altered, omitting all of the above 
references.
393
  The only remaining reference to any obligation to the defendant was the 
expectation that the defence lawyer "[a]ssist . . . the court where consistent with [his or 
her] duty to the client".
394
  What this indicates is uncertain; it is possible that the above 
standards were simply too verbose or too difficult to measure.  Alternatively, one could 
conclude that the principle of partisanship was not considered desirable by the designers 
of the scheme. 
 
‘Active Defence’,395 regarded as a standard reference text for criminal defence 
practitioners, stresses the importance of being a partisan in the police station.  Criminal 
defence lawyers should "exhaustively and systematically . . . investigate every aspect of 
the police case, the prosecution evidence and the police investigation".
396
  Without 
taking these steps, according to the authors, "the future defence of [the] client is placed 
in jeopardy."
397
  Similarly, ‘Criminal Defence’398 is considered an important source of 
defence ethics for solicitors.  It states that the job of a criminal defender is "to do what is 
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best for [his or her] client, consistent with his instructions, rather than bend to pressure 
to oil the wheels of the criminal justice system."
399
  This undoubtedly places a duty 
upon the defence solicitor to be a partisan representative and, interestingly, appears to 
directly contradict the duty to uphold procedural justice.  Advice is provided on how to 
act in the event of a confession of guilt by the client: "Even if your client admits guilt, 
you must enquire further and make sure that your client is actually guilty in law and that 
there is sufficient prosecution evidence to convict him."
400
  Therefore, the primary aim 
of the criminal defence lawyer is to steadfastly protect the client’s interests despite an 
admission of ‘guilt’.  ‘Defending Suspects at Police Stations’,401 another leading 
academic work used widely by the legal profession, outlines some compelling reasons 
for not necessarily taking a confession of guilt at face value: 
 
"In some cases, a person knows that they are not guilty but wishes to confess, for 
example, in order to protect another person, to help deal with guilt about 
something else, or to secure their release from custody.  In other cases, a person 
may actually believe that they are guilty even though this is not so.  This might 
be because they have deluded themselves into believing in their own guilt, or 
accept that they are guilty because the police say they are, and is a particular risk 
if their memory is affected by mental vulnerability or misuse of alcohol or drugs.  
Alternatively it may result from a mistaken understanding of the law."
402
 
 
The vast majority of criminal defenders are publicly funded.  As such, the contracts 
between defence firms and the Legal Services Commission (LSC) have relevance to the 
role of the criminal defence lawyer.  These contracts regulate the conduct and payment 
of solicitors’ firms acting in legally aided criminal cases, setting out standard contract 
terms between the LSC and firms of solicitors.  Thus, they have scope for defining the 
role of defence lawyers.  The current contract is the Standard Crime Contract 2010.  It 
makes reference to partisanship at Paragraph 7.2, stating that contracted lawyers "must 
act in the best interests of [their] Clients and be uninfluenced by any factor other than 
Clients’ (and potential Clients’) best interests."  Equally significant are the payment 
arrangements for criminal defence lawyers.  The Unified Contract (Crime) 2008, and its 
predecessor (the General Criminal Contract 2008), introduced sweeping changes to the 
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system of remuneration for criminal defence lawyers at police stations.  Defence 
lawyers are now paid "on the basis of a fixed fee rather than on Hourly Rates",
403
 which 
is "payable for all Police Station Attendance and Police Station Telephone Advice 
undertaken on a matter where a solicitor or accredited representative attends a Client in 
the Police Station".
404
  Defence work of this kind includes "time spent advising the 
Client, travelling to and from the Police Station, waiting, letters and telephone calls for 
the initial and subsequent visits to the Police Station",
405
 all of which can take varying 
lengths of time dependant on the nature of the case, the client and other factors.  
Arguably, the alteration of payments may cause criminal defence lawyers to, 
inadvertently or deliberately, invest less time in providing vigorous and thorough 
defence.  Where a client’s case is complex and time-consuming, a defence lawyer will 
be paid a fixed rate rather than by the number of hours spent on the case.  This is a 
disincentive for a defence lawyer to devote more time than is absolutely necessary to 
defending a client at the police station.  Due to shrinking margins in the criminal 
defence market, defence lawyers may feel pressure from above to cut costs by actively 
restricting time spent defending.  This will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 8. 
 
2.2 The Principle of Detachment 
 
Legislation and the Common Law 
 
The principle of detachment is enshrined in legislation, providing the basis for all other 
forms of regulation.  Section 17 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 sets out the 
objective of Part II of the legislation (‘Legal Services’) as being "the development of 
legal services . . . by making provision for new or better ways of providing such 
services and a wider choice of persons providing them, while maintaining the proper 
and efficient administration of justice."
406
  An important part of this ‘development’ is 
setting the standards required to obtain "a right of audience, or . . . a right to conduct 
litigation in relation to any court or proceedings".
407
  One of these standards is that the 
rules of conduct "of a body whose members are or will be providing advocacy 
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services"
408
 (e.g. criminal defence lawyers) make adequate provision to prevent 
members withholding services to clients "on the ground that the nature of the case is 
objectionable to him or to any section of the public . . . [or] on the ground that the 
conduct, opinions or beliefs of the prospective client are unacceptable to him or to any 
section of the public".
409
  Clearly, ‘a body’ includes all legal regulatory bodies, such as 
the SRA and BSB, whose rules of conduct criminal defence lawyers are subject to.  The 
principle of detachment is also recognized by the common law.   
 
In R v. Ulcay,
410
 Sir Igor Judge commented: 
 
"Counsel cannot choose his clients, or more accurately, cannot refuse to accept 
the instructions of a solicitor to act on behalf of an individual because of the 
nature of the charge he faces, or because of his character and reputation."
411
 
 
Similarly, in the case of Medcalf v. Mardell,
412
 Lord Hobhouse stated that "[u]npopular 
and seemingly unmeritorious litigants must be capable of being represented without the 
advocate being penalised or harassed whether by the executive, the judiciary or by 
anyone else."
413  
Both of these observations encapsulate the theoretical principle 
perfectly; defence lawyers are expected to act for clients who might be regarded as 
undeserving of legal protection or who have an objectionable cause.  In addition, they 
should not identify with, or be identified with, said client or cause.   
 
Professional Standards 
 
Like partisanship, the principle of detachment represents a core obligation binding 
criminal defence lawyers to their clients, and is manifested in all the main professional 
standards.  The Bar Code outlines one of its key purposes as being the provision of rules 
that require barristers "to be completely independent in conduct and in professional 
standing as sole practitioners."
414
  The professional standards require criminal defence 
                                                 
408
 Section 17(3)(c) - Courts and Legal Services Act 1990. 
409
 Section 17(3)(c) - Courts and Legal Services Act 1990.  
410
 [2008] 1 W.L.R. 1209. 
411
 Ibid., [39]. 
412
 [2003] 1 AC 141. 
413
 Ibid., 141. 
414
 [104(a)(i)], ‘Section 1:  The Code of Conduct’, Bar Standards Board Code of Conduct – Bar Standards 
Board, http://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/standardsandguidance/codeofconduct/: Last accessed 
16/08/2010. 
 90 
lawyers to be neutral and to refrain from moral judgment of the merits of a client’s case 
or character.  As such the Bar Code prohibits defence lawyers from expressing personal 
opinions when conducting themselves in court.
415  
The Bar Code lays out the basic 
principle of detachment in the following statement:  
 
"A barrister who supplies advocacy services must not withhold those services . . 
. on the ground that the nature of the case is objectionable to him or to any 
section of the public . . . [or] on the ground that the conduct, opinions or beliefs 
of the prospective client are unacceptable to him or to any section of the 
public."
416
 
 
The Solicitors’ Code replicates this statement in identical terms,417 as does the Law 
Society Code for Advocacy.
418
  Similarly, the Public Defender’s Code of Conduct states 
that a criminal defence lawyer "shall not refuse to advise, assist or represent a client 
because of the nature of the allegation or the client or because of the employee’s 
personal views."
419
 
 
The Principle of Detachment is best exemplified by the so-called "Cab-Rank Rule"
420
 
contained in the Bar Code.  This states that a barrister must: 
 
"[A]ccept any brief to appear before a Court in which he professes to practise . . . 
accept any instructions . . . act for any person on whose behalf he is instructed . . 
. and do so irrespective of . . . the party on whose behalf he is instructed . . . the 
nature of the case and . . . any belief or opinion which he may have formed as to 
the character, reputation, cause, conduct, guilt or innocence of that person."
421
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This rule is the cornerstone of the principle of detachment in relation to barristers.  The 
rule does not apply to solicitors as they are "generally free to decide whether or not to 
take on a particular client."
422 
 In Rondel v. Worsley,
423
 a landmark case on a barrister’s 
liability to his or her client for professional negligence, Lord Pearce stated the 
importance of the cab-rank rule in the context of detachment: 
 
"It is easier, pleasanter and more advantageous professionally for barristers to 
advise, represent or defend those who are decent and reasonable and likely to 
succeed in their action or their defence than those who are unpleasant, 
unreasonable, disreputable, and have an apparently hopeless case. Yet it would 
be tragic if our legal system came to provide no reputable defenders, 
representatives or advisers for the latter, and that would be the inevitable result 
of allowing barristers to pick and choose their clients."
424
 
 
Returning to R v. Ulcay,
425
 a criminal case, Sir Igor Judge affirmed that "[t]he cab-rank 
rule is essential to the proper administration of justice."
426
  Drawing on influential civil 
cases concerning the rule, including Rondel v. Worsley, he continued: 
 
"We simply emphasise that if the cab-rank rule creates obligations on counsel in 
civil proceedings, it does so with yet greater emphasis in criminal proceedings, 
not least because to a far greater extent than civil proceedings, criminal 
proceedings involve defendants charged with offences which attract strong 
public aversion, with the possibility of lengthy prison sentences, when more than 
ever, the administration of justice requires that the defendant should be properly 
represented . . ."
427
 
 
It seems well established that compulsory acceptance of work, the ultimate expression 
of detachment, is of paramount importance in the criminal justice system.  However, the 
cab-rank rule does contain a crucial caveat – the Bar Code states that a barrister "must 
not accept any instructions if to do so would cause him to be professionally 
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embarrassed".
428
 This is an umbrella exception which allows choice in the selection of 
clients in certain situations, for example: 
 
"[I]f [the barrister] lacks sufficient experience or competence to handle the 
matter . . . if having regard to his other professional commitments he will be 
unable to do or will not have adequate time and opportunity to prepare that 
which he is required to do . . . if the instructions seek to limit the ordinary 
authority or discretion of a barrister in the conduct of proceedings in Court or to 
require a barrister to act otherwise than in conformity with law or with the 
provisions of this Code . . ."
429
 
 
The exceptions to the cab-rank rule are open to interpretation and, as a result, criticism 
levelled at the rule is "largely directed at the possible evasion of the principle, rather 
than the principle itself."
430
  Such criticism has, over the years, created much debate 
about the value of the cab-rank rule and detachment in general.   
 
In Arthur J.S. Hall and Co. v. Simons,
431
 Lord Bingham seemed to view the cab-rank 
rule as relatively ineffective, stating: 
 
"It is a valuable professional rule. But its impact on the administration of justice 
in England is not great. In real life a barrister has a clerk whose enthusiasm for 
the unwanted brief may not be great, and he is free to raise the fee within limits. 
It is not likely that the rule often obliges barristers to undertake work which they 
would not otherwise accept."
432
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The BSB itself has been critical of the cab-rank rule.  In its consultation paper on the 
implications of the Legal Services Act 2007 for the regulation of barristers, the BSB 
highlighted:  
 
"Some argue that the 'cab-rank' rule is not required or justified by considerations 
of access to justice.  The rule does not apply to solicitors; and there is no 
evidence that members of the public are unable to find solicitors to represent 
them because of the nature of their case."
433
 
 
The paper added that, "the various exceptions to the 'cab-rank' rule enable barristers to 
avoid it for perfectly legitimate reasons, for example by deciding that they are too busy 
or by asking a high fee";
434
 this allows barristers to dodge undesirable clients by 
manipulative interpretation of the Bar Code.  In the context of criminal defence, the 
BSB made an important reference to what it termed "advice deserts in areas of publicly 
funded work",
435
 mostly made up of criminal and family work.  This is due to the fact 
that fees for criminal work are considered insufficient for the purpose of the cab-rank 
rule.  In September 2005, the BSB issued guidance for criminal barristers on the refusal 
of work.  It stated:  
 
"Until 15 November 2003, legally aided criminal defence work was deemed by 
the Code to be at a proper fee. On 15 November 2003, the Bar Council decided 
that criminal defence GFS cases should be excluded from the provision deeming 
them to be proper fees."
436
 
 
Since paragraph 604(b) of the Bar Code entitles barristers to refuse a case if the fee is 
not "proper", the above guidance suggests that defence barristers may, in fact, 
circumvent the cab-rank rule.  As a result, it has been commented that the cab-rank rule 
has, in reality, "not existed in publicly-funded work for several years".
437
  Considering 
that most criminal defence work is publicly funded, this raises the question as to 
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whether formal regulation really obligates the defence lawyer to be detached.   
 
Further doubts about the value of the cab-rank rule have been created by the Legal 
Services Act 2007.  The statute will allow barristers to work in ‘Alternative Business 
Structures’ (ABS) and ‘Legal Disciplinary Practices’ (LDP) which "allow lawyers and 
non-lawyers to work together to deliver legal and other services."
438
  In these structures, 
the cab-rank rule could prove a serious hindrance.  Where solicitors and barristers work 
together, problems of 'conflicting out' could arise. If a barrister is bound by the cab-rank 
rule to accept a brief, this could exclude the business from accepting other conflicting 
briefs.  This would not only limit the effectiveness of ABS, but would also contradict 
the principle that solicitors are "generally free to decide whether or not to take on a 
particular client."
439
  The cab-rank rule, applied in this context, is therefore deeply 
disadvantageous.  In the consultation paper referred to previously, the BSB recognised 
this problem, stating, "it will be difficult or impossible to impose a number of the rules 
governing self-employed barristers, notably the 'cab-rank' rule, on barristers working in 
ABS or LDP structures"
440
 because "[t]he acceptance or refusal of instructions will be a 
matter for the firm as a business entity, not for an individual taking part in it".
441
  As a 
result, the BSB concluded that "such firms or partnerships would be placed under such a 
disadvantage by this rule that it would be a considerable disincentive to them to form 
those structures, contrary to the legislative purpose."
442
  In the light of such a critical 
problem, the BSB suggested that "this may call into question whether those rules should 
continue apply to the self-employed bar".
443
  Such comments represent a real challenge 
to the validity and usefulness of the cab-rank rule and to the principle of detachment. 
 
Training 
 
There are few references to the principle of detachment in training materials.  The BVC 
‘Golden Book’ states that "the principle of professional independence"444 represents one 
of the core values underpinning the Bar Code.  Although open to interpretation, 
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‘professional independence’ could be said to embody the requirement that barristers 
disregard outside influences, such as the public, the media, friends and family, the court 
or even the client.  To suggest it requires them to act as neutral and non-judgmental is 
perhaps stretching the interpretation too far.  The only other meaningful reference is 
contained in ‘Criminal Litigation in Practice’,445 the training manual mentioned earlier.  
It suggested that the defence lawyer should remember the following:  
 
"You are not doing this for yourself.  You are doing it for your client.  Ignore 
your own worries and concerns."
446
  
 
This summarises the detached role of the defence lawyer succinctly; any moral qualms 
or personal doubts should be dismissed because professional defence lawyers are acting 
for defendants, not themselves. 
 
Other Relevant Standards 
 
The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and Legal Services Commission (LSC) consultation 
paper on quality assurance for criminal defence advocates contained one proposed 
standard reflective of the principle of detachment.  As a neutral advocate, the defence 
lawyer should advance the rights of a client regardless of his or her personal views, the 
opinion of the public or that of the court.  In the consultation paper, the spirit of this 
duty was captured in the requirement that defence counsel be "prepared to advance an 
argument that might not be popular".
447
  The Standard Crime Contract 2010 also has the 
potential to affect the detachment of publicly funded defence lawyers.  A ‘contract’ 
between defence lawyers and the LSC could obligate the lawyer to behave like an 
‘employee’ of the state; as such, the state could arguably influence the defence lawyer 
through the means of the contract.  Considering the adversarial criminal justice process 
pits the defendant against the state, this has potentially perilous consequences for the 
credibility of a detached defence lawyer.  However, the contract explicitly states that 
"[y]ou are, and acknowledge you are, an independent provider of legal services. You are 
not our employee, agent or partner (in law) and must neither act as such nor so as to 
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give the impression that you are our employee, agent or partner (in law)."
448
  Formally, 
this is an unambiguous statement that criminal defence lawyers are expected to be 
independent and free of influence from the state as its ‘contractor’.  Whether this 
reflects detachment in the theoretical sense is unclear.  In ‘Criminal Defence’,449 the 
authors address how a defence lawyer should approach a difficult, but important, 
situation:  when the lawyer suspects his or her client is guilty of the offence with which 
he or she is charged.  The advice is fairly unambiguous: 
 
"If you remain doubtful [about the client’s innocence], strive to avoid pre-
judgment and to remain detached.  If you think your client is guilty, that does not 
prevent you from fully defending him.  Your opinion may be erroneous and, in 
any event, it is not your function to judge your client."
450
 
 
This seems to reflect detachment as conceived in the ‘zealous advocate’ model; the 
defence lawyer is not charged with determining the client’s guilt or innocence.  He or 
she must provide detached, non-judgmental defence, regardless of personal beliefs. 
 
2.3 The Principle of Confidentiality 
 
Legislation and the Common Law 
 
In terms of legislation and common law, the principle of confidentiality is primarily 
embodied in the principle of ‘legal professional privilege’.  However, it is important to 
note that this is just one facet of the general duty of confidentiality incumbent upon a 
criminal defence lawyer.  For many years, legal privilege had been governed and 
developed by common law; with the advent of the PACE in 1984, this was given 
statutory definition under s.10, outlining "the scope of legal privilege in terms that 
would be instantly recognised by any lawyer as covering the position at common 
law".
451
  The statute recognises two distinct categories of legal privilege.  The first 
category provides that "communications between a professional legal adviser and his 
client or any person representing his client made in connection with the giving of legal 
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advice to the client"
452
 are subject to privilege.  This category is commonly known as 
‘legal advice privilege’ and "arises out of a relationship of confidence between lawyer 
and client."
453
  Not all communications relating to legal advice are protected – it seems 
that "[u]nless the communication or document for which privilege is sought is a 
confidential one, there can be no question of legal advice privilege arising."
454
  The 
legal advice privilege is a primary example of the principle of confidentiality as an 
obligation upon the criminal defence lawyer, and has been approved in strong terms in 
case law.   
 
In Three Rivers District Council and Others v. Governor and Company of the Bank of 
England (No 6),
455
 Lord Scott of Foscote stated: 
 
"[I]t is necessary in our society . . . that communications between clients and 
lawyers, whereby the clients are hoping for the assistance of the lawyers' legal 
skills in the management of their (the clients') affairs, should be secure against 
the possibility of any scrutiny from others . . . this idea . . . justifies . . . the 
retention of legal advice privilege in our law, notwithstanding that as a result 
cases may sometimes have to be decided in ignorance of relevant probative 
material."
456
 
 
The second category of legal privilege outlined in PACE protects "communications 
between a professional legal adviser and his client or any person representing his client 
or between such an adviser or his client or any such representative and any other person 
made in connection with or in contemplation of legal proceedings and for the purposes 
of such proceedings".
457
  Again, the common law has elaborated on this category, 
known as 'litigation privilege'.  According to Lord Carswell in Three Rivers, litigation 
privilege only arises when three conditions are met: "litigation must be in progress or in 
contemplation . . . the communications must have been made for the sole or dominant 
purpose of conducting that litigation . . . [and] the litigation must be adversarial, not 
investigative or inquisitorial."
458
  The major difference between the two categories of 
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privilege are therefore the nature of a communication – whether it is legal advice or in 
relation to litigation, commenced or in contemplation.   
 
They can also be distinguished because legal advice privilege is an ‘absolute’ right, 
whereas litigation privilege is not.  In R v. Derby Magistrates’ Court, ex parte B,459 it 
was held that "no exception should be allowed to the absolute nature of legal 
professional privilege, once established."
460
  The use of the umbrella term legal 
professional privilege suggested that both categories were ‘absolute’.  However, Lord 
Nicholls of Birkenhead clarified this, stating, "communications seeking professional 
legal advice, whether or not in connection with pending court proceedings, are 
absolutely and permanently privileged from disclosure even though, in consequence, the 
communications will not be available in court proceedings in which they might be 
important evidence."
461
  Additionally, the case of Re L (A Minor)
462
 distinguished Ex 
parte B as only applying "in the context of the relationship between solicitor and 
client."
463
  It was submitted by counsel that "the absolute nature of the privilege 
attaching to the solicitor-client relationship extended equally to all other forms of legal 
professional privilege."
464
  The court rejected this, stating that "[t]here is . . . a clear 
distinction between the privilege attaching to communications between solicitor and 
client and that attaching to reports by third parties prepared on the instructions of a 
client for the purposes of litigation."
465
  Furthermore, this case concerned care 
proceedings under the Children Act 1989, and the court concluded that "the primary 
consideration was and is the welfare of the child",
466
 clearly indicating that other factors 
can be taken into account in deciding whether to uphold privilege.   
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Thus, litigation privilege is not ‘absolute’ in the same way that legal advice privilege is.  
Lord Jauncey added:  
 
"[C]are proceedings are essentially non-adversarial.  Having reached that 
conclusion, and also that litigation privilege is essentially a creature of 
adversarial proceedings, it follows that the matter is at large for this House to 
determine what if any role it has to play in care proceedings."
467
   
 
This reinforces the conclusion that litigation privilege may be applicable at the 
discretion of the Court, whilst legal advice privilege is always applicable unless waived 
by the client 
 
Legal professional privilege of either category is "at the instance of the client",
468
 that is, 
the client may waive the right if he or she chooses.  Thus, the criminal defence lawyer is 
bound by the will of the client.  Waiver may take place expressly, for example "when 
[the client] elects to disclose communications which the privilege would entitle him not 
to disclose"
469
 or impliedly, for example by pursuing legal action against his or her 
lawyer.
470
  The point at which a reference to a privileged document constitutes implied 
waiver is the subject of some debate.  In Dunlop Slazenger International Limited v. Joe 
Bloggs Sports Limited,
471
 Waller LJ quoted Matthews and Malek in attempting to clarify 
the issue: 
 
"The key word here is ‘deploying’. A mere reference to a privileged document in 
an affidavit does not of itself amount to a waiver of privilege, and this is so even 
if the document referred to is being relied on for some purpose, for reliance in 
itself is said not to be the test. Instead, the test is whether the contents of the 
document are being relied on, rather than its effect."
472
 
 
Although the defence lawyer is, generally, bound by confidentiality until it is waived, 
there is an exception to this.  Section 10(2) of PACE states that "[i]tems held with the 
intention of furthering a criminal purpose are not items subject to legal privilege"; this is 
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known as the "Iniquity Exception".
473
  The word ‘held’ potentially limits the exception; 
since solicitors would normally ‘hold’ privileged items, the provision, interpreted 
literally, could only apply when a solicitor had the purpose of perpetrating a crime.  
However, in R v. Central Criminal Court, Ex Parte Francis & Francis,
474
 a majority of 
the House of Lords found that the exception could apply "to all documents prepared 
with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose whether the purpose be that of the 
client, the solicitor or any other person."
475
  This exception was justified in the case of 
In re McE,
476
 when Lord Hope stated: 
 
"The common law does not shut its eyes to the possibility that the 
communications between the detainee and the solicitor may be fraudulent or 
criminal.  Solicitors are of course expected to, and with rare exceptions do, act 
with complete propriety.  But it would be an abuse of the common law privilege 
for them to act as instruments or accomplices in the furtherance of the detainee's 
criminal activity . . ."
477
 
 
If confidentiality were allowed to shield the unlawful conduct of the defendant and 
other participants in the criminal justice process, then the process would no longer be 
legitimate. 
 
Professional Standards 
 
Within the ‘zealous advocate’ model, confidentiality represents a key supporting 
principle to the 'standard conception'.  It protects a client’s communications with his or 
her lawyer and manifests the undivided loyalty that defence lawyers owe to their clients, 
allowing, in theory, a frank and honest exchange between them.  This in turn should 
enable the criminal defence lawyer to advance the strongest possible case for the client.  
Although confidentiality is expressed in the form of legal professional privilege, all the 
professional standards outline a more broad duty of confidentiality.   
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The Bar Code states: 
 
"Whether or not the relation of counsel and client continues a barrister must 
preserve the confidentiality of the lay client's affairs and must not without the 
prior consent of the lay client or as permitted by law lend or reveal the contents 
of the papers in any instructions to or communicate to any third person . . . 
information which has been entrusted to him in confidence or use such 
information to the lay client's detriment or to his own or another client's 
advantage."
478
 
 
The Public Defender Service Code and the Law Society Code for Advocacy both have 
similar provisions.
479
  The Solicitors’ Code includes a shortened version of the 
obligation above,
480
 but does make an important point in the Guidance section.  It draws 
a contrast between legal professional privilege and the duty imposed in the code, 
stating: 
 
"It is important to bear in mind the distinction between this duty and the concept 
of law known as legal professional privilege.  The duty of confidentiality 
extends to all confidential information about a client’s affairs, irrespective of the 
source of the information . . . Legal professional privilege protects certain 
communications between you and your client from being disclosed, even in 
court."
481
 
 
Thus, it would seem that the principle of confidentiality as embodied in the codes 
extends beyond the borders outlined by legal professional privilege, encompassing ‘all 
confidential information’ and not just that which meets the criteria set by legislation and 
the common law.  However, it is important to bear in mind that legal professional 
privilege legally binds a criminal defence lawyer, whereas the codes professionally bind 
and will therefore have different consequences.  As the Solicitors’ Code says, "not all 
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communications are protected from disclosure and you should, if necessary, refer to an 
appropriate authority on the law of evidence."
482
  The Solicitors’ Code also imposes a 
duty not to act for a client when doing so might compromise the confidentiality of a 
current or former client; this situation arises where "[confidential] information might 
reasonably be expected to be material; and . . . that client has an interest adverse to the 
first-mentioned client or former client."
483
 
 
Training 
 
Training materials add little to formal conceptions of the principle of confidentiality.  
The LPC Written Guidelines merely require, under the 'Pervasive Areas' section, that 
professional conduct rules relating to confidentiality are something students must be 
"familiar with",
484
 a somewhat underwhelming statement.  Similarly, the ‘standards of 
competence’ for the Police Station Qualification simply state that "instructions are taken 
from the client and any information obtained is kept confidential."
485
 
 
Other Relevant Standards 
 
Other relevant standards mention confidentiality, but only repeat references that have 
already been covered. 
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3. The Duty to the Court  
 
3.1 The Principle of Procedural Justice 
 
Legislation and the Common Law 
 
The ‘zealous advocate’ model specified three umbrella duties incumbent upon criminal 
defence lawyers.  Of these, the duty to the court is best exemplified by the principle of 
procedural justice; that is, to aid the court in the fair and balanced administration of 
justice.  In terms of formal regulation, the primary representations of this are contained 
in statute.  The Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 states that "[e]very person who 
exercises before any court a right of audience granted by an authorised body has . . . a 
duty to the court to act with independence in the interests of justice".
486  
This statement 
infers that the defence lawyer has a duty to promote the interests of justice and must 
consider the needs of justice independently, free of the influence of the client's interests.  
To some extent, this summarises the role of amicus curiae and reflects the theoretical 
role of 'officer of the court'.  Similarly, the case of Medcalf v. Mardell
487
 states quite 
simply that lawyers, including defence lawyers, "must respect and uphold the authority 
of the court".
488
  Other expressions of procedural justice do not explicitly refer to a duty 
to pursue ‘justice’, but do obligate the defence lawyer to aid the court and in some ways 
that work against defendant interests.  A prime example is the duty of disclosure 
incumbent upon the defence.  The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 
states that "the accused must give a defence statement to the court and the 
prosecutor";
489
 in addition, the CPR strongly suggest that this duty extends to the 
defence lawyer personally.
490
   
 
The defence statement imposes significant duties of disclosure upon the accused and his 
or her lawyer; the statement must set out "in general terms the nature of the accused’s 
defence . . . indicating the matters on which he takes issue with the prosecution, and . . . 
setting out, in the case of each such matter, the reason why he takes issue with the 
prosecution."
491
  The Criminal Justice Act 2003 inserted an additional section into the 
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aforementioned statute, expanding the scope of defence statement.  The new section 
states that it must specify "the nature of the accused’s defence, including any particular 
defences on which he intends to rely",
492
 suggesting a more detailed description is 
required.  It should also contain "any point of law . . . which he wishes to take, and any 
authority on which he intends to rely for that purpose",
493
 as well as "a notice indicating 
whether he intends to call any persons (other than himself) as witnesses at his trial"
494
 
including their "name, address and date of birth".
495
  In addition, the Criminal Justice 
and Immigration Act 2008 added a further requirement that the defence statement must 
set out "particulars of the matters of fact on which [the accused] intends to rely for the 
purposes of his defence".
496
  If these rules are not adhered to then "the court or any other 
party may make such comment as appears appropriate"
497
 and "the court or jury may 
draw such inferences as appear proper in deciding whether the accused is guilty of the 
offence concerned."
498
 
 
The defence statement is a prime example of the criminal defence lawyer’s duty to 
facilitate the administration of justice.  The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 
1996 emerged in the wake of the 'Royal Commission on Criminal Justice',
499
 which 
criticised the fact that the defence could "require the police and prosecution to comb 
through large masses of material in the hope either of causing delay or chancing upon 
something that would induce the prosecution to drop the case rather than to have to 
disclose the material concerned".
500
  The defence statement was designed to alter this 
situation, ensuring that the defendant, and as such the defence lawyer, cooperated with 
the court and the trial process.  In addition, it has been stated that "the defence statement 
is intended to eliminate the ‘ambush’ defence",501 requiring that all defence evidence 
and argument is presented in a timely and fair fashion.  It is important to note that the 
requirement to serve a defence statement only applies where a person is charged with an 
indictable offence.
502
  The provision of a defence statement is voluntary in the case of a 
summary trial, although the impact of the CPR on this will be discussed further in 
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Chapter 4.  These obligations are clearly designed to facilitate a speedy, open, effective, 
and procedure-driven process, free from delays and ambushes. 
 
Leading case law appears to support this conclusion.  In both DPP v. Hughes
503
 and R v. 
Gleeson,
504
 defence counsel attempted to enter ‘surprise’ defences at a late stage in the 
proceedings.  In the former case, the defence submitted there was no case to answer, 
exploiting a hole in the prosecution’s evidence.  The court rejected this, saying: 
 
"Ambushes of the kind attempted in this case are to be discouraged and 
discountenanced. Criminal proceedings are not a game: their object is to achieve 
a fair determination of the innocence or guilt of the defendant."
505
   
 
In R v. Gleeson, the defence submitted no case to answer having not disclosed, in 
advance, a flaw in the prosecution case which related to the charge.  The prosecution 
application to have the indictment amended was accepted and the defence application to 
have a fresh trial rejected.  On appeal, the defence argued that by disclosing its 
argument, tactical advantage would have been lost.  Auld LJ dismissed this, stating: 
 
"[F]or defence advocates to seek to take advantage of such errors by deliberately 
delaying identification of an issue of fact or law in the case until the last possible 
moment is . . . no longer acceptable, given the legislative and procedural changes 
to our criminal justice process in recent years."
506
 
 
In DPP v. Chorley Justices
507
 the defendant had been charged with drink-driving, but 
submitted a plea of no case to answer on the basis that documents had not been served 
on him.  Again, the defence was raised at a late stage and had not been mentioned at all 
earlier in proceedings.   
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In response, Thomas LJ said: 
 
"The pertinent point relevant to what happened in this case is the early 
identification of the real issues . . . If a defendant refuses to identify what the 
issues are, one thing is clear: he can derive no advantage from that or seek, as 
appears to have happened in this case, to attempt an ambush at trial. The days of 
ambushing and taking last minute technical points are gone."
508
 
 
Similarly, in Writtle v. DPP
509
 the defence attempted to introduce expert evidence, and 
consequently a host of new issues, at a very late stage.  Simon J criticised this, saying, 
"[t]he days when the defence can assume that they will be able successfully to ambush 
the prosecution are over."
510
 
 
The CPR also reflect the importance of the principle of procedural justice.  The 
"participants in a criminal case",
511
 which includes criminal defence lawyers, must 
"prepare and conduct the case in accordance with the overriding objective".
512
  The 
‘overriding objective’ outlines a number of targets to be met by the court and 
‘participants’, including "dealing with the case efficiently and expeditiously".513  The 
Rules expand on this.  Under Rule 3.2, the court's duties include "the early identification 
of the real issues", "ensuring that evidence . . . is presented in the shortest and clearest 
way", "discouraging delay, dealing with as many aspects of the case as possible on the 
same occasion" and "encouraging the participants to co-operate in the progression of the 
case".
514
  According to Rule 3.3, "each party . . . must actively assist the court in 
fulfilling its duty under Rule 3.2",
515
 which insinuates a shared burden of responsibility 
between the court, the prosecution and the defence in achieving the requirements 
outlined above.  Rule 3.10 further outlines that the court may require a party, including 
the defendant and his or her lawyer, to identify "which witnesses he intends to give oral 
evidence", "what written evidence he intends to introduce" and "whether he intends to 
raise any point of law that could affect the conduct of the trial or appeal".
516
  In 
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summary, the rules eliminate almost any opportunity for the criminal defence lawyer to 
‘surprise’ the court.  Any tactical advantage that might be gained by the defence lawyer 
keeping "his case close to his chest"
517
 is, as far as the formal rules are concerned, no 
longer an option.   
 
The importance of the CPR was reinforced in December 2009.  Lord Justice Leveson, 
the senior presiding judge for England and Wales, issued a document entitled ‘Essential 
Case Management:  Applying the Criminal Procedure Rules’.518  Its general theme was 
to firmly remind parties involved in criminal procedure of their obligations; this 
included highlighting the following:  
 
"The Rules are not mere guidance. Compliance is compulsory. The word 'must' 
in the Rules means must."   
 
Of most relevance to the defence lawyer was the assertion that: 
 
"The key to effective case management is the early identification by the court of 
the relevant disputed issues . . . From the start, the parties must identify those 
issues and tell the court what they are . . . If the parties do not tell the court, the 
court must require them to do so." 
 
This 'reminder' makes it plain that case management is a very prominent and central part 
of the defence lawyer’s role as an actor in criminal proceedings.  These legislative, 
managerial objectives do reflect the principle of procedural justice, where the "highest 
loyalty is . . . to procedures and institutions".
519
  Arguably, these provisions take the 
principle much further than the obligations embodied in the 'zealous advocate' model. 
 
Professional Standards 
 
All of the professional standards governing the work of criminal defence lawyers 
feature obligations that reflect the principle of procedural justice, if only at a fairly 
vague and superficial level.  The Bar Code states that "[a] barrister has an overriding 
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duty to the Court to act with independence in the interests of justice: he must assist the 
Court in the administration of justice".
520
  This includes taking "all reasonable and 
practicable steps to avoid unnecessary expense or waste of the Court's time".
521  
The 
Solicitors' Code is equally unequivocal – the opening rule of the code states: "[y]ou 
must uphold the rule of law and the proper administration of justice."
522
  The Public 
Defender Service Code requires that defence lawyers "discharge their duties in a way 
which is consistent with the proper and efficient administration of justice",
523
 while the 
Law Society Code for Advocacy asserts the primacy of the duty to the court stating that 
"advocates have an overriding duty to the court to ensure in the public interest that the 
proper and efficient administration of justice is achieved".
524
 
 
Training 
 
The BVC ‘Golden Book’ places the principle of procedural justice firmly among the 
central duties of a lawyer.  Under the guidelines on ‘Professional Ethics and Conduct’, it 
is stated that commitment "to maintaining . . . the proper and efficient administration of 
justice and to the Rule of Law"
525
 is a core principle underpinning the Bar Code of 
Conduct, and thus the role of the criminal defence lawyer.  As regards Accreditation 
training, the ‘standards of competence’ for the Magistrates’ Court Qualification merely 
state a solicitor must have an understanding of his or her "duty to the court",
526
 a brief 
and unhelpful statement of the defence lawyer’s requirement to aid in the administration 
of justice. 
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Other Relevant Standards 
 
It is arguable that the principle of procedural justice has become a more and more 
prominent feature of modern regulation of the criminal defence lawyer’s role.  An 
indicative source is the ‘Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales’527 
conducted by Auld LJ, in which he referred scathingly to "the uncooperative or feckless 
defendant and/or his defence advocate who considers that the burden of proof and his 
client's right to silence justifies frustration of the orderly preparation of both sides' case 
for trial".
528
  He continued: 
 
"[T]o delay telling the court and the prosecution what [the defendant] challenges 
as a matter of tactics, has nothing to do with the burden and standard of proof or 
his right of silence. Those fundamental principles are there to protect the 
innocent defendant from wrongful conviction, not to enable the guilty defendant 
to engage in tactical manoeuvres designed to frustrate a fair hearing and just 
outcome on the issues he intends to take."
529
 
 
In addition, he stated: 
 
"Equally untenable is the suggestion that defence by ambush is a permissible 
protection against the possibility of dishonesty of police and/or prosecutors in 
the conduct of the prosecution."
530
 
 
In summary, Auld LJ asserted that "the sooner [a defendant] tells the court and the 
prosecutor the better, so that both sides knows the battleground and its extent"
531
 and 
that defence lawyers should no longer be able to "make it as procedurally difficult as 
possible for the prosecution to prove their guilt regardless of cost and disruption to 
others involved."
532
 
 
Another source reflecting this sea-change was the government white paper, ‘Justice for 
All’, published in 2002.  The paper laid out future, wide-ranging reforms of the criminal 
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justice system.  In the section, ‘The Need for Reform’, the desire to stamp out what 
were perceived to be disruptive defence methods was obvious in the assertion that: 
 
"While the fundamental principle remains that the prosecution must prove its 
case, this does not mean that the system should enable a defendant to obstruct 
justice by inaction or by abuse of the process. Defence lawyers have a duty to 
test the prosecution case, but also have obligations to the court as well as to their 
clients."
533
 
 
Reforms would work towards ensuring that the defence could no longer use "delay and 
obstruction . . . as a tactic to avoid a rightful conviction."
534
  The most unambiguous 
signal of intent was represented by the statement below: 
 
"We believe these changes will substantially improve prosecution disclosure and 
reduce the scope for tactical manoeuvring by the defence.  They will reinforce 
the professional obligation on defence lawyers to assist decision-making by the 
courts by defining and clarifying the issues in the case."
535
 
 
These statements summarise the gradual evolution of the defence lawyer’s duty to 
procedural justice.  Examples such as the expansion of the defence statement in the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the introduction of the CPR in 2005 represent the shifting 
attitude of the courts regarding frustrating defence tactics.  The launch of "Criminal 
Justice: Simple, Speedy, Summary" (CJSSS), a policy drive rolled out in 2006, further 
strengthened the 'need for speed' in defence work.  The official aim of CJSSS was, and 
is, "improving the speed and effectiveness of Magistrates’ and Youth Courts",536 
primarily by "reduc[ing] the number of hearings . . . [and] the average time taken from 
charge to disposal".
537
  CJSSS is applicable to all parties in the criminal justice system, 
including "magistrates, district judges, defence, prosecutors, the police, probation and 
the courts",
538
 with the aim of "tackling delay and improving efficiency . . . improv[ing] 
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the speed and effectiveness with which cases proceed and improv[ing] the way cases are 
managed."
539
  The scheme has permeated every aspect of summary criminal justice and 
fundamentally altered the approach of all actors, particularly the criminal defence 
lawyer, to the justice process.  The requirement that the defence lawyer engage with 
CJSSS is a concrete example of the principle of procedural justice. 
 
The proposed Quality Assurance Scheme discussed earlier also reflects a shift in the 
defender’s role, containing some interesting provisions that echo the principle of 
procedural justice.  The revised competency framework, issued in 2010, appears to 
place great emphasis on the defence lawyer’s role as a facilitator of the justice process.  
It suggests that the defence lawyer should [a]ssist . . . the court with the proper 
administration of justice"
540
 and "[o]bserve . . . [the] duty to the court and duty to act 
with independence".
541
  In addition, it must be demonstrated that the lawyer "[c]omplies 
with appropriate Procedural Rules and judicial directions",
542
 "[p]rovides appropriate 
disclosure of evidence"
543
 and "[m]akes only relevant submissions".
544
  All of these 
standards seem to emphasise the centrality of the principle of procedural justice in the 
role of the criminal defence lawyer.  Finally, the ‘Standard Crime Contract 2010’ 
exemplifies the drive for efficiency and economy in the criminal justice system.  The 
contract outlines that the LSC are bound by legislation "to aim to obtain the best 
possible value for money"
545
 in providing criminal defence services.  This is followed 
by the requirement that that the criminal defence lawyer and the LSC "agree to work 
together in mutual trust and co-operation to achieve this aim."
546
  The increased 
emphasis on efficiency and expediency characterised by formal conceptions of 
procedural justice has arguably been driven this desire to achieve 'value for money', 
something which will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
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3.2 The Principle of Truth-Seeking 
 
Legislation and the Common Law 
 
The primary legislative manifestation of truth-seeking is contained in the Criminal Law 
Act 1967.  Under s. 4(1), it is stated that:  
 
"Where a person has committed a relevant offence, any other person who, 
knowing or believing him to be guilty of the offence or of some other relevant 
offence, does without lawful authority or reasonable excuse any act with intent 
to impede his apprehension or prosecution shall be guilty of an offence." 
 
This obligation makes it reasonably clear that the defence lawyer cannot lie about the 
innocence of the client.  If a client admits to his or her defence lawyer that they have 
committed the offence but want the lawyer to assert a false defence, the lawyer would 
likely be committing a criminal offence if he or she obliged.  What one can conclude is 
that the criminal defence lawyer’s obligations to tell the truth and avoid deception take 
primacy over obedience to the client.  The CPR seem to support this.  The ‘overriding 
objective’ involves "[d]ealing with a criminal case justly", including "acquitting the 
innocent and convicting the guilty".
547
  This goal is the central rationale behind truth-
seeking, and since all participants in the process must help fulfil the 'overriding 
objective', helping to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent is therefore part of the 
defence lawyer’s role. The rules also contain other obligations which seem to promote 
the pursuit of honesty, openness and truth.  For example, "the early identification of the 
real issues",
548
 the revelation of "witnesses [the defence] intends to give oral evidence", 
disclosure of "what written evidence [the defence] intends to introduce" and notice of 
"whether [the defence] intends to raise any point of law that could affect the conduct of 
the trial or appeal".
549   
In 2008, the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act added a 
notable requirement to the list of contents for the defence statement; it should contain 
"any point of law (including any point as to the admissibility of evidence or an abuse of 
process) which [the defendant] wishes to take, and any authority on which he intends to 
rely for that purpose."
550
  The requirement to indicate any issues relating to 'abuse of 
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process' potentially imposes an active duty on the defence lawyer to correct any errors 
made by police or prosecution, which the defence might otherwise exploit.  Arguably, 
this means the truth must come before tactics. 
 
Common law appears to support the contention that the defence lawyer must seek the 
truth.  In Arthur J.S. Hall and Co. v. Simons,
551
 Lord Hope outlined the extent of this 
duty: 
 
"The advocate’s duty to the court is not just that he must not mislead the court, 
that he must ensure that the facts are presented fairly and that he must draw the 
attention of the court to the relevant authorities even if they are against him."
552
 
 
Even if legal authority undermines the client's case and damages his or her chance of 
success, the defence lawyer is obliged to disclose all authorities.  Again, the truth comes 
first.  R v. Gleeson,
553
 referred to earlier, outlines the most explicit statement of the 
criminal defence lawyer’s obligation to seek the truth.  Reading the court’s judgment, 
Auld LJ opted "to repeat and adopt the extra-judicial sentiments . . . in the 'Report of the 
Criminal Courts Review'",
554
 which stated: 
 
"A criminal trial is not a game under which a guilty defendant should be 
provided with a sporting chance. It is a search for truth in accordance with the 
twin principles that the prosecution must prove its case and that a defendant is 
not obliged to inculpate himself, the object being to convict the guilty and acquit 
the innocent."
555
 
 
This statement appears to suggest that the defence lawyer must actively contribute to the 
search for the truth, regardless of the conflicting interests of a defendant.   
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In terms of the defence lawyer's duty to correct flaws in the case, Auld LJ asserted: 
 
"For defence advocates to seek to take advantage of such errors by deliberately 
delaying identification of an issue of fact or law in the case until the last possible 
moment is, in our view, no longer acceptable . . . and not in the legitimate 
interests of the defendant." 
 
Such an explicit statement is interesting, not only because of its unambiguous 
endorsement of the defence lawyer's obligation to aid truth-seeking, but because of the 
phrase ‘the legitimate interests of the defendant’.  The word ‘legitimate’ suggests that 
only interests that are rightful or deserved may be pursued; for example, a defendant 
attempting to escape conviction on the basis of a prosecution error alone would not be 
pursuing his or her ‘legitimate’ interests.  The inference is that if the defendant only has 
a ‘technical’ defence, rather than a substantial or meritorious defence, then he or she has 
no ‘legitimate’ interest in acquittal.  Such a statement has significant potential to limit 
the defence lawyer’s role as a partisan advocate and expand the role as a truth-seeker, as 
well as presenting a considerable challenge to the presumption of innocence. 
 
Professional Standards 
 
The professional standards explicitly reflect the principle of truth-seeking.  The Bar 
Code states: 
 
"A barrister . . . must not deceive or knowingly or recklessly mislead the 
Court."
556
 
 
                                                 
556
 [302], ‘Section 1:  The Code of Conduct’, Bar Standards Board Code of Conduct – Bar Standards 
Board, http://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/standardsandguidance/codeofconduct/: Last accessed 
16/08/2010. 
 
 115 
It later expands on this, reinforcing the importance of adhering to the truth in presenting 
a client's case: 
 
"A barrister must not devise facts which will assist in advancing the lay client's 
case and must not draft any statement of case, witness statement, affidavit, 
notice of appeal or other document containing . . . any statement of fact or 
contention which is not supported by the lay client or by his instructions . . . any 
contention which he does not consider to be properly arguable . . ."
557
  
 
This principle is not limited to the defence barrister’s dealings with his or her client.  He 
or she "must not . . . encourage a witness to give evidence which is untruthful or which 
is not the whole truth".
558  
Like legislation and common law, the Bar Code stresses the 
importance of sharing all legal authorities with the court and correcting any flaws in the 
process.  Rule 708 (c) states that a barrister "must ensure that the Court is informed of 
all relevant decisions and legislative provisions of which he is aware, whether the effect 
is favourable or unfavourable towards the contention for which he argues", and that he 
or she "must bring any procedural irregularity to the attention of the Court during the 
hearing and not reserve such matter to be raised on appeal".
559
  Although the phrase 
'during the hearing' arguably leaves some leeway for ambushing, the general intention 
of the provision appears to reflect the principle that the defence should highlight an 
error rather than exploit it, as expressed in R v. Gleeson. 
 
The Solicitor’s Code is unequivocal about the obligation to seek the truth, stating "[y]ou 
must never deceive or knowingly or recklessly mislead the court."
560  
As with the Bar 
Code, it also asserts that solicitors must "draw to the court’s attention . . . relevant cases 
and statutory provisions . . . the contents of any document that has been filed in the 
proceedings where failure to draw it to the court’s attention might result in the court 
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being misled and . . . any procedural irregularity."
561
  Similarly, the Public Defender 
Service Code expects an employee to "act with honesty and integrity in carrying out his 
or her duties on behalf of the salaried service",
562
 while the Law Society Code for 
Advocacy states that advocates must not engage in behaviour that is "dishonest or 
otherwise discreditable".
563
  In the case of a confession of guilt, the criminal defence 
lawyer cannot lie or assert the defendant's innocence.  As is reflected elsewhere, "[s]uch 
a confession . . . imposes very strict limitations on the conduct of the defence";
564
 in 
particular, the defence barrister "must not assert as true that which he knows to be false . 
. . [and] must not connive at, much less attempt to substantiate, a fraud."
565
  This also 
seems to align with s.4 of the Criminal Law Act 1967, mentioned earlier. 
 
Training 
 
No training materials make explicit or implicit reference to the principle of truth-
seeking. 
 
Other Relevant Standards 
 
The proposed Quality Assurance Scheme for defence lawyers contributes to formal 
conceptions of the principle of truth-seeking.  The original competency framework 
contained several examples; in the section entitled ‘Integrity’, under Paragraph E of 
Annex 1, it was stated that defence advocates should "[be] honest and straightforward in 
professional dealings, including with the court and all parties",
566
 "not mislead, conceal 
or create a false impression"
567
 and "[w]here appropriate refer . . . to authorities adverse 
to the lay client’s case."568   
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However, by 2010, the competency framework had been reduced to only one reference: 
 
"Advises the court of adverse authorities and, where they arise, procedural 
irregularities."
569
 
 
These are, of course, prime examples of the duty to seek the truth.  The removal of the 
obligations 'not to mislead' and 'be honest' is perhaps not as significant as one might 
initially assume though.  These are fairly uncontentious duties and are unlikely to have 
been removed because they do not apply to criminal defence lawyers.  Rather, it seems 
likely they were removed for practical reasons.  Those consulted about the competency 
framework raised concerns about some of the proposed standards.  The analysis of these 
concerns concluded that "the level of detail was too elaborate, complex, 
disproportionate and should be simplified: some of the behaviours were considered to 
be subjective and difficult to measure",
570
 and it may well be for the above reasons that 
such standards were removed. 
 
Like other sources, the ‘Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales’571 also 
stressed the importance of correcting procedural errors rather than taking advantage of 
them.  In it, Auld LJ explained that: 
 
"A defendant's right to a fair trial . . . do[es] not entitle him to ignore the error 
hoping for a better chance of acquittal or in the hope, if there is a conviction, of 
getting it quashed in the Court of Appeal."
572
 
 
The words of the Bar Code at rule 708(d) mirror this statement, presumably because the 
Code was changed in the light of the review's conclusions.  This analysis is leant 
credence by the fact that, in the paragraph preceding the above quote, Auld LJ asserted 
that where regulation allowed a defence lawyer to leave an error uncorrected, "both the 
law and the codes should be changed to require it".
573
  The wording of rule 708(d) 
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suggests that this is exactly what happened. 
 
4. The Duty to the Public 
 
4.1 The Principle of Morality 
 
Legislation and the Common Law 
 
Although the principle of morality is manifested in various other sources, legislation 
makes few references of any relevance.  The ‘overriding objective’ of the CPR provides 
a clue as to the sort of behaviour expected, stating that "criminal cases must be dealt 
with justly",
574
 a provision that must be complied with by all ‘participants’ in a case.  
This includes "respecting the interests of witnesses, victims and jurors",
575
 an obligation 
which suggests something outside of the twin duties of loyalty to the client and the 
court.  The requirement to ‘respect’ witnesses and victims reflects the spirit of ‘doing 
the right thing’ embodied in the theoretical conception of morality.  Additionally, as 
mentioned previously, the ‘overriding objective’ also includes "acquitting the innocent 
and convicting the guilty",
576
 which is arguably an inherently moral pursuit.  
 
Professional Standards 
 
The principle of morality rests on the idea that a criminal defence lawyer is a public 
servant whose master, ultimately, is the public.  Therefore, a defence lawyer, in the 
course of his or her work, should consider the ethical implications of representing a 
client in the context of the interests of the greater good.  This ideal is not explicit in the 
professional standards, but is implied by several provisions.  For example, the Bar Code 
states that barristers "must not make statements or ask questions which are merely 
scandalous or intended or calculated only to vilify, insult or annoy either a witness or 
some other person".
577
  This establishes a standard of expected ethical behaviour which 
may actually limit, from a partisan perspective, the ability of a criminal defence lawyer 
to do all he or she can for the client.  Additionally, the broad requirement that a barrister 
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must not "compromise his professional standards in order to please his client"
578
 reflects 
the theoretical principle.  Rule 708(j) of the Code arguably supplies an example of the 
above; it states that a defence barrister "must not . . . make any defamatory aspersion on 
the conduct of any other person", inferring that the defender should not stoop to petty 
insults simply to undermine or provoke opposing witnesses.  Such behaviour would 
arguably 'compromise his professional standards'. 
 
Similarly to the Bar Code, the Solicitors' Code states that a solicitor "must not say 
anything which is merely scandalous or intended only to insult a witness or any other 
person",
579  
again suggesting that using immoral tactics, such as subtle slander or 
character-bashing, to advance the client's cause are not acceptable.  As was mentioned 
earlier, the Solicitors’ Code asserts that solicitors are "generally free to decide whether 
or not to take on a particular client".
580
  The implication is that a defence solicitor could 
refuse to represent a morally objectionable client or cause.  Once a client has been taken 
on, a solicitor "must act with integrity",
581
 a wide provision which appears to be directed 
at encouraging some form of ethical behaviour.  However, it is unclear whether this 
includes upholding moral values and acting in an ‘ethical’ manner.  The Guidance Notes 
of the code elaborate, stating "[p]ersonal integrity is central to your role as the client’s 
trusted adviser and must characterise all your professional dealings – with clients, the 
court, other lawyers and the public."
582
  If the defence lawyer believes the behaviour 
required of him might compromise his integrity, he or she can cease to act for their 
client.  However, the Code states that "[y]ou may only end the relationship with the 
client if there is a good reason" examples including "where there is a breakdown in 
confidence between you and the client, and where you are unable to obtain proper 
instructions."
583
  The phrase 'breakdown in confidence' is open to interpretation.  The 
defence lawyer may not trust his or her client or feel able to act for someone without 
damaging his or her integrity.  These are merely suggestions.  In general, these 
provisions seem only to hint at some kind of obligation of moral behaviour and are 
unlikely to prove useful in a practical situation of moral conflict.  The only other 
expression of the principle of morality is a provision in the Public Defender Service 
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Code which requires defence counsel to display "courteousness, mutual respect and 
professionalism."
584
 
 
Training 
 
The BVC ‘Golden Book’ outlines a variety of aims central to the course.  The principle 
of morality appears to be reflected in the statement, "the course will . . . inculcate a 
professional and ethical approach to practice as a barrister".
585
  In addition, the 
‘Professional Ethics and Conduct’ section states that students must have an 
understanding of the "principle of integrity".
586
  Again, the meaning of 'integrity' is 
undefined and open to interpretation.  One would assume it is designed to ensure trainee 
barristers behave as responsible and honest professionals, throughout their studies and 
practice. 
 
Other relevant standards 
 
The proposed Quality Assurance Scheme provides an interesting insight into formal 
conceptions of morality from the viewpoint of the government.  In the ‘Working With 
Others’ section of the original standards, there were proposed requirements for criminal 
defence lawyers to be "candid with the lay client"
587
 and "advance . . . arguments in a 
way that reflect . . . appropriate consideration of the perspective of everyone involved in 
the case."
588
  These standards imply that advice to the client should not be driven purely 
by the client’s wishes and the pursuit of victory.  The defence lawyer should be frank, 
honest and ethical in advising a client, and in dealings with witnesses and victims 
should exercise a degree of empathy.  Additionally, the more general provision that 
defence lawyers should act "in professional life in such a way as to maintain the high 
reputation of advocates"
589
 appears to be an effort to encourage avoidance of less 
palatable methods of defence, which might otherwise compromise the profession's 
reputation for fair and ethical behaviour.  However, as with other principles, these 
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references to the principle of morality have now been removed.  That being said, the 
competency framework proposed in February 2010 does contain one important standard 
requiring defence lawyers to "deal . . . appropriately with vulnerable witnesses."
590
  
Although brief, this duty seemingly expects a defence lawyer to treat vulnerable 
witnesses, most likely a complainant, with care and restraint.  Subjecting a vulnerable 
witness to humiliation and embarrassment in order to score points for the defendant 
would arguably be considered an immoral practice.  Presumably, 'dealing appropriately' 
with the vulnerable is aimed at discouraging this sort of behaviour. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The 'zealous advocate' model does find expression in formal conceptions of the criminal 
defence lawyer's role, as manifested in the regulation covered in this chapter.  All of the 
principles (perhaps with the exclusion of morality) are, to some extent, described in a 
substantial form by legislation, common law, professional standards, training materials 
and other relevant standards.  However, it is arguable that formal regulation outlines 
significantly different versions of the obligations embodied in the principles of the 
'zealous advocate' model.  Whereas the theoretical model placed more emphasis on the 
'standard conception', representing the core of the theoretical defence role, formal 
conceptions extend the obligations to the court beyond the traditional boundaries.  
Formal conceptions of partisanship are more restrained and often counter-balanced with 
language encouraging cooperative, court-orientated conduct.  Formal conceptions of the 
principles of procedural justice and truth-seeking appear to have more emphasis than 
under the 'zealous advocate' model and often seem to be the defender's primary duty.  
This perhaps suggests a shift away from the traditional values underpinning criminal 
defence work, although it should be recognised that partisanship remains an important 
formal obligation and that detachment and confidentiality appear to be substantially the 
same in formal and theoretical conceptions of the role.  This 'shift' illustrates the 
ongoing competition between different aspects of the defence lawyer's role.  Both 
Chapters 1 and 2 underline the potential incompatibility of the duties to the client, the 
court and the public.  The battle for primacy between the principles, both in theoretical 
and formal conceptions, creates difficulty for theorists seeking to define the role of the 
defence lawyer, draftsmen attempting to describe the role and, ultimately, the 
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practitioner trying to perform the role.  These 'conflict points' will be explored in 
Chapter 4, providing insight into incompatibilities and assessing their affect on 
conceptions of the role. 
 
 123 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 – Conflicts in the Theoretical and  
Formal Conceptions of the Role 
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1. Introduction 
 
The ‘zealous advocate’ model is not without inconsistencies and clashes.  This chapter 
will consider conflicts between the duties and obligations embodied in both the 
theoretical model and formal regulation.  These conflict points represent a crucial aspect 
of theoretical and formal conceptions of the criminal defence lawyer's role; to assess the 
relevance and usefulness of these conceptions, one must question whether such conflicts 
can be resolved and, if so, how.  Where two or more duties are in conflict and the 
resolution is unclear, the task of describing the defence lawyer’s role becomes complex 
and debatable.  For example, if the principles of confidentiality and truth-seeking come 
into conflict, one cannot decisively describe what the defence lawyer’s role would be in 
a given situation.  In effect, we need to know which principle ‘wins out’ in order to 
accurately outline theoretical and formal conceptions of the role.  In terms of the 
‘zealous advocate’ model, this lack of clarity causes a headache for those searching for 
coherent and definitive conceptions of the role, generating uncertainty.  However, in 
relation to formal and practical conceptions, unresolved ethical conflict can prevent 
defence lawyers performing their work, at least in a consistent way.  Thus, the conflict 
points are the key signifiers of what the criminal defence lawyer’s role really is.  
Identification of unresolved ethical conflicts should undoubtedly inform future changes 
in legislation, professional codes, training materials and other standards which define 
the role of the criminal defence lawyer in England and Wales.  After all, formal 
guidance should make a defence lawyer’s role clear and their work easier to perform; 
vague and contradictory obligations do not achieve this.  Some of the conflict points 
explored also represent what appears to be a changing attitude toward the core 
principles of the adversarial system, as referred to at the end of Chapter 3.  This chapter 
will engage in debate about the effect on principles such as the presumption of 
innocence, the prosecution burden of proof and right against self-incrimination, which 
traditionally provide protection for defendants.  
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This chapter will focus on describing incompatibilities in both the theoretical model and 
formal conceptions of the role in the context of the four identifiable conflict points: 
 
Confidentiality v. Procedural Justice and Truth-Seeking 
 
Partisanship v. Morality 
 
Detachment v. Morality 
 
Partisanship v. Procedural Justice and Truth-Seeking 
 
These appear to me to be the key areas of conflict within the conceptions of the defence 
lawyer's role.  I initially settled on these conflicts during the extensive exploration of 
academic literature, undertaken for Chapter 2.  I felt that the six principles of the 
‘zealous advocate’ model displayed obvious incompatibilities.  For example, whereas 
confidentiality requires secrecy, truth-seeking and procedural justice require openness, 
and while detachment demands an emotionless approach to defence, morality 
encourages the opposite.  As I continued the research for this thesis, it became clear that 
these conflicts manifested themselves in both theoretical conceptions and formal 
regulation of the role.  Not only could specific instances of conflict be identified, but the 
literature openly discussed these particular conflicts, as will be discussed below.  As 
such, I concluded that it was vital to place my exploration of these paired conflicts at the 
centre of my thesis.   
 
It should be noted that procedural justice and truth-seeking have been classified as one 
side of the conflicts with partisanship and confidentiality.  Together they constitute the 
duty to the court and will be explored in the same section primarily because they are 
closely linked and several elements of both overlap.  For example, for the purposes of 
this thesis, the defence lawyer's obligation to avoid 'ambushing' the prosecution 
represents part of the principle of procedural justice; the duty to correct procedural 
errors (an inter-linked duty) is considered an element of truth-seeking.  Both principles 
raise thematically similar issues and often arise from similar circumstances, primarily 
where the client's interests clash with the court's pursuit of a "full and fair hearing".
591
  I 
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consider the separate classification of procedural justice and truth-seeking throughout 
this thesis necessary for a logical and organised analysis.  However, in recognition that 
these classifications are fluid, conflicts involving procedural justice and truth-seeking 
will be examined in the same section.  I will explore the presence of these conflicts in 
the 'zealous advocate' model, before examining whether formal conceptions suffer from 
similar ethical tensions.  Again, it should be underlined that although I have chosen to 
use this structure in order to aid clarity of analysis, some issues and conflicts do overlap.  
It is acknowledged that the categories above make artificial distinctions. 
 
2. Conflict Points in the ‘Zealous Advocate’ Model 
 
"Nowhere in law do ethical considerations play a greater part or come into 
greater conflict than in the defense of those accused of crime."
592
  
 
The ‘zealous advocate’ model is intended to reflect a consensus view of the role and 
function of criminal defence lawyer, developed over the last century.  However, it is 
conceded that this consensus is a loose one and is constantly debated and questioned.  
This is partially due to the essential incompatibility of some of the principles.  The 
difficulty stems from the fact that the criminal defence lawyer owes "a duty to his client, 
a duty to his opponent, a duty to the court, a duty to the state and a duty to himself".
593
  
These inter-weaving loyalties can lead to friction because the interests of each party 
vary, and "when the various loyalties conflict, fair, safe, and moral resolutions are most 
difficult."
594
  One can identify a series of conflict points, where the principles clash with 
each other; this leads to uncertainty, at a theoretical level, as to which duties take 
precedence and which are subordinated.  These conflict points have inspired and 
perpetuated much of the discourse on the role and ethics of lawyers over the years.  This 
is particularly true of criminal defence lawyers, in part because of the unique and 
sensitive nature of their work but also because criminal defence work generates 
particularly acute conflicts. 
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2.1 Confidentiality v.  Procedural Justice and Truth-Seeking 
 
The principle of confidentiality is a crucial element of the defence lawyer’s role, but 
many have questioned its validity on the basis that it frustrates fair and efficient 
procedure and hinders the truth-seeking function of criminal justice.  Although it is not 
absolute, confidentiality obligates defence lawyers to keep information private which 
might otherwise help the court reach an accurate verdict.  This duty of privacy is 
designed to protect the client and encourage him or her to open up to their lawyer.  
Despite the likelihood that "it leads to some increased disclosure to lawyers",
595
 it has 
been argued that "intuition . . . tells us that there are bad effects" and that "we can be 
equally sure it leads to some reduced disclosure by lawyers."
596
  It is arguably "a 
significant barrier to the search for truth and the attainment of justice",
597
 denying the 
court the opportunity to review vital information and constructing metaphorical 'brick 
walls' for prosecutors.  As a result, the process could be reduced to little more than a 
slow and painful sham and "the image of a trial as a search for the truth could be made 
to appear a mockery".
598
  The principle of confidentiality, by its nature, requires the 
suppression of information.  Imposing this duty on the defence lawyer concedes that the 
defendant and his or her representative are entitled to be economical with the truth, and 
in accepting this it is arguable that the principle "unjustifiably undervalues the 
administration of justice, the interests of legal opponents, other affected third parties 
[and] the general public interest".
599
  Confidentiality is potentially a "device for cover-
ups",
600
 allowing the defendant to instruct the criminal defence lawyer to engage in 
"highly immoral acts of dubious legality"
601
 on his or her behalf.  Some argue that 
confidentiality is unnecessary.  The innocent, with nothing to hide, would in fact 
welcome a speedy and fair process and would be vindicated by the truth, whilst the 
guilty are loaned a cloak to veil their misdeeds.   
 
Of course, the above argument oversimplifies the debate.  Innocence, guilt and truth are 
not necessarily straightforward or discrete concepts; for example, a defendant may be 
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factually or legally innocent, yet may be convinced of their guilt.  Without the principle 
of confidentiality, defendants might unintentionally incriminate themselves or, fearful 
that honesty may lead to conviction, withhold vital information from their lawyer.  The 
result may be an inadequate defence and a disastrous miscarriage of justice.  Equally, an 
innocent defendant may be ashamed or embarrassed by certain facts relating to the case; 
without the protection of confidentiality the client may be reluctant to open up fully to a 
defence lawyer, who they may have been assigned without any choice.  The theoretical 
conception of the role of the adversarial defence lawyer therefore depends on 
commitment to both the principle of confidentiality and the principle of truth-seeking, 
but the conflicts between them are difficult to resolve.  This conflict point also has 
particularly significant implications for the presumption of innocence and the 
prosecution burden of proof, which will be discussed below. 
 
2.2 Partisanship v.  Morality 
 
The zealous pursuit of client goals may impinge upon common morality.
602
  Some 
defence tactics may be legitimate and legal but may still be regarded as morally wrong; 
for example, the questioning of a rape victim about their sexual history.  Under the 
theoretical duty of partisanship, a defence lawyer might cross-examine a rape 
complainant by portraying him or her as promiscuous, so as to insinuate that they were 
at least partially liable for their own suffering.  Unfortunately, "client goals may be best 
achieved through immoral, unjust or unfair means"
603
 and although this behaviour may 
be expected of a partisan defence lawyer, for many it is distasteful, brutal, uncaring and 
unfair.
604
  The question of which principle prevails in the event of a conflict is complex.  
Often, the defence lawyer will be faced with ‘Hobson’s Choice’: 
 
"She must follow Lord Brougham's famous ‘declaration’ that ‘[a]n advocate 
knows but one person in all the world, and that is his client’, while attempting to 
satisfy the vague but dangerous suggestion that she function as a ‘good 
person.’"605 
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Some theorists argue that in an adversarial system "the lawyer-client relationship has 
moral value as a relationship",
606
 and so partisanship on behalf of the client, as a crucial 
part of that bond, is intrinsically good.  If the importance of a vigorous defence for the 
accused is accepted by those outside of the relationship, it is suggested that they should 
also "accept the risk that some actions taken in the name of the relationship will conflict 
with the moral principles [the lawyer] would apply if acting independently".
607
  The 
defender’s role, as a morally commendable one, thus justifies actions which might 
normally be criticised.  As William Hodes noted, "one may act immorally and 
antisocially, but still ethically, in carrying out one's assigned role, so long as that role 
itself makes some positive contribution to society."
608
   
 
Yet, this logic is simple and convenient.  It lends credence to the contention that 
"questions about the moral conduct of lawyers and broader issues affecting the entire 
justice system are frequently evaded".
609
  It suggests that actions taken by defence 
lawyers do not require further moral examination because the role itself is accepted.  
The above arguments are of little consolation to the humiliated rape victim in a court 
room or to grieving families, and so the debate continues as to what is more valuable to 
society – moral fibre or an effective system.  This is essentially a conflict between 
‘macro’ and ‘micro’ morality, the former being ethics that represent the needs and 
values of society as a whole, and the latter being ethics at an individualistic level.
610
  
The difference between the two is important.  The principle of morality, as articulated 
by academics and commentators, does not disapprove of partisan defence of the accused 
per se.  The role’s existence and necessity is not questioned; this principle does not 
relate to ‘macro’ morality.  The principle of morality is more concerned with the effects 
of partisanship at a ‘micro’ level, and whether some aspects of it need to be curbed.  The 
principle of morality focuses more on countering the excesses of the over-eager 
defender, rather than creating a legion of righteous lawyers.  What is clear is that 
partisanship and morality are not comfortable bed-fellows, and that conflict between the 
two continues to preoccupy theorists and social commentators. 
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2.3 Detachment v.  Morality 
 
The former principle requires a criminal defence lawyer to act as a neutral advocate, 
who will defend a client regardless of the nature of their case or their character.  The 
obligation of morality encourages the defence lawyer to behave in a way that upholds 
common moral standards of right and wrong.  Common morality is a nebulous concept, 
in that the parameters of what is or is not morally correct are subjective.  However, 
terms such as ‘the public interest’ and ‘the will of the people’ could be similarly 
criticised, and they are well-used and accepted phrases.  The amorphous collection of 
ethics one might term ‘common morality’ has been described as "the set of norms 
shared by all persons committed to the objectives of morality".
611
  These norms are 
directed at "promoting human flourishing by counteracting conditions that cause the 
quality of people's lives to worsen"
612
 and are "applicable to all persons in all places, 
and all human conduct is rightly judged by [their] standards."
613
  Such norms arguably 
include "nonmalevolence, honesty, integrity, conscientiousness, trustworthiness, fidelity, 
gratitude, truthfulness, lovingness, kindness",
614
 and arguably empathy, civility and 
respect.  Often, the definition of these norms and the actions that reflect them are 
dictated by media agendas or unconvincing democratic mandates.  Despite this, it is 
broadly true to say that such norms are valued and defended by many people in many 
societies, and so reflect a common moral consensus.  The principle of detachment 
would expect a defence lawyer to abandon these standards if the client’s case required 
it, and so a direct conflict is created. 
 
A client may be guilty of the offence with which they are charged and if acquitted with 
the help of a morally neutral representative, the defence lawyer "who has contributed to 
that end is considered to be earning his fee from morally dubious practices."
615
  
Furthermore, whether a client is guilty or innocent, he or she may still be regarded as 
morally reprehensible, perhaps due to a history of criminal convictions, because of his 
or her sexual practices, extreme political views or controversial employment.  Whereas 
detachment demands that the defence lawyer ignore these factors, the principle of 
morality would urge him or her to ‘do the right thing’ and refuse to represent the client 
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or at the least provide only basic, technical assistance.  Another potential conflict arises 
when the nature of the charge offends common values, usually where the subject matter 
is morally controversial.  Examples include high-profile or multiple murders, rape, 
animal testing, child abuse and, in recent times, terrorism.  Generally, most 
commentators appear to agree that, in theory, the principle of detachment should 
prevail, at least on the basis of the presumption of innocence.  Additionally, it could be 
said that the criminal justice process morally justifies the defence lawyer’s role and that 
‘doing the right thing’ is the concern of the court.  However, criticism by some 
academics
616
 underlines that, in reality, criminal justice is not an idyllic system that 
always works.  Sometimes, bad people escape punishment for criminal acts, whilst 
some legal acts may be morally objectionable.  It is perhaps arguable then that to rely on 
theory is to deny reality and to shirk responsibility. 
 
2.4 Partisanship v.  Procedural Justice and Truth-Seeking 
 
The principle of partisanship and the principles of procedural justice and truth-seeking 
clash because they are duties owed to different masters with different interests.  On the 
one hand, the defence lawyer is engaged by a client to act as a vigorous partisan, 
protecting his or her rights and ensuring every favourable argument or approach is 
employed.  This may necessitate tactics which frustrate the administration of justice or 
compromise the truth.  Where evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the client is 
guilty, and the defence lawyer does his or her utmost to disparage witnesses, suppress 
evidence, slow down the process or surprise the prosecution, it would seem that neither 
justice nor truth are obtained.  The major criticism levelled at partisanship is that it is 
characterised by "[a] lack of civility between lawyers, the win-at-all-costs mentality, the 
running roughshod over witnesses, and with court procedures, rules, and the truth."
617
  
In contrast, as an officer of the court, the defence lawyer is expected to facilitate a fair 
and proper justice process and engage in helping the court uncover the truth.  In short, 
"[t]he lawyer seeking to be both an advocate for his client and at the same time, fair and 
candid with the court, faces a true dilemma",
618
 and the potential for conflict between 
the principles is considerable. 
 
                                                 
616
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Friction between partisanship and truth-seeking is problematic.  For example, the 
lawyer might choose to omit law or information that is unfavourable to the defendant’s 
cause but is relevant to the case, or might seek to paint an honest witness in a bad light.  
As was mentioned in Chapter 2, partisanship may lead "the lawyer . . . [to] lie in defense 
of his client’s interests".619  Perjury is difficult to justify and rarely approved of in 
theory, but it is arguable that passively allowing the court to be misled (perhaps through 
silence) is a form of dishonesty embraced by partisanship yet discouraged by truth-
seeking.  As such, the crux of the conflict rests on the fact that "[l]awyers often do know 
the truth . . . and partisanship often requires lawyers to work against the truth".
620
  
Which principle takes primacy is debatable.  It has been suggested that "[i]t is more 
important – and more virtuous – to serve one's client with devotion, faithfulness, and 
fidelity than to serve the truth".
621
  Yet, others have been critical of such logic.  In R. v. 
O'Connell,
622
 Crampton J seemed to suggest truth-seeking takes precedence, stating that 
"we are all – judges, jurors, advocates and attorneys together concerned in this search 
for truth"
623
 and that lawyers have "a prior and perpetual retainer on behalf of truth and 
justice"
624
 that was "primary and paramount".
625
 
 
Partisanship also regularly contradicts the principle of procedural justice.  A defence 
lawyer might 'ambush' the prosecution with a late defence or generate delay in 
proceedings with adjournments or the submission of extra evidence.  These are tactics 
which do not promote a fair and balanced process.  The conflict between partisanship 
and procedural justice is the quintessential example of ‘Client v. the Court’.  The 
defence lawyer is, as stated, an officer of the court and has a duty to aid the 
administration of justice; however, he or she is also a partisan for the client, charged 
with using all means possible to defend them.  These duties weigh heavily upon the 
defence lawyer, leading to "divided loyalties with the potential for conflict being very 
considerable."
626
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Resolution of this theoretical conflict is difficult and has fuelled debate for decades: 
 
"Legal authors have long wrestled with the question of how to balance the roles 
of zealous advocate and officer of the court charged with the pursuit of 
justice."
627
 
 
Strong arguments support either principle taking precedence over the other.  Some see 
the partisan advocate as a "mere instrument of the client’s interests",628 and that 
"instrumental behaviour of the sort prescribed by the principle of partisanship exhibits 
disrespect for the law."
629
  Partisanship serves only to frustrate the system and results in 
a case of "the lawyer against the law."
630
  In contrast, others contend that if a defence 
lawyer "see[s] . . . her role as aiding the court in accurate fact-finding and legal 
judgment,"
631
 then it is arguable that "the defender’s basic role in representing guilty 
clients consists in facilitating their conviction and punishment".
632
  In effect, actively 
helping the court requires betrayal of the client.  In this context, one could describe the 
defence lawyer who facilitates justice as a sort of ‘mole’ for the court. 
 
3. Conflict points in Formal Conceptions of the Role 
 
3.1 Confidentiality v. Procedural Justice and Truth-Seeking 
 
The principle of confidentiality conflicts with both of the major duties owed to the 
court.  An important point of friction between confidentiality and procedural justice 
arises when the defence lawyer attempts to balance the duty to protect confidential 
information with duties of pre-trial disclosure.  Confidentiality is a prominent feature in 
formal conceptions of the role.  It is extensive, covering "all confidential information 
about a client’s affairs, irrespective of the source of the information."633  This includes 
information provided by a client, any tactics and arguments for trial, any advice in 
contemplation of litigation and various other types of material.  The duty to 'hide' 
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information inevitably frustrates the duty to facilitate the justice process and some 
formal expressions of confidentiality appear to accept this conflict: 
 
"[I]t is necessary in our society . . . that communications between clients and 
lawyers . . . should be secure against the possibility of any scrutiny from others . 
. . notwithstanding that as a result cases may sometimes have to be decided in 
ignorance of relevant probative material."
634
 
 
It should be reiterated that confidentiality is "at the instance of the client",
635
 and that 
the defence lawyer cannot independently choose to waive any rights of confidentiality.  
However, obligations to disclose information at the pre-trial stage are also not a matter 
of choice. 
 
The formal process of pre-trial disclosure is outlined in the Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations At 1996, and is expanded on by the CPR.  Initial disclosure must be made 
by the prosecution, who must release any material which has not already been disclosed 
and "which might reasonably be considered capable of undermining the case for the 
prosecution against the accused or of assisting the case for the accused".
636
  Once this 
has occurred, the defence must provide a defence statement which, as described in 
Chapter 3, must outline information including "the nature of the accused’s defence", 
"the matters of fact on which [the defence] takes issue with the prosecution", "any point 
of law" the defence will raise and relevant authority.
637
  This is compulsory for 
indictable offences
638
 and voluntary for summary offences.
639
  The defence must 
comply with these requirements within 14 days of initial disclosure by the 
prosecution;
640
 this can be extended at the discretion of the court if the defence 
reasonably believes it cannot comply and can specify how long an extension will be 
necessary.
641
  The prosecution then has a continuing duty to disclose material to the 
defence that may be "relevant".
642
  The defence statement is comprehensive; it limits 
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what can be kept private until the trial and so the potential for conflict with the principle 
of confidentiality is substantial.  Failure to disclose correctly may have serious 
consequences for the defence case.  The defence lawyer will be at fault if he or she "puts 
forward a defence which was not mentioned in [the] defence statement or is different 
from any defence set out in that statement" or "relies on a matter which . . . was not 
mentioned in his defence statement."
643
  Withholding required information will entitle 
"the court or any other party . . . [to] make such comment as appears appropriate" and 
may result in "the court or jury . . . [drawing] such inferences as appear proper in 
deciding whether the accused is guilty of the offence concerned."
644
  This therefore 
makes balancing confidentiality and procedural justice, as exemplified by the defence 
statement, a tricky task. 
 
The statutory defence statement is by no means the only source of conflict.  The CPR 
have arguably extended the duties of disclosure that apply to the defence lawyer and, as 
a result, the duty to facilitate procedural justice.  The court has a duty to "actively 
manage"
645
 criminal proceedings; a primary part of this is "the early identification of the 
real issues"
646
 and "each party must . . . actively assist the court"
647
 with this.  As 
suggested in Chapter 3, this includes the defence lawyer, as well as the defendant and as 
such it is arguable that the court could compel the defence lawyer to disclose materials, 
issues, tactics or problems that might fall within the category of 'real issues'.  This vague 
concept is very powerful; the phrase 'real issues' remains undefined and open to 
interpretation.  In Malcolm v. DPP,
648
 Stanley Burnton J stated that "[i]t is the duty of 
the defence to make its defence and the issues it raises clear to the prosecution and to 
the court at an early stage."
649
  Equally, in Chorley Justices,
650
 Thomas LJ stated that 
"after the entry of the plea of not guilty, the defendant should have been asked first what 
was in issue".
651
  These readings of the procedure rules presumably cover the contents 
of the defence statement at least.  The definition is arguably flexible through design, 
potentially enabling the court to eliminate as many disclosure 'loopholes' as possible.  
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Rule 3.10 of the CPR appears to expand defence disclosure duties significantly.  It 
requires information about "which witnesses [the defence] intends to give oral 
evidence", "what written evidence [the defence] intends to introduce", "what other 
material, if any, [the defence] intends to make available to the court in the presentation 
of the case" and "whether [the defence] intends to raise any point of law that could 
affect the conduct of the trial or appeal".
652
  These provisions apply to the prosecution as 
well.  Since they have pre-existing legislative disclosure commitments and are backed 
with the support and resources of the state, it is reasonable to expect their compliance 
with such provisions.  In contrast, a defendant and his or her lawyer have severely 
limited funding and time available for preparation.
653
  Confidentiality is arguably the 
core expression of the adversarial philosophy that defendants cannot be compelled to 
incriminate themselves, a principle which levels the playing field.  Thus, provisions like 
those above, which eat into the protection of confidentiality, have a substantially bigger 
impact on the defence than on the prosecution.  It is important to highlight that the case 
management provisions apply to both the Magistrates’ Courts and the Crown Court.654  
However, this does not extend the scope of the more formal and well-defined defence 
statement.  Under Rule 22.4 (which concerns defence disclosure), a note states that 
"[t]he defendant is not obliged to give a defence statement in a Magistrates’ Court 
case."
655
  This relief from the arguably onerous disclosure framework is significant, as 
summary hearings make up the vast majority of criminal proceedings in England and 
Wales.
656
 
 
Formal regulation does address the clash between disclosure and confidentiality.  The 
Bar Code states that "[a] barrister must cease to act, and if he is a self-employed 
barrister must return any instructions . . . if the client refuses to authorise him to make 
some disclosure to the Court which his duty to the Court requires him to make".
657
  This 
suggests that procedural justice overrides confidentiality.  Similar advice is provided 
relating to voluntary disclosure.  The Solicitors’ Code suggests that where a defence 
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lawyer has "certain knowledge which [he or she] realise[s] is adverse to the client’s 
case, [he or she] may be extremely limited in what [they] can state in the client’s 
favour."
658
  First, the defence lawyer should attempt to resolve this problem by 
"seek[ing] the client’s agreement for full voluntary disclosure".659  Keeping such 
information hidden, as the principle of confidentiality would suggest, could result in the 
defence lawyer being "severely criticised by the court".
660
  If the client refuses to 
consent, then the defence lawyer is "entitled to refuse to continue to act for the client if 
to do so will place [him or her] in breach of [their] obligations to the court",
661
 namely 
the disclosure of information that will facilitate the process.  Thus, if a defence lawyers 
finds his or her disclosure obligations conflict with the duty to keep client matters 
confidential, withdrawal from the case appears to be the formal resolution.  It is 
interesting, and perhaps disappointing, to note that in this situation of conflict, defence 
lawyers are not obligated to reconcile their duties, one way or another: they can simply 
abandon them.  The fact that the professional codes of conduct recommend resignation 
in the case of a conflict between confidentiality and procedural justice, suggests that 
such a conflict is irresolvable. 
  
However, the CPR may have altered this.  Previously, where a defence lawyer was 
forbidden by his or her client to disclose information, then there was a problem since 
disclosure was required of the defendant rather than the lawyer.  However, the CPR has 
made it clear that the obligations it imposes apply to the ‘parties’, not just the defendant; 
arguably, this "implies that disclosure obligations extend to the defence lawyer."
662
  
Where a client 'refuses to authorise' disclosure, the defence lawyer may now be able to 
go ahead and do it anyway because he or she is considered a separate party to the client 
with, potentially, separate duties.  This would have significant implications for 
confidentiality, although it is by no means clear that this is the case.  In 2007, the Law 
Society released a practice note (which was updated in 2009) entitled, ‘Criminal 
Procedure Rules:  impact on solicitors' duties to the client’, which addressed some of the 
issues raised by the conflict between confidentiality and procedural justice.  It describes 
the defence lawyer's role as "a complex one"
663
 due to the fact that "as a lawyer the 
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solicitor owes professional duties to his or her client, as well as - as one of its officers - 
to the court."
664
  The practice note states that "[o]n occasions these various duties may 
conflict with each other",
665
 and as such the note is designed to "define the extent of 
these duties and burdens, and to identify and address the ethical problems that are likely 
to arise from their imposition."
666
  However, practice notes only "represent the view of 
the [Law] Society on what a standard of good practice in a particular area is"
667
 and 
"[s]olicitors are not required to follow them."
668
  Therefore, it could be considered as 
loose guidance rather than as binding dictum. 
 
The practice note provides example scenarios involving potential conflicts between 
confidentiality and procedural justice: 
 
"A solicitor may hold factual information . . . which is of crucial importance to a 
party to the proceedings. When requested, or served with a witness summons, to 
produce this information the solicitor declines to do so."
669
 
 
"There is a defence available to the defendant, but he refuses to permit the 
solicitor to pass the information to the court."
670
 
 
The practice note appears to come to some muddled conclusions.  In relation to the first 
scenario, it states: 
 
"Whilst, understandably, the court . . . may consider itself entitled to an 
explanation, and [be] frustrated by its absence . . . the court should understand 
that the solicitor’s duty of confidentiality to his or her client absolutely forbids 
the provision of reasons, because the information sought by the court will be 
privileged."
671
 
 
In response to the second scenario, the practice note again suggests that client 
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confidentiality takes precedence: 
 
"Whilst a positive duty is imposed by the CPR on the solicitor to pass on the 
information to the court, the solicitor should inform the court that the defendant 
refuses to permit the solicitor to disclose the defence."
672
 
 
However, despite these comments, the practice note makes several other remarks which 
seem to contradict the above.  Whilst noting that confidentiality "means that a court 
cannot ask a solicitor to reveal what a defendant has told him or her if it is 
privileged",
673
 the practice note warns: 
 
"[S]olicitors can clearly be required by the CPR, or by a direction of the court 
made under its case management duties arising from the CPR, to provide 
information that will enable the court process to proceed efficiently and 
expeditiously, but only if in so doing none of the defendant’s rights listed above, 
is encroached upon."
674
 
 
Coupled with the statement that "solicitors are under a duty to provide information to 
the court which is not privileged and which enables the court to further the overriding 
objective by actively managing the case",
675
 the practice note implies that any 
information falling outside of the definition of legal professional privilege can, and 
should, be disclosed.  This creates significant potential for conflict since "[n]ot 
everything that lawyers have a duty to keep confidential is privileged."
676
  This seems to 
be an inadequate resolution to the conflict between confidentiality and procedural 
justice. 
 
Confidentiality also conflicts with truth-seeking, primarily because the former 
obligation requires the defence lawyer to hide information from the court.  The extent to 
which the truth can be compromised for the sake of client privacy has one clear 
limitation:  where a client attempts to use the cloak of confidentiality to disguise 
criminal intent.
677
  However, outside of the context of this provision, the boundary 
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between confidentiality and truth-seeking is changeable.  Two situations that pose 
difficulty are confessions of guilt by a client and the failure of a client to attend a court 
hearing.  If a client confesses guilt to the defence lawyer, then that information is 
confidential and the lawyer has a duty to protect it.  However, formal conceptions of 
truth-seeking "impose . . . very strict limitations on the conduct of the defence”678 in 
these circumstances.  The defence lawyer “must not assert as true that which he knows 
to be false” and “must not connive at, much less attempt to substantiate, a fraud."679  
The real issue arises if the client asks the defence lawyer to lie to the court, which the 
principle of truth-seeking clearly forbids.  The Solicitors’ Code states that a defence 
lawyer must "never deceive or knowingly or recklessly mislead the court"
680
 and “must 
refuse to act or cease acting for a client . . . when to act would involve . . . a breach of 
the law or a breach of the rules of professional conduct".
681
   
 
Similarly, the Bar Code says that a client cannot "require a barrister to act otherwise 
than in conformity with law or with the provisions of this Code".
682
  The instructions are 
clear – the defence lawyer cannot assert the client’s innocence when the client has 
confessed guilt and so must withdraw.
683
  However, the lawyer who ceases to act has an 
ongoing duty of confidentiality.  He or she "must inform the court of the reasons for . . . 
withdrawal, by providing enough explanation to enable the judge to decide how to 
proceed”; however, “in doing so [he or she] must not breach legal professional 
privilege."
684
  Thus, a strange situation is created where the defence lawyer is forced to 
withdraw but cannot say why.  This resolution is designed to protect client 
confidentiality and promote truth-seeking, but essentially achieves neither.  Although 
the defence lawyer cannot explain their withdrawal, the act in itself indicates a serious 
ethical conflict between representative and client.  Equally, withdrawal does not, in 
reality, promote truth-seeking because the client’s intended deception and guilt remain 
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hidden.  It is, at best, avoiding lying.  A similar conflict arises in the context of a client’s 
non-attendance at trial: 
 
"If a client tells the solicitor that he or she is not going to attend the trial, the 
solicitor is placed in an invidious position as far as the solicitor’s duty to the 
court is concerned, for such information, in all likelihood, will be privileged; in 
which event the solicitor cannot waive the client’s privilege, and nor can the 
court order him or her to do so."
685
 
 
The defence lawyer cannot reveal what the client has said, yet has a duty to aid the court 
in the search for the truth.  In such a situation, formal regulation suggests that "[i]f the 
client does fail to attend . . . in relation to your duty of confidentiality you may properly 
state that you are without instructions, but may not disclose information about the 
client’s whereabouts" and "you may consider it appropriate to withdraw from the 
hearing where, having regard to the client's best interests, you believe you cannot 
properly represent the client."
686
  Once again, the defence lawyer must take the fall; he 
or she cannot lie about the client’s absence, but cannot tell the truth.  It is therefore 
questionable how adequate these formal resolutions are.                  
 
The conflict between the principle of confidentiality and the principles of procedural 
justice and truth-seeking raise questions about the very foundations of the adversarial 
process and the status of the defendant and his or her lawyer.  To suggest that the 
provisions outlined above are simply designed to improve the efficiency of the criminal 
process is misleading.  Rhetoric from the courts indicates that a significant part of their 
purpose is to ‘flush’ out the truth by removing any hiding places for the defence.  For 
example, defence tactics should not prevent "a full and fair hearing",
687
 the criminal trial 
is a "search for the truth"
688
 and in the adversarial process, "justice is what matters".
689
  
The defence is expected to cooperate in this exercise, which protects the "legitimate 
interests of the defendant".
690
  But what are his or her ‘legitimate interests’?  Article 
6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights and its associated case law, 
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applicable to England and Wales, establishes the right of a defendant to "be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law".  This inherently implies that the burden 
of proof lies with the prosecution and "[a]lthough not specifically mentioned in Article 6 
of the Convention, there can be no doubt that . . . the privilege against self-incrimination 
[is a] generally recognised international standard".
691
  This privilege protects defendants 
from being compelled to "co-operate in the building up of the case against them".
692
  
Confidentiality represents an arm of this privilege.  However, obligations to promote 
procedural justice and truth-seeking potentially offend this ‘legitimate interest’.   
 
The European case of Funke v. France
693
 provides a good example of this: 
 
"The Court notes that the customs secured Mr. Funke's conviction in order to 
obtain certain documents which they believed must exist, although they were not 
certain of the fact. Being unable or unwilling to procure them by some other 
means, they attempted to compel the applicant himself to provide the evidence 
of offences he had allegedly committed. The special features of customs law 
cannot justify such an infringement of the right of anyone 'charged with a 
criminal offence,' within the autonomous meaning of this expression in Article 6, 
to remain silent and not to contribute to incriminating itself."     
 
Even the CPR state that the criminal process should recognise "the rights of a defendant, 
particularly those under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights".
694
  
However, the basic ‘legitimate interests’ of presumption of innocence, privilege against 
self-incrimination and the prosecution burden of proof appear to have been sidelined to 
some extent.  The degree to which the defence lawyer and the defendant are expected to 
aid in criminal proceedings signifies an unprecedented erosion of the ‘legitimate 
interests’ of the defendant.  The dictum of Auld LJ in R v. Gleeson strongly suggests that 
the primary ‘legitimate interests’ of the defendant are to cooperate in "acquitting the 
innocent and convicting the guilty"
695
 and help in "dealing with the prosecution and the 
defence fairly",
696
 involving some degree of self-incrimination and relieving some of 
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the prosecution’s burden.  It could be argued that these developments are at best 
significant and at worst "a fundamental attack on the foundational principles of the 
criminal process in England and Wales".
697
  In summary, this conflict point appears to 
be unresolved, leaving troubling questions about where the defence lawyer’s loyalties 
should lie. 
 
3.2 Partisanship v. Morality 
 
Advancing the interests of a defendant will not always require unethical behaviour; as 
was argued earlier in the thesis, partisanship may be regarded as moral in itself.  
However, public morality and partisan defence often stand opposed.  For example, a 
defence lawyer should "do what is best for [his or her] client, consistent with his 
instructions, rather than bend to pressure to oil the wheels of the criminal justice 
system."
698
  The phrase ‘oil the wheels’ is significant in that it suggests that a defence 
lawyer should make it difficult for the prosecution or court to process the client through 
the system.  It is therefore arguable that a part of the defence lawyer’s job is to be a 
nuisance.  Providing solid opposition in turn validates the legitimacy of any 
prosecution; it will be hard-fought, fully held to account and thoroughly scrutinised.  
‘Pressure to oil the wheels’ may emanate from public opinion about a case or client.  
Strong public feeling is often aroused by criminal cases, for example, high-profile 
murderers,
699
 accused child abusers
700
 or immigrant rapists.
701
  In the case of wide 
media coverage, pressure on the defence lawyer to cooperate in the client’s conviction 
may be tangible.  Formal regulation suggest that this should be dismissed and the 
defence lawyer should do all that is possible to defend the client.  However, the defence 
lawyer is also expected to maintain certain standards of integrity.  He or she must not 
"compromise his professional standards in order to please his client".
702
  Although 
vague, this arguably implies that the lawyer should be honest, respectful, 
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straightforward and "maintain the high reputation of advocates".
703
  In cases like those 
above, one must wonder whether upholding the ethical and honest ‘high reputation’ of 
defence lawyers is a duty that is compatible with the ruthless questioning and 
obstructive delay that is often necessary in partisan defence. 
 
The treatment of complainants in court is an area of particular conflict.  A defence 
lawyer is expected to act "without regard to his interests or to any consequences to 
himself or to any other person".
704
  Yet, he or she should also use "proper and lawful 
means".
705
  There is, of course, nothing unlawful about being insensitive toward a 
complainant when defending a client in court; whether it is proper is another question.  
The phrase ‘lawful and proper’ occurs frequently in formal regulation and may 
represent an attempt to balance partisanship and ethical behaviour, although this is 
purely speculative.  ‘Cordery on Solicitors’706 suggests that "[t]he duty of a solicitor to 
place his client’s interests first is subject to his other professional obligations, and in 
particular duties of a public nature".
707
  The principle of morality is, essentially, a 
reflection of public values and the greater good; this advice implies that some higher 
duty to public service must have weight in defence lawyer’s decisions.  Yet, this is not 
explicit and as was argued earlier in this thesis, defending criminal clients can be 
considered a moral pursuit because “it is also in the public interest that the duty should 
be performed."
708
  Whether treating complainants with dignity and respect is a duty ‘of 
a public nature’ is uncertain.  Elsewhere, it is stated that lawyers "must not make 
statements or ask questions which are merely scandalous or intended or calculated only 
to vilify, insult or annoy either a witness or some other person".
709
  A realistic example 
of this conflict is a rape trial.  Rape is generally regarded as a heinous offence; due to 
the very intrusive, traumatic and personal nature of the crime, proceedings surrounding 
it are deeply emotive and sensitive.  As a trial advocate, the defence lawyer must make 
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submissions and arguments which test the prosecution and support the accused.  Cross-
examination can take the form of a very personal yet very public grilling of a rape 
complainant, undermining his or her honesty, accuracy or self-control.  Formal 
conceptions of partisanship suggest that the consequences of questioning a distressed 
person in this way should be ignored; the primary function of the defence lawyer is to 
pursue the client’s best interests.  Dependent on the approach however, this sort of 
cross-examination treads the border between acceptable and unacceptable conduct, and 
may contradict the moral obligation "not to vilify, insult or annoy" a complainant.  
Moreover, it might be argued that to harass a potential victim of crime in this way 
defeats the object of the criminal justice system.
710
 
 
The above example of conflict between partisanship and morality has had a significant 
impact on the defence lawyer’s role in recent years.  The Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999 attempted to “resolve the natural tension between protecting the 
complainant’s privacy and dignity and the accused’s right to a fair trial in a 
proportionate manner.”711  Under s.41(1), it was stated that "no evidence may be 
adduced, and . . . no question may be asked in cross-examination, by or on behalf of any 
accused at the trial, about any sexual behaviour of the complainant".  This provision, 
often referred to as the “rape shield”,712 was designed to “protect complainants from 
unnecessary humiliation and distress when giving evidence”713 and prevent rape trials 
from being “distorted”714 by the “twin myths . . . ‘that unchaste women were more 
likely to consent to intercourse and . . . were less worthy of belief.’”715  At the time of its 
introduction, the defence could apply to the court to bypass this provision but only in 
three very limited circumstances.  First, where the "issue is not an issue of consent";
716
 
second, where “it is an issue of consent” and the sexual behaviour in question "is 
alleged to have taken place at or about the same time as the event which is the subject 
matter of the charge against the accused;"
717
 and third, where “it is an issue of consent” 
and the sexual behaviour raised is “so similar” to the alleged offence or sexual 
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behaviour of the complainant at or about the same time of the alleged offence, that “the 
similarity cannot reasonably be explained as a coincidence."
718
  The statute added that 
no evidence would be allowed if "if it appears to the court to be reasonable to assume 
that the purpose (or main purpose) for which it would be adduced or asked is to 
establish or elicit material for impugning the credibility of the complainant as a 
witness."
719
  The provision seemingly eliminated all opportunity for the defence to raise 
evidence of past sexual behaviour, placing the well-being of the complainant above all 
else and significantly limiting the ability of the defence lawyer to be a partisan.  
 
However, this “virtual blanket exclusion of previous sexual history evidence”720 was 
challenged in the case of R v. A (No. 2).
721
  The case sought to address the conflict 
outlined above: 
 
“The question is whether one of these interests should prevail or whether there 
must be a balance so that fairness to each must be accommodated and if so 
whether it has been achieved in current legislation.”722 
 
Lord Slynn of Hadley reaffirmed that “women who allege that they have been raped 
should not in court be harassed unfairly by questions about their previous sex 
experiences”723 while Lord Steyn highlighted that “the statute pursued desirable 
goals”.724  However, he went on to describe the provisions contained as “legislative 
overkill”.725  He described how the admission of potentially relevant evidence of past 
sexual behaviour was limited by “extraordinarily narrow temporal restriction”726 in the 
statute.  He provided the example of a defendant and a complainant who may have had 
sexual relations over a period of weeks prior to an allegation.  He stated that “[w]hile 
common sense may rebel against the idea that such evidence is never relevant to the 
issue of consent, that is the effect of the statute.”727  
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 Lord Steyn concluded that: 
 
“[T]he test of admissibility is whether the evidence (and questioning in relation 
to it) is nevertheless so relevant to the issue of consent that to exclude it would 
endanger the fairness of the trial under article 6 of the convention.”728 
 
This case in effect relaxed the restriction on questioning and “unshackled judges from a 
legislative straitjacket that might otherwise have led them to exclude truly relevant 
evidence on an arbitrary basis”.729   
 
However, the restoration of judicial discretion has not entirely resolved the conflict 
between partisanship and morality.  In R v. Beedall,
730
 a defendant was charged with the 
homosexual rape of a youth who claimed not to be homosexual.  The defendant claimed 
that anal intercourse between the two had been consensual; in attempting to prove this, 
the defence lawyer wished to cross-examine the complainant about past sexual 
behaviour.  Specifically, the lawyer wished to ask the complainant whether he was or 
had been a practising homosexual.  If he denied this, the lawyer intended to raise 
medical evidence stating that no injuries resulted from the intercourse due "the lax and 
capacious nature of the complainant's anus",
731
 suggesting that he was a practising 
homosexual and may therefore have consented.  The defence attempted to raise this 
evidence under s.41(3)(c),  the exception relating to ‘similar’ behaviour; however, the 
trial court rejected this.  The defence appealed on the basis that the court had not 
interpreted s.41(3)(c) in a manner that was compatible with European Convention fair 
trial rights, as required under s.3 Human Rights Act 1998 and in light of the decision in 
R v. A (No. 2).  The Court of Appeal dismissed this, stating that "[i]t is by statute not 
permissible to cross-examine a complainant upon the basis that he or she has consented 
to similar acts in the past and therefore is likely to have consented on this occasion"
732
 
and that "[i]t is plain to us that the statute may well exclude things which are capable of 
having some relevance."
733
  R v. Beedall therefore exemplifies the ongoing conflict 
between partisanship and morality.  Such provisions place the defence lawyer in an 
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interesting position, severely limiting what they can do for a client in the case of a rape 
charge.
734
 
 
3.3 Detachment v. Morality 
 
The principles of detachment and morality are, by their nature, contrary.  The former 
requires the adoption of studied neutrality, free of prejudice in relation to clients and 
cases.  The latter is an obligation to be an ethical professional, to uphold standards that 
advance the ‘greater good’ and influence the client to do so as well.  Formal 
manifestations of these principles seem to leave the conflict unresolved, presenting 
defence lawyers with practical problems.  Formal regulation provides little guidance as 
to how the defence lawyer should interview a client in readiness for a trial.  For 
example, one might question whether the lawyer should prepare by requesting a full 
account from the client or by questioning selectively in order to obtain only 
advantageous information.  The former approach would be more ethical; possession of 
all the facts would allow the defence lawyer to advise the client on what the right course 
of action is.  The latter approach would require the defence lawyer to remain detached 
from any concerns that he or she may not be hearing the whole truth, potentially 
increasing the likelihood of an unjust victory for the client.  Formal conceptions of the 
defence role make no reference to the correct course of action at this stage, rendering 
the above options speculative. 
 
Where formal regulation does refer to detachment and morality, the advice is 
contradictory.  Defence lawyers are prohibited from expressing an opinion about the 
merits or morality of a case or client.  For example, barristers "must not unless invited 
to do so by the Court or when appearing before a tribunal where it is his duty to do so 
assert a personal opinion of the facts or the law."
735
  This sort of provision suggests that 
the defence lawyer, as a detached representative, is not required to assess moral virtues 
in his or her work.  Yet, this is confused by other formal regulation which implies a duty 
to pursue moral goals.  The ‘overriding objective’ of the CPR, which defence lawyers 
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must help achieve, includes "respecting the interests of witnesses, victims and jurors".
736
  
One must wonder to what extent ‘respect’ obligates a defence lawyer to consider the 
above parties.  Equally, it is questionable whether the role of detached defender, which 
essentially requires the lawyer not to care about other parties, is compatible with this 
requirement.  For example, if a defendant is charged with the murder of a child, one 
would assume that secondary victims such as the deceased’s family would have 
interests that should be ‘respected’.  Should the defence lawyer shape his or her case to 
protect the feelings and emotions of these parties?  Should he or she avoid submissions 
that might offend, even if they are potentially significant?  Alternatively, is the defence 
lawyer obliged by the principle of detachment to disregard all of this and simply ‘do his 
job’?  This is a difficult conflict with no clear resolution.   
 
Defence lawyers "must act with integrity"
737
 and should not "compromise [their] 
professional standards in order to please [their] client".
738
  The non-specific construction 
of such statements renders them unhelpful.  However, vague as they are, they open the 
door for restriction of the defence lawyer’s client-orientated role.  They suggest that 
defence lawyers should demonstrate some degree of honour and honesty in conducting 
their work, but when, where and in what form this is required is unclear.  Formal 
regulation dealing with the acceptance of clients also provides conflicting advice.  The 
cab-rank rule for barristers seems to be clear enough on this, although as was discussed 
in Chapter 3 the link between low-paid legal aid work and unpalatable clients may 
provide a convenient loop-hole for defence barristers to avoid undesirable work.  The 
Solicitor’s Code of Conduct states that a solicitor: 
 
"[M]ust not refuse to act as an advocate for any person . . . [because] the nature 
of the case is objectionable to [the solicitor] or to any section of the public . . . 
[or because] the conduct, opinions or beliefs of the prospective client are 
unacceptable to [the solicitor] or to any section of the public . . ."
739
 
 
Yet, the code also says that solicitors are "generally free to decide whether or not to take 
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on a particular client".
740
 This perhaps grants a licence to defence solicitors to reject 
cases on the basis of personal or public moral opinions.  For example, where a serial sex 
offender is on trial for indecent assault, a defence solicitor might be able to refuse to act 
for someone who might be widely regarded as unpleasant and undeserving.  The above 
provision is followed by a list of possible reasons for refusing to act or ceasing to act; 
none of them appear to rule out moral objections as a reason.  However, like all of the 
conflicts within formal regulation, there is much ambiguity.  As discussed in Chapter 3, 
the Solicitors’ Code does suggest that a solicitor "may only end the relationship with the 
client if there is a good reason", for example where there is “a breakdown in confidence 
between you and the client".
741
  Like many provisions, ‘breakdown in confidence’ is a 
phrase open to generous interpretation, and does not provide sufficient clarity in 
resolving such conflicts.  Other aspects of formal regulation do make broad attempts at 
resolving some of ethical conflict between detachment and morality.  Unlike most of the 
professional standards, the Solicitors’ Code directly addresses the issue of conflict 
generally, stating: 
 
"Where two or more duties come into conflict, the factor determining 
precedence must be the public interest, and especially the public interest in the 
administration of justice."
742
   
 
The inclusion of the phrase ‘public interest’ is again open to interpretation.  It could be 
argued that the ‘public interest’ means the ‘greater good’, and as such, conflicts should 
be resolved in favour of the people and public morality.  Alternatively, the ‘public 
interest’ might mean the fair and balanced pursuit of justice, which requires a full and 
thorough defence of the accused.  Whatever this provision means, it provides little 
specific or useful guidance for a defence lawyer faced with a conflict between 
detachment and morality. 
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3.4 Partisanship v. Procedural Justice and Truth-Seeking 
 
These principles represent the two main masters of the criminal defence lawyer – the 
client and the court.  Partisanship requires that the defence lawyer make "the client’s 
business [his or her] first concern".
743
  However, the duties of procedural justice and 
truth-seeking naturally contradict this: 
 
"Lawyers conducting litigation owe a divided loyalty. They have a duty to their 
clients, but they may not win by every means. They also owe a duty to the court 
and the administration of justice . . . Sometimes the performance of these duties 
to the court may annoy the client."
744
 
 
These split loyalties create a difficult conflict point, apparent in formal conceptions of 
the role.  The principles of partisanship and procedural justice, in particular, are a 
continual source of tension for the defence lawyer.  The partisan defender is expected 
"to do what is best for [his or her] client, consistent with his instructions, rather than 
bend to pressure to oil the wheels of the criminal justice system."
745
  However, the CPR 
appear to describe a substantial defence duty to facilitate procedural justice, involving 
"the early identification of the real issues", "discouraging delay" and "encouraging the 
participants to co-operate in the progression of the case".
746  
This indicates an increasing 
emphasis on the defence lawyer’s role as an officer of the court, arguably at the expense 
of partisanship.  Such changes have slowly transformed formal conceptions of the role 
into a tangle of contradictory obligations and inconclusive guidance.  
 
For example, the defence lawyer should "present a coherent and persuasive case that is 
consistent with the client's instructions",
747
 a clear reflection of the duty of partisanship.  
Yet, other formal regulation says that he or she "must ensure that the facts are presented 
fairly and that he must draw the attention of the court to the relevant authorities even if 
they are against him",
748
 words which appear contradictory.  The partisan lawyers’ 
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ability to present a comprehensive and favourable case for his or her client may be 
impeded by such provisions.  Other obligations to procedural justice indicate this.  The 
defence lawyer must take "all reasonable and practicable steps to avoid unnecessary 
expense or waste of the Court's time",
749
 and bring "any procedural irregularity to the 
attention of the Court during the hearing".
750
  Arguably, the latter provision may 
compromise the right against self-incrimination and the former provision may threaten 
the right to a full and fair public hearing.  However, the courts seem to disagree.  In R v. 
Jisl,
751
 Judge LJ said that "[i]t is not . . . a concomitant of the entitlement to a fair trial 
that either or both sides are further entitled to take as much time as they like, or for that 
matter, as long as counsel and solicitors or the defendants themselves think 
appropriate."
752
  Indeed, he stated that "[t]he objective is not haste and rush, but greater 
efficiency and better use of limited resources by closer identification of and focus on 
critical rather than peripheral issues."  Equally, in the case of R v. Chaaban
753
 the same 
judge again addressed the issue of efficiency and fair trial rights, stating: 
 
"Time is not unlimited. No one should assume that trials can continue to take as 
long or use up as much time as either or both sides may wish, or think, or assert, 
they need. The entitlement to a fair trial is not inconsistent with proper judicial 
control over the use of time."
754
 
 
Presumably, the above statements also reflect the rationale behind the CJSSS policy, 
applied to Magistrates' proceedings. 
 
Disclosure is a significant source of conflict for defence lawyers, who must juggle their 
duty as a partisan and their duty to promote procedural justice.  The Attorney General's 
‘Guidelines on Disclosure’, issued in 2005, state that "[a] fair trial should not require 
consideration of irrelevant material and should not involve spurious applications or 
arguments which serve to divert the trial process from examining the real issues before 
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the court."
755
  Of course, what is classified as 'spurious' or 'irrelevant' is not necessarily 
clear-cut.  As discussed earlier, the partisan defence lawyer would seek to keep the case 
of his or her client hidden from the opposition until its presentation in court.  However, 
as outlined earlier, formal regulation also imposes conflicting duties to uphold the 
administration of justice; concealing the defendant’s case until it is presented is now 
highly contentious.  The defence statement plays a major role in this conflict, requiring 
disclosure of, among other things, "the nature of the accused's defence, including any 
particular defences on which he intends to rely" and "any authority on which he intends 
to rely for that purpose".
756
  This is optional in summary hearings, which make up the 
majority of criminal proceedings.  However, other formal regulation seems to fill this 
gap.  The various requirements of the CPR arguably replicate the demands of the 
defence statement.  Recent case law provides that "[a]mbushes . . . are to be discouraged 
and discountenanced . . . criminal proceedings are not a game: their object is to achieve 
a fair determination of the innocence or guilt of the defendant."
757
  Manipulating 
prosecution omissions or slip-ups is equally controversial; it now seems that "for 
defence advocates to seek to take advantage of such errors . . . is . . . no longer 
acceptable".
758  
All of these provisions, and others, thus amount to considerable levels of 
disclosure. 
 
Formal conceptions of the role attempt to address the conflicts between partisanship and 
the duties to the court, but struggle to resolve them.  In Medcalf v. Mardell,
759
 Lord 
Hobhouse said: 
 
"At times, the proper discharge by the advocate of his duties to his client will be 
liable to bring him into conflict with the court. This does not alter the duty of the 
advocate. It may require more courage to represent a client in the face of a 
hostile court but the advocate must still be prepared to act fearlessly. It is part of 
the duty of an advocate, where necessary, appropriately to protect his client from 
the court as well as from the opposing party."
760
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This statement is an interesting but unhelpful attempt to resolve the conflict point.  It 
suggests that the client’s best interests should be protected and promoted first, and 
compliance and cooperation with the court and prosecution should come second.  
However, it is broad and non-committal and one must doubt how much weight it holds 
when juxtaposed with the CPR and more recent decisions, such as R v. Gleeson.
761 
 
According to the Law Society practice note discussed earlier, "[t]he concept of the 
solicitor apparently putting the court’s interests above those of the client has caused 
many solicitors to question where their duty lies."
762
  Of specific interest is the practice 
note's exploration of the conflict that arises when the defendant exercises his or her right 
to 'put the prosecution to proof': 
  
"The CPR stipulates that solicitors must assist the court in the management of 
the case. This can come into conflict with their duty to act in the best interests of 
their client where the client wishes to exercise their right to put the prosecution 
to proof and offer little by way of assistance to the court."
763
 
 
Where the defence lawyer adopts an uncooperative approach, management of the case is 
inevitably frustrated and the duty to assist the court goes unfulfilled.  The most 
controversial example of this might involve withholding information for the purposes of 
ambushing the prosecution with "an issue, or deficiency in [their] case, on which the 
defendant wishes to rely . . . . [which] he or she does not wish to give the court advance 
notice of".
764
  The practice note suggests that "the CPR require the defence to identify 
the issue, even if the technical defence is lost, or the deficiency is rectified because the 
prosecution is put on notice."
765
  This seems to resolve the conflict in favour of 
procedural justice.  Yet, it should be remembered that the practice note is not binding or 
necessarily authoritative and case law seems to contradict the above, suggesting 
defendants can demand that "the prosecution proves its case" and "keep silent at any 
prosecution shortcomings until the time when it can take advantage of them".
766
  Thus, 
the defence lawyer’s role remains confused in this context, divided between aiding the 
client and the court.   
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There are two primary sources of conflict between partisanship and truth-seeking.  The 
first is the age-old quandary of defending a client who has confessed guilt; the second is 
the incoherent approach of formal regulation to the issue of tactical silence.  Given the 
opportunity, the first question many laymen would probably ask a criminal defence 
lawyer is ‘how can you defend someone who you know is guilty?’  Of course, one could 
answer the above question theoretically; one can never ‘know’ a defendant is guilty 
until the court has weighed up the evidence and passed its judgment.  However, this 
answer is undermined by the concept of the guilty plea, a confession in all but name, 
which the court unreservedly accepts to be the truth.
767
  No evidence is considered, no 
testimony presented and no investigation into the truth of the matter undertaken.  
Considered in this light, a defence lawyer certainly can ‘know’ when his or her client is 
guilty, just as a court does when accepting a guilty plea.  One could argue that it is not 
for the defence lawyer to consider a client’s guilt or innocence.  However, the reality is 
that defence lawyers are human and may have an overwhelming suspicion that their 
client is guilty of the offence with which they are charged.  Considering that the defence 
lawyer is obliged to aid in “acquitting the innocent and convicting the guilty”768 under 
the ‘overriding objective’ of the CPR, this fact is troubling. 
 
A review of Chapter 3 suggests that formal regulation inadequately deals with conflicts 
between partisanship and truth-seeking.  The Bar Code’s ‘Written Standards for the 
Conduct of Professional Work’ state that a confession of guilt is "no bar to [a] barrister 
appearing or continuing to appear in [a client’s] defence, nor indeed does such a 
confession release the barrister from his imperative duty to do all that he honourably can 
for his client."
769
  Similarly, practice guidance asserts that "[e]ven if your client admits 
guilt, you must enquire further and make sure that your client is actually guilty in law 
and that there is sufficient prosecution evidence to convict him."
770
  However, other 
sources contain contradictory statements, placing emphasis on honesty and the pursuit 
of truth.  Most notably, defence lawyers "must never deceive or knowingly or recklessly 
mislead the court"
771
 or behave in a manner that is "dishonest or otherwise 
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discreditable".
772
  One must question whether representing a client who has confessed 
guilt is compatible with this requirement.  The difference between protecting a client 
who admits guilt and misleading the court is perhaps only a matter of semantics.  The 
defence lawyer may be treading a very thin line between legitimately representing their 
client and deliberately allowing the truth to be obscured, begging the question – where 
is the boundary to be drawn between defence and deception?  Positive acts of deceit are 
forbidden, what might be termed ‘actively’ misleading the court.  This would include 
"set[ting] up an affirmative case inconsistent with the confession [of guilt] made to [the 
defence lawyer]",
773
 "submitting inaccurate information or allowing another person to 
do so",
774
 or "calling a witness whose evidence you know is untrue".
775
  In contrast, 
‘passively’ misleading the court does not involve proactive dishonesty, but does allow 
the court to make false assumptions.  For example, the defence lawyer has no duty to 
disclose previous convictions of his or her client, which may be evidence of the bad 
character.  If the prosecution fail to identify such evidence and the court makes positive 
assumptions about a defendant’s character, the defence lawyer has no duty to disclose 
those convictions unless the defendant "is responsible for the making of an express or 
implied assertion which is apt to give the court or jury a false or misleading impression 
about the defendant",
776
 either through evidence or conduct.  Theoretically, if the 
defence remained passive, there would be no duty to correct a false impression. 
 
However, this is a major source of contention, as it no longer appears to be clear what 
forms of ‘passive’ deception are acceptable and which are not.  Formal conceptions of 
the role provide insufficient and conflicting assistance for defence lawyers dealing with 
such issues.  Since giving a false impression about character can even include the 
defendant’s "appearance or dress",777 it is hard to know what kind of ‘passive’ behaviour 
does not mislead the court.  Advising a lawyer to "ignore your own worries and 
concerns"
778
 may be easier said than done, especially in a minefield of professional 
regulation which forbids ‘dishonest or otherwise discreditable’ behaviour.  If formal 
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regulation was unambiguous in its encouragement of zealous defence and the courts 
supportive of such principles, perhaps the defence lawyer could dismiss any doubts as 
to his or her professional integrity.  Equally, if formal regulation consistently outlined 
that defence lawyers cannot deceive the court with silence, the position would be plain.  
This does not seem to be the case.  Guidance appears to create irresolvable conflicts, 
leaving defence lawyers to perform a dangerous balancing act between fallacious 
conduct and inadequate protection for a defendant. 
 
Tactical silence is another example of the treacherous waters defence lawyers must 
navigate between actively and passively misleading the court.  Some case law appears 
to endorse the use of tactical silence, stating "[a] defendant may demand that the 
prosecution proves its case and [may] keep . . . silent at any prosecution shortcomings 
until the time when it can take advantage of them".
779
  This encourages the partisan 
exploitation of any opportunities to further the client’s cause.  Academic commentary 
seems to support this, asserting that a defence lawyer is "under no duty to enquire in 
every case whether your client is telling the truth".
780
  Most explicit of all are the 
professional standards.  The Solicitors’ Code states that "[i]f you are acting for a 
defendant, you need not correct information given to the court by the prosecution or any 
other party which you know may allow the court to make incorrect assumptions about 
the client or the case, provided you do not indicate agreement with that information."
781
  
This perfectly encapsulates the concept of ‘passively’ misleading the court.  However, 
other regulation contradicts this.  Disclosure obligations such as the defence statement 
and those specified by the CPR require the defence to divulge material which might 
otherwise be useful to the defendant.  
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In the Chorley Justices
782
 case, Thomas LJ stated: 
 
"The duty of the court is to see that justice is done. That does not involve 
allowing people to escape on technical points or by attempting, as happened 
here, an ambush. It involves the courts in looking at the real justice of the case 
and seeing whether the rules have been complied with by ‘cards being put on the 
table’ at the outset and the issues being clearly identified."783 
 
This seriously limits the ability of the defence lawyer to maintain any tactical silence 
where it might benefit his or her client to do so.  It could be argued that this is 
reasonable since the duties of disclosure apply to both the defence and prosecution in a 
criminal trial, as was discussed earlier.  Yet, the prosecution has considerable resources 
at its disposal for constructing a case against an accused, primarily people and money; 
as such, prosecution disclosure is regarded as crucial to a fair and effective criminal 
justice process.  The Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure state that "[t]he 
'golden rule' is that fairness requires [that] full disclosure should be made of all material 
held by the prosecution that weakens its case or strengthens that of the defence"
784
 and 
that "[f]air disclosure to an accused is an inseparable part of a fair trial."
785
  
Additionally, the burden of proof lies with the prosecution.  Such principles recognise 
that criminal proceedings are not a level playing field.  Despite these long-standing 
principles, prevailing attitudes appear to dismiss the inherent inequality of the 
adversaries in English and Welsh criminal proceedings, claiming that "[a] criminal trial 
is not a game under which a guilty defendant should be provided with a sporting 
chance."
786
  Formal regulation implies that defence lawyers have duties to aid the search 
for truth; defence partisanship is "not a valid reason for preventing a full and fair 
hearing on the issues canvassed at the trial".
787
  The modern approach to tactical silence 
and defence disclosure therefore appears to undermine 'the golden rule' by compelling 
the defence to help the prosecution build a case against the defendant.   This surely 
conflicts with the defence lawyer’s duty to "promote and protect fearlessly and by all 
proper and lawful means his lay client's best interests".
788
  The rationale behind the 
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increasingly ‘zero-tolerance’ approach to tactical silence is debatable.  It is arguably to 
improve the effectiveness, efficiency and speed of the criminal justice system, 
eliminating deliberate prevarication and obstruction by the defence.  Alternatively, these 
provisions may be designed to reduce the influence of the defence lawyer as much as is 
possible within legal boundaries, demonstrating "a growing antipathy towards 
adversarial principles and the adversarial role of defence lawyers."
789
 
 
Attempts to resolve the conflict between partisanship and truth-seeking have been one-
sided and vague.  Leeson v. DPP,
790
 cited in Chapter 3, provides a good example:  
 
"I do not say that the defence are bound to remind the prosecution of all matters 
required to be proved, but I do say that they can hardly complain if, in the result, 
justices exercise their discretion so as to secure justice rather than allow a totally 
unmeritorious acquittal."
791
 
 
This statement seems to permit the use of tactical silence to some unidentified degree.  
However, it counteracts this by approving the exercise of a somewhat unpredictable 
discretion to ensure ‘justice’ is done.  Adversarial principles suggest that if the 
prosecution fails to cover a point of fact or law (as in R v. Gleeson), then the prosecution 
has failed to discharge their burden and the defence is entitled to remain silent about it.  
The defendant’s guilt will not have been proven sufficiently and an acquittal is entirely 
'meritorious'.  Leeson v. DPP suggests that the courts will take matters into their own 
hands and decide, regardless of prosecution incompetence, whether the defendant is 
guilty.  Other common law seems to confirm that technicalities will not prevent what 
Thomas LJ called 'real justice' being done, whatever that may be.  Therefore, one must 
question whether this approach alters the burden of proof in a criminal trial; it appears 
that the defence lawyer must now help the prosecution and court 'secure justice' despite 
their failings.  This implies that the burden of proof is, in part, a shared responsibility.  It 
is arguable that the truth-seeking obligations outlined above effectively force defendants 
to incriminate themselves through their lawyers, something that surely stands in contrast 
to formal conceptions of partisanship.  Formal conceptions of the role do not seem to 
answer these questions adequately, leaving substantial conflicts unresolved. 
 
                                                 
789
 Cape E. (2004) The Rise (And Fall?) of a Criminal Defence Profession – Crim. L.R., 415. 
790
 [2000] R.T.R. 385. 
791
 Ibid., 392. 
 160 
4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored a crucial aspect of the criminal defence lawyer’s role: ethical 
conflict.  The principles of the ‘zealous advocate’ model and the didactic rules of formal 
regulation may outline particular conceptions of the role, but neither is without conflict.  
The four conflict points identified in this chapter demonstrate that the central functions 
of the criminal defence lawyer often contradict each other.  However, a lack of clarity 
and certainty characterises the resolution of such clashes.  This makes describing and 
analysing the role of the defence lawyer, in theoretical and formal conceptions, much 
more difficult.  Furthermore, the conflict points have implications for criminal defence 
practice; without resolution, the ‘real-life’ work of the defence lawyer is surely 
hampered.  As such, examining the conflict points in greater depth is essential to a 
thorough and valid assessment of the usefulness of the ‘zealous advocate’ model in the 
21
st 
Century.  The next three chapters will outline the methodology and findings of an 
empirical study, focusing on how defence lawyers conceive of their role in practice and 
how, if at all, they resolve ethical conflicts in their day-to-day working life.  This will 
hopefully expand and enrich my exploration of role definition and ethical conflict in 
criminal defence work, and significantly contribute to answering the second research 
question: does the ‘zealous advocate’ model constitute a useful and relevant reflection 
of the role of the modern practitioner? 
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CHAPTER 5 – Exploring ‘Practical’ Conceptions of the Role of the 
Criminal Defence Lawyer:  A Methodological Approach 
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1. Introduction 
 
Do lawyers do what they are supposed to? 
 
As was outlined in Chapter 1, the exploration of the role of the criminal defence lawyer 
can be broadly divided into three layers; theoretical conceptions, formal conceptions 
and practical conceptions.  Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will focus on the third layer, describing 
the process and results of an empirical study of practical conceptions of the role in the 
modern English and Welsh criminal justice system.  Chapter 5 is a critical account of 
the methodology employed for conducting the empirical study, primarily detailing and 
justifying the use of the ‘vignette’ technique.  Chapters 6 and 7 are an analysis of the 
interviews undertaken with criminal defence lawyers.  From the outset, I would like to 
stress that this empirical study is designed to provide an insight into the 'real-life' role of 
the defence lawyer, rather than act as a comprehensive and statistically valid piece of 
fieldwork.  However, the importance of any such study should not be underestimated. 
Without empirical evidence about practical conceptions of the role, the ‘zealous 
advocate’ model and formal conceptions represent abstract aspirations and unconfirmed 
assumptions about how practitioners work.  Therefore, the rationale behind this 
empirical study is legitimacy.   
 
The central aim of this thesis is to explore and test the theoretical roots that underpin the 
role of the 21
st
 century criminal defence lawyer.  This empirical study was designed to 
help answer the second research question identified in Chapter 1 – does the ‘zealous 
advocate’ model constitute a useful and relevant reflection of the role of the modern 
practitioner?  In addition to exploring formal regulation, questioning practitioners about 
how they conceive of their role facilitates this goal.  The fieldwork was guided by two 
key sub-questions: what is the 'practical conception' of the role of the criminal defence 
lawyer in England and Wales and how, if at all, do practitioners resolve any 'conflict 
points' in their everyday role.  Empirical research ensures that analysis does not exist in 
a vacuum; the true test of theoretical conceptions of the role is whether modern 
practitioners understand the principles they embody and employ those principles in their 
working life.  This empirical study therefore gives genuine credibility to any 
conclusions drawn about the usefulness and relevance of the ‘zealous advocate’ model 
to modern criminal defence.  Of course, for the study to lend legitimacy to the thesis as 
a whole, it is important to both examine and justify the empirical process itself; thus, as 
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stated above, this chapter serves as a thorough critique of the research methodology 
used in this study.  Without a legitimate process, you do not have legitimate results. 
 
2. Empirical Methodology 
 
2.1 Overview 
 
This empirical study adopted a qualitative approach, in that it was focused on 
uncovering "the underlying motivations that people have for doing what they do"
792
 and 
exploring their "ideas, attitudes, motives and intentions".
793
  To achieve this, I undertook 
a series of in-depth interviews with criminal defence practitioners; that is, qualified 
professionals engaged in their work to advise or represent clients suspected of or 
charged with criminal offences.
794
  Qualitative interviews were chosen simply because 
they would provide the freedom to explore the key obligations which might define the 
role of the criminal defence lawyer.  The open-ended nature of the interviews allowed 
respondents to independently express their views on their role without being led to 
conclusions, but at the same time ensured that I could restrict the dialogue to relevant 
issues.  Each interview was conducted using a standard pro forma
795
 specifically 
designed for the purpose and which was divided into three sections. 
 
The first section posed a series of set questions with the aim of extracting 'base-line' 
information from respondents.  These were basic facts about their firm or chambers, 
their experience and the type of defence work (for example, bail applications) they 
usually undertook.
796
  This was necessary not only to establish reference points for the 
analysis of data, but also to demonstrate that a variety of lawyers, with a variety of 
experience, from a variety of organisations were interviewed.  This diversity provides a 
more accurate picture of how defence lawyers view their role; interviewing several 
solicitors from the same firm would provide less useful data than interviewing a mix of 
solicitors and barristers from a selection of firms and chambers.  In essence, a wider 
sample of subjects would hopefully yield more valid results.  The section also directly 
asked respondents to describe, in their own words, their obligations to different parties, 
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including the client, the court and the prosecution.  This kind of direct questioning 
ensured that, should the rest of the interview fail to elicit any clear opinions on their 
role, some basic impressions about their views could be gleaned.  More importantly, 
directly asking respondents about their obligations presented an opportunity to explore, 
without any context or facts, what they broadly believed their obligations to be; this 
provided an insight into how they consciously constructed their role when detached 
from the reality of their work.  This type of enquiry, as will be discussed later, does not 
necessarily reveal how respondents’ would behave in practice.  However, in this thesis, 
it did enable "a comparison between an interviewee's views and beliefs as expressed in 
general terms and their application to more or less detailed scenarios",
797
 and therefore 
revealed potential inconsistencies between what respondents preached and what they 
'practiced'.  What they practiced was explored in the second section of the pro forma.  
This section used a set of hypothetical ‘Professional Conduct Scenarios’ to ascertain 
how respondents’ obligations operated in practice and whether these obligations were 
commensurate with the ‘zealous advocate’ model outlined in Chapter 2.  These 
scenarios will be discussed in more depth shortly.   
 
The third section also posed set questions, focusing on the sources of guidance defence 
lawyers referred to when resolving ethical conflicts, their opinions on the CPR, how 
respondents characterised the role of the defence lawyer and how that role had changed 
in recent years.  Covering these subjects was important.  Exploring their attitude toward 
sources of guidance gave an impression of how useful respondents found modern 
regulation defining their role and would perhaps indicate a need for revision.  The CPR 
have introduced significant changes in criminal case management and, as a result, the 
role of the criminal defence lawyer.  It was therefore appropriate to dedicate a few 
questions solely to the exploration of their impact.  Finally, asking respondents about 
how they would describe the role of the criminal defence lawyer in broad terms would, 
hopefully, encourage them to focus on the most crucial aspects of their work and their 
most prominent obligations.  The question was asked without prior warning in order to 
encourage an instinctive, on-the-spot response.  I now return to the second section, and 
the major focus of the interviews: the four 'Professional Conduct Scenarios’, which 
employed a methodology commonly known as the 'vignette' technique. 
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2.2 The 'Professional Conduct Scenarios' 
 
2.2.1 Researching Lawyers:  Methodological Challenges 
 
As a subject of research, lawyers present several problematic traits which can hinder 
effective enquiry.  The choice of the vignette technique for this empirical study was 
driven by my desire to overcome such obstacles and probe deeper into the day-to-day 
role of the criminal defence lawyer. It therefore seems appropriate to discuss some of 
the potential methodological issues in lawyer-based research.  To begin with, selecting 
tried and tested methods for empirical work with legal practitioners was difficult 
because of a lack of established methodology in the area.  Reading the relevant 
literature, it became apparent that "[t]he history of research into the English Criminal 
Justice System is very short.  Only in the last twenty years have social scientists singled 
out the activities of Police Officers, Judges, Lawyers and other court personnel as 
subjects worthy of attention";
798
 in other words, the area is, or was, underdeveloped.  
That statement was from 1981, and much research has been done since, but over a 
decade later, the same author claimed that "there has been no systematic attempt to 
describe and explain what lawyers actually do",
799
 particularly the "working practices 
and philosophies of duty solicitors [and] defending solicitors . . . engaged in criminal 
work."
800
  Studies of the law and legal practices "did not make lawyers the focus of their 
interest and were very much 'end-process' oriented in their concern with court-based 
activity."
801
  This lack of focus on solicitors, barristers and other qualified legal 
professionals created a significant "lacuna"
802
 in both the collective knowledge about 
their work and the methodological rigour of such research.  In the last 15 years, 
empirical research into the activities of lawyers, from both a legal perspective
803
 and 
wider sociological perspective,
804
 has attempted to fill this gap.  However, using what 
one can broadly term quantitative and qualitative interviews and general observation are 
as far as proven fieldwork methods go, with expansion of those concepts open to the 
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individual researcher.  It therefore seems that the development of effective methodology 
for researching lawyers, and most particularly defence lawyers, is still dogged by a lack 
of academic interest. 
 
A second potential limitation on effective empirical research with lawyers is distrust of 
outside research, an attitude that inevitably inhibits a researcher's ability to access the 
world of the research subject.  At an early stage of research with lawyers, academics 
concluded that "[t]he legal profession has never shown much enthusiasm for 
research"
805
 and that researchers were generally regarded "with suspicion and on 
occasions with fear."
806
  This is not isolated to lawyers, but, as an ancient, unique and 
elite profession, it has been observed many times that legal practitioners demonstrate 
the "understandable reluctance of any professional group to allow its activities to be 
scrutinised with no obvious benefits for its members".
807
  This "natural conservatism 
shown by any profession towards having its business examined by outsiders"
808
 was 
illustrated in extremis in the historical, but educational, example of the furore 
surrounding the publication of 'Negotiated Justice'.
809
 This study implicated legal 
practitioners, particularly barristers, in 'plea bargaining' – the informal agreement 
between prosecution and defence that the defendant will plead guilty to lesser charges.  
This highlighted the possibility that counsel had exerted inappropriate pressure on 
defendants to plead guilty to offences when they did not want to.  The research had been 
conducted with defendants only, as the Senate of the Bar, the representative body of 
barristers, had "withheld co-operation".
810
  There were "continued efforts to thwart the 
conduct of the research"
811
 and a "concerted attempt . . . to prevent publication";
812
 the 
findings resulted in "open hostility"
813
 toward the authors with leaders of the legal 
profession "resort[ing] to slur and innuendo when pressed".
814
  The authors drew the 
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conclusion that, "[l]awyers characteristically demonstrate an extraordinary high level of 
satisfaction with current procedures and attempts to change these, from outside or from 
within, are likely to encounter the most stubborn resistance.  No researcher, then, who 
trespasses on this difficult terrain, can expect an easy passage."
815
  In the light of this 
warning, the implications for empirical research methodology were clear.  Any approach 
would need to penetrate a potential layer of distrust and allow the respondents to 
interpret questions in their own way.  It should be made clear at this point that, in 
undertaking my empirical study, I encountered virtually no resistance or evasion; all of 
my subjects were very open, friendly and willing to participate.  I would hope that this 
was, in part, a result of the methodology I adopted. 
 
Another potential issue is the attachment of lawyers to the standard values of their 
profession and their adherence to the 'official line'.  The 'official line' is the right one, 
the 'correct answer' to a question and one which may not reflect the truth.  However, 
providing acceptable answers to a researcher is not necessarily a deliberate or conscious 
deception on the part of lawyers; it is a result of training and a natural, internal 
perspective.  The education and regulation of legal practitioners aims to breed proud and 
conservative professionals with an in-built loyalty to and respect for the standards that 
govern them.  For example, Rule 301 of the Bar Code of Conduct states that a barrister 
"must not . . . engage in conduct . . . which is . . . likely to diminish public confidence in 
the legal profession" and "must not . . . engage directly or indirectly in any occupation if 
his association with that occupation may adversely affect the reputation of the Bar."  It 
has also been observed in the past that the "the [legal] profession itself tends to promote 
an altruistic model under which solicitors use their skills in the interests of their clients 
and of the public."
816
  The importance of maintaining this reputation is indoctrinated 
through the lengthy and intensive training process described earlier in this thesis.  It 
"provides the initiate with a knowledge (tacit or explicit) of the norms and values of the 
occupational community",
817
 resulting in a "high degree of social and cultural 
homogeneity at the point of entry".
818
  Beyond their education, lawyers practice in fairly 
closed circles, interacting largely with each other, meaning that "the initiate's 
subsequent path through the legal profession becomes a highly structured 'rite de 
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passage'".
819
  Therefore, a lawyer asked about their role may give the 'official' answer.   
 
This could be in the form of "'presentational information' being offered by 
respondents";
820
 that is, an answer that presents an acceptable image and upholds the 
integrity of the profession.  Alternatively, the 'official line' may be a result of 
"respondents' imperfect knowledge of their own world";
821
 in essence, a lack of 
awareness that the 'official' answer and the reality may be different.  I experienced this 
first-hand, prior to commencing my fieldwork.  Whilst undertaking a day of observation 
in the Crown Court of a large, urban legal circuit,
822
 I discussed the role of the criminal 
defence lawyer with a barrister.  When asked if he was a 'zealous advocate', he 
responded that he believed he was, and talked about defending the best interests of the 
client (reminiscent of the principle of partisanship).  I later observed him spend time 
convincing a client, who claimed to be innocent of any offence, that she should plead 
guilty.  After arranging a plea bargain with a very forceful and impatient prosecuting 
barrister, the client agreed and the case ‘cracked’.823  I felt compelled to question 
whether the 'official line' and the reality matched up here; arguably, the client and 
lawyer had divergent views as to what the client’s best interests were.  In this case, does 
a lawyer serve the best interests of the client by doing his or her best to execute the 
client’s wishes, or by effectively ‘overruling’ the client and imposing their own paternal 
view?  Again, the implications for methodology are significant.  My approach would 
need to encourage answers grounded in actual practice and eliminate room for potential 
'standard' answers. 
 
Two other issues had the potential to restrict effective empirical research with lawyers.  
Lawyers, and particularly criminal defence lawyers, act as a confidante and "legal friend 
. . . which exemplifies . . . the ideal of personal relations of trust".
824
  Without that 
reputation of discretion and trustworthiness, the lawyer cannot perform his or her work.  
Empirical research is by its nature intrusive; to effectively explore the role and work of 
a lawyer, a researcher will seek to at least glimpse the private domain of the practitioner 
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and his or her clients.  As a result, lawyers may be unwilling to engage in fieldwork of 
this nature for fear of undermining their standing as a figure of trust, and also to protect 
client confidentiality, an obligation which "predisposes lawyers to be extremely 
reluctant to allow a research function to intervene at all."
825
  The methodology would 
therefore need to make appropriate provision for anonymity guarantees, to reassure 
respondents that their reputation would not be jeopardised.  The second problem applied 
specifically to criminal defence lawyers – that of public image, a subject briefly 
discussed in Chapter 1.  Lawyers generally are the subject of a "widespread and ancient 
perception that [they] are grasping, callous, self-serving, devious and indifferent to 
justice, truth and the public good."
826
  As a result of this, criminal defence lawyers, as 
one of the most visible and well-known types of lawyer, have a particularly poor public 
image.
827
  They are often regarded as defenders of the wicked and persecutors of the 
victimized.  Furthermore, because "[t]here is a tendency to associate lawyers with their 
clients . . . for criminal lawyers the association with poverty and crime gives them low 
status within the professional hierarchy."
828
  I therefore expected to encounter a 
profession suffering from low morale, unwilling to be exposed to further analysis, 
criticism and potential denigration from an outsider.  My approach would therefore need 
to grant respondents the opportunity to explain their role in their terms and avoid any 
loaded concepts or implied criticism.  I felt that the vignette technique could effectively 
counter all of the above issues.
829
    
 
2.2.2 What are ‘Vignettes’? 
 
It is necessary to clarify that a ‘Professional Conduct Scenario’ is a vignette.  This 
alternative label was chosen to more appropriately reflect the focus of the vignettes and 
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also to avoid using a term that, whilst having a specific meaning to empirical 
researchers, might have confused respondents as to the nature and purpose of the 
scenarios.  The vignette technique uses "short stories about hypothetical characters in 
specified circumstances, to whose situation the interviewee is invited to respond."830  
Respondents are "typically asked to respond to these stories with what they would do in 
a particular situation or how they think a third person would respond."
831
  The purpose 
of this was to obtain an impression of how a respondent behaves in a realistic context 
and why.   The "scenarios depicted in the stories can take the form of ‘moral 
dilemmas’",832 and by asking the respondent to make choices about what action they 
would take in the situation presented, one can hopefully derive what values, principles 
or beliefs drive that behaviour.  In this thesis, the application of the vignette technique 
was therefore designed to present ethical dilemmas to criminal defence lawyers (based 
on the conflict points),
833
 to which they would respond, outlining what course of action 
they would take in such circumstances.  These decisions should reflect what criminal 
defence lawyers regard as their guiding values and obligations as professionals.  This 
choice of method was based on extensive research into past use and academic 
commentary on the advantages and disadvantages of vignettes. 
 
2.2.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Vignette Technique 
 
One of the key advantages of the vignette technique is its focus on specific, hypothetical 
situations.  A fundamental criticism of interview or survey-based research is "the 
ambiguity that often arises when survey respondents are asked to make decisions and 
judgments from rather abstract and limited information."
834
  This is a problem for two 
reasons.  First, it can result in responses which are "simply bland generalisations and 
impossible to interpret".
835
  Presenting a respondent with vague, abstract questions is 
likely to encourage answers that are detached from their day-to-day experience.  
Second, a respondent may not be "particularly insightful about the factors that enter 
their own judgment-making process"
836
 and forcing them to engage in isolated 
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speculation about such factors may lead to confusion and inaccuracy.  As Hughes 
highlights, "[i]ndividuals have a limited capacity to maintain a discursive awareness of 
every aspect of day-to-day life".
837
  Thus, asking direct questions about abstract 
concepts that seemingly bear no relation to the ‘real-life’ experience of a respondent 
may prove difficult for him or her to answer.  For example, for the purposes of this 
thesis, the principle of partisanship is a defined concept which generally describes the 
obligation a defence lawyer owes to a client to defend them to best of their ability.  I am 
attempting to discover whether this concept accurately reflects the role of criminal 
defence lawyers in practice.  However, a respondent may not understand such a 
detached concept and will be unlikely to have the self-awareness to recognise its 
influence.  The way he or she defines and performs their role may correlate with this 
concept, but the respondent may or may not be conscious of this; they may just do their 
job in a particular way without any over-arching view of their role.  Therefore, asking 
about it directly is unlikely to be helpful. 
 
In contrast, the vignette technique avoids asking a respondent directly about factors that 
they may not comprehend in the same way as the interviewer.  Instead, they enable an 
interviewer to place a respondent in a position where he or she can make instinctive 
decisions about specific factors which are indicative of the underlying principles that 
shape their role.  By asking a respondent to focus on a specific set of facts, they "move 
further away . . . from a direct and abstracted approach, and allow for features of the 
context to be specified, so that the respondent is being invited to make normative 
statements about a set of social circumstances, rather than to express his or her 'beliefs' 
or 'values' in a vacuum."
838
  The use of vignettes recognises that a respondent has to 
make decisions about his or her behaviour in a variety of circumstances and 
"acknowledges that meanings are social and that morality may well be situationally 
specifically."
839
  Therefore, asking a respondent to react to a set of facts rather than a 
direct, abstract question "more closely approximate[s] a real-life decision-making or 
judgment-making situation."
840
  The more realistic and specific the situation in which a 
respondent is placed, the more likely one is to receive a realistic and specific response.  
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Responses to vignettes should therefore be more reflective of a respondent’s 
"experience of practice, facilitating the identification of individuals’ situated 
understanding and practical theory."
841
  By presenting conflicts as fact-based vignettes 
rather than abstract concepts, the responses given should more accurately indicate how 
defence lawyers resolve conflicts in 'real life'. 
 
Vignettes should also result in more honest and natural answers.  Vignettes disguise the 
intentions of the interviewer, making it less likely that a respondent will be influenced 
by leading questions or directed reasoning.  As stated earlier, vignettes generally contain 
an ethical dilemma which a respondent is asked to resolve.  This resolution indicates 
what principles guide their behaviour.  In the context of this thesis, the ethical dilemmas 
presented in the vignettes were based on the conflict points.  Directly presenting conflict 
points to a respondent has little empirical value because it effectively guides the 
respondent to the answer.  For example, consider the following question:   
 
'When faced with a conflict between the two obligations, would you say that 
your duty to assist the court takes precedence over your duty to fearlessly defend 
your client?' 
 
The answer to this may have limited usefulness.  The question may influence the 
respondent in three ways.  First, the use of language such as 'fearlessly defend' and 
'assist the court' presumes that these are, by default, a defence lawyer's practical 
obligations.  Second, presenting them in this way presumes that the respondent 
subscribes to this view, without providing any opportunity for him or her to identify 
them without being prompted.  Third, presenting a conflict directly and asking about 
how it might be resolved inherently hints that the interviewer is looking for a particular 
answer.   
 
When faced with this type of loaded question, the likelihood is that a respondent will 
provide the answer they think the questioner wants to hear, what is known in 
psychology as the observer-expectancy effect.  This is likely to be the 'official' answer.  
Formal regulation provides 'official' answers to questions such as these; the Bar Code of 
Conduct deals with this conflict quite explicitly, stating that the duty to the court is 
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"overriding".
842  
This, of course, may not necessarily reflect the reality of conflict 
resolution.  In addition, no detail about the 'conflict' is given; to quote or paraphrase the 
formal guidance is much easier than considering the potential permutations of a real life 
client-court conflict.  These kinds of answers defeat the point of the fieldwork.  Its 
purpose is to investigate whether day-to-day criminal defence work reflects formal and 
theoretical conceptions of the role.  If posing questions like the one above only results 
in broad, formal answers, then they have no place in a probing and effective empirical 
study.  Vignettes allow the interviewer to avoid explicitly leading respondents to either 
recognise or resolve the conflict points; they are masked by the scenarios, allowing 
respondents to identify and consider the issues independently.  By removing any 
suggestive context that direct questions might add, the respondents will hopefully give 
more honest answers.   
 
Vignettes also provide a form of 'comfort zone' for respondents.  Asking them to 
comment on a set of facts rather than directly questioning them about their ethical 
framework "provides respondents with an opportunity to discuss issues arising from the 
story from a non-personal and therefore less-threatening perspective."
843
  This reduces 
the potential effect of "social desirability factors";
844
 that is, the urge to provide a 
response which will cast the respondent in the best light in the context of their work.  
When asked about a subject directly and in broad terms, a respondent may be tempted to 
give the socially acceptable or 'correct' answer, which may not be the honest answer.  
For example, a lawyer who is asked whether they 'fearlessly defend a client' may answer 
that they do, because that reflects well on them as a professional.  Vignettes go deeper.  
If the lawyer is presented with a specific scenario rather than a loaded question, he or 
she will be less likely to present a sanitised version of what they would do or describe 
what they should do; they are more likely to describe what they actually do.  Thus, 
when presented with a vignette, a "respondent is not as likely to consciously bias his 
report in the direction of impression management (social approval of the interviewer) as 
he is when being asked directly".
845
  In essence, vignettes are a form of research 
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subterfuge, disguising the interviewer's interest in the underlying opinions and attitudes 
of respondents.  Humans are likely to behave more naturally when they do not know 
they are being observed and vignettes help reduce the awareness the respondent has of 
the interests of the interviewer. 
 
Finally, a danger in qualitative research is the difficulty in analysing and comparing the 
data collected from respondents.  If the questions are broad and non-specific, then "each 
respondent will answer in terms of his own mental picture of the task before him."
846
  If 
questions do not reflect any realistic situation that the respondent can relate to, each 
answer will reflect a respondent’s personal interpretation of a very abstract question.  
For example, if each respondent is asked 'Do you have a duty of truth-seeking?', the 
answers given will reflect the meaning each respondent attributes to 'truth-seeking'; it is 
not a discrete concept.  When it comes to analysing whether defence lawyers recognise 
such a duty, one cannot credibly say that all the respondents understood the concept of 
‘truth-seeking’ in the same way.  Therefore, how can one compare their answers?  
Vignettes go some way to overcoming this troublesome but inevitable complication.  By 
presenting the same, concrete situation to each respondent, "the survey researcher gains 
a degree of uniformity and control over the stimulus situation",
847
 limiting the potential 
for more personalised and incomparable responses.  They remove abstraction, forcing 
respondents to consider limited, definite factors; this should lead to more consistency 
across an empirical study.  By setting the boundaries within which a response can be 
formulated, each respondent is more likely to give an answer to the same question or 
'stimulus' rather than their personal reading of the question.  Of course, one can never 
eliminate subjective interpretation, nor would one want to; if the parameters of the 
question were narrowed too much, then the interviewer would receive the same, 
mechanical answer over and over again from each respondent.  Vignettes provide 
enough concrete information to enable the comparison of answers, without limiting a 
respondent’s freedom of interpretation too much. 
 
Although vignettes appear to be effective at eliciting realistic responses to a situation, it 
is important to remember that they are merely a simulation of life.  As Wilks states, 
"[t]here is no guarantee that the responses to a given vignette will in some way mirror 
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actual behaviour of the respondent in their professional practice."
848
  Three key 
criticisms support this caution.  First, vignettes are fixed scenarios, with no human 
participant other than the respondent.
849
  This problem is well summarized by Hughes: 
 
"Individuals are constantly responding to the people and the environment around 
them and one of the main criticisms levelled at the vignette technique is that it 
neglects the interaction and feedback that is a necessary part of social life."
850
 
 
This not only adds to the ‘unreality’ of the vignette, but fails to take account of the 
potential reactions that others may have to the respondent’s analysis of the situation.  
For example, in the context of this thesis, a vignette cannot take account of the reaction 
that a defendant, a judge, a prosecutor, a complainant or a police officer may have to the 
respondent’s answers.  This may affect how a respondent proceeds.  Unfortunately, the 
vignette technique cannot capture this organic development entirely.  Second, vignettes 
cannot recreate the effect of a pressurised environment, such as a court room or police 
station, which might influence the respondent's answers.  A respondent is "right 'in the 
thick of things' in real life, whereas they are always detached or detachable from stories 
they read".
851
  However specific the facts of a vignette may be, an interview situation 
still gives a respondent time and space to think, with no vested interest in the outcome.  
Third, the problem of "social desirability bias" cannot be totally eliminated by the use of 
vignettes.  There may be differences between "what people think should happen and 
what actually does happen";
852 
indeed, in a study using vignettes, Field suggested that 
respondents may have still been "defensively constructing an account for the 
interviewer built in terms of what they were supposed to be doing rather than what they 
actually did."
853
  Cornwell defined this contrast between the response and the reality as 
public and private accounts.
854
  The former "reflect what people feel is acceptable to tell 
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strangers",
855
 whilst the latter are "richer and more detailed descriptions of people’s 
lives."
856 
 Therefore, when using vignettes, one should be aware that "we can never be 
sure that the way in which respondents say that they would behave and why reflects 
accurately their likely actions and motives in the 'real world'."
857
  Literature on the use 
of the vignette technique also highlights that "[n]o research tool can truly reflect 
people’s real life experiences"858 and will only be indicative.  Notwithstanding this 
assertion, when used as a tool for gaining an interpretation of and insight into the real 
life experiences of respondents, vignettes can "complement other forms of data 
collection to provide a more balanced picture of the social world which researchers seek 
to understand" and "help unpackage individuals’ perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes to a 
wide range of social issues."
859
 
 
2.2.4 Construction 
 
The construction of the ‘Professional Conduct Scenarios’ was an extended and 
challenging process.  Discourse on the vignette technique referred to using scenarios 
that "seem real and relevant",
860
 and that "reflect mundane, rather than exceptional, 
occurrences".
861
  In constructing vignettes, academics recommended resisting the 
temptation to describe "a group of eccentric characters . . . subject to a chain of 
disastrous events".
862
  Capturing the imagination of the respondent should be 
subordinate to the aim of presenting a realistic situation which reflects his or her real-
life experience.  Literature suggested that if one aims for the plausible and average, then 
there is more likely to be a "close relationship between people’s real life and vignette 
responses"
863
 and avoiding the fantastical should minimise "an atmosphere of 'make 
believe'".
864
  One of the research studies reviewed described the use of vignettes that 
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were "adapted from real cases";
865
 I adopted a similar method for this thesis.  With the 
objective of creating believable and realistic scenarios in mind, I undertook several brief 
periods of shadowing and observation with solicitors, barristers and accredited 
representatives. On four occasions (April 2008, November 2008, December 2008 and 
January 2009), I shadowed criminal defence practitioners as they performed work in 
court, in the cells, in the police station and in client conferences.  Tasks observed 
included advocacy in summary and indictable/either way trials, bail applications, plea 
and case management hearings and sentencing; providing clients with advice prior to 
hearings, in the cells and during police interviews; preparing case files; drafting advice 
in Chambers or at Firm offices.  Notes based on these experiences were used to draft 
vignettes for the fieldwork. 
 
The purpose of the empirical study, and thus the vignettes, was to gain an insight into 
the relationship between defence lawyers’ practical conceptions of their role, the 
theoretical ‘zealous advocate’ model, and formal conceptions of the role.  The study also 
aimed to explore how defence practitioners resolve the key conflicts that arise in the 
course of their working life.  Therefore, each vignette was constructed around what the 
literature termed a 'dilemma' and what this thesis has referred to as conflict points.  The 
benefit of basing the vignettes around the conflict points was twofold; it not only placed 
a respondent in a central problem-solving position, but, due to the free-form nature of 
the discussion surrounding the vignettes, allowed the respondent to elaborate on the 
principles in conflict and what they meant to them.  For example, discussion of a 
vignette based around the conflict between the principle of partisanship and the 
principles of procedural justice and truth-seeking (Scenario D – see below) would allow 
a respondent to demonstrate how they might approach resolution and also outline their 
conceptions of partisanship, procedural justice and truth-seeking.  Although manifested 
in formal regulation, these conflict points are essentially abstract, theoretical concepts; 
adapting them for presentation to each respondent required realistic, fact-based 
conflicts.  This process of converting theoretical dilemmas into believable, recognisable 
conflicts exploited my extensive observation notes.  None of the final vignettes were 
direct reproductions of actual ethical conflict situations that I observed.  However, all 
incorporated elements of observed events and everyday, real-life clashes witnessed by 
the author.  Therefore, one might regard the vignettes as a collage of fact-based 
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dilemmas, arranged to represent the conflict points being examined in this thesis. 
 
The arrangement of these observed ideas and concepts into vignette form took account 
of advice of the literature already discussed.  I constructed a series of brief ‘narratives’; 
this appeared to be the most compact and accessible method, and constituted "one of the 
more common applications of the vignette technique",
866
 indicating reliability and 
effectiveness.  The scenarios had to "contain sufficient context for respondents to have 
an understanding about the situation being depicted, but be vague enough to ‘force’ 
participants to provide additional factors which influence their decisions."
867
  Striking 
this balance was difficult.  Too vague a vignette would lead to the issues discussed 
earlier in this chapter, while too much detail could constrict the necessary flexibility for 
a respondent to interpret facts and obligations in their own way.  Despite this, a core 
benefit of the vignette technique is that detailed, fact-based situations can enhance a 
"[p]articipant’s ability to engage with the story".868  This is especially true if a 
respondent has "personal experience of the situation described",
869 
which is why the 
vignettes were adapted from observed situations involving the types of respondent 
targeted in this empirical study.  However, all of the literature appeared to place 
considerable emphasis on the philosophy that "fuzziness is strength".
870
  In using 
vignettes for qualitative, empirical research, academic commentary concurs that 
"ambiguity is a positive virtue, since it leaves space for respondents to define the 
situation in their own terms".
871
  This taps into the personal view of the respondent 
about his or her role, rather than one pre-defined by extensive detail.  In essence, too 
much detail results in too much certainty, which in turn eliminates room for conflict.  
This would defeat the object of the vignettes.   
 
In drafting the vignettes, I outlined basic facts about the subjects of the scenario, the 
events that had occurred and only inferred conflict issues.  I considered it important that 
the potential conflicts of principle be identified by each respondent if possible.  
Unnecessary or irrelevant details, such as elements of procedure or unanswerable legal 
questions, were omitted from the vignettes.  This is not to say that such detail was not 
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discussed when deemed material to the conflict or the surrounding principles.  In terms 
of practicality, the literature also highlighted that vignettes should be "readily 
understood, [be] internally consistent and not too complex" and "that more than three 
changes to a story line was often too confusing for participants to remember."
872
  Each 
vignette was approximately a paragraph in length (100-250 words), with one basic 
storyline made up of four or five events.  Where the direction of the story changed, the 
vignette was divided into two separate parts; 'Part A' would be presented and discussed, 
followed by 'Part B'.  The vignettes were also drafted to reflect, as was highlighted 
earlier, "mundane, rather than exceptional, occurrences".
873
  The events described 
involved an alleged offence followed by interaction with the client, court, police and 
others.  These offences and interactions were influenced by observed events and were 
designed to be commonplace. 
 
2.2.5 Pilot 
 
Once I had drafted vignettes that appeared to fulfil all the aforementioned criteria, I felt 
it was important to validate how realistic and effective they would be when presented to 
criminal defence practitioners.  Again, literature on the use of vignettes proved useful; it 
highlighted that "[m]ost commonly experts or professionals not involved in the study 
are used to pre-test the ‘realness’ of the hypothetical account presented in the 
vignette."
874
  I chose to follow this advice and 'pilot' the vignettes with appropriate test 
respondents who would not be included in the fieldwork.  One practitioner and two 
academics were targeted.  The practitioner, a criminal defence solicitor, was based in a 
different geographical location to that of the empirical study, to ensure there were no 
potential links between the pilot respondent and any research respondents.  The 
academics, both university lecturers with expertise in criminal law, were based in the 
location of the study, but it was felt that they would be less likely to have personal 
connections with potential research respondents as they were not in the same profession.  
I felt that, for a small study like this, only a few pilot respondents were needed.  
Unfortunately, only one of the three individuals targeted (one of the academics) 
responded with feedback.  However, the pilot respondent was also a qualified criminal 
                                                 
872
 Barter C., Renold E. (1999) The Use of Vignettes in Qualitative Research – 25 Social Research 
Update, 4. 
873
 Field S. (2008) Early Intervention and the ‘New’ Youth Justice: A Study of Initial Decision-Making – 
Crim. L.R., 180. 
874
 Wilks T. (2004) The Use of Vignettes in Qualitative Research into Social Work Values – 3 Qualitative 
Social Work 1, 82. 
 180 
defence practitioner with recent experience in the field, despite his employment as an 
academic.  He was sent a feedback document, explaining what my thesis was and that 
the fieldwork was ‘specifically interested in the ethical conflicts that defence lawyers 
encounter in their day-to-day work’.  He was provided with a copy of the draft 
vignettes, accompanied by a 'title', indicating the conflict point each vignette 
represented.  It was also explained that, in employing vignettes, it was hoped that 
responses to them would ‘indicate how [respondents] would react to the ethical 
dilemma presented . . . [and] indicate how they view their role as a criminal defence 
lawyer and where their duties lie.’  It was requested that feedback on the vignettes 
comment on the following: 
 
1. The ‘realism’ of the scenarios – do they make sense in a legal context?  
Could these scenarios potentially occur in day-to-day work? 
2. Are the scenarios understandable?  Are they confusing, rambling, too 
simple? 
3. Do they raise real ethical conflicts? – The scenarios are intended to create 
conflicts that reflect the heading they are under. 
 
The feedback was very helpful.  The pilot respondent highlighted where information 
was too vague; proposed alterations where no realistic conflict existed (such as using a 
different offence or clarifying procedural defects); suggested that questions about 
financial considerations be included; edited the narrative to ensure the language used 
was realistic (e.g. "special measures" in place of "special arrangements"); provided 
advice on likely answers, allowing the author to judge where more ambiguity could be 
introduced.  The implications of such a limited pilot must be conceded; feedback was 
received from only one respondent, although he was both an academic and a 
practitioner.  Different perspectives, particularly from a current practitioner, may have 
provided valuable information for improving the scenarios.  However, feedback from 
other sources may have reflected what the author did receive, and so may have added 
nothing substantial to the drafting process.  It is likely that the wider the range of 
feedback, the more accurate and effective the vignettes may have been and thus may 
have led to more statistically valid data.  Thus, one must bear in mind the limitations of 
the process when weighing the value of the results of this study. 
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2.2.6 The Final 'Professional Conduct Scenarios' 
 
The four final scenarios were presented (minus the 'titles') to the respondents: 
 
Scenario A (Confidentiality v. Procedural Justice and Truth-Seeking) 
 
'Your client, Z, has been charged with possession of heroin with intent to supply.  
He was arrested on North Road, which is a well-known haunt for drug users.  Z 
claims that the heroin found on him was for personal use and that he does not 
deal.  He pleads not guilty and his trial date is set; however, in your last meeting 
with Z before the trial, he says that he won't be able to attend the first day of the 
trial as he ‘needs to score on North Road after the weekend.’  You warn him he 
must attend the trial; he responds by asking you to explain his absence to the 
court.  You outline the potential consequences of failing to attend, but he insists 
on his instructions.  On the morning of the trial, Z does not appear as expected; 
you attempt to phone him but receive no answer.  You must explain Z's absence 
to the court. ' 
 
In this vignette, the respondent is provided with information by the client; this 
information could potentially aid the court in locating the defendant and thereby 
facilitate the proceedings and progress the truth-seeking process.  Equally, the 
information could be disadvantageous to the client.  It not only casts him in a bad light 
but could help the court find and convict him.  The respondent therefore needs to 
reconcile competing duties - to keep communications with the client confidential and to 
assist the court in the administration of justice and pursuit of the truth.
875
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Scenario B (Partisanship v. Morality) 
 
'Your client, A, has been charged with raping B.  A met B in ‘The Dock’, a local 
nightclub, and after having drunk a lot, went back to B’s house.  B claimed that 
A then raped her when she refused to have sex with him.  A denies the 
allegation, claiming that B consented at the time and had made it clear she 
wanted to have sex throughout the night.  There were no witnesses to the alleged 
rape itself.  A claims to have seen B in ‘The Dock’ several times before, 
behaving flirtatiously and always leaving with different men.  He claims others 
would agree with him that B has a reputation for picking up men in ‘The Dock’ 
and taking them home to have sex.  She has alleged rape against a man in the 
past, a charge which was dropped due to lack of evidence.  A has an historic 
conviction for sexual assault and witnesses attest to his history of sexual 
promiscuity.  A instructs you to argue that B is lying and that her sexual history 
backs up this claim. ' 
 
In this scenario, the respondent is presented with a conflict between the duty to advance 
the best interests of the client and the duty to act in an ethical manner.  On the one hand, 
exploring the sexual history of the complainant may demonstrate a propensity to make 
false claims and may suggest to a jury that she is someone who consents to random 
sexual encounters regularly.  This may further the client's case that she is lying about the 
alleged rape.  However, pursuing this line of questioning may be a cheap and immoral 
tool for humiliating someone who may be a vulnerable victim of a serious sexual attack, 
to the advantage of a man with a record of sexual offences.
876
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Scenario C (Detachment v. Morality) 
 
PART A:  'W, a 40 year old male, has been charged with sexually assaulting his 
13 year old daughter, X, whilst visiting her at her mother's home.  Her mother, Y, 
had left the house briefly to go to the shop.  W has a string of past convictions 
for domestic violence directed at Y, for which he has spent time in custody and 
which led to their separation.  'W' also had a charge of indecent exposure to a 
minor dropped due to a lack of evidence.  He protests his innocence, claiming 
his daughter is lying and made the accusations after he refused to give her 
money.  W requests your representation in what will clearly be a large-scale and 
potentially lucrative Crown Court trial. ' 
 
PART B:  'W pleads not guilty, on your advice.  In preparing for trial, you 
discover that X has raised allegations of violence against both of her parents in 
the past, none of them pursued by the Police.  The trial begins and the 
prosecution call X, who has been given special measures to protect her in court. 
She claims that W asked her to perform a sexual act on him and attacked her 
when she refused.  She also claims that he has sexually abused her several times 
in the past, but she was too scared to tell anyone.  You begin cross-examination 
of X.' 
 
The conflict in this scenario pitches detachment against morality.  Defending a man with 
a history of domestic violence and sexual deviance with minors could be considered 
abhorrent and not a task that a figure with a duty of morality should undertake.  In 
addition, attacking a child for the purpose of advancing his case could also be 
considered unethical.  However, if the respondent also has a duty to remain detached 
and not pre-judge a client based on their character or the nature of the case, then a 
conflict exists.
877
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Scenario D (Partisanship v. Procedural Justice and Truth-Seeking) 
 
PART A:  'Your client, F, has been charged with driving whilst under the 
influence of alcohol.  She was pulled over by a Police Officer who breathalysed 
and arrested her.  She provided a breath sample using an Intoximeter at the 
Police Station, which gave a reading of 50 microgrammes – 15 microgrammes 
over the limit.  This entitled her to choose to replace her breath sample with a 
blood or urine sample.  However, contrary to procedure, an officer said that she 
must give a blood or urine sample, and she complied.  Her samples confirmed 
she was over the limit and she was charged.  She tells you she ‘was at the pub 
but didn't drink anything’ and on her instructions, you enter a plea of not guilty. ' 
 
PART B:  'The trial begins.  The arresting officer gives evidence that on arrest F 
claimed she'd ‘only had one drink’.  In a brief break, F admits to you that she 
may have drunk alcohol at the pub but had just forgotten.  In addition to this, the 
officer who operated the Intoximeter fails to confirm that it was working 
reliably, as is required.  The prosecution case is drawing to a close. ' 
 
This scenario presents respondents with a difficult clash of principles.  The client 
appears to have committed the offence but wishes to plead not guilty on a technicality.  
The respondent must therefore resolve the conflict between the duty to be a partisan for 
the client, and the duties to seek the truth and aid the administration of justice.  The 
latter obligations require the lawyer to aid the conviction of the guilty and share 
information with the court, including being open about tactics and mistakes by the 
police and prosecution.  The vignette therefore requires difficult decisions about what 
duties will take precedence.
878
  It is important to point out that none of the vignettes 
contain a direct reference to the theoretical principles identified in this thesis, nor 
explicitly outline a conflict.  They set up a series of facts and are left open to the 
interpretation of the respondent.  This, as has previously been stated, is to ensure that a 
respondent identifies any duties or conflicts without guidance. 
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2.3 Target Organisations 
 
Lawyers working in the context of two types of 'organisation' were targeted in this 
empirical study; Firms, employing both solicitors and accredited representatives, and 
Chambers, at which barristers were tenured residents.  The respondents were drawn 
from six Firms and two Chambers.  Each Firm specialised in legally aided criminal 
defence, whilst each set of Chambers had a large number of barristers undertaking 
defence work.  It was recognised that the type and size of the respondent's organisation 
might have an effect on their responses; there is clear potential for trends to emerge in 
the data collected when several respondents are drawn from the same organisation.  This 
could be related to factors such as an internal culture of practice or specific 
organisational policies from partners/seniors, factors which could perpetuate an 
organisation-specific approach.  Although this potential 'osmosis' within Firms and 
Chambers could influence the data, it was decided that the data collected would not be 
categorised based on which organisation the respondent belonged to (for example, 
Respondent 1 from Firm A).  First, it was felt that the sample in this study was too small 
to demonstrate any meaningful trends; the highest number of respondents from the same 
organisation was four.  Second, this empirical study and thesis are interested in the 
views of individual criminal defence lawyers about their role and how that compares 
with theory, not the impact of organisational structures on an employee's thinking.  The 
scope of the research had to remain focused; it was for this reason that other variables 
which might affect the responses of the respondents, such as gender or age, were not 
included.
879
 
 
2.4 Target Respondents 
 
The only variable that the empirical study took account of was the type of criminal 
defence lawyer.  'Criminal defence lawyer'
880
 is an umbrella term and in the course of 
the fieldwork, three types of criminal defence lawyer were interviewed - Solicitors, 
Barristers and Accredited Police Station Representatives.  At the early stages of the 
fieldwork, my intention was to interview approximately twenty criminal defence 
lawyers from at least four firms of solicitors and one set of chambers, and I considered 
fifteen respondents to be the minimum number for a substantial sample.  The process of 
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securing interviews with the respondents was extended and problematic.  As stated 
earlier, I undertook several periods of observation with firms and chambers in the year 
leading up to the fieldwork; these were used to establish key contacts within the 
organisations, disseminate information about my study amongst practitioners and to 
develop relationships with individual practitioners who seemed open to the idea of 
participation.  I organised the interviews through two channels.  The first, and primary 
method, was to directly contact  individual respondents who I considered willing to be 
involved, either by telephone, by email or in person (either at court or at their 
organisation).  The second method was to arrange interviews by proxy, either through a 
respondent I had already interviewed who recommended me to another practitioner, or 
through staff at the organisations targeted (such as clerks at barristers' chambers), who 
would arrange an interview on my behalf. 
 
The period of fieldwork began in March 2009.  Initially, my primary method of securing 
interviews through personal contact resulted in only five interviews by the end of April 
2009 (four solicitors and one accredited representative, at only three firms).  This lack 
of success led to the second method, what one might call 'exploiting' contacts.  This 
was, frankly, a result of luck rather than planning, as two respondents offered to contact 
others for me.  This saw a greater success rate by the beginning of June 2009 - ten 
interviews with seven solicitors, one barrister and two accredited representatives, at four 
firms and one chambers.  However, the period of fieldwork had now extended beyond 
my original schedule of two months; I therefore adopted a more persistent approach, 
communicating with potential respondents nearly every day and informing them that I 
needed to complete all interviews by the end of June 2009.  This injection of urgency 
resulted in six more interviews.  In total, I managed to interview sixteen respondents 
from all three of the 'categories' of defence lawyer identified above – nine solicitors, 
four barristers and three accredited representatives.  These were drawn from six firms 
and two sets of chambers. 
 
The key problems I encountered were making initial contact with respondents and 
convincing them to commit to an interview.  I approached at least twenty-five criminal 
defence lawyers for interviews, either through speculative messages or direct 
conversation.  However, several either promised to commit and never did, or did not 
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respond at all.
881
  Unsurprisingly, I was most successful when I either established a 
relationship with a respondent before approaching them for interview or convinced an 
established contact to arrange an interview on my behalf.  It should also be noted that 
only four of the respondents were what one might term 'leaders' at their organisations; 
that is, those involved in management, such as partners at firms.  This is not to say that 
other respondents were not experienced or senior.
882
  However, it would have been 
desirable to interview more organisation leaders, not only due to the considerable 
experience they would inevitably have, but because of the potentially high-end work 
they do.  The reasons for the absence of more leaders and the general limited numbers 
of willing respondents are difficult to identify; without doubt, the time demands on 
criminal defence lawyers contributed.  Some of the obstacles discussed earlier, such as 
distrust of independent researchers, may have played a part, but one can only speculate. 
 
At an early stage of analysis, there appeared to be certain trends in the responses of each 
type of criminal defence lawyer and considering these differences presented an 
interesting opportunity.
883
  Despite this, these trends served only as a background 
consideration in the analysis; the focus remained on exploring whether the views of 
each individual respondent reflected the theoretical and formal conceptions identified 
earlier in this thesis.  Therefore, the type of lawyer served primarily as a simple method 
of categorising the respondents. Specifically, they were classed as a Solicitor ('S'), 
Barrister ('B') or Accredited Representative ('A'), combined with a number derived from 
the order in which they were interviewed.  So, the first Solicitor interviewed was 
categorised as 'S1', whilst the fourth Barrister interviewed was categorised as 'B4', and 
so on.  The empirical study was based exclusively in a single, major legal circuit in 
England and Wales and the respondents were drawn from organisations practicing 
primarily on that circuit.  There are, of course, limitations to conducting research in a 
single location with a low number of subjects, namely the potential for localised 
cultures and the lack of breadth across the profession as a whole.  However, as has been 
explained, this study represents an insight rather than a statistically valid assessment.  A 
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single-area study can provide valuable indicative data if, for example, it "reflect(s) 
geographical spread within a single police force area"
884
 and targets respondents with "a 
range of experience".
885
  This piece of fieldwork attempted to capture this.
886
 
 
2.5 Data Collection 
 
As stated above, the fieldwork took place between March and June 2009.  Each 
interview was conducted in the same way.  Prior to the date of interview, each 
respondent was sent a set of advance materials, consisting of the 'Professional Conduct 
Scenarios', an Ethical Consent Contract
887
 and an Anonymity Guarantee
888
 (the latter 
two will be discussed in the 'Ethics' section below).  I would attend the Firm or 
Chambers of the respondent and the interview would be conducted in private, usually in 
a conference room or office.  Each interview was recorded in full using a microphone 
and laptop computer, whilst I took notes.  As stated previously, the first and third 
sections of the interview posed pre-set questions to all of the respondents, followed by 
some open-ended discussion.  In the second section, I would read out each ‘Professional 
Conduct Scenario’ followed by a series of 'starter' questions, designed to engage the 
respondents in a free-form discussion.  Obviously, open-ended dialogue would vary 
with each respondent and, in several interviews, some pre-set questions were omitted if 
they had already been answered or if time became a factor.  Additionally, a number of 
ad hoc questions were asked and a variety of spontaneous topics explored.  The addition 
of appropriate questions during the interview ensured that the points of relevance were 
explored in depth and that the discussion remained within the scope of the research – 
the views of criminal defence lawyers about their role and obligations.  However, in 
general, respondents were asked the same questions in the same order.  The importance 
of this is that consistency in the conduct of the interview validates comparison and 
analysis of responses as they are the result of the same or similar stimuli.  It should also 
be made clear that the 'starter' questions mentioned above did not attempt to steer the 
discussion toward specific issues; as I highlighted earlier, the vignettes are designed to 
avoid leading or influencing the respondent.  However, 'starter' questions were 
necessary for several reasons.  Sometimes respondents would become bogged down in 
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detailing court procedures, discuss topics outside of the scope of the fieldwork or 
merely be unclear as to what was required of them.  In these situations, questions used 
to bring the discussion back to the scenarios were designed to be as broad as possible 
and omitted, wherever possible, any terms used in this thesis, such 'partisanship' or 
'detachment'. 
 
I conducted each interview using the pro forma,
889
 which was not seen by the 
respondents. This consisted of an opening narrative explaining the purpose of the 
interview and its structure, followed by the three distinct sections described earlier in 
this chapter.  The vignettes section ('Part 2') included the 'titles',
890
 indicating each 
ethical conflict, as well as the 'starter' questions mentioned previously.  In addition, 'Part 
2' included brief summaries of relevant legislation, case law and regulation under each 
vignette, in case I required direct reference to aid the respondents in answering a 
question.  The drafting of the pro forma used in this study was influenced in terms of 
layout by a questionnaire used for telephone-based interviews in the research project, 
Evaluation of the Public Defender Service in England and Wales.
891
  The interviews 
were intended to last approximately an hour, although if the respondent was willing to 
continue beyond this then that was acceptable.  In fact, the interviews lasted between 
approximately 45 minutes and 1 hour and 40 minutes, the average being approximately 
an hour. 
 
2.6 Ethics 
 
In undertaking an empirical study, I needed to consider several ethical issues, by which I 
mean "those issues that concern the behaviour of social researchers and the 
consequences that their research brings to the people they study."
892
  This piece of 
fieldwork is an example of 'applied' social research; that is, it is grounded in exploring 
real-life issues rather than detached theory.  In social science disciplines, such as 
psychology, sociology and law, applied research inevitably involves human beings.  
This leads to a variety of ethical considerations for researchers, generally directed at 
ensuring that "studies are directed toward worthwhile goals and that the welfare of . . . 
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subjects and . . . research colleagues is protected."
893
  This welfare may relate to issues 
such as: 
 
1.   Protecting the identity of subjects 
2. Protecting the legal rights of subjects 
3. Providing subjects with the opportunity to consent to participation 
4. Ensuring subjects are properly informed about their obligations 
5. Protecting vulnerable subjects, such as children or medical patients 
6. The source of funding for the research and any potential bias as a result 
7. Providing the opportunity for subjects to withdraw 
8. Whether there will be remuneration for subjects 
9. Ensuring the security of data collected 
 
Ensuring that such standards are considered and adequately met requires the researcher 
to strike a balance between ethical behaviour and safe-guarding the integrity and probity 
of the research.  For example, providing too much information to subjects may 
influence the way they behave or respond to research questions.  This, of course, would 
undermine a project designed to capture a natural and realistic snapshot of the behaviour 
or views of subjects.  To help achieve this balance, researchers generally have regard to 
ethical guidelines; in the context of this empirical study two strands of ethical standard 
were consulted.  The first of these was an informal and general ethical standard, a non-
specific and undefined body of broadly accepted values, such as anonymity of subjects 
and informed consent.  These were drawn from literature on social research and ethics.  
I regarded satisfying widely accepted ethical standards as essential.  If these standards 
are ignored, research is unlikely to be considered valuable or valid in academic circles.  
That is not to say such research would be without merit, more that research is only 
likely to be effective when it is regarded as ethically robust.  This indistinct set of 
principles in turn informs the second strand; the internal ethical standards imposed by 
my institution.  This process required that I submit an Ethical Consent Proposal to my 
university faculty Ethics Committee. 
 
In satisfying both of these strands, I adopted some methods for conducting my 
interviews designed to reinforce the ethical integrity of my research.  Each respondent 
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was approached directly by me and given a full explanation of the nature and aims of 
the fieldwork before they consented to involvement.  Prior to each interview, the 
respondent would be sent a copy of the scenarios, as well as an Ethical Consent 
Contract
894
 and Anonymity Guarantee.
895  
The Contract created an agreement between 
me and the respondent to abide by and uphold the obligations contained, including my 
right to publish data and record the interview, and the respondent’s right to 
confidentiality and right of withdrawal.  The Guarantee specifically outlined what 
information would be kept confidential, for example a respondent’s name, age, gender 
and employer, and what would not.  In drafting these, I wanted to reflect widely 
accepted ethical principles.  As a result, the Consent Contract and the Anonymity 
Guarantee were designed using the guidance of the Statement of Principles of Ethical 
Research Practice
896
 issued by the Socio-Legal Studies Association (SLSA), and the 
Statement of Ethical Practice
897
 issued by the British Sociological Society (BSA). 
 
3. The Process of Analysis 
 
3.1 Qualitative Data Analysis 
 
Much has been written about qualitative methodology, yet when it comes to analysing 
the data it yields, little is certain.  Many academics from many disciplines have devoted 
time and energy to exploring and explaining strategies for analysing such data, but there 
does not appear to be any consensus about what methods should be used.  Producing a 
definitive account of a 'correct' approach continues to elude academics, and as a result 
"much mystery surrounds the way in which researchers engage in [qualitative] data 
analysis."
898
  There are a few reasons for this.  First, the qualitative data produced by an 
empirical study tends to vary enormously in its form, content, size and significance.  In 
this respect, qualitative data is a very different creature to its more traditional and 
scientific counterpart, quantitative data.  Qualitative data is both nuanced and 
voluminous; therefore, a major obstacle to any analysis and its presentation is the "sheer 
volume of data customarily available and the relatively greater difficulty faced by the 
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researcher in summarising qualitative data."
899
  Another contributor to the ‘mystery’ of 
qualitative data analysis is the lack of focus on the analytical process itself in research 
studies and advisory literature.  Academics complain that "many qualitative researchers 
have neglected to give adequate descriptions in their research reports of their 
assumptions and methods, particularly with regard to data analysis."
900
  It also seems 
that while "[t]here are numerous texts and sets of readings attempting to give guidance 
to researchers about the styles and strategies that can be used in qualitative research . . . 
the books are often silent about the processes and procedures associated with data 
analysis."
901
  Therefore, the analysis of qualitative data is "often characterised by its 
lack of distinct rules".
902
  One might consider this is a disadvantage, but arguably it "can 
be liberating, since it can be considered that there are no right or wrong approaches".
903    
 
In relation to vignettes, there was little description of or guidance on qualitative analysis 
in any of the research studies I encountered.  In Stewart Field’s study of police decision-
making,
904
 the focus was on the use of the vignette technique and content of the 
interviews themselves.  The only reference to analysis was the statement that "[a]ll 
interviews were taped and then coded and analysed using Atlas data indexing and 
sorting software."
905
  This tells us little about the process of analysis; however, the 
subject of ‘Atlas’ is worth briefly expanding upon.  Atlas is a computer program 
designed to aid researchers in organising and analysing qualitative data.  The use of 
computer programs has become increasingly popular amongst researchers handling 
large amounts of qualitative information.  This was a tool I could have employed in my 
analysis, however, due to the size of the sample, it seemed unnecessary.  The only other 
vignette-related reference described a quantitative analytical method, ("fractional 
replication factorial design") in a study by Alexander and Becker.
906
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3.2 Application in this Thesis 
 
Due to the flexible and indistinct nature of qualitative data analysis, the analytical 
process in this thesis did not reflect any pre-defined method; one might therefore refer 
to this approach as 'informal narrative analysis'.  This process wove together disparate 
methods outlined by literature on qualitative data analysis, drawn from a variety of 
disciplines.
907  
The interviews produced three types of data for analysis – the 'base-line' 
data from the first section, the vignette data from the second section and additional data 
from both the first and third sections.  The 'base-line' data, as mentioned earlier in the 
chapter, was basic, quantitative information about the respondents and therefore 
required no analysis for any deeper meanings.  The vignette and additional data were 
qualitative and thus indicative of the views and opinions of the respondents about the 
practical role of the criminal defence lawyer.  They consisted of extensive dialogue 
between myself and each respondent.  The vignette data resulted from the presentation 
of the 'Professional Conduct Scenarios' and subsequent questioning, whilst the 
additional data resulted from direct questioning about a variety of other topics, 
discussed earlier in the chapter.  The vignette and additional data were analysed together 
as they were both qualitative in nature and related to closely linked issues.  However, 
distinctions will be made in the next chapter between information obtained as a result of 
the 'Professional Conduct Scenarios' and as a result of direct questioning.  Once this 
data had been collected, the next step was to analyse the information in the hope that I 
might answer the second research question – does the ‘zealous advocate’ model have 
any relevance or validity in modern practice? 
 
The first step was to transcribe the data that I had collected.  One would normally 
consider transcription a straightforward, dull and repetitive process, where one simply 
copies what has been said by another.  This is a myth.  Transcription is "neither neutral 
nor value-free . . . [w]hat passes from tape to paper is the result of the decisions about 
what ought to go on to paper . . . [t]ranscriptions are, quite unequivocally, 
interpretations."
908
  It is one of the most important stages of analysis because 
transcription is a form of subtle, eliminative analysis in itself.  Despite a researcher's 
best efforts, what he or she transcribes "will never fully encompass all that takes place 
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during an interview".
909
  Therefore, transcription is a process of "data reduction", that is 
"selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting and transforming the 'raw' data that 
appear[s] in written-up field notes."
910
  One might assume that this is merely an 
organisational exercise, a formality; data reduction is in fact "part of analysis . . . [t]he 
researcher's choices of which data chunks to code, which to pull out, which patterns 
summarise a number of chunks, what the evolving story is, are all analytic choices."
911
   
 
Decisions as to what to transcribe will shape the final, indisputable record of what each 
respondent had said in their interview and since all references in an analysis will flow 
from this document, it is clear that "what is transcribed, what is not transcribed, and 
how the transcript is structured very much influences the analysis process."
912
  Deciding 
how much of the interviews would be transcribed was reasonably straightforward.  The 
following advice accurately summarises the approach I took: 
 
"For some analyses, it may not be necessary to transcribe an entire interview.  
Selected sentences, passages, paragraphs, or stories relevant to the research 
question or theory may be all that are needed . . . The level of transcription 
should complement the level of the analysis . . . If researchers do not need such a 
detailed analysis, the exploration of general themes and patterns can be 
undertaken with less text."
913
 
 
I came to the conclusion that I would not need to transcribe the interviews in full.  This 
empirical study, as has been mentioned, represents an insight into the practical role of 
the criminal defence lawyer.  On this basis, I only transcribed what I felt related to the 
scope of the research; that is, the obligations of the criminal defence lawyer and the 
resolution of ethical conflicts.  Once I had settled on a partial-transcription approach, 
the next stage was to decide exactly what data I would include.  I did this using two key 
methods – coding and data display.  Coding involves "categorizing data extracts 
according to how they relate to emerging or existing analytic themes".
914
  Extracts are 
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categorised using a 'code', which is "an abbreviation or symbol applied to a segment of 
words – most often a sentence or paragraph of transcribed field notes – in order to 
classify the words."
915
  Put simply, codes are "data-labelling and data-retrieval 
devices"
916
 allowing a researcher to refer back to key sections of a transcript when 
analysing data.  Furthermore, coding is a process of filtering out irrelevancy and 
including data which may answer the questions a study asks; in short, coding is a crucial 
form of analysis.   
 
According to literature on the subject, codes "usually derive from research questions, 
hypotheses, key concepts, or important themes".
917
  As mentioned at the beginning of 
this chapter, two sub-questions have driven this empirical study:  what practical 
conceptions of the role do defence lawyers have and are ethical conflicts resolved in 
practice?  I therefore followed the advice of the literature and based my codes (in the 
form of a 'coding framework') on the ‘zealous advocate’ model (e.g. principle of 
partisanship, etc.).  I engaged in a process of "familiarisation"
918
 with the interviews; 
that is "immersion in the raw data . . . by listening to tapes, reading transcripts, studying 
notes and so on, in order to list key ideas and recurrent themes."
919
  I listened to each 
interview in full and, with reference to my notes, transcribed quotations related to these 
principles or the resolution of conflicts between them, matching them to the relevant 
code.  Thus, any quotation relating to the principle of morality was coded under the 
‘principle of morality’.  This enabled a direct comparison between the practical 
expression of principles, the theoretical model and formal conceptions; this aided 
analysis of similarities or differences between them and by extension, illustrated how 
relevant and useful the ‘zealous advocate’ model was to modern practice.  References to 
conflict points were coded according to which principle took ‘precedence’.  Thus, if a 
respondent suggested that a conflict between detachment and morality was resolved in 
favour of detachment, it would be transcribed under the ‘detachment’ code.  Again, this 
method provided a picture of how respondents chose to resolve ethical conflicts, 
indicating the true nature of the modern role of the criminal defence lawyer.  This 
coding approach represents deductive qualitative analysis, in that "it starts . . . from pre-
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set aims and objectives"
920
 and is "strongly informed by a priori reasoning".
921
  The 
rationale for a deductive approach is based on the fact that the empirical study grew out 
of the exploration of theory rather than the other way around; the objective of this thesis 
is to evaluate the validity of existing principles, rather than generate new ones.  
Therefore, in testing theoretical principles, I wanted them to be at the foundation of my 
analysis.  
 
In order to code the data effectively, I needed to settle on a method of display.  Data 
display is another stage of analysis that is overlooked, yet important.  Efficient coding 
and analysis is facilitated by "an organised assembly of information that permits 
conclusion drawing and action taking."
922
  Transcribing data is an intensive process, and 
it is "important to establish a format template so that each transcript has an identical 
structure and appearance."
923
  Without a display, the process of transcription will be 
slow and inconsistent, codes may be arbitrary and confusing, and data may be lost.  In 
addition, a display acts as a mental 'map' for the researcher when transcribing, aiding 
them in their search for relevant and important data.  The coding framework with which 
I transcribed the interviews can found under Appendix 2.  It is a very simple display 
with no text to explain what the codes mean; as a qualitative study, the categories the 
codes represent were meant to be open to interpretation and did not have detailed 
criteria (as one might find in a quantitative study) that could limit the transcription.  So, 
for example, a quotation did not have to contain the word ‘partisan’ in order to be 
placed under the 'partisanship' code. The basic criterion for each category was that a 
quotation related to either the principle or a conflict point involving that principle.
924
   
 
The coding framework was for my reference only and thus a tool to aid selective 
transcription.  This selectivity leads to the potential issue of researcher bias in choosing 
what quotations fulfil the broad criteria outlined above.  A researcher may have a 
personal agenda or goal, pressure from those funding the research or may make 
subconscious assumptions about the data, factors which can undermine the validity of 
the analysis.  It is therefore important that the researcher have an objective, rigorous and 
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reasoned method of selection, particularly in qualitative research.  As the name 
indicates, qualitative data analysis involves assessing the quality of what is said rather 
than the quantity (as in quantitative data analysis).  One must therefore look for the 
meaning conveyed by what a respondent says, rather than the number of times a 
particular phrase or utterance is used.  The difficulty, of course, is that the quality of a 
phrase is open to interpretation.  In the case of this thesis, as the researcher, I interpreted 
what a respondent meant and transcribed it using the coding framework above.  The 
unique problem of qualitative research is that it is challenging to explain and justify the 
selections a researcher makes; so, how can a researcher combat potential bias in his or 
her analysis? 
   
Miles and Huberman suggest that during interviews or observations, a researcher should 
"[a]void cooptation or going native by spending time away from the site; spread out 
visits."
925
  This should reduce the danger of interpreting data in a manner that suits the 
needs or aims of the respondents or their colleagues.  They also advise that 
transcriptions include "dissidents, cranks or isolates – people with different points of 
view from the mainstream, people less committed to tranquillity and equilibrium in the 
setting."
926
  This gives a more balanced reflection of the views and opinions of all the 
respondents.  Finally, they stress that throughout the process of analysis one should 
"[k]eep [his or her] research questions firmly in mind; don't wander too far from them to 
follow alluring leads, or drop them in the face of a more dramatic or momentous 
event."
927
  The selections I made for transcription were continuously related back to the 
‘zealous advocate’ model and the conflict points, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 6.  
At the same time, I approached selection with an open mind, transcribing as much as I 
thought was relevant, a point reinforced by the significant amount of unused 
transcription material.  More broadly, since it is virtually impossible to describe the 
internal mental processes of the researcher during selection, I hope that the open and 
detailed scrutiny of the process of analysis which I have engaged in signals a desire to 
hide nothing. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
The design of the methodology for this empirical study was driven by a genuine desire 
to connect with the everyday life of the practicing criminal defence lawyer.  At every 
stage of the process, I consciously questioned whether the approach adopted would lead 
to a more open, more honest and more natural exchange between me and the 
respondents.  From the beginning, I was aware of the undoubted possibility that the 
criminal defence lawyers I wanted to interview might be either unresponsive or try to 
satisfy my curiosity with easy answers; this would, of course, add nothing to this thesis.  
I was pleased to find, as I will outline in the next chapter, that every person I 
interviewed expressed many interesting and insightful ideas, which I believe have truly 
furthered the overarching aim of this thesis – to accurately conceptualise the role of the 
modern criminal defence lawyer in England and Wales.  Finally, I felt that ensuring that 
the methodology was rigorous and robust had two key benefits.  The first, and most 
obvious, was referred to at the beginning of this chapter: to give the study credibility.  A 
well-designed methodology leads, in theory, to more valid results.  The second benefit 
was personal; if one sees the researcher as an explorer, then he or she must be well 
equipped.  With a strong and thoroughly researched framework for my study, I was 
instilled with the confidence and freedom to effectively interview the respondents.  At 
no point did I feel under-prepared or out of my depth, and believe that a large part of 
this is down to the methodology used.  My findings are set out in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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CHAPTER 6 – Criminal Defence Lawyers’ Conceptions of their Role:  
An Empirical Comparison 
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1. Introduction 
 
This, and the next, chapter will detail a critical analysis of the data obtained in the 
empirical study. The analysis is divided into two parts, based on the two research sub-
questions identified at the beginning of Chapter 5: 
 
What is the 'practical conception' of the role of the criminal defence lawyer in England 
and Wales? 
 
How, if at all, are conflicts between principles resolved in practice? 
 
The first part, covered in this chapter, considers each of the principles in the ‘zealous 
advocate’ model and explores whether the responses of the practitioners reflect those 
principles in both their traditional and formal manifestations.  Structurally, the 
examination of these responses is further divided, distinguishing between responses that 
resulted from direct questioning and from the vignette technique.  I felt that, in 
presenting my findings, it was important to distinguish between the two interview 
methods.  As was discussed in Chapter 5, there are potential dangers with direct 
questioning which may undermine the validity of data; it is arguable that responses to 
vignettes are more honest and accurate reflections of the practice of criminal defence 
lawyers than responses to direct questions.  Despite this, responses to direct questions 
are still valuable.  They give an impression of how defence lawyers consciously 
construct their role and how that compares to theoretical and formal conceptions of the 
role.  They also enable a comparison between what defence lawyers say they do and 
what they actually do, as indicated by their responses to the vignettes.  Furthermore, 
direct questioning, if used in a careful and subtle manner, encourages respondents to 
engage in active reflection on their role.  Using only vignettes might leave such 
engagement to chance since respondents may become 'lost' in the scenario, focusing on 
irrelevancies such as hypothetical variations of the facts or legal minutiae. Utilising both 
direct questioning and the vignette technique therefore facilitates the extraction of 
relevant information from respondents and, in turn, aids analysis of what the ‘real-life’ 
role is.  However, I still considered it important to demarcate the two types of data, so 
that their value can be weighed in the context of the methods used to obtain them.  The 
second part, covered in Chapter 7, focuses on practical resolution of the conflict points.  
Each 'Professional Conduct Scenario' was based on the conflict points set out in Chapter 
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4.  In this part, I will explore whether respondents recognised any conflicts in each 
scenario; if they did, I will consider whether their responses sought to resolve these 
conflicts.  This in turn may indicate which principles take primacy in a 'real-life' conflict 
situation.  In analysing this process of conflict resolution, I will compare the responses 
provided by the respondents with some of the theoretical and formal 'solutions', which 
were discussed in Chapter 4.  Again, the second part considered each 'Professional 
Conduct Scenario' and its relevant conflict point in turn.  In contrast to the first part, all 
of the data obtained pertaining to conflict points and their resolution was derived from 
responses to vignettes, thus there is no need to distinguish between responses to direct 
questioning and responses to vignettes. 
 
2. Do Lawyers’ Conceptions Reflect the ‘Zealous Advocate’ Model? 
 
In assessing the respondents' conception of their role, my primary approach was to 
question them about their role in the context of each of the principles within the 
theoretical 'zealous advocate' model, but without any explicit reference to the principles.  
However, I also wanted to explore their interpretation of the general concept of the 
'zealous advocate', whether this reflected the ‘zealous advocate’ model and if so, what 
aspects of the model the respondents emphasised.  During the latter stages of each 
interview, I asked the respondents the following direct questions: 
  
'Are you familiar with the term 'zealous advocate'?  What does it mean to you? ' 
 
Interestingly, 10 out of the 16 respondents were not familiar with the term 'zealous 
advocate'.  One had "no idea" what the term meant (Respondent B3), while another was 
"not entirely sure" (Respondent A1).  Most of the respondents who were unfamiliar with 
the term did attempt to define what they thought it meant.  A slim majority seemed to 
regard the term 'zealous advocate' as having a "negative connotation" (Respondent B3).  
One respondent stated, "I don't know whether it's meant to be a criticism or not" 
(Respondent S4), while another regarded the term as more akin to "TV law" where the 
lawyers were "slightly over-the-top" (Respondent S7).  Another respondent seemed to 
concur, thinking a 'zealous advocate' might be someone who was "a bit dramatic, too 
theatrical and perhaps too involved" (Respondent S6), while another equated the term 
with "speaking aggressively" (Respondent A2).  However, some of the respondents who 
did not recognise the term considered it to be a form of compliment.  One respondent 
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thought it meant "being extremely positive and speaking really well on your client's 
behalf" (Respondent A3), while another went further, suggesting a 'zealous advocate' 
"speaks on behalf of the client . . . without fear of  . . . facing up to people who don't 
necessarily agree" (Respondent S2).  Others thought it described a lawyer who was 
"thorough and professional" (Respondent S3), and "thorough and committed" 
(Respondent S4). 
 
Five of the respondents were familiar with the term, and expressed mixed views about 
its merit as a description of the defence lawyer's role.  One respondent (Respondent S5) 
thought a 'zealous advocate' would be "fairly fearless" in representing the client, while 
another described it as "the advocate who takes every point" (Respondent B2).  Others 
felt that a 'zealous advocate' would be "proactive" and would work "carefully [and] 
conscientiously" (Respondent S9), and would protect the client "at most costs", even if 
it "upset magistrates or judges in [the] advancement of [a] client's case" (Respondent 
S8).  However, some of the respondents who were familiar with the term appeared to be 
critical of it.  One respondent stated that a 'zealous advocate' was "somebody who is 
rather [more] emotive than necessary", and tended to use "using very florid and emotive 
language" in order to "give the impression of a passion which may not necessarily be 
there" (Respondent B4).  One respondent suggested that a 'zealous advocate' might in 
fact be "over-zealous", for example where the lawyer "starts taking it personally" 
(Respondent S9).  One respondent was not asked this direct question due to time 
constraints.  In general, most of the respondents seemed unfamiliar with the term 
'zealous advocate'.  Generally, they seemed to equate it with a more negative image of 
the defence lawyer, one disconnected from the reality of their work where theatrics and 
aggression were the main tools for advancing a client's case.  However, others did view 
the 'zealous advocate' as a positive label, denoting fearlessness in the face of hostility, 
and a thorough approach. 
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2.1 The Principle of Partisanship
928
 
 
2.1.1 Responses to Direct Questioning 
 
When responding to direct questioning about their obligations to the client, the 
respondents' answers fell into two broad categories; those reflecting the theoretical duty 
of partisanship, and those reflecting formal conceptions of the principle.  Answers 
falling under the former category exhibited a more traditional view of the principle.  
One respondent stated that, "[t]he obligation to the client is uppermost and foremost" 
(Respondent B2) and that a defence lawyer should "represent his interests fearlessly . . . 
[putting] instructions in an appropriate way in order to best advance his defence" 
(Respondent B1).  Some seemed to hold the opinion that the defence of the client 
should be pursued as far as possible, especially in the face of prosecutors that regard 
court work as "a gladiatorial contest" (Respondent S8).  In attempting to convict the 
respondent’s clients, prosecutors were "not above bending the rules and the like, and 
therefore the only way you can deal with them is to deal with them on exactly the same 
basis" (Respondent S8).  This appears to mirror the theoretical conception of partisan 
dedication to the cause of the client, even at the cost of absolute procedural integrity.  
Some respondents felt that the interests of the client should be defended in the face of 
overwhelming evidence of guilt.  Even when the client provides instructions which 
essentially admit guilt, the defence lawyer is "still entitled to test the prosecution case" 
(Respondent A1).  Another respondent stated that, "[t]he fact that I think my client’s 
guilty, even in some circumstances that I may know that my client is guilty, is not the 
point.  If the prosecution can’t prove their case, then the defendant still succeeds" 
(Respondent S3).  These opinions appear to reflect the ‘zealous advocate’ model, which 
suggests that the criminal defence lawyer is "the gladiator of the accused"
929
 who will 
do "anything arguably legal to advance the client’s ends."930 
 
However, the majority of respondents subscribed to a form of partisanship more 
reflective of formal regulation.  Half of the respondents characterised the duty to the 
client as requiring the defence lawyer to represent their "best interests" (Respondents 
S5, S6, A1 and A3) or secure the "best outcome" (Respondent S2) or "best possible 
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result" (Respondent B3).  Alongside these fairly restrained statements, several 
respondents made it clear that anything they did for a client had to be "within the 
parameters of professional conduct", (Respondent S3), "within the rules" (Respondent 
B3) and "within the law" (Respondent S2).  One respondent made it clear that modern 
partisan defenders are not "obliged simply to say or do anything that the client tells us to 
do" (Respondent S3) and another stated:  
 
"[T]he client has to understand that there are limitations on what I can do . . . I 
have professional duties which mean . . . that I can’t lie for the client and I 
wouldn’t do that." - (Respondent S4) 
 
Such statements seemed designed to reinforce the idea that the modern defence lawyer 
is not "a tool"
931
 of the client, who will "acquiesce in mendacity"
932
 and try to extract 
"everything the law can give."
933
 
 
One respondent described the role of the defence lawyer at the police station as being to 
"protect [the client’s] position legally" (Respondent A3), whilst another described the 
role as being to "protect and advance my client’s legal rights" (Respondent S9).  These 
statements are similar to the dictates of PACE Code C and also seem to reflect the 
concept of ‘mere-zeal’ described by Tim Dare,934  where a defence lawyer is "concerned 
solely with their clients’ legal rights"935 and will not slavishly pursue "anything which 
happens to be in the client’s interests, let alone anything in which the client happens to 
be interested."
936
  The view above also appears to reflect Maureen Cain's theoretical 
conception of partisanship, discussed in Chapter 2, as the obligation to "translate [client] 
interests into legal language that will make sense and hopefully establish legitimacy for 
their claims."
937  
Overall, when directly questioned, the majority of respondents seemed 
more inclined towards a less traditional form of criminal defence, reflecting formal 
conceptions of the role.  The emphasis appears to be on doing the best one can for the 
client within the rules rather than displaying the unyielding partisanship described by 
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Lord Brougham,
938
 who exploits any opportunity to secure victory for the client at all 
costs. 
 
2.1.2 Responses to Vignettes 
 
One respondent highlighted a potential difference in the degree of partisanship required 
by different types of defence lawyer, stating that their duty "is to defend [the] client, if 
you're a barrister fearlessly, if you're a solicitor, to the best of your abilities" 
(Respondent S6).  This appears to reflect the formal regulation of criminal defence 
lawyers, which appears to distinguish between what might be termed ‘barrister 
partisanship’ and ‘solicitor partisanship’.  The primary examples of this contrast are 
contained in the Bar Code and the Solicitors’ Code, the former requiring barristers to act 
"fearlessly",
939
 the latter obligating solicitors to "do your best for each of your 
clients."
940
  Whether this division sets different standards is debatable.  ‘Fearless’ seems 
to have connotations of unswerving devotion to the client's cause, whereas ‘do your 
best’ couches the duty in terms of the lawyer's skills rather than the client's needs.  In 
short, the language used suggests that barristers owe a more powerful and far-reaching 
duty of partisanship than solicitors.  This formal adoption of explicitly divergent 
language stands in contrast to the theoretical conception of the principle of partisanship, 
which makes no such distinction.   
 
It is important to note that adversarial theory is cross-jurisdictional (with much derived 
from American literature), applying to legal systems without any professional division.  
England and Wales is one of the few adversarial systems
941
 with multiple ‘types’ of 
lawyer and thus it was perhaps justifiable, at one time, for those drafting formal 
regulations to assign different standards of partisanship to barristers and solicitors.  
However, the modern roles of barristers and solicitors appear to be slowly converging; 
many solicitors now practice as advocates in court, a role traditionally reserved for 
barristers.  Historically, it was perhaps important for barristers to be ‘fearless’ in the face 
of a hostile court, prosecution, jury and public gallery.  In modern practice, that 
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fearlessness is no longer reserved for members of the Bar, exemplified by the use of the 
word ‘fearless’ in the description of the roles of Solicitor Advocates942 and employees of 
the Public Defender Service, which includes solicitors.
943
  In this context, the divergent 
language used by the primary codes of conduct may represent nothing more than 
archaic syntax.  Therefore, one might suggest that the aforementioned respondent's 
definition of her role is mere repetition of the outdated language contained in the most 
prominent codes of conduct, rather than a reflection of the role in practice.    
 
Other respondents seemed to describe a role more reflective of the theoretical principle 
of partisanship.  These views were expressed by respondents of all types and in 
reference to all stages of the criminal process.  One respondent asserted that the 
"primary obligation is to ensure [the client's] acquittal" (Respondent B1) and another 
that, in defending a client, one had to "wear a suit of armour as far as the court's 
concerned" (Respondent S6).  Others ventured opinions on a variety of aspects of the 
criminal defender's work.  Respondents agreed that a degree of bravery was required in 
taking advantage of defences that might not be approved of by the court, police or 
public.  For example, referring to technical points,
944
 one respondent said, "I think it's 
your obligation to fearlessly defend your client and if there is a point there to be taken, 
you might take it" (Respondent S6).
945
   
                                                 
942
 [2.3(a)], page 3, The Law Society Code for Advocacy – The Law Society, 
http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/documents/downloads/Profethics_Advocacy.pdf: Last accessed 
16/08/2010. 
943
 Rule 2.1, page 4, Public Defender Service Code of Conduct – London:  The Stationery Office. 
 
944
 A technical point could also be described as a 'procedural' point.  Rather than relating directly to the 
guilt or innocence of a defendant, the point relates to the technicalities of the process.  A flaw or 'loophole' 
might therefore allow a defendant to escape conviction, even when the substantive evidence points to 
guilt. 
945
 Interestingly, this was the same respondent who described different degrees of partisanship for 
barristers (“fearlessly”) and solicitors (“best of your abilities”), yet used the word “fearlessly” to describe 
her role as a solicitor.  Her initial description, as suggested earlier, may have subconciously reflected the 
codes of conduct; the latter quote may, as a result of immersion in the vignettes, symbolise a more honest 
representation of the reality of practice.  One must again question, how useful the distinction between 
‘barrister partisanship’ and ‘solicitor partisanship’ is in reality. 
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The same respondent indicated that all available defences and information should be 
presented to the client, regardless of the opinions of others: 
 
"I've been threatened with [being] thrown out of police stations because I 
wouldn't kowtow to police officers when they didn't want me to provide clients 
[with] information.  They simply don't understand my obligation is to my client, 
not them." - Respondent S6 
 
Another respondent gave an example of, perhaps, the most personal form of sacrifice a 
criminal defence lawyer should make for a client.  Discussing the use of tactics that 
displeased court, the respondent said that "often judges use the threat of costs to make 
you back down . . . so [in] my view, fearless representation includes fearlessness in 
relation to your own wallet" (Respondent B1).  Some respondents also seemed to 
support a robust and vigorous approach to questioning witnesses.  One described the 
goal of the defence lawyer as being to "try and make [a witness] look like [they] 
couldn't be believed" and even if it is only "one or two bits of . . . evidence . . . if you 
can make them big enough, they can throw doubt on the rest of it." (Respondent B3).  
This seems to reflect the dogged and thorough approach embodied in theory, where a 
defence lawyer takes advantage of every point that might benefit the client.  In some 
situations, a vulnerable witness may face intrusive or embarrassing examination by the 
defence lawyer and this may be frowned upon by the court or the wider public.  One 
respondent argued that: 
 
"Judges may plenty of times not wish me to pursue matters in the way that [the] 
client requires [me] to . . . judges may find it deeply unpalatable to watch a 
witness have to answer those questions, but . . . you've still got to challenge it." - 
Respondent B2 
 
Another respondent seemed to concur, bluntly stating that, when questioning a witness, 
"[i]f you've got no baggage yourself then you can be as rude as you want in a way, 
subject to being told off by the court" (Respondent S7).  These statements seem to be 
consummate examples of theoretical partisanship - defending the client's interests 
without regard for the opinions of or consequences to other parties. 
 
However, others seemed to describe a role where one-sided and vigorous define of the 
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client was either not possible or not desirable.  These responses seemed to reflect formal 
conceptions of the role, rather than the ‘zealous advocate’ model.  Whilst discussing 
whether a defence lawyer should reveal tactics or favourable information to the court, 
some respondents felt that they should keep their cards close to their chest, but were 
required to strike a balance in doing so.  One stated, "[m]y own tactical preference is to 
withhold as much as I can" but in a manner that was "commensurate with my duties of 
frankness and candour" (Respondent B4).  This suggests significant limitations on what 
a defence lawyer can hide for the benefit of a client, illustrating a role where 
partisanship is tempered by other obligations.  In a similar vein, another respondent 
declared, "[w]e're not allowed to lie or mislead the court, but we don't have to be totally 
upfront and frank with them" (Respondent A2), while another felt that "sometimes it 
seems . . . very appropriate to be very upfront about a defence", although "there are 
occasions where you want to be as vague as possible" (Respondent S3).  The 
respondents’ answers suggest that the role of the modern partisan defence advocate lies 
somewhere between theoretical and formal conceptions of the principle.  The responses 
indicate that the theoretical conception of uncooperative and ruthless advocacy in 
pursuit of victory has been altered by modern regulation.  However, the responses do 
suggest that core elements of theory remain - fearlessness in the face of a hostile court, 
vigorous questioning of witnesses, exploitation of loopholes and, to a degree, hiding 
information from the court.  However, these aspects must be balanced with honesty, 
openness and cooperation. 
 
2.2 The Principle of Detachment
946
 
 
2.2.1 Responses to Direct Questioning 
 
In responding to direct questions about their role, only two respondents made any 
reference to the principle of detachment.  One respondent stated that "[y]ou’re there as 
your client’s mouthpiece" (Respondent B2).  This is a common theoretical 
characterisation of the criminal defence lawyer.  A ‘mouthpiece’ implies that the lawyer 
acts as a spokesperson for the defendant, rather than funnelling their desires and 
interests through a personal filter.  Another respondent seemed to reject what he saw as 
the 'pre-judging' of defendants in criminal proceedings: 
                                                 
946
 See Chapter 2, 3.1.2 and Chapter 3, section 2.2 for definitions and discussion of the principle of 
detachment. 
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“'Victim' is something the police and CPS have brought into our legal system, 
‘cos it’s so emotive.  It’s a 'victim' – in other words, you’ve already decided that 
there’s somebody who has suffered at the hands of your client . . . so I prefer to 
call them complainants." - Respondent S8 
 
This seems to adhere to the principle that the lawyer should remain detached and not 
judge their client’s guilt or innocence in advance of a trial, regardless of the accusations 
they face.  Additionally, the respondent suggests that the involvement of emotions in the 
criminal justice process is undesirable, by referring to the use of the word victim as 
‘emotive’. 
 
In questioning the respondents directly, I refrained from using phrases such as 
‘neutrality’ or ‘detachment’ unless they were prompted or clearly pertinent to what a 
respondent was saying; this was to avoid leading respondents to answers.  Although 
respondents made little mention of the principle of detachment in response to direct 
questioning, it is not necessarily because it is not part of their role.  The obligation to 
remain detached is perhaps a less obvious duty when exploring the role a defence 
lawyer plays.  Most answers to direct questions made reference to the principles of 
partisanship and procedural justice – the primary examples of the duties to the client 
and the court respectively.  Without leading them to it directly, it might be argued that 
respondents were likely to describe more obvious and exciting aspects of their role than 
the principle of detachment.  Alternatively, it may be that the principle of detachment is 
such a basic element of criminal defence, that respondents simply took it as read. 
 
2.2.2 Responses to Vignettes 
 
Detachment is arguably the most controversial of the theoretical obligations incumbent 
on defence lawyers as it effectively requires them to turn a blind eye.  The duty to 
remain neutral and professional when defending those who might be considered morally 
reprehensible by the wider public is a major source of criticism from many outside of 
the legal world.   
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One respondent perfectly encapsulated this: 
 
"You get asked this a lot as a criminal defence solicitor, ‘How can you represent 
somebody who’s done all these heinous crimes?’ and the other one is ‘How can 
you represent somebody who you know is guilty?’" - Respondent S6 
 
The responses of those interviewed seemed to reflect both the theoretical and formal 
conceptions of the principle, suggesting a unity between theory, regulation and practice.  
One respondent said, "[w]e do not refuse, on moral grounds or on judgmental grounds, 
to represent anybody" (Respondent S4), whilst another asserted, "you never know that 
[a client] is guilty . . . unless they tell you, in which case you know your options become 
more limited" (Respondent S6).  These answers suggest that morality or pre-judgment 
of ‘guilt’ do not enter into decisions about accepting clients.  If a client does confess 
guilt, the defence lawyer should continue to defend him or her within the ‘limitations’ 
alluded to above.
947
  One respondent felt that when defendants are accused of offences 
which are "unpleasant, unsavoury and . . . unpopular with the general public . . . it’s 
more important for [them] to be represented, to show that the process is working 
properly" (Respondent S2).  Another joked, "we’ve got all sorts of cases and all sorts of 
clients that if we could give back we would (laughs)" (Respondent B3), perhaps 
indicating the strength of the obligation - it overrides personal preference.   
 
For barristers, choosing clients appears straightforward.  One respondent explained, "the 
cab-rank principle applies.  If you hold yourself out as being a criminal practitioner, 
then you are available . . . to defend those who need defending" (Respondent B4).  
Another respondent stated that the cab-rank rule meant that "the only realistic things 
that I should be taking into consideration are . . . basically, my diary availability . . . 
[and] whether my professional capabilities are sufficient" (Respondent B1).  Another 
respondent simply said, "I’m briefed to represent [a client].  End of" (Respondent B2).  
Formal regulation states that solicitors are "generally free"
948 
to choose their clients, 
unlike barristers.  As discussed above, theory does not seem to make this distinction and 
neither did the respondents in this sample.  One said, "[n]o solicitor is bound to act for 
anybody but most solicitors do act for anybody in the sense that it’s not a matter for us 
                                                 
947
 That is, the criminal defence lawyer cannot falsely assert the innocence of the client, for this would be 
‘actively’ misleading the court.  See Rule 11, Solicitors’ Code of Conduct – Solicitor’s Regulation 
Authority, http://www.sra.org.uk/rules/: Last accessed 16/08/2010. 
948
 Ibid., Rule 2.01(1). 
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to start picking and choosing" (Respondent S4).  Similarly, another stated, "[w]e can’t 
pick and choose the offences and the clients that we represent.  I would say we have a 
duty to . . . represent anybody who asks for representation" (Respondent S3).  Another 
respondent, a solicitor, appeared to dismiss any distinction in practice between solicitors 
and barristers at all: 
 
"Most barristers work on what they call the . . . taxi-rank rule, which is that if 
I’m next in line then I take the case whether I like the client or not . . . and I 
think we have to work on very much the same sort of principle." - Respondent 
S8 
 
These responses indicate that, in practice, the principle of detachment operates in a 
similar way for both barristers and solicitors. 
   
One element of the principle of detachment that was mentioned several times was the 
requirement to remove all personal feeling and emotion from representation.  One 
respondent said, "my role . . . in an adversarial system is to put my client’s defence to 
the complainant and I have to be objective about it; I can’t become passionate or 
emotional" (Respondent S6).  It would seem that the lawyer cannot become attached or 
personally invested in a case, regardless of the vulnerability of a complainant or the 
ignobility of a defendant.  The same respondent explained that "you get on with it as a 
professional and you represent them." (Respondent S6).  Another respondent made it 
plain that his personal opinions and thoughts were irrelevant, stating, "I never say ‘I 
think’" (Respondent B1).  One respondent seemed to place emotional detachment and 
personal neutrality at the centre of his role as a defence lawyer: 
 
"They say that the best lawyer is the one who has no emotion at all.  That’s . . . 
one of the duties of a lawyer to his client, to . . . take all emotion out of it, 
because emotional people can make some very silly decisions and if you . . . 
don’t have the emotion there . . . then [you] can make a decision that is totally 
emotionless and therefore based on the facts." - Respondent S8 
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Another respondent underlined how crucial personal detachment is to effective criminal 
defence work: 
 
"Say, for example, the barrister who [a brief] was sent to was somebody who had 
personal experience of quite hideous domestic violence . . . if they know that 
they're not going to be able to deal objectively [with] the client's best interest . . . 
it would really be a question of . . . being honest with yourself, are you able to, 
you know, fearlessly represent this client and give them the best service and if 
you can't then you shouldn't take the brief." - Respondent B3 
 
Although this seems to contradict the principle that a defence lawyer should accept any 
client, it in fact represents the consummate example of practical, professional 
detachment.  If the defence lawyer does not realistically believe they can overcome 
deep-seated personal feelings and provide a neutral, zealous defence of their client, they 
should sacrifice their opportunity to be paid.  In other words, the duty to the client 
comes first. 
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2.3 The Principle of Confidentiality
949
 
 
2.3.1 Responses to Direct Questioning 
 
Similarly to the principle of detachment, only a few respondents made explicit mention 
of the duty of confidentiality when questioned directly about their role.  In response to 
being asked what obligations they owed to their clients, three respondents said the 
following: 
 
"Act with confidentiality." - Respondent S7 
 
"I've got an obligation of confidentiality to clients, which exists even after I've 
finished dealing with them." - Respondent S9 
 
"You have an obligation to . . . keep what [the client] tells you private in most 
circumstances." - Respondent S8 
 
All of these statements are fairly simple and self-explanatory, reflecting both theoretical 
and formal conceptions of the principle.  The second quotation highlights that the duty 
of confidentiality does not cease once the lawyer-client relationship is terminated.  The 
theoretical obligation is designed to "encourage clients to give their lawyers 
information";
950
 if the client knew that their lawyer could simply reveal secrets once the 
formal criminal process ended, then he or she would most likely say nothing in the first 
place and as such the duty “continues after the final disposition of the case."951  Formal 
regulation also recognises that the obligation extends beyond the immediate lawyer-
client relationship, thus aligning with the respondent's statement above.  The Bar Code 
says, "[w]hether or not the relation of counsel and client continues, a barrister must 
preserve . . . confidentiality",
952
 while the Solicitors’ Code states that the duty applies to 
                                                 
949
 See Chapter 2, section 3.1.3 and Chapter 3, 2.3 for definitions and discussion of the principle of 
confidentiality. 
950
 ‘The Adversary System Excuse’ by David Luban, in Abel R. (1997) Lawyers: A Critical Reader – New 
York: New Press, 5. 
951
 Gold G. (1965) Split Loyalty: An Ethical Problem for the Criminal Defense Lawyer – 14 Clev. 
Marshall L. Rev., 66. 
952
 [702], ‘Section 1:  The Code of Conduct’, Bar Standards Board Code of Conduct – Bar Standards 
Board, http://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/standardsandguidance/codeofconduct/: Last accessed 
16/08/2010. 
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"clients and former clients".
953
  The Public Defender Service Code of Conduct is 
clearest, asserting that the duty of confidentiality is "an ongoing duty that does not cease 
once employment has terminated".
954
  The answer of the third respondent above also 
accurately reflects theoretical and formal conceptions of confidentiality, inferring that 
the principle is not absolute.  The low number of references to the duty of 
confidentiality does not necessarily indicate that respondents did not consider it part of 
their practical role.  Again, this may be attributable to it being so basic an element of the 
role; respondents may have chosen to focus on more prominent features of their job.  If 
we return to the idea of providing ‘public accounts’ (explored in Chapter 5), it is 
possible that respondents identified more exciting and controversial aspects of their role 
as defining it.  The respondents may also have assumed knowledge on my part.  
Alternatively, the breadth of the direct questions posed or the size of the small sample 
may have contributed to the limited references to the duty. 
 
2.3.2 Responses to Vignettes 
 
Most responses that made reference to the principle of confidentiality were 
unambiguous, reflecting the basic theoretical obligation that defence lawyers must 
guard private communications with a client.  One respondent said that defence lawyers 
"cannot be used, if you like, by the courts to make [a] client's situation worse and 
anything he does tell me is privileged" (Respondent S6), while another explained that 
"[a]lthough we have professional obligations to the court . . . that doesn't require us to 
spill the beans . . . as to everything we know about everything" (Respondent A2).  
Similarly, another respondent said, "I don't think you have a duty to . . . show your hand 
to either the court or the CPS" (Respondent S8).  All of these respondents emphasised 
the primacy of secrecy in their professional relationship with the client.  However, 
another respondent described the duty of confidentiality in a different way: 
 
"Your job is to pass on relevant information in a way that assists the client and 
does not mislead the court." - Respondent S7 
 
This response seems to couch the duty in terms of what you must divulge, rather than 
what you must not.  This response suggests that any information that is revealed has to 
                                                 
953
 Rule 4.01, Solicitors’ Code of Conduct – Solicitor’s Regulation Authority, 
http://www.sra.org.uk/rules/: Last accessed 16/08/2010. 
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 Rule 5.1, page 5, Public Defender Service Code of Conduct – London:  The Stationery Office. 
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aid the defendant, but without deceiving the court.  This appears to be a more negative 
interpretation of the duty, implicitly accepting that revelation of information will be 
required to some degree.  The other respondents seemed to provide more positive 
interpretations, starting with the assumption that the defence lawyer is obliged to protect 
client secrets and withhold information. 
 
2.4 The Principle of Procedural Justice
955
 
 
2.4.1 Responses to Direct Questioning 
 
The respondents referred several times to this principle when questioned about their 
obligations to the court and the prosecution.   Respondents said they had to "[e]nsure the 
swift progress of justice" (Respondent S8) and "facilitate the administration of justice" 
(Respondent S2), words that seem to reflect both theoretical and formal conceptions.  
Another respondent said that the duty to the court represented the "primary obligation, 
and one that, when in conflict with any duty to the lay client, takes precedence" 
(Respondent B1).  Respondents expressed divergent opinions about their position as an 
'officer of the court'.  An accredited representative claimed to be a "quasi court officer" 
meaning that the "court takes precedence over everything else" (Respondent A2), while 
a solicitor simply stated, "I'm an officer of the court, so I have a duty to the court" 
(Respondent S6).  In contrast, a barrister said: 
 
"I'm not, as I understand it, necessarily an officer of the court; I merely have a 
right of audience, whereas solicitors, I think, are officers of the court." - 
Respondent B1 
 
The significance of this distinction is debatable.  Whether it means barristers are less 
obliged to help administer justice than solicitors is questionable, particularly since 
neither formal nor theoretical conceptions seem to explicitly describe different standards 
of ‘commitment’ for the two types of lawyer.  As discussed earlier, solicitors can now 
acquire higher rights of audience and defend clients in the Crown Court in the same way 
as barristers, suggesting that there is little practical difference between the two in terms 
of their duty to the court.  Accredited representatives do not have such rights of 
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 See Chapter 2, section 3.2.1 and Chapter 3, section 3.1 for definitions and discussion of the principle 
of procedural justice. 
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audience although they can perform the functions of a solicitor in the Magistrates' 
Court.  The description of a ‘quasi’ officer role is thus confusing as it insinuates a lesser 
duty than solicitors, even though large parts of their jobs overlap.  Although accepting 
some form of obligation to procedural justice, some respondents expressed mixed views 
about the extent of their duty as an amicus curiae.  One respondent unenthusiastically 
said, "[m]y duty, I suppose . . . to the court [is] to be . . . actively involved in case 
management" (Respondent S6).   
 
Another respondent seemed to present a contrasting view, stating: 
 
"My obligation to the court . . . is to properly represent my client within the 
rules." - Respondent B3 
 
This represents an interesting approach.  It recognises, primarily, that the best way to 
serve the court is to defend the client.  In a sense, this exhibits a true commitment to 
procedural justice; it endorses the validity of adversarialism, which pits defence against 
prosecution in order to produce a fair and balanced verdict.  In this context, too active a 
role in case management would conflict with the essential tenets of adversarial 
procedure.  As commented earlier, formal regulation seems to describe a more active 
version of the principle of procedural justice than the theoretical model.  The above 
response therefore seems more akin to the ‘zealous advocate’ model of criminal 
defence, where counsel help to progress justice but whose primary method of 
participation is still the defence of their clients' interests.  One respondent seemed to 
view active engagement, rather than deliberate truculence, as beneficial to the client: 
 
"My obligation is to the client, but the client's best interests, in my opinion, [are] 
usually served by cooperating with the prosecution and the police rather than 
being confrontational with them, unless necessary." - Respondent A2 
 
Another respondent took a slightly different view, claiming that "[y]ou are obliged to be 
as cooperative as you can be, within your client's instructions" (Respondent S3).  This 
statement seems to present a somewhat cautious attitude toward active engagement, 
attaching the important caveat, ‘within your client's instructions’.  Others seemed to 
outwardly reject any duty to cooperate, particularly in relation to the prosecution.  One 
respondent described the obligations to them as being "very limited", and added, "I will 
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always be very cautious whatever I say to the prosecution" (Respondent B2).  Three 
others stated that they did not have any obligations to the prosecution (Respondents A3, 
S9 and A1), particularly since they were "the other party" (Respondent A1).  
Respondents also expressed different views about the duty of the defence to disclose 
information to the prosecution and help narrow the issues in the case.  One respondent 
accepted there had been a shift towards this, saying, "[t]here are a lot of changes at the 
moment with the case management requirements which means we have to disclose more 
of our defence than we would normally have done . . . before that came in" (Respondent 
S5).  In contrast, another respondent said that, "[y]ou are obliged to be as candid as you 
need to be . . . to ensure that disclosure is properly considered" (Respondent B4).  The 
former statement seems to represent a philosophical acceptance that the defence is now 
expected to openly share information with the prosecution and the court.  The latter 
statement represents a more limited interpretation, where any information that can be 
reasonably withheld will be. 
 
As mentioned earlier, formal regulation reflecting the principle of procedural justice 
seems broader and more extensive than the theoretical conception of the duty.  An 
example of this is CJSSS.  Respondents seemed to recognise the significance of the 
policy in their practical role; one said, "[t]here's a greater emphasis on making progress 
on cases basically . . . rather than unnecessary delay" (Respondent S3), while another 
felt that CJSSS was "designed to rush certain cases through the courts" (Respondent 
S9).  The responses gave the impression that the undoubted presence of procedural 
justice, primarily in the form of CJSSS, was not entirely welcome.  One respondent 
bluntly stated that he was "not a big fan of CJSSS” and that he was “not sure it's 
designed . . . to shall we say acquit the innocent as much as it is to convict the . . . 
apparently guilty, but that's a personal view" (Respondent S9).  He added that there 
were "occasions where . . . defendants are put at a disadvantage as a result of [CJSSS] . . 
. because . . . issues perhaps are not explored as . . . fully as they could have been had 
more time been given to investigate it" (Respondent S9).  The pressure to implement 
fast and efficient justice therefore has implications for the defence lawyer's other 
obligations, something which will be explored further in the next chapter.  The 
respondents appeared to acknowledge a core duty to cooperate with the court and 
progress cases.  They also seemed to concede that the obligation to procedural justice is 
more far-reaching in the light of modern legislation and regulation, although with a 
degree of cynicism and resistance from some.  One respondent neatly summarised the 
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prevailing attitude of the sample: 
 
"The obligation to the court may have to override the obligations to the client, 
but the approach to the case, the approach to advice and the tactical approach to 
the case will always be . . . taken with the client's interests primarily at stake." - 
Respondent B2 
 
2.4.2 Responses to vignettes 
 
In reaction to the vignettes, respondents seemed to recognise that their practical role 
involved a significant duty to aid in the administration of justice.  One said, "[t]here is 
an obligation under the Criminal Procedure Rules to ensure the smooth running of the 
court . . . and I think you're obliged to assist the court with telling them what the issues 
in the case are" (Respondent S2), while another felt that it was the criminal defence 
lawyer's duty to ensure that "justice does move . . . swiftly on and the trial process is 
preserved" (Respondent B4).  Some appeared to identify an institutional change in 
attitude towards the defence and its role in promoting procedural justice.  One 
respondent said that "[b]y and large, the court won't let the defence profit from simply 
playing games with the system"(Respondent S4).  Another stated: 
 
"The procedure rules now make it clear that [the criminal process is] not 
supposed to be a game and that the purpose of criminal proceedings is to convict 
the guilty and acquit the innocent, not to allow . . . tactical considerations to 
outweigh those interests." - Respondent B2 
 
The opinions above suggest that the promotion of an efficient and effective process is a 
prominent part of the defence lawyer's day-to-day role.  The elimination of 'game-
playing' has significant implications for the defendant and the lawyer, specifically in 
relation to disclosure and ambush defences.  One respondent felt that defence disclosure 
allowed the trial to be "reduced to its narrowest point of focus" (Respondent S2).  Views 
on how positive this is were mixed.  One respondent was "all for" (Respondent S6) 
narrowing the issues in a trial, while another said "[the] earlier the issues are put out 
there, the better prepared all parties can be . . . [and] that's actually in favour of the 
defendant" (Respondent A1).  However, another believed that the modern duty of 
defence disclosure had caused "all sorts of inroads" (Respondent B3) into the traditional 
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burden of proof – that is, that the prosecution have to prove their case against the 
defendant, who is free from self-incrimination.  The same respondent thought the 
defence statement had been "extended well beyond what was originally envisaged" 
(Respondent B3), while another believed that the defence lawyer now had an obligation 
to reveal information to avoid "wasting people's time . . . that's the great sin these days" 
(Respondent A2).   
 
When discussing ambush defences, the respondents were consistent in their answers - in 
modern practice, they no longer have a place.  As one respondent put it: "[t]he game's 
changed" (Respondent S1).  It would seem that defence lawyers can no longer "exploit a 
loophole or jump up and say 'you've forgotten to say this therefore we win and you 
lose'" (Respondent S4).  Several respondents identified the CPR as playing a key role in 
shaping this aspect of modern criminal defence work.  One stated that as a result of the 
rules, "the ambush defence stuff is theoretically undermined fatally" (Respondent B1), 
while another said, "[t]hat aspect of defence tactics has . . . since the procedure rules 
been taken out of the defence box of tools" (Respondent B2).  Other respondents 
referred to the burgeoning body of case law on the subject of ambush defences, one 
stating, "there are any number of authorities now which frown upon that" (Respondent 
B4).  Another elaborated: 
 
"[A] number of cases that have come out of the Court of Appeal say that 
defendants and solicitors will not be rewarded for making ambush points or 
keeping the powder dry . . ." - Respondent S4 
 
As a result, the day-to-day attitude of the courts seems to have hammered a final nail 
into the coffin of the ambush defence.  One respondent stated that: 
 
"[T]here are District Judges who tend to be quite aggressive . . . in enforcing the 
way they think things should be done.  A lot of them don't take very kindly to 
ambush defences.  The consequence of that could potentially be a costs order 
against me as an individual . . ." - Respondent B1 
 
Another confirmed this, saying that there were now "penalties and costs for ambushing 
the Crown on the day of trial . . . which, of course, in the old days used to be part of the 
fun!" (Respondent S9).  Joking aside, the use of the phrase ‘the old days’ implies a 
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distinct expansion in the scope of procedural justice in recent years.  The fact the CPR 
and key cases are also recent is no coincidence, and supports suggestions by the 
respondents that they have been integral in the decline of ambush defences.  More 
broadly, this indicates that the modern role of the defence lawyer is different to that of 
the past. 
 
A few respondents seemed supportive of the duties of case management, defence 
cooperation and aiding procedural fairness.  Discussing the use of ambushes, one 
respondent said that they made defence lawyers "look like [they're] being difficult for 
difficult's sake . . . it just makes you look like you haven't got a defence, [that] you're 
just trying to be devious" (Respondent S7).  Another seemed to think that ambushes 
were justifiable in the case of "fundamental defects in the Crown's case", but that "there 
is a difference between [fundamental defects and] simple, procedural defects which are 
essentially remediable" (Respondent B4).  However, some respondents, whilst accepting 
the role and extent of the principle of procedural justice, questioned its necessity and 
fairness.  One respondent said, "[i]n terms of case management, we are very often being 
utilised as a club with which to batter our clients" (Respondent S6).  Another respondent 
felt that the obligation was applied unequally, stating that "the prosecution routinely 
take points late, serve notices of additional evidence during a trial . . . adapt their case 
constantly . . . [and] there's never any suggestion that those prosecuting counsel are in 
the wrong" (Respondent B1).  Both statements insinuate that the principle of procedural 
justice is not so much a tool for improving the fairness and efficiency of proceedings, 
but a weapon for suppressing the defence.  One of the aforementioned respondents 
continued: 
 
"[T]here is a conflict there, and the Law Society hasn't really . . . provided us 
with up to date guidance [as] to how we actually deal with that." - Respondent 
S6 
 
This seems to confirm the conclusions of Chapter 4, which suggested that formal 
regulation does not adequately resolve the conflicts between the different duties owed 
by defence lawyers. 
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2.5 The Principle of Truth-Seeking
956
 
 
2.5.1 Responses to Direct Questioning 
 
At the core of the principle of truth-seeking is the idea that the criminal justice process 
is designed to acquit the innocent and convict the guilty, a duty which the ‘zealous 
advocate’ model and formal regulation (notably the CPR) extend to the defence lawyer.  
When responding to direct questioning, respondents seemed to doubt the desirability 
and logic of such an obligation.  This was summarised in no uncertain terms by one 
respondent: 
 
"The overriding objective of the Criminal Procedure Rules . . . is to convict the 
guilty and acquit the innocent, and all parties are under an obligation to 
cooperate with that.  So in those circumstances, theoretically, as a defence 
advocate, if the defendant is guilty, I should work under the overriding objective 
to assist the court to convict the client.  Which is a bit fucked up really isn't it?" - 
Respondent B1 
 
The key word above is ‘theoretically’, which insinuates a potential gap between what 
defence lawyers are supposed to do and what happens in practice.  Where a lawyer 
protects and defends a defendant he knows to be 'guilty', the principle of truth-seeking 
supposedly requires him or her to help the court in the pursuit of a conviction.  
However, arguably the defence lawyer can only know a defendant is guilty in the event 
of a confession.  Outside of this, does the duty extend, in practice, to strong or even 
moderate suspicion of guilt?  If the defence lawyer genuinely believes in the client's 
innocence, is it then, and only then, the defence lawyer's job to argue for an acquittal?   
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 See Chapter 2, section 3.2.2 and Chapter 3, section 3.2 for definitions and discussion of the principle 
of truth-seeking. 
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One respondent did not think so, believing that defending the guilty helped achieve the 
ultimate objective: 
 
"If anything, your obligation is to argue . . . your defence case even more 
vociferously and that really does demonstrate the objective fulfilled, because the 
prosecution have managed to persuade a jury of the guilt of somebody in the 
face of a very well fought and hard pressed defence." - Respondent B4 
 
In essence, this respondent is saying that by defending the guilty, one ensures that any 
resultant conviction is legitimised.  As has been discussed in previous chapters, the 
‘acquit the innocent, convict the guilty’ element of truth-seeking creates ethical 
conflicts.  One respondent, however, seemed to imply that the obligation is hollow and 
merely designed to make defence work harder: 
 
"I don't think there's very much emphasis on acquitting the innocent, and I think 
that has an effect on defence lawyers because we obviously occasionally do 
believe our clients to be innocent . . . [I]t becomes frustrating and difficult to 
continue doing the job when you feel barriers are being put up to a fair trial." - 
Respondent S2 
 
Other aspects of the principle of truth-seeking hold a more certain place in practical 
conceptions of the role.  Six respondents said they were "not to mislead the court" 
(Respondents A1, B4, B3, S2, S9 and S7), a core feature of their duty to seek the truth 
and one they are "taught from a very early stage" (Respondent B4).  Others used more 
explicit language to describe the obligation, stating that they had "an obligation to . . . 
tell the truth at all times" (Respondent S9), a duty "always to be truthful" (Respondent 
S2) and "to be completely honest and frank with the court" (Respondent B4).  One 
respondent subtly elaborated on the duty "not to mislead", saying, "I've got a duty not to 
actively mislead the court . . . [and] I certainly wouldn't lie to the court" (Respondent 
S5).  This openly recognises the difference between 'passively' and 'actively' misleading 
the court, as discussed earlier.  All of the statements above reflect the primary 
characteristic of truth-seeking, which is not to actively mislead or lie to  the court – but 
what about passively misleading the court?  Little mention was made of this in response 
to direct questioning.  However, two respondents seemed to believe that passively 
misleading the court was acceptable in practice.   
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One respondent made the distinction clear: 
 
"I mustn't actively seek to mislead [the court] nor put forward information I 
know to be false . . . but I am entitled to advance my client's instructions on 
occasion . . . without saying something to the court and it being a matter for 
them whether they ask me or not." - Respondent S4 
 
The same respondent continued, "[i]t's no part of my role, with or without the Criminal 
Procedure Rules, to tell the court things that I may know" (Respondent S4).  These 
responses indicate limitations to the obligation to seek the truth, but it should be 
remembered that direct questioning is without context or conflict.  General responses to 
the vignettes and, more crucially, the conflict points more thoroughly test the validity of 
tactical silence in a practical context, aiding the exploration of practical conceptions of 
the principle. 
 
2.5.2 Responses to Vignettes 
 
During the vignette section of the interviews, the respondents discussed the principle of 
truth-seeking extensively.  Some respondents were divided on whether acquitting the 
innocent and convicting the guilty formed a part of their role.  One recognised the 
rationale and utility of such an obligation, citing a practical example to justify it – the 
use of 'loopholes' to secure acquittals: 
 
"The public would say that that is an obviously guilty person who's got away 
because of an issue, a loophole, that has no relevance to the question of guilt but 
is simply a procedural mishap." - Respondent B2 
 
This implies that using a loophole evades the truth and that those the system is designed 
to serve – the public – reject it.   
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The same respondent also reinforced the idea that the defence lawyer's role should focus 
on searching for the truth, rather than pursuing irrelevant issues, giving the example of 
defendants harbouring ulterior motives for pleading their case: 
 
"Take the conduct in a case where the client has admitted his guilt of the offence, 
but wants to conduct the defence in order to advertise a political cause.  That's 
not appropriate to my role." - Respondent B2 
 
This indicates that the defence lawyer's practical role is not to slavishly serve the whims 
of a client, but to pursue the truth by dealing with facts.  One would assume the same 
principle would apply if a defendant sought a defence in order to humiliate a witness or 
promote a religious faith.  However, others did not believe it was their role to judge the 
'truth'.  One respondent stated, "[i]f my client says they are not guilty, then they're 
entitled to have their day in court as far as I'm concerned . . . I don't think it's for me as a 
lawyer to . . . try to in any way . . . influence their thinking" (Respondent S9).  Another 
respondent echoed this, asserting, "I don't think as the defence you are searching for the 
truth; burden of proof's on the prosecution . . . [the] defendant doesn't have to prove 
anything" (Respondent B3).  This represents a rather blunt assessment of the place of 
truth-seeking in the practical role of the adversarial defence lawyer; the burden of proof 
is not a shared responsibility. 
 
Responses alluding to another element of truth-seeking – the duty not to mislead the 
court – seemed to reflect both theoretical and formal conceptions.  One respondent 
considered it a core duty, saying "[t]he duty to the court . . . is summed up very 
succinctly – it's that you can't go into court and lie on behalf of the client" (Respondent 
S8).  He also considered the obligation to engage in "facilitation of the criminal 
process" (in other words, procedural justice) to be "a fairly modern thing", while being 
"honest before the face of the court" was "far more ancient" (Respondent S8).  The 
difference between actively and passively misleading the court was highlighted by one 
respondent, who explained, "I'm entitled to allow the court to labour under a 
misapprehension" (Respondent B1).  Several respondents reported that some clients 
misunderstood the truth-seeking aspect of their role, and did not understand the 
difference between actively and passively misleading the court.  One respondent 
outlined that she would tell a client, "'I can't lie on your behalf, it's not my job'" 
(Respondent B3).  She elaborated, saying that "most clients understand that . . . [but] 
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you get the occasional one who thinks you'll say anything in order to get them off . . . 
you have to explain quite clearly what your role is" (Respondent B3).  She later gave a 
telling example: 
 
"I had one client . . . sort of sat there and I went through it and he admitted it all 
to me, and then he said 'Yeah, but that's not what we're saying in court' and I just 
said, 'Hmm, I'm not sure you understand what we're doing here' and he . . . 
turned around to his solicitor and said 'Get me a fucking proper barrister'." - 
Respondent B3 
 
This aspect of truth-seeking therefore appears to be well-defined in theoretical, formal 
and practical conceptions of the role.  Deliberately misleading or lying to the court has 
no place in the defence lawyer's role. 
 
Another dimension of the principle of truth-seeking, developed significantly in formal 
regulation, is the duty to correct errors in the prosecution case.
957
  One might consider 
this and prohibition of ambush defences as two sides of the same coin.  Respondents 
gave mixed reactions; some seemed to categorically reject the concept.  One said, "I 
don't think you have an obligation to the court or the prosecution to make sure that their 
case is right" (Respondent A3), while another dismissed any duty to "prove their case 
for them or highlight any . . . errors in their case" (Respondent S9).  The same 
respondent did not accept that the changes ushered in by modern regulation meant that 
the defence role had changed in this respect, saying "even with the Criminal Procedure 
Rules . . . if they make a mistake, that is unfortunately an issue for them" (Respondent 
S9).  In contrast, others did seem to recognise the duty as part of the role, but were 
critical of the practical difficulties it created for defence lawyers.  One respondent 
commented that defence lawyers "now appear to have been given a duty to assist the 
prosecution in prosecuting our clients . . . and it's quite bizarre but it's there" 
(Respondent S2).  Another made a near-identical observation, stating that, "[t]he rules 
have changed slightly in that the Government tell us that if we see a glaring hole in the 
prosecution case, we should in all reality tell the prosecution about it so they can fill it, 
which doesn't seem to me to be quite fair in an adversarial judicial system" (Respondent 
S8).  One respondent felt it restricted the ability of defence lawyers to do their job by 
"putting [them] in a procedural strait-jacket" (Respondent S5), while another felt it 
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unburdened the prosecution of their responsibilities: 
 
"You should be able to not point out glaring errors, bearing in mind there are 
lawyers on the other side who should be spotting those errors.  I think it's their 
duty to do that and our duty to do our side of it, and if they get it wrong then 
that's their responsibility.  But that's definitely changed quite substantially in the 
last few years." - Respondent S7 
 
One respondent found it disconcerting that the court, as exemplified in R v. Gleeson, 
could weigh in to censure the defence for not fulfilling this duty: 
 
"The prosecution are presenting the case, they've got trained lawyers, they 
should be spotting those things.  Is it a matter for the court to enter into it, 
effectively on the side of the prosecution?  I'm really not sure about that one at 
all." - Respondent S5 
 
Only one respondent seemed to openly accept and approve of this aspect of the principle 
of truth-seeking.  When asked whether the judicial system was a level playing field, he 
said: 
 
"You can have people who are seriously outgunned on either side . . . I'm very 
concerned that I can take a tactical advantage that is not fair to the prosecution 
witnesses . . . simply by virtue of the ineptitude of my opponent.  That should be 
evened out by the judicial process to a great extent." - Respondent B1 
 
Respondents were also sceptical about the obligation to share disadvantageous 
authorities and evidence with the prosecution and court, as part of their duty to seek the 
truth.  One respondent said, "I don't think we've reached the stage in this country, and it 
may well come . . . where we are duty-bound to put everything in front of the court 
whether it be advantageous to our client or not" (Respondent S8).  The same respondent 
summarised the essential problem with such an obligation, saying it would create a 
"strange clash of interests between your duty to your client and your duty to the court" 
(Respondent S8).  Evidence of this kind might include previous convictions.  One 
respondent said, "I dare say you would want to keep that away from the jury . . . 
whether to let a client's form go in is always a tricky one" (Respondent A2). 
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2.6 The Principle of Morality
958
 
 
2.6.1 Responses to Direct Questioning 
 
Few references were made to any obligation of morality in response to direct 
questioning, but respondents did discuss duties they owed to victims, or complainants.  
When asked directly, most respondents did not think the defence lawyer owed any 
"direct obligation" (Respondent B3) to complainants or prosecution witnesses.  
However, one respondent believed that a defence lawyer should not go to any length, 
however unethical, to secure an advantage for the client at a complainant's expense: 
 
"If a client instructed me to cross-examine a victim by saying that she was 'an 
effing bitch and everyone knew she'd slept with half the people in the road', I 
would . . . probably refuse to do it on the basis that it would be completely 
wrong or disconnected from the reality of the case.  So, on some levels it may be 
a professional decision that I'm simply not prepared to run a case like that . . . it 
would be positively conspiring to do something . . . more broadly wrong and 
illegal anyway." - Respondent S4 
 
Other respondents described more restrained versions of this obligation, saying that 
defence lawyers should "treat [complainants] with courtesy and dignity" (Respondent 
S2), defend as "civilly . . . and politely as circumstances allow" (Respondent B4) and 
display "common decency" (Respondent S4).  Some respondents felt that defending 
their client within the parameters of the criminal justice framework fulfilled any ethical 
duties.  One said the only duty to the complainant was in the "wider picture of the 
criminal justice system" (Respondent A1), while another described a "moral obligation" 
to "abide by the rules" (Respondent B3).  However, as regards complainants and 
prosecution witnesses, most respondents described their role as having "[n]o duty 
whatsoever . . . save the procedural aspects" (Respondent B1), and that to impose any 
would be "widening the role too far" (Respondent A1).  
 
None of this necessarily indicates that the respondents, or criminal defence lawyers 
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generally, approve of treating complainants or witnesses poorly.  Rather, one respondent 
described choosing to behave ethically towards victims and witnesses of crime because, 
ultimately, it advances the client's cause, or at least does not damage it: 
 
"[The] jury will . . . unless justified, react I think generally against any of the old 
fashioned bullying that used to be commonplace at the Bar." - Respondent B2  
 
The same respondent continued, "[j]uries are less willing to accept and tolerate you 
being pompous or patronising or shouting down witnesses and the Judges reflect the 
change in public opinion . . . requiring actually a different standard of behaviour in 
court" (Respondent B2).  It would seem that behaving in an ethical and respectful 
manner was "not an obligation, but failing to do that doesn't assist the client" 
(Respondent A2). 
 
2.6.2 Responses to Vignettes 
 
The responses to the vignettes produced only a few statements reflecting duties of 
morality in relation to both third parties and defendants.  One respondent said, "[t]he 
obligation I have to the complainant is to ask fair questions in an appropriate way" 
(Respondent B4), implying that the defence lawyer should avoid irrelevant and 
unnecessarily distressing questions, even if they might lead to some advantage for their 
client.  Another respondent, using a rape case as an example, demonstrated a similar 
approach to a potentially sensitive and difficult cross-examination: 
 
"In terms of representing a case . . . like that, I will do it on a professional basis.  
It doesn’t necessarily mean that I will allow the client to effectively trample 
through the evidence . . . part of my job is persuading the client . . . that if the 
evidence is there, that it is appropriate not to go through the trial process . . . 
[and] spare the person cross-examination . . . I think you’ve got to have a 
responsible approach" - Respondent S5 
 
This statement lends some support to the notion that, in practice, criminal defence 
lawyers have a duty to consider the complainant when presenting their client’s case.  In 
this instance, it is to be ‘responsible’ in handling the evidence and honestly assess the 
necessity of cross-examination.  Some respondents recognised some degree of moral 
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obligation in performing their role, but usually counter-balanced this with a more client-
oriented statement.  One respondent said, "[y]ou’re not there just to haul [complainants] 
over the coals for no reason", but conceded that "if [the] client insists on . . . a slightly 
more aggressive strategy then of course that might happen" (Respondent S9).  Similarly, 
another respondent stated, "[t]he client can’t make me do what I consider unethical", but 
also said, "I can’t allow my own sensitivity to outweigh my duty to the client" 
(Respondent B2).   
 
One respondent believed that sometimes she could be frank with a client about his or 
her behaviour: 
 
"There are clients that we get to know extremely well . . . if you know them, you 
might say ‘I can’t believe you’ve done that again’ or . . . ‘you keep getting 
yourself into this mess, what are you doing?’  In that way, there are occasions in 
which . . . you would pass an opinion on somebody, that you have known for a 
while." – Respondent S7 
 
Such conduct does reflect elements of the principle of morality.  It suggests that defence 
lawyers can advise criminal clients about their personal conduct in almost a parental 
fashion.  However, it is doubtful that this represents a concrete obligation.  First, it is 
virtually impossible to regulate how defence lawyers conduct their private meetings 
with clients, in or out of court.  Second, defence lawyers would most likely resent such 
intrusive regulation of their work.  Third, it is unlikely that a large number of criminal 
clients would appreciate being scolded by a figure who is employed, primarily, to 
protect them.
959
  Other respondents outlined what might be termed a ‘watered down’ 
obligation of morality.  This was, in essence, an obligation to exhibit basic levels of 
respect for complainants and prosecution witnesses.  One respondent stated that defence 
lawyers "don’t have a duty to the witness other than in terms of common decency and 
not being deliberately unreasonable" (Respondent S4), while another felt that, "[y]ou 
must not badger or harass a witness" and that defence lawyers should "treat everybody 
with civility and respect" (Respondent S6).   
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One respondent made it clear that any duty to behave ethically had boundaries: 
 
"[The] only . . . obligation [is] to treat her as courteously as possible.  That’s the 
only obligation I think you have to the complainant, because . . . if you were to 
go further than that and start bending over backwards to be good to the 
complainant . . . you must be disadvantaging your own client and you shouldn’t 
be doing that." – Respondent S8 
 
Indeed, another respondent echoed this.  Whilst accepting that the defence lawyer has 
an obligation "to treat [complainants] properly", he said, "[i]t doesn’t mean not tackling 
awkward, difficult, embarrassing situations" (Respondent S2).  Other respondents felt 
that any duty they owed to treat complainants with civility and respect also benefited 
their client’s cause.  One respondent said, "I personally feel an obligation to treat 
everybody with a degree of respect . . . I’m not sure it ever helps your client to move 
away from that" (Respondent B3).  This suggests that treating a complainant with 
respect is a personal obligation, rather than a professional one; it just happens to benefit 
the client to behave in this way.  Similarly, another respondent said that a defence 
lawyer "should take sufficient account of any obligations . . . to put questions in a 
palatable way", so as not to "disadvantage [the] client or . . . be perceived by the jury as 
taking any kind of . . . pleasure or . . . gratification in watching [a complainant] 
apparently humiliated" (Respondent B2).  Another respondent believed that taking a 
"softly, softly approach" in cross-examination was "not really . . . an obligation to the 
witness but . . . [due to] how it comes across to the jury.  I don’t think you want to be 
seen as aggressive" (Respondent A3).  Most respondents did not recognise any moral 
obligation giving them responsibility for the complainant’s wellbeing.  One said, "[t]he 
court will protect the complainant" (Respondent S2), while another said "[t]he court . . . 
[are] there to rein me in if I go too far" (Respondent S9).  One respondent did not 
believe the role encompassed a duty to "place any moral restrictions upon how we 
approach the evidence of complainants" (Respondent S1).  Another made it clear that 
such a limitation could not apply in practice: 
 
"You can’t not ask questions just because it might upset them – you have to put 
your case." – Respondent S7 
 
Some respondents simply believed that the principle of morality was not compatible 
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with their primary function of protecting and advancing the client’s case: 
 
"I’ve had cases where the client has absolutely insisted on doing the most 
unattractive, the most unpalatable and he was right to do so." – Respondent B2 
 
Another felt that delicacy and sensitivity in cross-examination were not obligations, 
saying, "[i]f my instructions are to go in with a sledgehammer rather than a scalpel, then 
unfortunately that’s probably what I would do" (Respondent S9).  All of these responses 
suggest that modern practice does not obligate defence lawyers to act as moral agents.  
As one respondent neatly summarized that, for complainants, "any chance of dignity is 
virtually non-existent in practical terms" (Respondent A2).  Some respondents seemed 
to dismiss any duty to reprimand clients for poor behaviour, claiming that it "would be 
pre-judging" (Respondent B4), while another stated, "I wouldn’t ever moralise to 
anybody" (Respondent S3).  Another concluded that, as a defence lawyer, "[o]ne has to, 
to a degree, not address moral issues" (Respondent S2). 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
All of the respondents interviewed were keen to engage in debate about the role of the 
defence lawyer, and various aspects of the ‘zealous advocate’ model appeared to be 
reflected in the respondents’ conceptions of their roles.  Opinions about the importance 
or prominence of different obligations and duties varied to an extent, but clear trends 
can be identified.  The respondents’ practical conceptions seemed to place different 
emphasis on different aspects of their role.  The duties to the court, particularly 
procedural justice, appear to have more significance to the role than under the ‘zealous 
advocate’ model, reflecting the more court-oriented tone of formal regulation.  Duties 
owed to the client, specifically the principle of partisanship, appear to be restrained.  
Few respondents seemed to recognise any substantial obligation of morality, suggesting 
it is very much an ideal.  These conclusions will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
8.  The responses in Chapter 6 only tell half of the story though.  As was discussed in 
Chapter 4, conflict between the various principles fundamentally affects the nature of 
the role and any exploration of practical conceptions should be coupled with an 
exploration of practical conflict resolution.  Using the vignette technique discussed in 
Chapter 5, I questioned the respondents about how they would react in the event of 
ethical conflicts.  Chapter 7 outlines my findings. 
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CHAPTER 7 – Resolving Conflicts in Practice 
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1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will examine the respondents' reactions to the 'Professional Conduct 
Scenarios' presented to them during the interviews.  Specifically, it will explore what 
conflicts of principle, if any, the respondents identified in the scenarios and how they 
chose to resolve those conflicts, if they felt they could be resolved. The purpose of this 
is twofold; first, it will gauge whether the respondents recognise the conflicts points 
around which the scenarios were designed.  This will go some way to indicating 
whether the conflict points discussed in Chapter 4 are recognised by defence 
practitioners and whether they pose difficulties for defence lawyers in practice.  Second, 
by examining the attempts of the respondents' to resolve such conflicts, we will gain an 
impression of what obligations are overriding in a conflict situation and whether any of 
the conflict points are irresolvable.  The importance of analysing the conflict points 
cannot be underestimated.  Although some elements of the theoretical and formal 
conceptions of the role are consistent and compatible, there are inevitable conflicts of 
obligation which have not been adequately resolved by theoretical discourse or formal 
regulation, leaving an uncertainty about what the role of the defence lawyer is.  By 
ascertaining how, if at all, defence lawyers resolve conflicts in 'real-life' scenarios, one 
can gain a fuller picture of the role.  For example, with empirical evidence it can be said 
with more conviction that partisanship overrides procedural justice or vice versa.  
Empirical investigation into defence obligations, both in isolation and in conflict with 
each other, allow a more accurate and valid examination of the defence lawyer and 
indicate whether practical conceptions of the role reflect the theoretical and formal 
conceptions.  Structurally, this chapter is divided into four sections (excluding this 
introduction), each one dealing with a conflict point.  Within each section, the 
'Professional Conduct Scenario' representing its respective conflict point will be 
explained; this explanation will make explicit the conflict point that the scenario is 
designed to represent.  It should be noted that this explanation of the scenario and the 
conflicts at play is the author's and not necessarily the respondents'.  Once the scenario 
has been outlined, I will undertake a thorough analysis of the responses to each conflict 
point, examining whether or not they resolve the issues presented and what this 
indicates about practical conceptions of the role. 
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2. Confidentiality v. Procedural Justice and Truth-Seeking 
 
Scenario A: 
 
'Your client, Z, has been charged with possession of heroin with intent to supply.  
He was arrested on North Road, which is a well-known haunt for drug users.  Z 
claims that the heroin found on him was for personal use and that he does not 
deal.  He pleads not guilty and his trial date is set; however, in your last meeting 
with Z before the trial, he says that he won't be able to attend the first day of the 
trial as he "needs to score on North Road after the weekend."  You warn him he 
must attend the trial; he responds by asking you to explain his absence to the 
court.  You outline the potential consequences of failing to attend, but he insists 
on his instructions.  On the morning of the trial, Z does not appear as expected; 
you attempt to phone him but receive no answer.  You must explain Z's absence 
to the court. ' 
 
Scenario A was designed to create tensions between the principle of confidentiality and 
the two opposing duties to the court - the principles of truth-seeking and procedural 
justice.  The client divulged information to his defence lawyer, namely that he wouldn't 
be able to attend the first day of his trial as he was intending to buy drugs.  Arguably, 
this information is not only protected by legal professional privilege, as outlined by s.10 
of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and common law,
960
 but also wider 
professional obligations of confidentiality, including paragraph 702 of the Bar Code and 
rule 4.01 of the Solicitors’ Code.  These would require the defence lawyer to keep the 
client's communication private, in line with the theoretical principle of confidentiality.  
Such information might be regarded as having the potential to damage the client's 
reputation and credibility in the eyes of a judge and jury and keeping such information 
away from the court may be more favourable to the client than revealing it.  However, 
this creates two potential conflicts of obligation for the defence lawyer.  First, it could 
be argued that the lawyer's duty of truth-seeking obligates him or her to reveal this 
information.  Revelation would prevent the court from being misled in any way, as 
paragraph 302 of the Bar Code and rule 11.01(1) of the Solicitors’ Code specify, and 
would ensure that all relevant evidence, advantageous to the client or not, was available 
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for assessment by the court.
961
  This, of course, stands in contrast to any obligation to 
suppress such information, as the principle of confidentiality might require.  Second, the 
principle of procedural justice imposes obligations of disclosure on the defence 
lawyer,
962
 as well as a duty to facilitate the administration of justice.
963
  Shielding the 
information about 'Z's non-attendance, as the principle of confidentiality would 
require,
964
 could contravene this principle.  Remaining silent about the client's 
whereabouts, information which might help the trial proceed, could significantly 
contribute to a delay contrary to this principle.
965
  
 
In reaction to this, respondents provided an array of responses which can be broadly 
grouped into five categories.  The first category of responses favoured upholding the 
principle of confidentiality in the event of a conflict and respondents explained their 
reasoning in a variety of ways.   Several doubted that their duties to be honest or open 
with the court or speed up the trial process required them to compromise any duties of 
confidentiality owed to the client.  One respondent explained, "[y]ou do have a duty to 
assist the court but not to that extent, and certainly not to breach confidentiality in 
relation to offences being committed" (Respondent S3).  Another respondent bluntly 
stated, "I am under no obligation to tell the police or the court where my client is" 
(Respondent S4), while another said, "I don't think this falls into the category where you 
have to start informing on your client" (Respondent A1).  When asked whether 
withholding information from the court would create procedural delay, the above 
respondent said, "I don't think it would necessarily slow things down" (Respondent A1), 
while another did not think upholding confidentiality in this scenario would hold up the 
process because "the trial's going to go ahead" (Respondent S7).  One respondent said, 
"[I] would be concerned about . . . putting myself in the position where you're 
volunteering information about [the client]" (Respondent S7).  The key word here is 
‘volunteering’.  It insinuates that a defence lawyer in this scenario would not be obliged 
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to reveal information and that freely choosing to do so in order to aid the court and 
prosecution made this respondent uncomfortable. 
 
Respondents also seemed to think that the duty to the client, in the form of 
confidentiality, overrides the duty to the court.  One respondent conceded that Scenario 
A presented the defence lawyer with a conflict of interests, but that the client should 
come first: 
 
"[C]ertainly we are under a duty not to inadvertently delay the court proceedings 
. . . but . . . my understanding is my obligations to the client will supersede that . 
. ." - Respondent S9 
 
Similarly, others seemed to justify their decisions on the basis that the client's cause was 
paramount. One respondent said, "it wouldn't be appropriate in the interests of your 
client . . . to . . . explain his absence" (Respondent A1), while another stated, "[i]t's not 
your obligation to assist the court in going to affect an arrest of your client", despite the 
possibility that "[t]he judge may not like that" (Respondent B2).  Some respondents 
simply did not believe that ‘Z’ had waived his right to confidentiality, thus they had no 
obligation to reveal information to the court: 
 
"If my client or clients generally . . . had provided me with information that they 
hadn't confirmed that I could pass on, then I don't think it would be appropriate 
for me to . . . waive confidentiality potentially to avoid any delay." - Respondent 
S9 
 
Another respondent agreed that waiver was a matter for the client and that, in this 
instance, ‘Z’ had not freed the defence lawyer from his responsibility to protect 
confidential material: 
 
"I think that the information he's given is effectively confidential information; 
once I start to explain what he's told me, I am waiving privilege I think and I'm 
not going to do that." - Respondent B2 
 
The second category of responses seemed to resolve the conflict point by revealing the 
information about 'Z'.  However, the respondents justified this decision on the basis that 
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they were following their client's instructions, not because their duties to the court were 
overriding.  The client had, in their view, waived the protection of confidentiality, 
allowing them to share the information with the court and prosecution.  One respondent 
simply followed orders, stating, "[i]f he wants me to, I must do it" (Respondent A2).   
 
Some respondents seemed unwilling to reveal such information since it might damage 
the client's cause, but conceded that they would pass on the information to the court 
despite their misgivings: 
 
"[I]f the client's giving me instructions to pass that on and I've got signed 
instructions from him that says that he is content with me to pass on those 
instructions to the court, then I see no difficulty with that . . . I wouldn't feel 
comfortable with it, but I would do it." - Respondent S9 
 
Another respondent provided a similar response, saying, "I don't think there [are] any 
confidentiality issues; he has told me to tell the court that he's gone to score drugs and 
as undesirable as that is to tell a court . . . that is what it is" (Respondent A3).  Other 
respondents held a contrasting opinion, believing that following the client's instructions 
would in fact further his cause.  One respondent stated that facilitating the client's 
attendance at court would be beneficial because "it is in the defendant's interests to have 
. . . his evidence before the jury, to set forward to them 'I'm not a drug dealer, I'm a drug 
user'" (Respondent B1).  He continued:  
 
"[B]ased on his instructions, I'd say to the judge, you will be able, in all 
likelihood, to get him here for a trial if you send your officers to North Road . . . 
to nick him . . . He's instructed me to say that on his behalf . . ." - Respondent B1 
 
The same respondent later concluded that "the reason that I do it is because, yes, it is to 
his tactical benefit and it is based on his instructions" (Respondent B1).  Another 
respondent agreed, saying, "If you withhold the information, you're not doing your 
client a service in any event" (Respondent B4).  Some of the above decisions do leave 
the defence lawyer in a strange situation.  In a sense, one could conclude that the 
respondents are defending ‘Z’s interests, because they are following his instructions and 
therefore fulfilling his wishes.  Equally, by providing the court with the information, the 
respondents are fulfilling their duties to facilitate the justice process and aid the search 
 238 
for the truth.  Yet, simultaneously, neither the duty to the client nor the duty to the court 
are truly being served.  One could argue that revealing this confidential information 
could damage 'Z's cause and therefore is not in his best interests.   It should be 
remembered that confidentiality is not secrecy for the sake of it; it is secrecy with the 
purpose of protecting the client.  Thus, even if it is the client's wish that detrimental 
information be revealed, to do so could be considered a failure on the part of the 
defence lawyer to fulfil his or her true duty to the client, which is to protect and advance 
his or her best interests.  Criminal clients do not necessarily know the ideal course of 
action to take in order to promote their cause.  They are not lawyers (usually) and 
consequently are entitled to representation by a qualified professional.  Arguably, the 
defence lawyer should recognise that confidentiality is designed to prevent private 
information from hurting the defence case and adopt a paternal approach with the client, 
taking the decision for him or her.  In this context, the merit of simply following 'Z's 
instructions is questionable.  At the same time, the evident reluctance and discomfort at 
revealing the information hardly reflects willing commitment to the principles of 
procedural justice or truth-seeking.  These principles expect an officer of the court to 
provide as much information to the court as possible and help oil the cogs of the justice 
machine.  However, from the responses above, it would appear that had they had the 
choice, many respondents would opt to maintain confidentiality, regardless of 'Z's 
misguided commands or the court's desire to be in the loop.  The respondents do not 
appear to be choosing disclosure – it is an overriding expectation because of the client's 
instructions.  This seems to leave the defence lawyer in a position where he or she is 
slavishly following orders, but doing a disservice to both the client and the court. 
 
The third category of responses saw respondents resolve the conflicts by revealing the 
information provided by ‘Z’, primarily because they owed overriding duties to the 
court.  One respondent said, "[i]f I'm directly asked by the court . . . I couldn't mislead 
them . . . that is my obligation to the court . . . to keep them fully informed I think" 
(Respondent A3), while another said, "[i]f the court asks you the direct question 'why 
isn't your client here?', you're going to have to tell them" (Respondent S8).  These 
responses again demonstrate the subtle difference between actively and passively 
misleading the court; both responses imply that if the court did not directly ask about 
the whereabouts of ‘Z’, then the defence lawyer may choose to keep the information 
secret.  In contrast, to withhold the information when directly asked would be actively 
misleading the court, and thus unacceptable.  However, one respondent suggested that 
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this division between passively and actively misleading the court is perhaps a false one: 
 
"He's told you, as an officer of the court, that he won't be attending.  In your duty 
not to mislead the court, you have two choices:  You can remain silent, which 
would be singularly unhelpful to your client in any event and the inferences 
drawn against you could only be adverse, or you can tell the court the reasons 
that he has told you why he's not going to be there.  I wouldn't consider there 
was any other duty to the defendant which would preclude me from giving that 
account." - Respondent B4 
 
It would therefore seem that regardless of being asked directly or not, a defence lawyer, 
in this scenario, would best serve both court and client by revealing the information.  
This respondent therefore seemed to believe that, in this scenario, there was no real 
choice.  Other responses seem to reaffirm this sense of 'obligation' to reveal the 
information.  One respondent admitted: 
 
"I think I'd be pretty truthful with the court actually . . . I wouldn't say what 
conversations we'd had, but I would say that Z is a heroin addict . . . he may well 
be taking his drugs for the day or whatever . . . the court actually . . . can be quite 
sympathetic." - Respondent B3 
 
 Another respondent was of a similar opinion: 
 
"I would urge . . . for the trial to go ahead to the court . . . and to be honest I 
would explain that he's indicated he's not available for the first day . . . if pushed, 
I probably would tell the court that he has told me that he will be using drugs 
and needed to obtain some drugs . . . I would be reluctant to mislead the court or 
lie." - Respondent A3 
 
The fourth category of response to Scenario A could be described as 'in between' or 
'mixed'.   
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Rather than resolve the conflict point in favour of the principle of confidentiality or the 
principles of procedural justice or truth-seeking, one respondent settled for a form of 
compromise between the conflicted obligations: 
 
"I think my first duty's to my client . . . and I would be able to find a form of 
words . . . which . . . tried to get my client into the least amount of trouble, 
without breaching confidentiality but also enabled the court to make decisions as 
to whether they adjourn and wait or whether they carry on." - Respondent B3 
 
She later added, "[y]ou've got to try and give [the court] the information, but in the way 
that puts your client in the best light" (Respondent B3).  Finally, when asked whether 
the obligations to confidentiality and procedural justice were reconcilable, the 
respondent said, "I'm sure they're not always, but I think most of the time you can find a 
middle ground" (Respondent B3). 
 
In the fifth and final category of responses, the respondents did not seem to recognise 
any particular conflict requiring resolution, describing their actions simply and 
unequivocally.  When asked how she would approach Scenario A, one said, "I simply 
wouldn't explain his absence to the court" (Respondent S3).  Another, contemplating 
potential interactions with the court, said, "I think . . . I would be asked by the court if I 
have any information and I think the answer that I would have to give would be I have 
no information to give to the court" (Respondent S2).  One respondent was of the 
opinion that the information provided by ‘Z’ was not afforded any protection by the 
defence lawyer's obligations of confidentiality: 
 
"You have to consider the question of whether that piece of information he gives 
you is privileged, and the answer is it's probably not and so you could divulge 
that to a third party." - Respondent S8 
 
He continued, "I don't think that him telling you he's going to score on North Road is 
privileged information – it's nothing to do . . . directly with his case" (Respondent S8).  
These statements seem to dismiss any notion of conflict; if the information is not 
privileged, then it would seem there is no clash between the confidentiality and the 
principles of procedural justice and truth-seeking.  Accordingly, respondents in this 
category seemed to answer without difficulty. 
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3. Partisanship v. Morality 
 
Scenario B: 
 
'Your client, A, has been charged with raping B.  A met B in ‘The Dock’, a local 
nightclub, and after having drunk a lot, went back to B’s house.  B claimed that 
A then raped her when she refused to have sex with him.  A denies the 
allegation, claiming that B consented at the time and had made it clear she 
wanted to have sex throughout the night.  There were no witnesses to the alleged 
rape itself.  A claims to have seen B in ‘The Dock’ several times before, 
behaving flirtatiously and always leaving with different men.  He claims others 
would agree with him that B has a reputation for picking up men in ‘The Dock’ 
and taking them home to have sex.  She has alleged rape against a man in the 
past, a charge which was dropped due to lack of evidence.  A has an historic 
conviction for sexual assault and witnesses attest to his history of sexual 
promiscuity.  A instructs you to argue that B is lying and that her sexual history 
backs up this claim. ' 
 
Scenario B was constructed in order to create a clash between the duty of partisanship 
owed to the defendant, 'A', and any duties of morality owed to the complainant, 'B'.  The 
conflict centres on the proposed tactics for defending 'A'.  As a partisan advocate, it 
could be argued that the defence lawyer should fearlessly make use of any avenues of 
cross-examination that might discredit the complainant and promote the best interests of 
the client, as long as they are lawful and proper.
966
  For example, her promiscuous 
sexual history and her past allegation of rape may show a propensity to consent.  
Coupled with her behaviour throughout that night, it could be suggested that she is lying 
about her intentions and what occurred at her house.
967
  Questioning 'B' about these 
issues could demonstrate her unreliability to the jury and undermine the prosecution 
against 'A'.  However, the obligation to morality causes difficulties.  Conducting a cross-
examination of a vulnerable witness, who is potentially the victim of a rape, is naturally 
strewn with pitfalls.  It is suggested that defence lawyers, "when the witness is nervous, 
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vulnerable or apparently the victim of criminal or similar conduct", have an obligation 
to ensure that they "are put as much at ease as possible".
968
  In contrast, to publicly 
suggest that a rape victim is a liar and a drunk by tarnishing her character is a tactic that 
is arguably deeply unethical, unfair and unacceptable.
969
  Equally, suggesting that she 
must have consented to sex on this occasion on the basis that she regularly consents to 
sex is an example of the ‘twin myth’ logic discussed in Chapter 4.  So, if the principle of 
morality requires a defence lawyer to respect victims of crime
970
 and the principle of 
partisanship expects the lawyer to utilise all his or her legal clout to secure victory for 
the defendant, regardless of the feelings of a complainant,
971
 then Scenario B presents 
an interesting dilemma. 
 
It should be noted, before proceeding to the analysis of the responses, that several (if not 
the majority) of the respondents questioned whether they would be legally allowed to 
cross-examine 'B' about her previous sexual conduct.  As was discussed earlier,
972
 the 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 places significant limitations on this area 
of advocacy, so far as to start with the assumption that any such questioning would not 
be permissible,
973
 although some exceptions could be allowed.
974
  Of course, whether 
the court would permit such cross-examination is a potentially complex legalistic 
debate.  In the course of the interviews, I did not want discussions to be side-tracked by 
consideration of the possible interpretations of the statute and the facts, particularly 
since the scenarios were designed to be relatively vague.  As a result, when respondents 
raised the question as to whether they would be granted permission to pursue this course 
of action, they were told to assume that they had been and to consider what they would 
do in light of that assumption.  This was done in order to focus on the true purpose of 
the 'Professional Conduct Scenarios' - namely the exploration of the respondents' 
approaches to conflicts of obligation, rather than on the potentially unpredictable 
decision the court might make about the validity of such questioning.  It should be 
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stressed that this was done for practical reasons of time and relevance. 
 
Several respondents seemed to believe that they did have an obligation, as a partisan 
defender, to discredit the complainant by questioning her about her sexual history and 
reliability as a witness.  One respondent suggested that, regardless of his or her personal 
views on the ethics of such behaviour, it was not a matter of choice: 
 
"It's for [the client] to tell me what my instructions are and I don't regard myself 
as  . . . having the right to choose the tactical course without having consulted 
with him in advance . . . If that's how he wants it done, that's how it'll be done." - 
Respondent B2 
 
Similarly, one respondent said, "[i]f the court would let me do it, if the client instructs 
me to do it, then I would ask those questions" (Respondent S9), while another stated, 
"[i]f it is relevant and it is something that you are permitted . . . to use, then you use it" 
(Respondent S6).  One respondent justified this approach by reference to his duties to 
the client: 
 
"If you adopt a process where you are gonna go easy on her essentially because 
she's telling the truth, then you're not doing your job and you're failing in your 
obligations to your client." - Respondent B4 
 
This statement suggests that questioning the complainant robustly on such matters is a 
core element of defence practice, and to do otherwise, however morally commendable, 
would be contrary to the essential principles of the role.  One respondent seemed to 
concur, conceding that this type of cross-examination was "what jurors need to see" 
despite being "quite unattractive" (Respondent A3).  Another respondent simply felt that 
the reality of criminal defence in a situation like Scenario B did not leave room for 
‘ethical’ behaviour: 
 
"In this particular circumstance, could it be immoral to . . . cross-examine very 
robustly a vulnerable woman about her alleged past sexual promiscuity?  Well, 
of course, it might be, but I think morality . . . isn't really a consideration on a 
day-to-day basis." - Respondent A1 
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In contrast, very few respondents felt that they would have an overriding obligation to 
uphold any broad notions of morality; those that did merely insinuated as such.  One 
respondent explained: 
 
"The court would not allow you to put in or ask questions about sexual history 
which are merely to show that she had sex a lot; who cares, so what?  She's 
perfectly entitled to have sex ten times a day." - Respondent S4 
 
This statement implies a certain disdain for such tactics, but does not necessarily 
indicate any duty to uphold morality and protect the complainant's dignity.  However, 
other respondents did seem to allude to some level of obligation to morality.  One said, 
"[y]ou can't go off on a fishing expedition just because 'A' says, you know, she's a 
slapper and that's what he wants the jury to know" (Respondent S6).  The same 
respondent seemed to identify both morality and legal regulation as restraints on over-
zealous behaviour: 
 
"You can't gratuitously just . . . detract from her character on your client's 
instructions; what you have to do, as I said, is work within the framework that 
the law and the procedure provides you with but fearlessly defend your client 
and present his case." - Respondent S6 
 
Only one respondent openly suggested that she felt obliged to uphold a moral standard, 
saying that she would not employ tough tactics in Scenario B because it was an 
unethical thing to do: 
 
"I wouldn't be awful to her in cross-examination because at the end of the day, it 
is a really nasty offence if it has been committed . . . No doubt she's terrified to 
give evidence and, to be honest, I wouldn't want the jury to think that we were 
bullying a witness or being overly harsh 'cos it just doesn't call to be like that I 
don't think . . . To be sensitive is an obligation I would try to have." - Respondent 
A3 
 
However, the vast majority of respondents subscribed to neither of these approaches.  
Although most felt that their obligation would be to avoid a rough cross-examination of 
the complainant's sexual habits and personal behaviour, this was not because of a duty 
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to uphold moral standards.  Rather, it was because of an obligation to protect and 
advance the client's best interests in the circumstances.  In effect, the respondents chose 
not to probe delicate issues with a vulnerable witness out of a duty of partisanship; 
securing the best tactical advantage for the client seemed to be the driving factor, rather 
than the complainant's well-being.  When asked whether she would hold back to protect 
the complainant, one respondent said: 
 
"I wouldn’t do it on the basis that I was considering necessarily the witness' 
point of view; I would do it because it is common courtesy . . . and also because 
in my opinion, it is detrimental to your client's defence to be seen to be 
aggressive or . . . derogatory of witnesses who are there just to give evidence." - 
Respondent S6
975
 
 
Another respondent expressed a similar view: 
 
"If you really go to town on . . . an alleged victim, then . . . every question you 
ask is bumping up the sentence should it go wrong.  But no, I don't think I have 
any obligation to protect her or to treat her well because the reality is that [the 
client] expects me to fearlessly represent him." – Respondent B1 
 
Several respondents explained the potential consequences of employing aggressive 
tactics with a rape complainant, believing that they would ultimately do damage to their 
client's cause.  One respondent said, "you'd be very, very foolish to go slagging her off 
left, right and centre, unless you had a particularly cogent piece of evidence which could 
demonstrate that she was lying" (Respondent B4), while another believed that 
"chucking around seriously nasty allegations that aren't directly involved with what 
happened on that particular night . . . can do more harm to a defendant's case than . . . 
good" (Respondent B1).  Respondent B1, although sharing the broadly negative view of 
such tactics, did not rule out a more ruthless approach to cross-examination in the right 
situation.   
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When asked if he had an obligation to question 'B' about her sexual history, he said: 
 
"No, because . . . it may not be in the defendant's best interest to do that.  It's 
certainly my duty to seek disclosure of that material . . . I'd ask the solicitors 
instructing me to explore, you know, if she is the village bike . . . to see what 
cards are in my hand." - Respondent B1 
 
Similarly, Respondent A1 said: 
 
"Generally speaking, I don't think it's gonna be tactically a very good move to 
start rubbishing the complainant and saying that she's very promiscuous, but 
again it depends on the circumstances." - Respondent A1 
 
These statements probably reflect the overall consensus.  Adopting such tactics are, 
essentially, a choice rather than an obligation.  The obligation is to defend the best 
interests of the client; this may require thorough and unflinching cross-examination 
sometimes and other times it may not.  This flexibility perhaps has more utility in 
practice than a slavish devotion to the idea of 'partisanship'. 
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4. Detachment v. Morality 
 
Scenario C: 
 
PART A:  'W, a 40 year old male, has been charged with sexually assaulting his 
13 year old daughter, X, whilst visiting her at her mother's home.  Her mother, Y, 
had left the house briefly to go to the shop.  W has a string of past convictions 
for domestic violence directed at Y, for which he has spent time in custody and 
which led to their separation.  'W' also had a charge of indecent exposure to a 
minor dropped due to a lack of evidence.  He protests his innocence, claiming 
his daughter is lying and made the accusations after he refused to give her 
money.  W requests your representation in what will clearly be a large-scale and 
potentially lucrative Crown Court trial. ' 
 
PART B:  'W pleads not guilty, on your advice.  In preparing for trial, you 
discover that X has raised allegations of violence against both of her parents in 
the past, none of them pursued by the Police.  The trial begins and the 
prosecution call X, who has been given special measures to protect her in court.  
She claims that W asked her to perform a sexual act on him and attacked her 
when she refused.  She also claims that he has sexually abused her several times 
in the past, but she was too scared to tell anyone.  You begin cross-examination 
of X.' 
 
Scenario C again raises issues relating to the principle of morality, but this time in 
conflict with the principle of detachment.  Part A deals with what might be called the 
'acceptance' stage of the client-lawyer relationship.  In upholding the duty to remain 
detached and neutral in accepting clients, the defence lawyer would be expected to take 
up 'W's case without regard for the accusation against him, his previous conduct, beliefs 
about his guilt or the fee involved.
976
  However, the principle of morality might require 
a defence lawyer to take a more responsible approach and refuse to represent someone 
like 'W'.
977
  He might be considered a morally reprehensible person because of his 
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numerous convictions for domestic violence and the historic allegation of sexual 
activity involving a child.  Some might conclude that a man of 'W's character is not 
deserving of a defence.  At the very least, the principle of morality would urge the 
defence lawyer, as a guardian of public values, to highlight to 'W' the unacceptable 
nature of his behaviour.
978
  Part B operates on the basis that the respondent has accepted 
'W' as a client, and explores the potential for conflict between the two principles at the 
trial stage, particularly in the cross-examination of 'X'.  The principle of detachment 
would expect the defence lawyer to dismiss any moral qualms about questioning 'X' and 
would require an unflinching and unsympathetic exploration of her allegations 
regardless of their veracity or her potential vulnerability.
979
  Furthermore, the defence 
lawyer should arguably attempt to undermine 'X's credibility by questioning her habit of 
making unproven complaints against her parents and 'conveniently' recalling past sexual 
abuse.  This should be done regardless of any doubts the defence lawyer has.  In 
contrast, the principle of morality would expect the defence lawyer to behave as a right-
thinking member of society would and show restraint with an emotionally exposed and 
potentially terrified child.
980
  The defence lawyer, having a duty to protect and respect 
victims of crime,
981
 would arguably be required to cross-examine 'X' very gently and 
empathetically and refrain from trying to paint her as a liar or a blackmailer.
982
 
 
As regards Part A, all of the respondents recognised a clear and overriding duty to 
remain detached when deciding whether to accept 'W' as a client.  Two respondents 
neatly summarised the general consensus about the role of the defence lawyer in 
Scenario C, describing themselves as "the educated mouthpiece for the client" 
(Respondent S5) who were "here to represent people . . . not here to judge them" 
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Commission (2007) Creating a Quality Assurance Scheme for Publicly Funded Criminal Defence 
Advocates – London:  Ministry of Justice/Legal Services Commission, Annex 1, [C(4)].  This appears to 
have been excised from the 2010 ‘competency framework. 
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accessed 16/08/2010;  
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(Respondent A3).  Respondents identified several reasons for this.  When confronted 
with the potential conflict between morality and detachment, one respondent suggested 
that it was the job of the court to pass moral judgments, and not that of the defence 
lawyer: 
 
"Any moral qualms you might have about representing 'W' . . . you should put to 
one side because of course it's right, morally, that the guilty should be convicted 
. . . and the only people who are sure to be guilty are convicted.  So, if you trust 
in the system, the system is fair and moral . . . there shouldn't be any moral 
concerns about representing him." - Respondent B1 
 
Another respondent agreed with this conclusion, expanding on the concept of 'systemic 
morality': 
 
"It's an unsavoury allegation but . . . to have a moral problem with this is to . . . 
almost reverse the burden of proof . . . and it's not my duty to make any 
judgment of him at all . . . if I have private opinions, I feel they really ought to 
remain private." - Respondent S2 
 
Another respondent believed that passing judgement on 'W' would be "essentially 
bypassing the trial system . . . which is of course something which defence lawyers need 
not concern themselves with" (Respondent A1).  Another respondent highlighted that "at 
that stage, it is simply an allegation, no more than that" (Respondent S9). 
 
Respondents also cited 'W's "right to representation" (Respondent S3) as a compelling 
reason for accepting him as a client, and that this should be done "regardless of any 
personal feelings you might have" (Respondent S3).  It was pointed out that to do 
otherwise would lead defence lawyers down a treacherous road: 
 
"If you say 'no, I'm not dealing with this because it's unpleasant', you're starting 
to make moral judgments and where would you be drawing the line if you do 
that?" - Respondent S2 
 
All of this implies that to apply any sort of ethical litmus test when deciding on which 
clients to accept would be a dangerous move.  To do so could seriously undermine the 
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legitimacy of the criminal justice process.  Furthermore, individual defence lawyers 
cannot necessarily be relied upon to represent broad moral standards, since each one 
will likely possess different opinions on the merits of a client or a cause.  The 
respondents seemed to agree that defence lawyers should not involve personal feelings 
in the process of accepting clients.  One said, "I can't take into consideration . . . 
whether or not I feel sick about the alleged allegations or anything like that" 
(Respondent B1).  The implication is that, as a person, the respondent may have felt that 
way about 'W', but that this should not influence any decision to accept him as a client.  
One respondent recognised the important difference between 'the person' and 'the 
defence lawyer', as well as 'the person' and 'the client': 
 
"I don't think I would like 'W' . . . for a kick off, but I don't think that's 
something I can take into account when I decide to represent him or not . . . 
There are a number of clients I don't particularly like as people, but . . . as long 
as I'm satisfied I can do my best for them and that . . . I will not involve any 
emotion in their defence then . . . I can quite reasonably represent them." - 
Respondent S8  
 
In essence, the approach of all the respondents to Part A of Scenario C was to "get on 
with it as a professional and . . . represent them" (Respondent S6).  Equally, none of the 
respondents felt that they would be obliged to moralise to 'W' about his past conduct or 
current predicament; several considered it positively inappropriate for a defence lawyer 
to do so.  One respondent said, "[w]hat I certainly wouldn't do is say 'essentially, you're 
a wife beater and a pervert, I'm not representing you'" (Respondent B4).  Others seemed 
to believe that expressing personal opinions would be stepping beyond the boundaries 
of their role: 
 
"It is not for me to start letting [the client] know I find him personally offensive . 
. . I will not, in my professional capacity, when I'm actually dealing with him, 
say . . . that I think he is such and such, a bad man or a pervert or whatever it 
might be." - Respondent S4 
 
"I'm not there as a friend . . . I'm there to professionally advise them and if you 
start expressing personal opinions, you're not being professional in my view." - 
Respondent S9 
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In summary, the responses to Part A suggest that the backbone of the criminal defence 
lawyer's role, when deciding on whether to accept clients and when dealing with them 
generally, is to act as a detached professional. 
 
Part B produced a wider range of responses than Part A.  Part B focused on the trial 
stage of 'W's case, specifically the cross-examination of the complainant, 'Y'.  After 
contemplating the potential for conflict when questioning a 13 year old girl, a few 
respondents seemed reasonably certain that their obligation to remain detached would 
outweigh any duty to protect the complainant.  When asked whether he might refrain 
from pursuing delicate or sensitive issues with 'Y', one respondent said, "[w]ell, she 
might not want you to put those questions to her, but so what?" (Respondent B2).  
Another respondent (Respondent B3) said she "wouldn't be concerned about ['Y']" in 
such a situation.  Some respondents recognised the potential drawbacks of an aggressive 
approach, but ultimately conceded that one had to detach from this.  One respondent 
said, "I think it's undesirable to use those tactics . . . but sometimes it is necessary" 
(Respondent A3), while another stated, "[h]owever apparently unpalatable, sometimes it 
has to be done" (Respondent B2).  One respondent did not believe that a tough cross-
examination "necessarily amounts to a lack of respect for the witness" and summarised 
the approach a defence lawyer adopts as "nasty things put nicely" (Respondent A2). 
 
Other respondents were more cautious in their approach to Part B, although few seemed 
to overtly express any overriding obligation to morality.  One respondent said: 
 
"[T]he first [thing] you have to take into account is the fact this is a 13 year old 
girl . . . and therefore you have to treat her very carefully; not only morally 
should you treat a 13 year old very carefully but legally you have to." - 
Respondent S8 
 
This statement implies that a more restrained and delicate approach than described 
above is required.  Further, this response suggests that to do so is a moral obligation.  
However, the same respondent added that, whilst taking a careful approach, "you have 
to put, as robustly as you can, your client's version of events to her" (Respondent S8).  
This response summarises the general consensus.  Most respondents seemed to 
recognise a degree of moral obligation, but that the situation was "a balancing exercise" 
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(Respondent S1) between a detached and thorough cross-examination and exhibiting 
"care and consideration of the fact that ['Y'] is a child" (Respondent S6).  Some took a 
similar approach, but for different reasons – namely, that respectful treatment of 'Y' 
could be more advantageous to the client than undertaking a ruthless grilling in front of 
a jury: 
 
"You'll be weighing up the . . . damage it may do to ['W's] cause for you to attack 
a witness who's 13 years old, who's got the protection of the court and the 
sympathy of the jury [by] accusing her of lying; but . . . that may be a justifiable 
risk to take." - Respondent B2 
 
This response makes the point that 'Y' has the protection of the court, perhaps 
suggesting that this is not part of the defence lawyer's role.  However, exercising care 
and restraint with the complainant may be a more tactically sensible approach.  Rather 
than representing fulfilment of any moral duties, "it just happens to be convenient . . . to 
treat her in that way and it happens to be kinder as well" (Respondent S3).  In a sense, 
Respondent B2's statement above is the consummate example of detachment.  It 
recognises the vulnerabilities of 'Y' and the risks attached to any attack on her character.  
However, the overriding drive behind the respondent's approach is the benefit to the 
client.  The defence lawyer remains detached from the moral whys and wherefores, and 
makes a decision based on the requirements of his or her client. 
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5. Partisanship v. Procedural Justice and Truth-Seeking 
 
Scenario D: 
 
PART A: 'Your client, F, has been charged with driving whilst under the 
influence of alcohol.  She was pulled over by a Police Officer who breathalysed 
and arrested her.  She provided a breath sample using an Intoximeter at the 
Police Station, which gave a reading of 50 microgrammes – 15 microgrammes 
over the limit.  This entitled her to choose to replace her breath sample with a 
blood or urine sample.  However, contrary to procedure, an officer said that she 
must give a blood or urine sample, and she complied.  Her samples confirmed 
she was over the limit and she was charged.  She tells you she "was at the pub 
but didn't drink anything" and on her instructions, you enter a plea of not guilty. ' 
 
PART B: 'The trial begins; the arresting officer gives evidence that on arrest F 
claimed she'd "only had one drink".  In a brief break, F admits to you that she 
may have drunk alcohol at the pub but had just forgotten.  In addition to this, the 
officer who operated the Intoximeter fails to confirm that it was working 
reliably, as is required.  The prosecution case is drawing to a close. ' 
 
The final scenario attempted to draw out tensions between the principle of partisanship 
and the principles of procedural justice and truth-seeking – the major conflict point 
between the defence lawyer's concurrent duties to serve the client and the court.  Again, 
the scenario was split into two parts to deal with different aspects of the conflict.  Part A 
deals with pre-trial issues of disclosure and tactics.  The information that the police have 
made a procedural error could be advantageous to the client's cause.  If the prosecution 
and police discovered this mistake, there is the possibility that they could remedy it or 
otherwise alter their strategy (or even the charge) to counter any 'technical defence' 
offered by the client.  A partisan defence lawyer might feel obliged to keep silent about 
such information in order to make the most of the error.  In contrast, the principle of 
procedural justice expects the defence lawyer to facilitate speedy and efficient justice.
983
  
Withholding potentially useful information and employing secretive tactics could 
                                                 
983
 All parties, including the defence, are expected to aid in “dealing with the case efficiently and 
expeditiously” (Rule 1.1(2)(e) - Criminal Procedure Rules 2010, 2010/60). 
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arguably contravene this obligation.
984
  The principle of truth-seeking also expects the 
defence lawyer to help convict the guilty
985
 and to highlight errors the prosecution may 
have made.
986
  Keeping quiet about this flaw in the prosecution case as well as making 
use of this technicality to help 'F', who was clearly very drunk at the time of arrest, 
might be viewed as contrary to these duties.  Part B presents similar issues during the 
trial.  The change in 'F's story might be considered very relevant to the court in 
determining a verdict.  The principle of partisanship would probably compel the defence 
lawyer to remain silent about the admission,
987
 and continue to plead not guilty but on 
more limited grounds.
988
  It could be argued again that the principle of truth-seeking 
would expect the defence lawyer to help convict the guilty, by either revealing this 
evidence or by withdrawing.  The omission by the police officer regarding the 
functionality of the intoximeter is another technical flaw.  Therefore, a potential conflict 
again arises between the principle of partisanship, which might encourage a tactical 
'ambush' of the prosecution,
989
 and the principle of procedural justice, which prohibits 
this.
990
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 All parties have a duty to "at once inform the court and all parties of any significant failure (whether or 
not that participant is responsible for that failure) to take any procedural step required by these Rules . . . 
A failure is significant if it might hinder the court in furthering the overriding objective” (Rule 1.2(1)(c) - 
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Conduct – Bar Standards Board, 
http://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/standardsandguidance/codeofconduct/: Last accessed 16/08/2010. 
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 In DPP v. Hughes [2003] EWHC 2470, the court stated that “ambushes . . . are to be discouraged and 
discountenanced.” 
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Part A provoked a variety of responses.  One respondent seemed to consider 'F's case 
unwinnable, and suggested that pursuing it would create unnecessary work for the court 
and undermine the search for the truth: 
 
"This sounds like a 'take the money and run' kind of case . . . I suppose your 
obligations would be to tell the client that she doesn't have a hope in hell of 
winning her case, she will be convicted and if she wants to pay you to . . . put 
forward some kind of not guilty case, then firstly she's . . . wasting her money 
and secondly . . . you don't really wanna do it because . . . you [have] some kind 
of reputation with the court for not taking the piss." - Respondent A2 
 
However, other respondents took a different view.  One respondent was of the opinion 
that if 'F' wanted a not guilty case run, that was her choice: 
 
"I make sure that at no stage are [clients] pressured to plead guilty on anything.  
It is always their decision . . . it's not for us to pressure, it's not for us to persuade 
. . . I think professionally it is dangerous." - Respondent S9 
 
Another respondent did not believe he could deny 'F' her day in court if that was her 
desire, saying, "I have an obligation to tell ['F'] that in fact she may have a technical 
defence, even if she doesn't have a defence of any particular merit in terms of . . . the 
reality of what happened that night" (Respondent S4).  He later recalled a similar, real-
life experience to support his conclusion, stating, "It was obvious that [the client] was 
completely drunk, but you can't not tell him that he has a defence.  So, in this scenario, I 
can't not tell her . . . whether or not she has a defence" (Respondent S4).  Similarly, 
other respondents were not deterred from pursuing a not guilty case using a technical 
defence as opposed to a 'substantive' defence.  One respondent, when asked if he would 
employ such a tactic to secure an acquittal said, "[e]very single time, yes.  I think that's 
part of our job; I mean that's what the client, or the state, pays us for . . . it's what 
lawyers have done for hundreds of years" (Respondent S8).  Another respondent added: 
 
"From the client's perspective and from my perspective, if there is a loophole to 
which we're entitled, then we're entitled to seek to avoid a conviction by means 
of that loophole." - Respondent B2 
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Where the duty to truth-seek would expect a defence to be based on issues of ‘particular 
merit’ (primarily, whether 'F' was drunk when driving), this client-oriented approach 
focuses on using any advantage to further 'F's defence, even if it does ‘take the piss’. 
 
Part A also produced an array of responses to the potential conflict between partisanship 
and procedural justice, in the context of disclosure of defences and tactics.  If the 
defence lawyer were obliged to reveal the procedural flaw and the resultant defence, 
then the prosecution and police might act to nullify any advantage the defence could 
receive.  A few respondents did not think they would necessarily be obliged to disclose 
such information.  One said, "[y]ou're not under an obligation to . . . put all of 'F's 
instructions to the court if you don't think it assists her case" (Respondent A2), while 
another stated, "[i]t's not for the defence to assist the prosecution in completing their 
case anymore than it would be the prosecution's job to suggest what defences the 
defence might run" (Respondent A1).  However, other respondents suggested that this 
was no longer the case: 
 
"It used to be that you could turn up on the day of trial and go 'Aha!  You haven't 
noticed this, this and this!', but these days you would have to say . . . it's a 
procedural defence based on the police's incorrect completion of the relevant 
forms." - Respondent S7 
 
Some conceded that whilst they would prefer to play their cards close to their chests, 
maintaining secrecy in this scenario would probably be difficult: 
 
"I would be desperately checking the Criminal Procedure Rules to see what my 
obligation is.  My inclination is to remain silent, but I am not sure that that's the 
right thing to do under the new regimes . . ." - Respondent S2 
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He continued: 
 
"It creates a feeling for me of real discomfort having to reveal what the issues 
are and a lack of knowledge by other professional parties causes problems.  I 
have a court clerk . . . who will repeatedly tell me that clients are no longer 
allowed to put the prosecution to proof, which is simply not correct."
991
 - 
Respondent S2 
 
Another respondent also described this almost embattled state of existence for criminal 
defence lawyers: 
 
"I think you're being made, when you're defending, to give the prosecution far 
more information about your case and I think that in some ways waters down the 
basic rule that the prosecution must prove it.  I think you're being made to help 
them or at least flag up the problems in their case, which I don't think . . . should 
be the role of the defence." - Respondent B3 
 
It would thus seem that some respondents considered the principle of procedural justice, 
with its obligations of disclosure and cooperation in facilitating justice, to be a negative 
but undoubted influence on the role of the defence lawyer.  However, whilst agreeing 
that they would probably be obliged to share information with the prosecution and 
court, several other respondents viewed revelation as a positive step which would 
benefit (or at least not disadvantage) the client.  One respondent said: 
 
"[If] you've got a winning legal point, then you'd raise that at the start . . . I 
would say that you've got an obligation to your client in any event . . . if you can 
kick it out before it starts, to do so." - Respondent B3
992
 
 
Other respondents concurred that dealing promptly and openly with the issue of a 
procedural flaw would be ideal.  One respondent said, "I certainly wouldn't sit on it if it 
was something that I could do before the trial, instead of going 'Ta-da! Here's out 
surprise" (Respondent A3), while another explained, "I don't think in this country we 
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 The dispute about the validity of "putting the prosecution to proof" is also relevant to Part B; it should 
be considered as a response to that aspect of this scenario also. 
992
 It should be noted that Respondent B3 appears to have made contradictory statements.  However, one 
might consider the first quotation above to be more of a general comment on the role of the defence 
lawyer, while the latter quotation deals directly with the conflict in Scenario D.  
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really believe in producing rabbits from hats . . . you would be telling the prosecution 
that you have that rabbit" (Respondent A2). 
 
Interestingly, one respondent characterised sharing such information with the court as 
fulfilling both the principle of partisanship and the principle of procedural justice.  
Considering the procedural error in Part A, she stated: 
 
"They can't rectify that after the event, can they?  It's not like they can go and 
take another statement from somebody or change the charge or anything like that 
. . . it would be in your client's interests to raise it at an early stage if it's a real 
technical knockout point." - Respondent B3
993
 
 
Furthermore, she also suggested that to do so discharged the obligations owed to the 
court, and in fact circumvented any conflict between partisanship and procedural 
justice: 
 
"I think if you've got . . . proper legal argument which effects for example the 
fact of the case carrying on at all or legal argument to admissibility of evidence . 
. . then I think, yeah, you probably do have an obligation to the court which isn't 
necessarily contrary to your obligation to the client." - Respondent B3 
 
Part B raised similar issues.  One potential point of contention was 'F's admission that 
she had drunk alcohol on the night she was arrested and although this was not a 
confession of guilt, it clearly represented a drastic change in the substance of her 
testimony.  The key question was whether defence lawyers felt compelled to reveal this 
important but disadvantageous evidence, as the principle of truth-seeking might expect, 
or whether to ignore it and continue to put the prosecution to proof, as the principle of 
partisanship might require.  The respondents were clear about what they could not do 
for 'F'.  One said, "I can't make things up for her" (Respondent S2) and another stated, 
"[w]e can't be party to the putting forward of any information which we have been told 
by [the client] is not the truth" (Respondent S3).  Clearly, continuing to claim that 'F' 
had not consumed alcohol was thus out of the question; but would a defence lawyer 
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 Contrary to Respondent B3's answer, the prosecution could arguably change the charge.  In R v. 
Gleeson [2004] 1 Cr. App. R. 29, the defence remained silent about a flaw in the prosecution's case on a 
charge of common law conspiracy.  The court allowed the prosecution to add a charge of statutory 
conspiracy instead. 
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have to reveal such information to the court?   
 
One respondent did not seem to believe there was an obligation to share the admission 
with the court: 
 
"I don't think you would have any difficulty proceeding as before . . . ['F'] does 
have the right not to give live evidence and they could draw any inferences they 
wanted from that . . . you're putting the prosecution to proof.  There's no 
obligation that she's got to give evidence or to put over that information to 
them." - Respondent S3 
 
Similarly, another respondent said, "you can't mislead the court but I don't think you 
have a duty to reveal your instructions . . . even if she has made a full admission . . . as 
long as you're not putting the case that she hasn't had a drink at all, then you can still 
test the prosecution case" (Respondent A1).  One respondent suggested that it would 
only become necessary to reveal the admission by 'F' if she were asked directly, saying, 
"I don't need to tell anybody; she needs to tell somebody if she gives evidence and that's 
it really" (Respondent S6).   
 
However, one respondent did not seem to think the client's admission could simply be 
swept under the carpet, believing he had a responsibility to correct any misapprehension 
the court may have about 'F's sobriety: 
 
"I would be placed in a position where I had misled the court by putting a case 
that wasn't actually accurate and unless I put that right, the court would be 
misled throughout the proceedings, whatever I did.  So, I would want to put that 
right." - Respondent B4 
 
The other issue in Part B concerned the police officer's evidential omission.  This raised 
the question of whether a defence lawyer should remain silent about it and ambush the 
prosecution at an advantageous juncture, or whether to highlight the mistake and help 
them present a fuller case. Several respondents seemed adamant that they would not be 
obliged to correct prosecution errors.   
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One respondent stated: 
 
"I don’t see it as a criminal defence solicitor’s obligation to make sure that the 
prosecution complete their case, particularly if that’s acting against the interests 
of your client." - Respondent S3 
 
Others held similar convictions.  One said, "you've got no obligation to draw it out 
yourself, you're not prosecuting it . . . it is after all an adversarial process" (Respondent 
B3), while another did not believe that a defence lawyer would be "under any duty at 
that stage to go to the prosecution and say 'oh, by the way, you've got a hole in your case 
possibly" (Respondent S8).  Even though several respondents favoured remaining silent 
about the police officer's mistake, virtually none suggested that they would use the error 
to ambush the prosecution at a later stage.  One respondent insinuated that he might do, 
saying, "I think that is something that if we can exploit it, we should" (Respondent S8).  
However, the majority of responses characterised an ambush as pointless, self-defeating 
or undesirable.  One respondent summarised, in sceptical terms, the likelihood such a 
tactic would succeed: 
 
"It's playing games and a game that you can't actually win because somebody at 
some point is gonna pick up on it . . . It helps much more if you are perceived to 
be somebody who is straightforward and honest, and not have a reputation for 
pulling a fast one because it won't help in the long run.  Now obviously, that isn't 
something that should override your helping the client in this particular situation, 
but I can't see how, even if you keep your mouth shut, that's gonna result in you 
winning that case." - Respondent S7 
 
Other respondents agreed, concluding that attempting an ambush would probably 
damage 'F's case, rather than advance it: 
 
"I could understand why the court would be critical if you left it to the last 
minute to do it . . . I think it would benefit everyone to sort it out earlier rather 
than later." - Respondent B3 
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Another respondent suggested that the court would consider an ambush a defence 
diversion, designed to help the client escape justice: 
 
"It may be that by keeping your powder dry, it looks to the court as if your 
client's amending her case to try  . . . to introduce new issues." - Respondent B2 
 
Two other respondents simply said that they would, effectively, ignore the omission and 
that they were not compelled to reveal or exploit the point.  One respondent claimed, 
"[i]f you're not taking advantage of it, you don't need to correct it, do you?  It goes 
unsaid" (Respondent S6), while another explained: 
   
"[I]t doesn't necessarily look good in court to positively jump up and say 'the 
prosecution have forgotten to do this, let me help you cure the prosecution case'; 
but equally you can know that there's no point in raising it because even if you 
did raise it they would just be allowed to cure the problem - so it is neither here 
nor there really." - Respondent S4 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The respondents’ approached resolution of the conflict points in a variety of ways.  
Some seemed to staunchly place the interests of the client before all other obligations, 
while many recognised that they needed to work within a strict and extensive 
framework of duties owed to the court.  The most certain conclusion one can initially 
draw is that the respondents did not provide a set of identical, uniform answers.  This 
could suggest that uncertainty exists about how to deal with conflicts of duty in practice, 
insinuating that what formal regulation says and what happens may be different 
concepts.  However, these are initial observations about the diverse range of opinions 
offered and it should be remembered that this study comprised only a small sample of 
the criminal defence profession.  It should also be remembered that, despite the benefits 
of the vignette technique discussed in Chapter 5, the respondents were invited to engage 
with a simulation of conflict.  Their interpretation of the information provided could 
have varied, producing a wide range of conclusions.  These caveats, and the other issues 
discussed in Chapter 5, should be borne in mind when assessing the value of these 
findings.  Chapter 8 will now return to the research questions identified in Chapter 1, 
drawing more specific and detailed conclusions about the overall findings of this thesis.  
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Finally, I will discuss the implications of my conclusions for both adversarial culture in 
general and the future of theorising the criminal defence lawyer’s role. 
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CHAPTER 8 – The ‘Zealous Advocate’:  A 21st Century Conception? 
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1. Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to draw together the findings of every part of this thesis and 
adequately answer the research questions identified in Chapter 1.  The research 
questions read as follows: 
 
The overarching question: 
 
What is the role of the criminal defence lawyer in the modern era? 
 
The three guiding research questions and their sub-questions: 
 
1.  Is there a coherent 'theoretical' conception of the role of the adversarial criminal 
defence lawyer? 
 
- In relation to this question, I intend to explore three issues: why one should look 
at 'theoretical' conceptions of the adversarial of the role; where one looks for 
'theoretical' conceptions of the role; and what principles define any coherent 
'theoretical' conception of the role.   
  
2. Does any coherent 'theoretical' conception constitute a useful and relevant 
reflection of the role of the modern practitioner? 
 
- In relation to this question, I intend to explore six issues: what 'formal' 
conceptions of the role exist in England and Wales; how do 'formal' conceptions 
compare with any 'theoretical' conception of the role; do 'conflict points' exist 
within 'theoretical' and 'formal' conceptions of the role; are any 'conflict points' 
resolved by regulation in England and Wales; what 'practical' conceptions of the 
role exist in England and Wales; and how, if at all, do practitioners resolve any 
'conflict points' in their everyday role.   
 
3. What implications do my findings have for any 'theoretical' conception of the 
role? 
 
- In relation to this question, I will consider what the future of theorizing the 
 265 
criminal defence lawyer’s role and explore what implications my findings have 
for the wider adversarial tradition in England and Wales. 
 
Each research question, and its relevant sub-questions, will be addressed in turn.  First, I 
would like to draw some conclusions about the empirical methodology used in this 
thesis. 
 
2. Lawyers and the Vignette Method 
 
The use of the ‘vignette technique’ coupled with traditional, open-ended qualitative 
questioning was novel.  Vignettes have been used many times in various social science 
disciplines, but have had limited application in legal research.
994
  Vignettes have, as far 
as I am aware, never been used in qualitative research with lawyers generally or defence 
lawyers specifically.  Thus, adopting this method for my empirical study was, to some 
extent, a leap into the unknown.  However, I found that the vignettes produced an 
abundance of rich, varied and relevant material.  Respondents happily engaged with the 
scenarios presented to them.  Virtually none asked for more information about the 
situations presented, suggesting that the scenarios were not too vague.  Equally, the 
respondents discussed several possible courses of action or outcomes within each 
scenario, suggesting that none were too restrictive.  All the respondents tended to 
answer in terms both specific to the scenario (for example, referring to characters) and 
in the abstract (for example, discussing their duties generally).  Although several 
respondents paraphrased formal regulation, nearly all questioned and discussed the 
practical application of their formal duties.  Part of the rationale for using the vignettes 
was to produce honest answers reflecting real-life practice and the responses received 
indicate that the vignette technique, to some extent, achieved this.  Most of the 
respondents recognised the conflicts presented in the vignettes without being directed or 
prompted, and regularly referred to elements of the six principles which I have argued 
constitutes the role.    
 
As with any empirical study, there is also scope for criticism of the approach adopted.  
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Some of the respondents interviewed either had limited or no experience of the 
situations presented.  For example, the accredited representatives interviewed had little 
advocacy experience compared to barristers.  However, it should be highlighted that the 
specific situation presented was not crucial; what I wanted respondents to identify and 
engage with were the core duties owed by defence lawyers and the resolution of 
conflicts between them.  None suggested that they had not encountered ethical conflicts, 
and none believed that they were not in a position to address the issues raised.  An 
inevitable criticism of this empirical study is its size.  Obviously, the limited sample and 
imbalance in the types of lawyer interviewed must be borne in mind in assessing the 
validity of the findings.  However, as I have stated previously, this study was intended 
to provide an insight into the working role of defence lawyers.  The wealth of material 
gathered suggests that this study is a good example of quality over quantity.  Overall, I 
felt that the vignette technique, integrated with wider, open-ended questioning, was a 
very worthwhile, effective and simple method to adopt.  I genuinely believe it brought 
realism to the interviews.  Placing the respondents in a hypothetical scenario helped 
them engage in a practical way with the issues raised and allowed them to express their 
thoughts quite freely.  On a pragmatic level, it was a useful method for maintaining the 
interest and engagement of the respondents, who might otherwise have become bored 
with repeated questioning. 
 
3. Is There a Coherent 'Theoretical' Conception of the Role of the Criminal 
Defence Lawyer? 
 
The first and second sub-questions, outlined above, were dealt with in detail in Chapter 
1, and therefore here I consider the third sub-question - What principles define any 
'theoretical' conception of the role? 
 
The answer to this question has arguably been the spine of this thesis.  I have argued 
that the ‘zealous advocate’ model constructed in Chapter 2 represents a coherent, 
justifiable and accurate description of the traditional, ideal conception of the role of the 
criminal defence lawyer acting in an adversarial context.  The umbrella duties to the 
client, the court and the public have characterised the role for nearly three centuries.  
From the very beginning, the first of these duties has remained a constant element of the 
role.  Brougham's statement that the defence lawyer should work to "save [the] client by 
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all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons"
995
 is echoed 
today in the comments of former Law Lord, Tom Bingham: 
 
"Scarcely less important than an independent judiciary is an independent legal 
profession, fearless in its representation of those who cannot represent 
themselves, however unpopular or distasteful their case may be."
996
 
 
Despite this, the defence lawyer has always been part of a system of justice designed to 
fairly and consistently seek the correct determination of criminal accusations for the 
good of the public.  In owing "all due fidelity to the court as well as the client",
997
 the 
defence lawyer has always had procedural duties and moral obligations.  Theoretical 
literature describes the defence lawyer as "an officer of the law . . . with the duty of 
aiding in the administration of justice"
998
 and who "has important responsibilities to the 
court",
999
 and it discusses the important duty to "reconcile the interests he is bound to 
maintain . . . with the eternal and immutable interests of truth and justice."
1000
 
 
The ‘zealous advocate’ model, based on a wide range of diverse academic discourse, 
attempted to bring together the three umbrella duties and express them as part of a 
single, coherent and comprehensive conceptual model.  I have argued that this model 
consists of six principles, which describe the professional obligations of defence 
lawyers under the three umbrella duties.  The duty to the client is characterised by the 
principles of partisanship, detachment and confidentiality; the duty to the court is 
characterised by the principles of procedural justice and truth-seeking; and the duty to 
the public is characterised by the principle of morality.  These theoretical principles, and 
their academic grounding, were discussed at length in Chapter 2 and as such, it is 
unnecessary to repeat the definitions and sources here.  However, in reaching a 
conclusive answer to the third sub-question, and consequently the first research 
question, it would be informative to critique the theoretical model as a whole and 
comment on the relative robustness of its principles.  All of the above principles were 
constructed after an extensive, ongoing review of the academic literature relating to the 
role of criminal defence lawyers and lawyers generally.  The latter point is important. 
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Several of these principles, to an extent, apply to lawyers engaged in other legal 
disciplines; thus, some of the literature simply implies that these are obligations owed 
by criminal defence lawyers.  However, this does not, materially, affect the validity of 
the ‘zealous advocate’ model – after all, criminal defence lawyers are included in these 
more general discussions and when such principles are considered in the context of 
criminal defence, their applicability is obvious.  Furthermore, the majority of literature 
considered whilst constructing the model focused on criminal defence, and in reading 
such articles the importance of these particular principles was apparent. 
 
Some of the principles could be described as being more robust than others.  A robust 
principle could be broadly classified as one which has a consistent presence in academic 
literature, is described as a positive theoretical obligation and features in discourse 
across a significant chronological period.  All of the principles described in Chapter 2 
exhibited the above characteristics to some extent.  However, the ‘zealous advocate’ 
model attempts to describe as wide a range of potential obligations as possible, some 
with more robust academic roots than others.  The principles of partisanship, 
detachment and confidentiality have, since the early days of criminal defence, been 
consistently raised in academic discussion, and are regularly asserted as core duties 
owed by the defence lawyer.  Similarly, elements of the principle of truth-seeking, most 
notably the prohibition of lying to the court, have long represented unquestionable 
obligations.  The principle of procedural justice has featured in descriptions of the role 
since the 19
th
 Century, but some aspects of the principle, like disclosure and procedural 
integrity, have taken on increasing theoretical importance in the last three decades.  
Thus, the principle has, in an academic sense, developed considerably in recent times.  
As such, the principle of procedural justice is perhaps less theoretically robust than 
others.  Similarly, the principle of morality, whilst undoubtedly present in theoretical 
discourse, was arguably a stronger element of the role in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
Centuries.  Modern descriptions of the role involving moral obligations are arguably 
less common than, for example, those discussing partisanship or confidentiality.  
However, it is certain that all of the principles describe, to some extent, the ‘zealous 
advocate’ conception of the role in a clear, thorough and comprehensive way.  
Therefore, bearing in mind the caveat detailed in this paragraph, I would argue that the 
‘zealous advocate’ model sufficiently answers the first research question – it is possible 
to identify a coherent ‘theoretical’ conception of the role of the adversarial criminal 
defence lawyer. 
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4. Is the ‘Zealous Advocate’ Model Useful and Relevant to Modern Practice? 
 
Answering the above required me to address two questions:  what is the role of the 
modern criminal defence practitioner and to what extent, if at all, does the ‘zealous 
advocate’ model reflect this?  As stated in Chapter 1, and reiterated above, I pursued six 
main issues in order to answer these questions: 
 
What 'formal' conceptions of the role exist in England and Wales; how do 'formal' 
conceptions compare with any 'theoretical' conception of the role; do 'conflict points' 
exist within 'theoretical' and 'formal' conceptions of the role; are any 'conflict points' 
resolved by regulation in England and Wales; what 'practical' conceptions of the role 
exist in England and Wales; and how, if at all, do practitioners resolve any 'conflict 
points' in their everyday role.   
 
4.1 Do Formal Conceptions Reflect the ‘Zealous Advocate’ Model? 
 
Chapter 3 outlined formal conceptions of the defence lawyer’s role, using the ‘zealous 
advocate’ model as a guiding structure.  I examined how formal regulation defined the 
role and assessed how closely such definition reflected the theoretical model discussed 
in Chapter 2.  The theoretical principle of partisanship requires defence lawyers to 
fearlessly and vigorously protect and advance the client’s cause, at any cost to other 
parties.  Although formal conceptions of the principle share this client-orientated 
approach, the language used to describe the obligation is much more restrained.  Formal 
regulation seems to require, primarily, that defence lawyers act in the legitimate best 
interests of their client, by advancing their legal rights.  Any actions must be proper, 
lawful and, in terms of exploiting prosecution errors, ‘just’.  The most robust references 
to the principle of partisanship are contained in some codes of conduct, older case law 
and authoritative guidance manuals.  In general, reference to the principle is 
characterised by vague and conservative language.  Whilst ‘fearless’ summarises the 
nature of the theoretical obligation, ‘best interests’ is perhaps a better summary of 
formal conceptions of the principle.  The CPR, which have had a crucial impact on 
criminal defence, make absolutely no reference to the principle of partisanship.  Formal 
conceptions of partisanship appear to be more highly regulated than the theoretical 
conception.   
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Legislation, case law and conduct rules have curtailed several traditional elements of 
criminal defence work.  The use of ambushes or delaying tactics, the exploitation of 
errors and loopholes, and aggressive cross-examination of witnesses have either been 
eliminated or restricted to very specific circumstances.  The somewhat ambiguous and 
often arbitrary concepts of ‘proper conduct’ and ‘justice’ have also emerged as powerful 
influences on how far a defence lawyer can go in fulfilling the obligation to be a 
partisan defender.  Furthermore, defence lawyers are sent mixed messages about the 
principle of partisanship.  In police stations, a solicitor’s "only role is to advance their 
clients legal rights".
1001
  In court, they are expected to be ‘fearless’ according to some 
standards, yet ‘act in the best interests’ of a defendant according to others.  This is not 
simply semantic nit-picking; the importance, and difference between, the meaning of 
these obligations should not be underestimated.  In the light of Lord Auld’s reference to 
"legitimate best interests" in R v. Gleeson, one has to wonder whether promoting the 
‘legitimate best interests’ of a client and protecting them ‘fearlessly’ are the same thing. 
 
It could be concluded that formal conceptions reflect the concept of ‘mere-zeal’ 
proposed by Tim Dare.
1002
  The “merely-zealous lawyer”1003 seeks to secure the client’s 
legal rights and nothing beyond that.  Considering the emphasis formal conceptions of 
the principle of partisanship place on promoting the ‘legitimate best interests’ and legal 
rights of the defendant, one could conclude that the formal framework regulating the 
defence lawyer’s modern role has more in common with ‘mere-zeal’ than theoretical 
notions of partisanship.  In summary, formal conceptions of the principle of partisanship 
seem to be typified by more moderate and cooperative obligations.  Under the ‘zealous 
advocate’ model, partisanship is undoubtedly the foremost aspect of the defence 
lawyer’s role, taking primacy over most other obligations.  In contrast, the principle is 
less prominent in formal regulation.  It remains an essential and central part of modern 
criminal defence, but is now symbolised by deference to the court and to justice, a less 
combative approach to opponents, and arguably a more paternal relationship with 
clients, where a defendant’s blind desire to escape conviction at all costs may not 
necessarily guide the defence lawyer’s work. 
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The principle of detachment is arguably as robust in formal conceptions of the role as it 
is under the ‘zealous advocate’ framework.  Legislation appears to prohibit defence 
lawyers from rejecting clients because the nature of an allegation or the character of a 
client is personally objectionable to him or her.
1004
  Other regulation, particularly case 
law and codes of conduct, make it clear that defence lawyers cannot pick and choose 
their clients, and must accept unpopular or unmeritorious causes.  Further, the personal 
views of the defence lawyer have no place in the decision-making process or advisory 
function of defence lawyers.  It is, however, worth noting that criminal defence 
solicitors are ‘generally free’ to choose clients, while the ‘cab-rank’ rule binding 
barristers contains exceptions, most notably related to fees.  Both of these issues can be 
attributed to the idiosyncrasy of the English and Welsh legal system and its divided 
legal profession.  However, as has been highlighted, the overriding principle applying to 
both types of lawyer, and accredited representatives, is that members of the public 
should not be denied representation on the basis that the case or the client are disliked 
by the lawyer or wider society.  The rather non-committal suggestion that solicitors are 
‘generally free’ to choose clients is not fatal to the applicability of the principle of 
detachment, and the cab-rank rule is, in formal regulation, a leading example of 
detachment and neutrality, despite the practical flaws it might have.  I would therefore 
conclude that formal conceptions of detachment, when regarded as a whole, very 
closely reflect the principle as conceived in the theoretical ‘zealous advocate’ model. 
 
Like the principle of detachment, confidentiality appears to remain a fundamental, and 
mostly unchallenged, aspect of formal conceptions of the role.  Legal Professional 
Privilege is the primary manifestation of the duty, and represents a highly respected and 
overriding client-orientated obligation.  Defence lawyers remain bound by until it is 
waived by the defendant, and courts cannot compel defence lawyers to breach it, even if 
it means "cases may sometimes have to be decided in ignorance of relevant probative 
material."
1005
  Like the theoretical conception, the principle is not absolute, with 
exceptions primarily in cases of iniquity.  Alongside legal professional privilege, 
defence lawyers are bound by general confidentiality rules contained in codes of 
conduct.  These cover a wider range of material than privilege, but have arguably been 
eroded by increasingly burdensome disclosure obligations in legislation such as the 
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and the CPR.  As such, one could 
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conclude that although the core principle of confidentiality remains intact in formal 
conceptions of the role, the extent to which it can apply has been limited by encroaching 
duties to reveal information to the prosecution and court. 
 
Formal conceptions of the principle of procedural justice are arguably much more 
extensive than under the ‘zealous advocate’ model.  Like the theoretical conception, 
formal regulation expects defence lawyers, as ‘officers of the court’, to uphold the 
interests and administration of justice.  The theoretical principle of procedural justice 
requires defence lawyers to "keep clients law-compliant"
1006
 and work within "the 
framework of the prescribed rules".
1007
  In addition, theoretical discourse suggests that 
as an officer of the court the defence lawyer should reduce delay and refrain from using 
tactics that "den[y] fundamental principles of fairness",
1008
 such as ambushes.  Formal 
conceptions of the principle of procedural justice arguably go much further.  To begin 
with, defence disclosure requirements are now more far-reaching than ever before.  The 
expectation that defence lawyers will reveal information about their case in order to 
facilitate the justice process is a strong one.  This is embodied in the defence statement, 
provided for in the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, and evident in the 
requirements the CPR.  Formal regulation now demands that defence lawyers share the 
nature of their client’s defence, any authorities they wish to rely on, and any witnesses 
they wish to call.
1009
  Furthermore, failure to reveal required information (for example, 
by omission from the defence statement or by maintaining silence at the police station) 
can lead to negative inferences being drawn against the defendant. 
 
The CPR and policies such as CJSSS arguably extend the defence lawyer’s case 
management duties beyond the general theoretical obligation to facilitate the 
administration of justice.  The obligations owed by the defence lawyer are now much 
more specific, highly regulated and compulsory.  Defence lawyers must help identify 
the "real issues", must participate in "discouraging delay" and "co-operate in the 
progression of the case".
1010
  Although criticised by some academics, the theoretical 
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principle of procedural justice did not explicitly prohibit ambush defences.  Again, 
formal conceptions of the role contrast.  The case of R v. Gleeson,
1011
 amongst several 
others, makes it clear that utilising prosecution or court errors for tactical advantage is 
no longer acceptable; thus, the principle of procedural justice requires that defence 
lawyers refrain from exploiting such loopholes.  Coupled with formal conceptions of the 
principle of truth-seeking (which arguably requires defence lawyers to ‘cure’ mistakes 
in their opponents case), it is clear that the defence lawyer has a much more court-
orientated role than the ‘zealous advocate’ model depicts.  However, both the theoretical 
and formal conceptions of procedural justice have, at their heart, the principle that the 
defence lawyer should promote a fair procedure and play by the rules.  The robustness 
of procedural justice in formal regulation can be attributed to the increased body of rules 
governing criminal procedure.  Extensive and detailed legislative and jurisprudential 
obligations have replaced broad and vague professional regulation as the primary source 
of guidance for defence lawyers’ duties to the court.  I would therefore argue that formal 
conceptions of the principle of procedural justice make it a much more prominent 
element of the defence role, and only partially reflects the theoretical conception. 
 
Some aspects of formal regulation are consistent with the theoretical conception of 
truth-seeking.  For example, lying for a client is prohibited, a rule that is evident in all 
formal regulation.  Both formal and theoretical conceptions require defence lawyers to 
participate in the process of acquitting the innocent and convicting the guilty.  This has 
somewhat vague implications for the role; however, where theory leaves such 
uncertainty unresolved, formal conceptions of truth-seeking are more clear and 
expansive.  The disclosure obligations discussed above not only fulfil the principle of 
procedural justice, but promote the principle of truth-seeking.  Defence disclosure is a 
quintessential example of truth-seeking, in that it reveals all relevant information for the 
court to assess, whether it damages or aids the defendant.  Formal regulation also 
requires the defence lawyer to draw the court’s attention to adverse legal authorities.  
Although this is identified by a minority of theorists as constituting a defence duty, it 
does not seem to represent prevailing theoretical opinion.  At best, sharing 
disadvantageous authorities with the court and prosecution symbolises an extreme of 
end of truth-seeking within the ‘zealous advocate’ model.  In contrast, formal 
conceptions of truth-seeking treat it as a basic duty of any defence lawyer. 
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Formal conceptions of the principle also expect defence lawyers to highlight any abuse 
of process, technical error or procedural flaw that may have been perpetrated by the 
prosecution, the court or indeed the defence.  The theoretical principle makes no 
reference to such a duty.  In fact, the theoretical principle of partisanship urges defence 
lawyers to take advantage of such opportunities.  Once again, formal regulation goes 
further than the ‘zealous advocate’ model.  In summary, it would be fair to say that to 
some extent formal conceptions of truth-seeking reflect the ‘zealous advocate’ model.  
However, in many ways formal regulation of the role goes beyond the basic idea that 
the defence lawyer should "pursue the process from which the truth emerges".
1012
  It 
specifies concrete, active obligations which the defence lawyer must discharge.  Formal 
regulation surrounding the modern criminal defence lawyer sends a fairly clear message 
– the principle of truth-seeking is a significant and central obligation which defence 
lawyers must comply with.  It also places greater emphasis on the court-orientated 
duties owed by the defence lawyer.  Thus, it can be said that formal conceptions of the 
principle of truth-seeking do reflect the theoretical principle in a sense, but certainly 
seem to extend the duties of the defender beyond the boundaries of the ‘zealous 
advocate’ model. 
 
Formal conceptions of the principle of morality are, at best, limited in scope.  
Regulation in the form of legislation, case law and codes of conduct require defence 
lawyers to respect witnesses, and avoid "defamatory aspersion[s]".
1013
  In essence, the 
defence lawyer cannot say anything to support a client’s cause.  The provisions of the 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 severely restrict the cross-examination of 
complainants about their sexual history, to ensure that vulnerable complainants are 
"treated with dignity in court and . . . given protection against cross-examination and 
evidence which invades . . . privacy unnecessarily and which subjects [a witness] to 
humiliating questioning and accusations which are irrelevant to the charge against the 
defendant."
1014
  This is a clear and robust obligation, requiring that defence lawyers 
avoid employing cynical, unethical and offensive tactical options.  Beyond this, the 
principle of morality has little presence in formal conceptions of the role.  Like much of 
the academic discourse on this area, some of the sources that shape formal conceptions 
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have a normative tone, urging change rather than imposing standards.  Mostly, formal 
regulation in this area relates to matters of civility and respect, rather than proactive 
moralising.  Of the few regulatory materials that infer a formal obligation of morality, 
none require defence lawyers to exercise a conscience in choosing, advising or 
defending their clients.  It could therefore be concluded that formal conceptions of the 
principle only vaguely reflect the ‘zealous advocate’ conception, and that the principle 
of morality should be considered an ideal rather than a formally regulated duty. 
 
4.2 Conflicts and Formal Conceptions 
 
The introductory section of Chapter 4 comprehensively identified and explored conflict 
points in the ‘zealous advocate’ model.  The remainder of that chapter reviewed the 
existence of such conflicts in formal conceptions of the defence lawyer's role, and 
pointed to a number of conflict points that seem to be unresolved by formal regulation.  
The conflict between the principle of confidentiality and the principles of procedural 
justice and truth-seeking is significant.  In terms of confidentiality and procedural 
justice, the major point of friction is defence disclosure.  The requirements of the 
defence statement and the CPR are extensive, and the boundary between confidential 
information and what information should be disclosed is unclear.  As was highlighted 
earlier, the ‘identification of the real issues’ is a primary obligation and the meaning of 
‘the real issues’ is not yet formally defined.  Regulation provides mixed and confusing 
guidance on such matters, in some instances insisting that defence lawyers cannot reveal 
information the court may require, yet stating elsewhere that case management 
provisions must be adhered to.  If the defence lawyer is unable to balance the duty to 
maintain confidentiality with the duties of disclosure, then he or she may be forced to 
withdraw.  This is hardly an adequate solution, helping neither the client nor the court.   
 
In terms of the clash between confidentiality and truth-seeking, there are some clear-cut 
resolutions.  For example, confidentiality cannot be used to suppress material that might 
facilitate criminal activity.  However, the balance is more difficult elsewhere, a 
particular example being a confession of guilt by the defendant.  Although the defence 
lawyer is forbidden from asserting a positive defence in such a situation, he or she is 
obliged by the principle of confidentiality to hide said confession.  If a defendant, after 
having made such a confession, insists on a positive defence, then again the defence 
lawyer must withdraw.  However, in doing so, the defence lawyer cannot reveal why he 
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or she is withdrawing.  This results in a very questionable situation; the defendant is left 
without representation, the court is left without any information, yet the actions of the 
lawyers clearly imply that the defendant has attempted to perpetrate some form of 
deception.  This does not seem to promote either confidentiality or truth-seeking, or 
equate with the stated purpose of achieving a "full and fair hearing".
1015
  Similar 
problems arise with the defendant’s non-attendance, or a fundamental change in 
instructions that fall short of a request to lie.  Therefore, various conflicts between 
confidentiality and the umbrella duty to the court remain unresolved and are, in some 
ways, farcical. 
 
The principles of partisanship and morality also appear to be blighted by unresolved 
friction, but perhaps less acute than some other conflict points.  The principle of 
morality, as was discussed above, has a very faint presence in formal conceptions of the 
defence lawyer’s role.  However, where it does place obligations upon the defence 
lawyer, it generates difficulties.  For example, the provisions of s.41 of the Youth Justice 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 created very strict ‘gateways’1016 which defence 
evidence must pass through in order to question witnesses about their sexual history.  
So, in a rape case or sexual assault case, a vulnerable victim may be shielded from 
humiliating or upsetting cross-examination about their past sexual activity.  This 
undoubtedly fits within the scope of the principle of morality, as an obligation (or more 
accurately, a bar) which compels defence lawyers to respect the interests of a 
prosecution witnesses.  In R v. A,
1017
 Lord Slynn highlighted that, "the accused is 
entitled to a fair trial and there is an obvious conflict between the interests of protecting 
the woman and of ensuring such fair trial."
1018
  As such, Lord Steyn concluded that the 
above provisions constituted “legislative overkill."1019   
                                                 
1015
 R v. Gleeson [2004] 1 Cr. App. R. 29, 416. 
1016
 Rook P. (2004) Restrictions on Evidence or Questions About the Complainant’s Sexual History – The 
Barrister Magazine Website, http://www.barristermagazine.com/articles/issue22/rook.htm: Last accessed 
27/07/2010. 
1017
 R v. A (No. 2) [2001] UKHL 25. 
1018
 Ibid., [5]. 
1019
 Ibid., [43]. 
 277 
Yet, even in the light of a more balanced application of the provisions, it seems that: 
 
"The strict requirements imposed by the legislation remain active, are 
consistently and rigorously applied by trial judges, and there has been no 
softening of the very tight regime regulating previous sexual history with people 
other than the defendant himself."
1020
 
 
Cases like R v. Beedall
1021
 add to the evidence that the balance between the defence 
lawyer’s obligation to thoroughly cross-examine a witness and the ethical requirements 
of the statute is a difficult one to strike.  Other than this particular issue, the obligations 
incumbent upon defence lawyers to respect victims and avoid scandalous or defamatory 
assertions do not necessarily conflict with the duty to be a partisan advocate.  However, 
to some extent, this conflict remains unresolved. 
 
The principle of detachment is, at a basic level, incompatible with any comprehensive 
set of duties to uphold moral standards.  However, as has been illustrated, formal 
conceptions of morality are limited and represent a fringe obligation.  The conflicts that 
do remain in formal regulation do raise questions.  For example, the duty of solicitors 
not to reject clients based on their cause or character clashes with the assertion that they 
are ‘generally free’ to choose who to represent.  This is a freedom which presumably 
allows solicitors to turn away persons accused of offences of an opprobrious nature or 
who possess dubious intentions.  These obligations are not only contradictory; they lack 
detailed advice as to when they may or may not be applicable.  For example, it might be 
questioned whether the seriousness of a case or the fee involved would be reasonable 
issues to take into account.  This conflict point is also affected by the provisions of s.41 
of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act.  Arguably, detachment is a necessary 
corollary of the zealous cross-examination of witness.  The inference of s.41 is that 
defence lawyers should not pursue issues that may be difficult for a vulnerable witness 
to cope with unless they are absolutely necessary.  In contrast, the principle of 
detachment would expect defence lawyers to ask difficult questions regardless of the 
consequences to others.  The latter requirement seemingly contradicts the obligation to 
‘respect’ witnesses.  As such, some elements of conflict exist in formal conceptions of 
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detachment and morality, particularly in relation to the boundary between neutral 
advocacy and respectful questioning. 
 
The final conflict point, between the principle of partisanship and the principles of 
procedural justice and truth-seeking, presents significant, ongoing difficulties.  Defence 
lawyers are, on the one hand, expected to follow their client’s instructions, to act in their 
client’s "best interests",1022 present to the court "a coherent and persuasive case"1023 and, 
when necessary, put the prosecution to proof.  On the other hand, they are expected to 
comply with rigorous disclosure obligations, help facilitate a fair, efficient and speedy 
process and be honest at all times.  The can create serious clashes.  For example, the 
former set of requirements might obligate the lawyer to secure the services of expert 
witnesses to test the prosecution case, or require a thorough examination of evidence, 
such as witness statements or CCTV footage.  These endeavours may take time.  Yet the 
defence lawyer is also expected the conduct such work in a way which is "consistent 
with the law and with counsel's overriding duty to the court",
1024
 which includes 
avoiding "unnecessary expense or waste of the court’s time" (and what unnecessary 
means is open to interpretation).  The CPR clearly expect defence lawyers to minimise 
delays by “identification of the real issues” and "discouraging delay"1025 from the 
outset.  It must be questioned whether these obligations are compatible or realistic.  
After all, some crucial issues that the defence might wish to pursue may arise after the 
start of a case, making ‘efficiency’ obligations seem heavy-handed.  Alternatively, a 
defence lawyer may simply be trying to waste time and money to deter the prosecution 
or bore a jury.  Formal requirements are therefore in a continual state of conflict. 
 
Ambush defences (and the closely related issue of ‘curing’ prosecution errors) also 
present problems.  The defence statement requires defence lawyers, as a party to the 
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proceedings, to correct any "abuse of process",
1026
 which one would assume includes 
fundamental flaws in the prosecution case.  Law Society advice seems to support this, 
suggesting that defence lawyers sacrifice a helpful "deficiency"
1027
 in order to help the 
court.  However, case law sends mixed messages about the issue.  R v. Cocks,
1028
 R v. 
Khatibi,
1029
 R v. Munnery
1030
 and R v. Gleeson
1031
 all address the problem of ambushes 
and provide some contradictory conclusions.  The opinions expressed in R v. Gleeson 
appear to represent the prevailing attitude in much case law.  However, difficulties 
remain, particularly in the context of the privilege against self-incrimination and the 
right to put the prosecution to proof.   
 
A defendant’s right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, under Article 6(2) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 48 of the European Union 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, was interpreted by the European Court of Human 
Rights in the following manner: 
 
"The right to remain silent under police questioning and the privilege against 
self-incrimination are generally recognised international standards which lie at 
the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6."
1032
 
 
Related is the ancient principle, famously articulated in Woolmington v. DPP,
1033
 that 
the prosecution must discharge the burden of proof in a criminal case.  It is therefore 
questionable whether compelling the defendant’s lawyer to correct prosecution 
mistakes, and as a result help the prosecution ‘build’ a case against the defendant, would 
be compatible with the right against self-incrimination.  Equally, the prohibition of the 
ambush defence (which arguably forgives and encourages incomplete and deficient 
prosecutions) seems incompatible with the obligation to provide "fearless, vigorous and 
effective defence"
1034
 where the defendant’s interests are the defence lawyer’s "first 
concern".
1035
  Therefore, I would suggest that serious conflicts of duty remain a problem 
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in the context of the principle of partisanship and the principles of procedural justice 
and truth-seeking. 
 
4.3 Do Practical Conceptions Reflect the ‘Zealous Advocate’ Model? 
 
Practical conceptions of the criminal defence lawyer’s role were derived from the 
empirical study.  As has been discussed, the empirical study had two main aims: to 
assess how criminal defence practitioners conceive of their role and to examine whether 
defence practitioners recognise the conflict points discussed in this thesis, and how, if at 
all, they resolve them in practice.  In assessing how the respondents conceived of their 
role in practice, I utilised a mixture of direct questioning and vignette-based 
methodology.  With these techniques, I intended to explore how the respondents defined 
their practical role and whether it reflected the ‘zealous advocate’ model and formal 
conceptions of the role, outlined in Chapters 2 and 3.  Like much of this thesis, this 
approach was structure around the theoretical framework of principles described in 
Chapter 2, and my conclusions will use the same structure. 
 
The respondents provided a large body of opinion relating to the principle of 
partisanship.  It was one of the most pervasive topics discussed in the interviews.  
Several respondents expressed views that were akin to a more traditional, ideal model of 
the vigorous, combative and gladiatorial defence lawyering, characterised by a defiant, 
invariable pursuit of client interests, even if it meant ‘bending the rules’.  Yet, several 
expressed more moderate and balanced views, carefully explaining the need to work 
within the rules and the law, closely reflecting formal conceptions of the role.  Most 
respondents stated they would pursue the ‘best interests’ of the client which, as 
discussed, is a term open to interpretation.  For example, 'best interests' could mean 
victory for the client at all costs; it could mean an early guilty plea to get a sentence 
reduction; or it could mean getting an early guilty plea because the client should be 
convicted in the light of the evidence against him or her.  'Best interests' is therefore a 
difficult term, which may have had different meanings to different respondents.  In 
pursuing the 'best interests' of the client, only one respondent overtly stated that his 
duty, regardless of innocence or guilt, was to "ensure [an] acquittal" for their client.  
This suggests that, for most respondents, to 'win' is not necessarily the same as pursuing 
the 'best interests' of the client.  This is perhaps a little closer to formal conceptions than 
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the theoretical model.   
 
However, this is not to suggest that the respondents seemed inclined to surrender clients 
of questionable credibility to the mercy of judges and magistrates without a fight.  For 
example, several made it clear that confessions of guilt were not, within reason, a 
barrier to representation, reflective of both the ‘zealous advocate’ model and formal 
conceptions of the role.  Several respondents suggested that they would take points, 
pursue leads or ask questions that were not necessarily popular with the court, the 
prosecution or complainants.  However, in general, duties of partisanship were 
described in restrained and complaisant terms.  Promoting the 'best interests' of a client 
seemed to focus specifically on their legal rights, again reflecting the concept of ‘mere-
zeal’ that characterises formal conceptions of the principle.  None suggested that they 
would indulge defendants’ whims by making inflammatory statements, false claims or 
telling lies. At no point did the respondents convey the traditional image of the defence 
lawyer as a ‘tool’ of the client.  Yet, the respondents’ practical conceptions of the 
principle of partisanship still seemed to lie somewhere in between the theoretical 
‘zealous advocate’ model (more akin to the ‘hyper-zealous’ lawyer) and formal 
regulation.  Responses displayed aspects of both the theoretical spirit of uncooperative 
and ruthless advocacy, alongside the more conciliatory nature of formal conceptions.  
Thus, one could conclude that practical conceptions do not fit comfortably within the 
categories of mere or hyper zealous partisan.  The responses do indicate that core 
elements of theory remain; fearlessness in the face of hostility, vigorous questioning of 
witnesses and some exploitation of loopholes.  However, these aspects must be balanced 
with honesty, openness, cooperation and the acceptance that the court and the rule of 
law come first. 
 
Responses relating to the principle of detachment were consistent, reflecting the 
‘zealous advocate’ model and formal regulation.  Respondents made it clear that, in 
accepting clients, they would not pass any sort of moral judgment and would always put 
personal opinions aside.  Barristers referred to the ‘cab-rank principle’ as obliging them 
to represent any client, regardless of their alleged offences or their motives.  
Interestingly, as was highlighted in the analysis, solicitors also believed that were 
obliged to accept any client, feeling they could not "pick and choose" (Respondent S3).  
The conclusion one can draw is that, in practice, barristers and solicitors both operate a 
‘cab-rank principle’, which closely reflects the theoretical conception of the role.  In 
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general, the respondents seemed to characterise the role of the defence lawyer as being 
emotionless, where feelings of empathy, passion or anger have no place.  This, of 
course, is the very definition of detachment; the exercise of complete neutrality toward 
the right or wrong of the proceedings enables the defence lawyer to act as a thorough 
and determined professional.  Several respondents made this explicit.  In summary, 
practical conceptions of the principle of detachment closely mirror both the ‘zealous 
advocate’ model and formal regulation, suggesting a unity between all three conceptions 
of the role.  It should be noted that since legal aid is no longer classified as sufficient 
pay under the ‘cab-rank rule’, both barristers and solicitors may, in practice, opt out of 
representing clients if the fee is too low to justify acceptance.  However, one respondent 
addressed this issue directly, stating: 
 
"I don't think legal aid is deemed to be sufficient remuneration anymore . . . so I 
could turn it down saying 'you aren't offering me enough money' . . . I wouldn't 
do that cos I do actually take on legal aid cases routinely." – Respondent B1 
 
This seems to undermine the suggestion that money affects detachment. 
 
Most respondents seemed to regard the principle of confidentiality as a primary 
obligation in their practical role.  They described the necessity of protecting information 
passed on by the client or material relating to the case.  However, they also accepted 
that the principle was not absolute.  Most of the respondents that referred to their duty 
of confidentiality seemed to imply that it had to be balanced with professional 
obligations to the court.  However, none seemed to think that this meant they had to 
betray their clients by ‘spilling the beans’.  The practical principle of confidentiality 
therefore appears to be a question of judgment.  The respondents suggested that they 
would maintain confidentiality as far as possible, but that there were limits.  None were 
clear about where these boundaries lie, but one suspects that, in practice, the 
respondents dealt with such issues on an ad hoc basis, depending on the type of 
information held, the attitude of the client, the demands of the court and the obligations 
outlined by regulation such as the CPR.  This is of course speculation.  Overall, the 
responses received suggest that practical conceptions of the principle of confidentiality 
are robust but limited by competing obligations, much like the theoretical and formal 
conceptions.  The theoretical conception of uncooperative, secretive and evasive 
defence is less tenable in modern practice, and as such the practical conception is 
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seemingly more akin to formal conceptions than to the theoretical model. 
 
The respondents' opinions strongly suggest that the principle of procedural justice has 
an unwelcome but undoubted place in practical conceptions of the role, extending 
beyond the limited parameters of the theoretical principle.  Furthermore, practical 
conceptions appear to reflect formal conceptions of procedural justice; for example, the 
CPR were referenced by the respondents frequently, as they described obligations to 
avoid delays, time-wasting and game-playing.  They described definite duties to 
disclose extensively at an early stage, via the defence statement or as a result of 
procedural requirements, and they categorically dismissed the use of ambushes on the 
court or prosecution.  Overall, most respondents described a role in which they actively 
helped the court 'manage' a case, avoided unnecessary confrontation and allowed justice 
to move "swiftly on" (Respondent B4).  However, this is not to say that all the 
respondents considered this situation to be positive.  Some seemed to think the 
disclosure and efficiency requirements had gone too far, and had made "inroads" 
(Respondent B3) into traditional, adversarial defence territory.  In contrast, others felt 
that the obligations were fair and often beneficial to the client.  It is therefore difficult to 
draw definite conclusions about how happy respondents were with their practical 
obligations to promote procedural justice.  However, what is clear is that the 
respondents recognised an extensive, court-orientated principle, which has much in 
common with formal conceptions of the role, and leaves the theoretical principle of 
procedural justice looking both limited and vague. 
 
Both the theoretical and formal conceptions of the principle of truth-seeking were, in 
some ways, reflected in the comments of the respondents.  It is clear that the duty not to 
actively mislead the court by lying for the defendant is a universally recognised 
obligation of defence lawyers in theory, formal regulation and practice.  Several 
respondents also suggested that passively misleading the court, by allowing it to “labour 
under a misapprehension" (Respondent B1) for example, was also acceptable.  The 
‘zealous advocate’ model reflects this.  However, the 'no ambushes' doctrine and the 
suggestion that defence lawyers should 'cure' prosecution mistakes, outlined in formal 
sources such as R v. Gleeson,
1036
 cast doubt on the viability of passively misleading the 
court.  Again, the respondents expressed contrasting views about the practical reality of 
these truth-seeking obligations, some confidently dismissing any practical duty to 
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correct errors, others stating with some certainty that they were obliged to do so.  
Several respondents rejected the notion that they had a direct responsibility to help 
acquit the innocent and convict the guilty, regarding it as an almost perverse idea.  
Therefore, much of the discussion relating to the principle of truth-seeking suggests that 
its practical conception is uncertain and debatable.  Outside of the obligation not to lie 
to the court, it is difficult to conclude with any clarity whether practical conceptions of 
the principle reflect the theoretical model or formal regulation.  However, the 
uncertainty about whether the more controversial duties apply and the obvious 
resistance of several practitioners to them, implies that in practice the principle of truth-
seeking is more akin to the theoretical principle, which primarily prohibits lying.  
Modern, formal conceptions of the principle, which encourage active pursuit of the truth 
by aiding the opposition and sharing information, may not yet have filtered into practice 
but may have in the near future. 
 
The principle of morality primarily focuses on the defence lawyer's treatment of other 
parties to the criminal justice process, namely complainants and witnesses.  Most 
respondents described a duty to be polite, civil and respectful, reflecting basic elements 
of both formal and theoretical conceptions of the principle.  The ‘zealous advocate’ 
model describes a set of active moral duties that go beyond basic courtesy, however, 
few respondents felt they were obliged to do any more than this.  None of the 
respondents recognised any direct duty to do the 'right thing' by complainants and 
witnesses.  Moreover, respectful behaviour was not driven by any obligation to protect 
the dignity of the complainants or witnesses, but by the needs of the defendant.  Several 
stated that bullying or aggression was likely to damage a client's case and so was of 
little utility.  Most respondents suggested that they would prefer not be rough or 
unsympathetic with prosecution witnesses, but explained that their job was to serve the 
client, which would come first. Additionally, most respondents dismissed any obligation 
to moralise to their clients about their past convictions or their ongoing behaviour; 
however, some suggested they would attempt to steer a defendant towards a more 
ethical course of action in the right circumstances.  In conclusion, any meaningful 
principle of morality therefore seems to have little application in practice, although this 
is not because defence lawyers have an active duty to be immoral, rather, they have no 
duty to avoid or prevent unfair or immoral behaviour.  Practical conceptions of the 
principle, much like formal regulation, are very limited.  Any practical principle of 
morality is more closely related to common decency than a robust framework of moral 
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obligations.  Thus, there is little reflection of the theoretical conception in modern 
practice. 
 
4.4 Resolving Conflicts in Practice 
 
Confidentiality v. Procedural Justice and Truth Seeking 
 
The majority of respondents recognised a conflict point in Scenario A, primarily 
between their duty to protect privileged information and their duties not to mislead the 
court or generate procedural delay.  All of the respondents attempted to overcome the 
conflict points presented, with most resolving it in favour of the client.  Few seemed to 
believe that any delays would be caused by upholding confidentiality and expected the 
trial to proceed.  Where respondents felt delay might be caused by secrecy, they still 
believed that confidentiality superseded other obligations.  Several respondents stated 
that they would not reveal the information passed on by ‘Z’ and would thus uphold the 
principle of confidentiality, whilst others stated that they would divulge the information 
only if the client desired this and had clearly waived privilege.  Some felt that sufficient 
waiver had been granted, but most did not.  Other respondents felt that they had an 
overriding duty not to mislead or lie to the court, but would only reveal ‘Z's 
whereabouts if they were asked directly.  This suggests that, if possible, the respondents 
would avoid revealing the information.  Some respondents did resolve the conflict in 
favour of their court-orientated duties by sharing the information with the court; 
however, they characterised such behaviour as client-serving, believing that honesty and 
openness would benefit the defendant's cause.  In summary, most recognised and 
resolved the conflict point without much difficulty, with the majority opinion favouring 
secrecy over revelation.  This seems to be contrary to some examples of formal conflict 
resolution.  Cases like R v. Gleeson and regulation such as the CPR suggest that the 
principles of procedural justice and truth-seeking are overriding.  However, the 
respondents’ answers imply that, in practice, confidentiality may outweigh the 
principles of procedural justice and truth-seeking. 
 
Partisanship v. Morality 
 
The respondents seemed to find the resolution of this conflict point relatively 
straightforward.  The vast majority of the respondents believed they had a duty to 
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discredit a complainant by reference to her sexual history, if the court allowed it and the 
client requested it.  The group consensus was that defence lawyers have no direct 
obligation to actively protect a vulnerable complainant, for example, by rejecting any 
unfair, cruel or morally questionable tactics.  Aside from the limitations placed on the 
lawyer by a court, most notably the provisions of the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999, the respondents seemed to agree that they would adopt unattractive 
but necessary tactics in the right circumstances.  However, the respondents also seemed 
to suggest that they would not indulge clients by asking irrelevant or intrusive 
questions, or by making derogatory claims about complainants.  They would most likely 
adopt a sensitive approach to dealing with vulnerable witnesses, although not because of 
any duty of morality.  As above, the respondents suggested that to do otherwise would 
usually damage client interests and as such, nearly all the respondents felt that they had 
a choice rather than a duty to behave in a careful and delicate manner.  However, it was 
clear that if a more robust and tough approach seemed necessary and was expected by 
the client, then that would happen.  In conclusion, the overwhelming majority of 
respondents resolved this conflict point in favour of the principle of partisanship, 
suggesting not only that it is overriding in such situations but that any principle of 
morality is not a significant aspect of the defence lawyer's role on a day-to-day basis. 
 
Detachment v. Morality 
 
Part A of this conflict point dealt with acceptance of clients.  The respondents were 
unanimous in concluding that they would always remain detached when accepting 
clients and refrain from passing judgment.  All of the respondents believed that the 
allegations levelled at a client, his or her character or any past convictions were 
immaterial to acceptance of their case.  They suggested that their job required them to 
regularly dismiss moral qualms about potential clients.  They also suggested that they 
could trust in the criminal justice system to reach a fair and accurate verdict and   that 
introducing moral judgments into the acceptance process would undermine the system.  
They seemed to regard such behaviour as unprofessional, too personal and outside of 
the remit of their role.  Part B examined potential conflict when conducting the defence 
of a client.  Again, most respondents concurred that questions of morality were 
irrelevant to their decisions about the conduct of a case.  All the respondents accepted 
that cross-examination of a potentially vulnerable child witness did raise delicate issues.  
The majority suggested that they would adopt a careful and cautious approach but that, 
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ultimately, they would ask difficult or intrusive questions and would not shy away from 
tough or aggressive tactics if necessary.  This would only be limited by the potential 
damage such an approach might do to a defendant's case and none recognised morality 
as an obstacle to a detached and thorough defence.  In conclusion, the majority of 
respondents seemed to suggest that, in potential clashes between detachment and 
broader moral standards, the former, client-orientated obligation would prevail. 
 
Partisanship v. Procedural Justice and Truth-Seeking 
 
Part A examined the respondents' decisions about disclosure and the exploitation of 
'loopholes' for the client's advantage.  One respondent believed that presenting a 
technical defence in the face of significant evidence was "taking the piss" (Respondent 
A3), but the vast majority disagreed.  Most felt that a client deserved his or her day in 
court, regardless of whether the defence was meritorious or the evidence compelling.  
Most simply believed that their job was to help the client before helping the court.  In 
terms of disclosing the defence, a minority suggested that they would keep the 
information secret, believing they were not obliged to reveal anything to the court.  
However, the majority accepted, rather reluctantly, that they had an overriding duty to 
share their defence with the court and prosecution at an early stage.  A small number of 
respondents considered such disclosure requirements to be positive; however, most felt 
aggrieved by this state of affairs, claiming that they were being forced to help prove the 
case against their client.   
 
Part B also explored disclosure issues, namely whether a substantial change in the 
client's instructions had to be shared with the court.  The vast majority provided the 
same response - they would not lie for the client by asserting her innocence, but they 
would not say anything to the court about her admissions as they could put the 
prosecution to proof.  Most respondents therefore suggested that they would passively 
mislead the court which, in a sense, reconciles the principles of partisanship and truth-
seeking.  The second issue dealt with in Part B focused on ambush defences, examining 
whether the respondents would exploit a prosecution error and surprise the prosecution 
with a late defence.  All the respondents concurred that they would not ambush the 
prosecution; most recognised that to do so would be pointless and counter-productive.  
However, the majority suggested that they would remain silent about any prosecution 
errors, although a few stated that they were obliged to 'cure' the flaws in the prosecution 
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case.  Overall, the conflict point presented difficult and controversial issues for the 
respondents to tackle.  Where they could, the respondents favoured the client-orientated 
principle of partisanship (for example, in relation to loopholes and putting the 
prosecution to proof).  However, the respondents recognised that most of the time, they 
had an overriding duty to uphold the administration of justice and the search for the 
truth.  They felt obliged to disclose information at an early stage, avoid ambushes and 
generally adhere to the truth.  One gained the impression that, were the court more 
direct and probing, then the respondents would be forced to reveal more about their case 
than they would want to.  As such, one can summarise that this conflict is, more often 
than not, resolved in favour of the court-orientated principles. 
 
5. The Research Questions: Conclusions 
 
Does any coherent 'theoretical' conception constitute a useful and relevant reflection of 
the role of the modern practitioner? 
 
If the ‘zealous advocate’ model adequately describes the modern role, then one could 
conclude that it is both relevant and useful.  It would suggest that academic discourse 
explains and influences the role of the criminal defence lawyer, and continues to 
resonate with 21
st
 century practitioners.  If the theoretical conception only loosely 
reflects modern practice or has no similarity at all, then one could draw different 
conclusions.  At an extreme, one might suggest that theory is both irrelevant and 
useless, representing the disengaged commentary and ancient rhetoric of isolated 
academics.  Alternatively, it could be argued that past and current theorising about the 
role of the criminal defence lawyer lacks relevance, in that it is out of touch with the 
modern duties and obligations of practitioners, but still serves a valuable normative 
purpose.  This conclusion therefore implies that the ‘zealous advocate’ model is useful 
as a set of ideals that modern practitioners should aspire to.  In the same way that 
pressure groups attempt to steer government toward less conventional, more idealistic 
policies, the theoretical conception could be regarded as an influential, external force for 
change in the criminal legal profession.  I am inclined to draw the latter conclusion.  
There is a significant ‘gap’ between the ‘zealous advocate’ model and the modern role, 
as manifested by formal and practical conceptions.  Some aspects of the traditional 
model remain valid and are reflected in both formal rules and modern defence practice; 
for example, the modern principle of detachment generally mirrors the historic, 
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traditional and ideal conception of the role.  Nevertheless, much of the doctrine outlined 
in the theoretical conception appears to be at odds with the tone of the modern role. 
 
Having examined formal and practical conceptions of the role, the theoretical principle 
of morality seems utopian.  Despite this, the defence lawyer’s role appears to have at 
least shifted towards a more complainant-friendly model.  However, the most notable 
and important conclusion that one can draw from this thesis is that, in modern criminal 
defence, there is an increased emphasis on the duty to the court.  The theoretical 
principles of procedural justice and truth-seeking seem limited in comparison to the 
recent and extensive formal provisions relating to case management, the search for the 
truth, efficient procedure and cooperative conduct.  Furthermore, this new culture of 
prominent court-orientated obligations has undoubtedly filtered into modern practice.  
As a consequence, one can also conclude that there are now more barriers and 
disincentives attached to client-orientated defence.  For example, far-reaching 
disclosure obligations, the prohibition of ambushes, more focus on respect for and 
fairness to prosecution witnesses, the reduction of delays and the correction of 
disadvantageous errors.  In addition, the responses of the practitioners in the empirical 
study suggest that more pragmatic issues have also contributed, such as controversial 
pay structures and rates for legal aid work, the threat of costs orders, increased 
administration and paperwork, and the focus on speed and simplicity.
1037
  The result is 
arguably a less zealous, combative, secretive and one-sided defence role than theory 
portrays; some aspects of the theoretical principles of partisanship and confidentiality 
seem almost excessive and extreme.  As such, I would conclude that the ‘zealous 
advocate’ model has less relevance and utility in the context of modern practice, 
appearing outdated, somewhat detached from reality and anchored in the abstract.  Early 
in this thesis, I highlighted a comment by Nicholson and Webb.  This now represents an 
appropriate summary, since the findings of this thesis suggest that much of the 
underlying theory relating to legal defence ethics may simply be "pure aspiration".
1038
 
 
6. The Implications for the ‘Zealous Advocate’ Model 
 
The conclusion that there is a 'gap' between the ‘zealous advocate’ model and the 
modern role of the criminal defence lawyer implies that it has decreasing relevance and 
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utility as a commentary of and influence upon the development of criminal defence 
ethics in the 21
st
 Century.  Before addressing the implications that these findings have 
for future theorising of the role of the criminal defence lawyer, it would be valuable to 
further explore the meaning of the 'gap', its significance in recent criminal justice policy 
and the impact it may have on the English and Welsh adversarial system. 
 
6.1 ‘Mind the (Theoretical) Gap’ 
 
One of the potential causes of the discrepancy between the ‘zealous advocate’ model 
and the modern role is what might be termed 'ideological drift'.  This is the notion that 
the role of the criminal defence lawyer and the criminal justice process in general are 
gradually shifting toward a ‘hybrid’ construction, incorporating elements of both 
adversarial and inquisitorial legal traditions.  England and Wales has operated a 
traditional adversarial system for centuries, thus one could argue that the English and 
Welsh defence lawyer and the criminal justice system are drifting away from their 
accusatorial roots and towards more inquisitorial ideology.  The evidence for this claim 
is substantial.  In terms of the defence lawyer, modern obligations and duties (as 
compared to the theoretical and traditional ones) seem to have both diluted adversarial 
principles and embraced investigative ones.  The abundant references to cooperation 
and openness contained in the CPR stand in contrast to the adversarial contest between 
opposing parties; instead, it envisages a system in which the defence lawyer works 
closely with the court and prosecutor, and all information is shared.  Cases like R v. 
Gleeson and Chorley Justices appear to obligate defence lawyers to aid the prosecution 
in presenting a factually and procedurally correct case, and the disclosure requirements 
of both statute and the procedure rules demand that defence lawyers provide plenty of 
advance information to the court about their case.  The inquisitorial tradition places 
great emphasis on the court leading the investigation, handling the construction of the 
case and gathering as much information as possible.  The principles above seem to fit 
within this model more comfortably than they do within the traditional, adversarial 
process which allows defence secrecy and exploitation of prosecution mistakes.  Most 
notably, the CPR expect defence lawyers, as participants in criminal proceedings, to 
help ‘acquit the innocent and convict the guilty’, whilst Auld LJ made it plain that the 
criminal process is a ‘search for the truth’ which defence lawyers are obliged to help 
with.  These sentiments seem closer to the inquisitorial tradition than to the adversarial. 
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English and Welsh criminal justice procedure generally appears to have undergone 
similar cultural change, indicating an ideological drift toward a multi-traditional 
approach.  Several aspects of modern criminal procedure suggest that this is true.  The 
significant case management powers granted to judges; the ‘dilution’ of the defendant's 
right to silence; the increased disclosure obligations incumbent on both defence and 
prosecution; the restriction of jury trials; the treatment of the criminal investigation and 
trial as a linked, "continuous process";
1039
 the emphasis on early pleading rather than 
lengthy, costly court battles; the use of secretive control orders and the detention 
without charge of suspected terrorists.  As such, it is arguable that "[l]egislative reform 
over the last twenty years appears to have ignored the theoretical framework of the 
criminal justice system in England and Wales."
1040
  There are a variety of potential 
explanations for the shift toward a hybrid model.  It has been suggested that, in the 
wake of high profile miscarriages of justice in the early 1990s, criminal justice policy 
was directed away from adversarialism in order to avoid the "police tunnel vision"
1041
 
that significantly contributed to the conviction of innocent people.  It is also argued that 
a more cooperative, judicially-managed system has evolved out of necessity.  The last 
government's "strong and populist law and order agenda"
1042
 was very much 
characterised by "constant and unprecedented change in the substantive law",
1043
 and 
resulted in "a huge growth in criminalization over this period".
1044
  As such, with larger 
streams of offenders moving through the criminal justice system, there has been a drive 
to cut costs, increase efficiency and reduce the time from arrest to conviction or 
acquittal.  As Hodgson suggests, the "weight of case disposition is shifting ever more 
away from trial"
1045
 with the introduction of "more diversion away from prosecution, 
more summary justice dispensed by prosecutors, police and quasi-police, and more 
system penalties for non-co-operation."
1046
 
 
Coupled with the necessity of processing more cases through the system is the culture 
of managerialism that has generally pervaded government policy for some years.  
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Managerialism emphasises "productivity, cost-efficiency and consumerism"
1047
 in 
organisational structures.  In terms of the criminal justice system, this has led to the 
development of policies designed to promote "value-for-money"
1048
 and "triple 'E' 
initiatives" of "economy, efficiency, and effectiveness".
1049
  It has been argued by some 
that managerial imperatives have "gained ascendancy over grand ‘metanarrative’ 
schemata like liberal progressiveness and humanitarianism"
1050
 and as such, cost-
efficiency and speed have facilitated a shift away from "more traditional, themes of 
criminal justice, such as 'protection of human rights' . . . and 'promotion of due 
process'".
1051
  Managerialism has great significance in the context of criminal defence 
work.  As Cheliotis highlights: 
 
"[T]he natural complexity and capriciousness of the variable human is largely 
regarded as an impediment to the delivery of pragmatic penal policy 
agendas."
1052
 
 
Of all people, criminal defendants tend to exhibit such complexity and the robust and 
uncompromising defence of such characters (in the context of an increasingly 
managerial system) is problematic.  To fulfil managerial aims, it has been suggested that 
"criminal justice organizations . . . look for . . . an army of impotent, homogenous 
executive automata that will humbly sustain faceless systems and mundane 
routines".
1053
  Although this is perhaps an exaggerated image, the defence lawyer, as 
evidenced by much of the regulation identified in this thesis, is expected to comply with 
and sustain managerial imperatives within the criminal justice system.  This altered 
focus, which has dominated criminal justice policy over the last two decades, can 
therefore partially explain the 'drift' away from the traditional, adversarial model of 
criminal defence. 
 
The CPR represent a primary example of the managerial culture in English and Welsh 
                                                 
1047
 Raine J., Willson M. (1996) Managerialism and beyond: The case of criminal justice – 9 Int. J. of 
Public Sector Management 4, 21. 
1048
 Loader and Sparks quoted in Cheliotis L. (2006) Penal Managerialism from within: Implications for 
theory and research – 29 Int. J. of Law and Psychiatry, 397. 
1049
 Ibid., 399. 
1050
 Ibid. 
1051
 Raine J., Willson M. (1996) Managerialism and beyond: The case of criminal justice – 9 Int. J. of 
Public Sector Management 4, 21. 
1052
 Cheliotis L. (2006) Penal Managerialism from within: Implications for theory and research – 29 Int. 
J. of Law and Psychiatry, 399. 
1053
 Ibid. 
 293 
criminal justice and although the nature of the impact they have had is debatable, it is 
undoubtedly significant.  During my empirical study, respondents were directly asked 
what effect, if any, the CPR had had on their role.  The majority of respondents did 
believe that the rules had had "a significant impact" (Respondent S1) on their working 
lives.  One respondent claimed they had "changed the culture" of criminal defence and 
likened them to a "revolution" (Respondent S4).  However, one respondent suggested 
they had "less impact than the government would want them to have" (Respondent S8).  
Surprisingly, another respondent claimed that he "didn't know there were any" 
(Respondent A2), which initially suggests one of three conclusions: either the rules are 
very insignificant; they are now so ingrained in defence culture that they are not 
distinguished from the normal requirements of criminal defence work; or this particular 
respondent had not consciously encountered a situation where they were relevant.  
Judging by the thoughts of other respondents, the first conclusion is almost certainly 
wrong, whilst the third conclusion, due to the pervasive nature of the rules, is also 
improbable.
1054
  It is therefore likely that the second conclusion is correct.  Further 
evidence for this was the same respondent’s claim that the rules were "probably all 
common sense anyway" (Respondent A2). 
 
The respondents were divided as to whether the CPR had had a positive or negative 
impact on the criminal defence role.  A significant proportion of the respondents 
expressed favourable opinions about the rules, identifying the benefits they had brought 
to the criminal justice process and their role.  One stated, "I think there are aspects of 
[the rules] that will probably make it more likely that justice is done" (Respondent B3), 
while another described them as "useful assistance as to how you conduct things on a 
day-today basis" (Respondent A1).  One respondent suggested that the rules had helped 
eliminate the more excessive aspects of adversarial culture, stating that "they've 
probably put a brake on game playing" (Respondent B2) and that it was "certainly the 
public wish and . . . I think it's probably a justifiable wish" (Respondent B2).  Others 
concurred.  One respondent felt that "the ‘no delay’ objective" was "mostly . . . a good 
thing" (Respondent S3), and added that what she called the "adjournment culture" was 
"largely gone [which] you don’t think [is] a bad thing" (Respondent S3).  Others 
concluded that the reduction in delays and ‘game playing’ had helped to "focus minds as 
to timescales and obligations" which had had "a positive effect" (Respondent B4), and 
that "ultimately you probably represent your client better" (Respondent B3).     
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However, a majority of respondents were critical of the CPR.  One respondent stated, "I 
think they've made our lives harder" (Respondent S2), while another felt that "they do 
put us into conflict with our client" (Respondent S6).  Their obstructive nature thus 
leads to a situation where defence lawyers "try to avoid them as much as possible" 
(Respondent B3).  One respondent felt certain that the rules "create more of an 
obligation to the court" (Respondent B1), while another believed that there was "too 
much emphasis on speed" which was "to the detriment of cases being decided properly" 
(Respondent S2).  Another respondent made a similar point, claiming that "courts are 
now very much fixed with the culture of getting things on, getting things done" 
(Respondent S4).  This approach, dominated by the CPR, has, according to the 
respondents, created an almost mechanical criminal justice process.  One respondent 
stated that cases had become "a purely administrative exercise without any recognition 
that it involves people" (Respondent B3), while another described the system being like 
"a sausage machine" where "people who have been charged go in one end and 
eventually come out the other" (Respondent S8).  However, respondents were most 
dismayed by what they regarded as the unfair nature and application of the rules.  
Several respondents described how "they're used to beat the defence" (Respondent S9), 
and that "if the defence don't do what they're supposed to do the sanction is always 
there", whereas "if the prosecution don't do what they're supposed to do, there is no 
sanction" (Respondent S6).  One respondent described the rules as "absurd" 
(Respondent B1) and was vitriolic about their inequitable application, claiming that 
"judges cite them routinely when you're being awkward" (Respondent B1).   He 
suggested that they "completely undermine the point of an adversarial legal system" 
(Respondent B1), and added:   
 
"They're not a trump card, they're just procedural rules, they don't create new 
law, they don't fundamentally change what you're supposed to be doing." – 
Respondent B1 
 
He concluded that the rules were not designed "to make the system fairer".  Rather they 
represented "populist policy" which simply serves to "make things cheaper and easier 
for the government to convict people" (Respondent B1). 
 
As Respondent B1 suggests, an overarching driver behind managerial culture and the 
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necessity of better 'through-put' in the criminal justice system is, put simply, money.  
The sweeping financial reforms affecting the criminal defence system were primarily 
kick-started by Lord Carter's review of legal aid procurement, ‘Legal Aid: A market-
based approach to reform’.1055  Charged with auditing the public funding of legal aid 
services, Lord Carter recommended a "market economy"
1056
 system stating: 
 
"A healthy legal services market should be driven by best value competition 
based on quality, capacity and price"
1057
 
 
Much of Lord Carter's report reflected more managerialist, cost-efficient ways of 
working.  He underlined that the reforms were designed to ensure that "the taxpayer and 
government receive value for money",
1058
 that "the justice system is more efficient, 
effective and simple"
1059
 and would "reward more efficient practices and provide 
appropriate incentives for early preparation and resolution".
1060
  Such intentions 
arguably contradict the adversarial tradition in England and Wales and perhaps indicate 
the intention to move away from such practice.  Indeed, the report made clear that “the 
adversarial nature of the justice system in England and Wales appears to be a key 
contributory factor to the higher cost of justice here.”1061  Lord Carter expressed surprise 
at what he termed an "adversarial and sometimes hostile"
1062
 relationship between the 
publicly funded bodies involved in legal aid work (which could potentially mean 
defence lawyers and prosecutors) and instead praised what he called "a growing 
recognition that a new co-coordinated and collaborative approach is required".
1063
  
Again, these words seem to reflect a shift away from adversarial culture towards a more 
cooperative, integrated and streamlined system of criminal justice. 
 
In terms of criminal defence work, Lord Carter specifically recommended the 
introduction of fixed fees for police station and magistrates' court work and graduated 
fees for Crown Court work, which were duly implemented.  He also recommended a 
system of best-value tendering (BVT), where firms would bid against each other to 
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secure legal aid work in certain geographical areas, for example at certain police 
stations.  This was to be piloted in January 2010, but was abandoned a month before, in 
part due to serious resistance from legal aid firms.
1064
  Since Lord Carter's review in 
2006, commentators have criticised the reforms on the basis that they have made it 
significantly more difficult for defence firms to survive financially.  This has arguably 
forced defence firms to either fold, cut corners in their work or merge, reducing the 
overall number of legal aid practices available to those who need it.  From the 
beginning, it seemed that Lord Carter's reforms would inevitably be achieved through 
the ultimate efficiency – a "shift to a smaller number of suppliers",1065 or as the Law 
Society Gazette termed it, "driv[ing] small practices out of business".
1066
  Despite Lord 
Carter's claim that "the restructuring of firms, whether through consolidation or other 
means of growing, is about developing efficient practices and not reducing the total 
number of solicitors in the overall legal aid market",
1067
 many disagree.  In 2006, the 
Law Society Gazette suggested that "[f]irms will be encouraged to consolidate so that 
they can take on large volumes of work".
1068
  Four years later, the Legal Action Group 
highlighted that the proposed savings of BVT would be achieved through "cuts in 
administration costs, mainly made through reducing the number of providers"
1069
 and 
noted how, over the last decade, there had been a marked "decline in legal aid 
practices".
1070
   
 
In March 2010, the government published a new paper on legal aid reform, entitled 
‘Restructuring the delivery of criminal defence services’.1071  Intended as a follow-up to 
Lord Carter's review, it admitted that the original report "[u]ltimately . . . envisaged a 
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much smaller number of suppliers winning contracts".
1072
   
 
More worryingly, the paper also acknowledged: 
 
"A number of providers have told us forcefully that we have already reached the 
point at which criminal legal aid work has become unprofitable for them, and it 
is no longer viable for them to continue to undertake it.  At some point in the 
future we might therefore expect that suppliers would start to leave the market in 
significant numbers. We cannot predict how quickly this might happen, or the 
impact on the provision of services."
1073
 
 
The paper, in effect, re-launched the abandoned BVT scheme, proposing a "future 
tendering process [that] would ensure a more consolidated market, with a smaller 
number of more efficient suppliers, required to undertake the full range of the services 
we need."
1074
  The reaction of commentators was critical.  The suggestion by former 
legal aid minister Lord Bach that "only efficient firms will thrive"
1075
 has been 
interpreted by some as meaning 'only big firms will survive'.  The Solicitors’ Journal 
commented that "[a] large number of small and medium-sized criminal legal aid firms 
would lose their contracts under the government’s latest and most drastic cost-cutting 
plans",
1076
 whilst the Legal Action Group claimed that "up to 1,500 firms could close 
down or be forced to merge", representing a "draconian culling".
1077
  In terms of 
ideological drift, it is arguable that the reforms and the resultant re-shaping of the legal 
aid market have had, and will continue to have, a significant trickle-down effect on 
adversarial criminal defence work, forcing defence lawyers towards a more cooperative, 
managerial culture.  With fewer firms doing much more work for less money in less 
time, it is conceivable that a less adversarial service will result because a centrally 
managed, speedy and cooperative approach is simply more cost-effective.  For example, 
fixed fees in the police station and magistrates' court will be maximised if defence 
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lawyers cooperate and avoid disputing 'minor' issues on the defendant's behalf.  Firms 
might also endeavour to avoid punitive 'wasted costs orders' by complying more 
willingly with the court.  In short, the reality of 'less for more' may simply be just 'less'.   
 
The respondents interviewed in my empirical study appeared to reflect these 
conclusions about the effect of funding on their role.  Broadly, they seemed to think that 
changes to legal aid and the funding of criminal defence "encourage you to do less 
work" (Respondent A3) because "it is more financially efficient to do less work" 
(Respondent S8).  This was described as "galling" (Respondent S8).  Others described 
the financial state of criminal defence as representing "the quick and cheap justice 
route" (Respondent B1), where defence lawyers have had "to cope with a number of 
restrictions in the way legal aid funding takes place . . . [and] do what we used to do 
with fewer staff" (Respondent S4).  Some felt that pay structures and rates had created a 
situation where "the gap between criminal defence lawyers and other areas of law . . . 
has got even wider" (Respondent S3), leaving defence lawyers feeling "a bit devalued to 
be honest, like . . . it's not a very good profession" (Respondent A3).  The above 
respondent continued: 
 
"It's like they can just . . . pay you whatever they want and actually it's a really . . 
. invaluable service you're offering to people.  The people who make these rules . 
. . probably don't find themselves in the police station" – Respondent A3 
 
Another respondent seemed to reflect this deep dissatisfaction with what he regarded as 
the under-funding of criminal defence services and the apparent ignorance of authorities 
about the problem, stating, "sod what the Bar Council says about quality being what the 
government's interested in – they're not . . . . [t]hey're interested in volume and price" 
(Respondent B1). 
 
Several respondents seemed to believe that funding had compromised their ability to do 
their job properly.  One respondent claimed:  
 
"In a very complicated case, you're left with the . . . invidious choice of either . . 
. not doing the work you feel that you should be doing . . . because you're not 
going to get paid for it, or else doing a certain amount of work pro bono for the 
government." – Respondent S8 
 299 
 
He asserted that such a situation left defenders with "a decision as to whether to do 
work for free or not to do the work at all and thereby prejudice [a] client", which he 
described as a decision a defence lawyer "shouldn't have to make as a professional" 
(Respondent S8).  Another respondent concurred with this claim, stating that "fixed fees 
. . . act . . . as a deterrent for exploring some avenues that would previously have been 
explored" (Respondent S3).  One respondent neatly summarised the overall attitude of 
the sample toward the effect of money on the defence work, saying, "it may well have 
an effect, although it really pains me to say that; I don't think it should, but I think it 
might do" (Respondent S2). 
 
A more broad and indirect influence on ideological drift may have been the increased 
European Union involvement in general criminal justice policy and its goal of 
"progressing toward a single area of justice."
1078
  Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the 
EU's direction of travel in criminal justice has been characterised by harmonisation and 
ensuring that: 
 
"Cross-border crimes are dealt with more efficiently and that individuals have 
their rights guaranteed equally, no matter under which Member State's 
jurisdiction their case is being heard in, whether they are suspects, accused or 
victims."
1079
   
 
The European Council meeting at Tampere accelerated this process, prioritising the 
"approximation of legislation"
1080
 on criminal justice across the EU and emphasising the 
"cornerstone"
1081
 of cooperation:  the principle of mutual recognition.  The principle 
asserts that a member state must recognise the validity of judicial decisions in another, 
as if it were its own.   
                                                 
1078
 ‘Prosecuting criminals and guaranteeing individuals’ rights more effectively in free movement Europe 
- Introduction’, Criminal Justice, European Commission Policies - EUROPA website, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/criminal/policies_criminal_intro_en.htm: Last accessed 23/08/2010.  
1079
 Ibid., ‘Part II - General Context’. 
1080
 Ibid. 
1081
 Ibid. 
 300 
An operating manifestation of this principle is the European Arrest Warrant, which is: 
 
"[A] judicial decision issued by a Member State with a view to the arrest and 
surrender by another Member State of a requested person, for the purposes of 
conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention 
order."
1082
 
 
This of course requires close cooperation between member states, and thus promotes a 
European criminal justice culture, as opposed to the separate cultures of individual 
states.  That being said, the rights of the ‘requested person’ under a warrant are 
governed by the "national law"
1083
 of whichever state he or she happens to be in.  Thus, 
the European Arrest Warrant is not a fully 'continental' criminal justice policy.  
However, the move toward a more collective concept of criminal justice is undoubted.  
The existence of bodies such as the European Court of Justice, Europol and Eurojust 
provide concrete evidence of this. 
 
The pursuit of ‘single area’ criminal justice clearly requires harmonisation of policy 
across the EU.  It is therefore important to note that most member states have 
inquisitorial-style systems, whereas England and Wales (among others) have an 
adversarial tradition.  One therefore has to question how this will be achieved.  It is 
arguable that while England and Wales moves away from adversarialism towards a 
hybrid incorporating elements of inquisitorialism, other member states are being 
compelled to do the opposite, creating a more uniform hybrid tradition.  An example of 
this is the recently resurrected policy designed to create Europe-wide minimum rights 
for criminal suspects and defendants.  This was re-launched in late 2009 as part of the 
‘Stockholm Programme:  An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the 
citizen’,1084 which endorsed the European Council's "Roadmap for strengthening 
procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings".
1085
  
Originally proposed in 2004, the revived 'roadmap' sought to "strengthen the rights of 
suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings",
1086
 applying to both "pre-trial 
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and trial stages".
1087
  Significantly, the 'roadmap' also recognised that the development 
of minimum procedural standards had to give "due respect for [member states'] legal 
traditions."
1088
  This implies that the different legal traditions will be considered in the 
development process but will not in themselves be barriers to the establishment of 
harmonised standards, lending credence to the hybridisation theory espoused above.   
 
The proposed rights, outlined in the annex to the 'roadmap', are fairly limited, the most 
significant and interesting being Measures B and C.  Measure B states that "[a] person 
that is suspected or accused of a crime should get information on his/her basic rights 
orally or, where appropriate, in writing"
1089
 and "also receive information promptly 
about the nature and cause of the accusation against him or her."
1090
  These rights have 
more in common with the adversarial tradition than the inquisitorial, where the suspect 
is usually entitled to little information in the pre-trial stage.  Measure B also suggests 
that "[a] person who has been charged should be entitled, at the appropriate time, to the 
information necessary for the preparation of his or her defence",
1091
 although "this 
should not prejudice the due course of the criminal proceedings."
1092
  This seems to 
reflect a balance between both traditions, allowing the defendant to build a defence case 
yet stressing the importance of maintaining the integrity of the justice process.  Measure 
C proposes a guarantee of "[t]he right to legal advice (through a legal counsel) for the 
suspected or accused person in criminal proceedings at the earliest appropriate stage", 
calling it "fundamental".
1093
  Again, this introduces rights for suspects and defendants 
that are traditionally alien to inquisitorial systems.  For example, extensive access to a 
lawyer at an early stage appears incompatible with the current "diminished role of the 
defense lawyer"
1094
 in French criminal process.  In general, some of these proposals, 
which are at an embryonic stage, would constitute a traditional shift for inquisitorial 
member states towards a more adversarial model, although a wider assessment of the 
reality of criminal defence across the EU would be needed to back up this claim.
1095
  
However, what is clear is that the European Union continues to strive for a more 
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unified, harmonised and common model of criminal justice, which may well have 
contributed to the ideological drift in England and Wales over the last decade. 
 
Alongside the influence of a 'new European' tradition in criminal justice is the 
development of legal competence at international level.  In a similar vein to the 
ideological drift in both England and Wales and across the EU, international criminal 
justice has arguably shifted from a distinct legal tradition to a hybrid form in recent 
years.  In 1990, the United Nations ‘Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders’ issued a document entitled the ‘Basic principles on the role of 
lawyers’.1096  Known as the 'Havana Declaration', the document stated that the 
principles set out: 
 
"[S]hould be respected and taken into account by Governments within the 
framework of their national legislation and practice and should be brought to the 
attention of lawyers as well as other persons, such as judges, prosecutors, 
members of the executive and the legislature, and the public in general."
1097
 
 
The principles set out had a distinctly adversarial character.  For example, defendants 
had to have lawyers available to "defend them in all stages of criminal proceedings,"
1098
 
perhaps contrary to traditional inquisitorial procedure where defence lawyers are mostly 
excluded from the pre-trial phase.  The declaration also required lawyers to "always 
loyally respect the interests of their clients",
1099
 and outlined that "all communications 
and consultations between lawyers and their clients within their professional 
relationship are confidential."
1100
  The more recent and significant examples of 
international criminal justice are the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and later the International Criminal Court (ICC), established by the 
Statute of Rome in 2002.  These two institutions have exhibited the aforementioned 
ideological drift from the primarily adversarial tradition, in the mould of the Havana 
Declaration, to a compromise between common and civil law systems. 
 
Academics describe early adversarial trends in international criminal justice.  Ambos 
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explained how the original draft statute for establishing the ICC in 1994 "provided for 
an adversarial procedure",
1101
 while Langer noted the "dominance of the adversarial 
system"
1102
 in the "early years"
1103
 of the ICTY.  However, over the last decade and a 
half, this situation appears to have changed.  Ambos argued that "it is only recent 
developments which have strengthened the civil law elements in international criminal 
procedure",
1104
 with both the ICTY and the ICC incorporating a more inquisitorial 
approach, which he described as more "judge-led".
1105
  He claimed that there is "general 
agreement that the procedure before the ICTY and ICC is a mixed one",
1106
 which 
"contains structural elements or building blocks of both the 'adversarial' and 
'inquisitorial' system."
1107
  He concluded:   
 
"At the level of international criminal procedure, the traditional common-civil 
law divide has been overcome.  Although most rules can be traced back to a 
common or civil law origin, they are rendered sui generis and unique in their 
application before International Criminal Tribunals."
1108
  
 
Langer appeared to draw similar conclusions, describing the adversarial and 
inquisitorial systems as playing a "central role"
1109
 in the development of international 
criminal justice and arguing that it was "a competition between these two systems".
1110
  
He described the modern international criminal justice procedure as "managerial",
1111
 
which "conceives the parties not only as zealous advocates of their positions, but also as 
the court's assistants in the goal of expediting process."
1112
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He also stated that:   
 
"The parties can be zealous advocates of their positions as long as this zeal does 
not delay the proceedings, but they also have an active duty to collaborate with 
the court and to coordinate with each other to expedite the case."
1113
 
 
Much of the above is reminiscent of modern criminal justice procedure in England and 
Wales.  It is perhaps more than a coincidence that the merging of the different legal 
traditions has occurred over a similar timeframe. 
 
Indicative of an ideological shift away from adversarialism in England and Wales is the 
increase in victim-oriented criminal justice policy.  The traditional adversarial criminal 
justice system operates on the premise that some offences are of such magnitude that 
they merit state attention.  As such, the offender or offenders are prosecuted by the state.  
The victim, if one exists, does not commence proceedings or even have to consent to 
them.  As such, "[v]ictims are not parties to a criminal trial, and the existence of a 
victim is neither necessary nor sufficient for proceedings to be brought."
1114
  The only 
parties in a traditional, adversarial system are the defendant and the state's prosecution.  
The victim is a third party and since a "formal adversarial framework is said not to take 
into account the interests of other persons"
1115
 the result is that, despite any direct 
connection with the offence, "conceptually . . . victims have no role to play in the 
modern criminal justice system".
1116
  In this sense, the state is a sort of "surrogate victim 
of crime".
1117
  In contrast, the traditional inquisitorial system "appears to take a more 
inclusive approach"
1118
 to victims who generally play "a more active role in the 
investigatory stage as well as in court."
1119
  They are considered "a party to the 
proceedings"
1120
 and as such are given "voice, validation and respect in more, and 
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better, ways than they are in the adversarial system."
1121
  This is demonstrated by the 
French criminal justice system, arguably the archetypal inquisitorial system, where the 
victim "enjoys the same rights of participation as the suspect"
1122
 in the pre-trial phase 
and thus "has a greater role to play . . . than is the case in England and Wales".
1123
  In 
summary, the traditional inquisitorial system has a "unitary process"
1124
 which 
"uphold[s] the rights and interests of the state, the victim and the accused."
1125
 
 
However, in England and Wales this situation has arguably changed.  Over the last 
decade and a half, "a strong policy emphasis on victims and witnesses has existed"
1126
 
which has been justified on the basis that "[j]ustice [is] weighted towards the 
criminal"
1127
 and that reform aimed at "re-balancing in favour of victims"
1128
 was 
necessary.  Such New Labour "mantra"
1129
 not only characterised defendants as 
'criminals' rather than suspects, but seemed to introduce a fundamentally new concept 
into English and Welsh criminal justice – the victim as a 'stakeholder' in criminal 
proceedings.  This arguably represents a "subtle shift in mindset from the adversarial to 
the inquisitorial"
1130
 and has raised questions about "how far the interests of a third 
party ought to be accommodated within the traditionally dichotomous nature of the 
criminal trial between the state and the accused."
1131
  The changes introduced have been 
significant.  For example, in 2001, a national Victim Personal Statement scheme was 
launched, allowing victims of crime to elaborate on the impact of an alleged incident, 
how they feel and even "anything . . . helpful or relevant".
1132
  In 2006, the government 
launched a Code of Practice for Victims of Crime, aimed at putting victims "at the heart 
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of our criminal justice system."
1133
  Among other things, it gives victims a right to early 
notification of a charge being brought or being dropped, explanations for delays in 
proceedings and a right to appeal against unsatisfactory service from the relevant 
organisations, such as the CPS and police.  Victim protection and anonymity have also 
arguably been strengthened.  The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 set out 
a number of situations meriting special measures for witness protection and limitations 
on certain strands of defence questioning (for example, sexual history).  Equally, the 
Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008 made sweeping changes to victim 
anonymity.  In R v. Davis,
1134
 Lord Bingham criticised anonymity as leaving defendants 
to take "blind shots at a hidden target"
1135
 and the court held that the common law 
arrangements for anonymous evidence contravened the defendant's right to a fair trial.   
In knee-jerk reaction, the above legislation abolished all common law provisions, 
including the restrictive precedent in R v. Davis, and re-established an extensive system 
of victim and witness anonymity.  Such provisions clearly bolster the position of the 
victim, potentially at the expense of the defendant. 
 
The rise in the use of restorative justice in England and Wales is one of the best 
examples of the ideological shift.  Restorative justice focuses on victim impact, 
recognising that "the harm done by crime an offence as against a person or 
organisation"
1136
 rather than just the state.  Under this model, offenders and victims 
interact in a mediation setting; this gives the victim the opportunity to explain the 
impact of the offence, ask questions of the offender and possibly receive recompense, 
reparation or an apology.  Equally, the offender is given the chance to explain their 
actions and make amends for them.  Restorative justice gives the victim more control 
and involvement in the criminal justice process and as such represents an area where 
"there has been the most convergence between adversarial and inquisitorial 
systems".
1137
  Highlighting all of these trends is not necessarily a criticism, but there are 
undoubtedly dangers in over-emphasising the role of the ‘victim’ in criminal justice.1138  
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These observations do underline what seems to represent a distinct move away from a 
strictly bipartisan, open, oral and unrestrictive criminal justice process.  The 
'rebalancing' process has been questioned by academics and practitioners.  It has been 
argued that the increase in victim involvement in the process creates "a risk that policy-
makers and commentators alike perceive the appropriate balance to be achieved as 
between the interested parties in the case (victims, witnesses and an accused) rather than 
the state as prosecutor and the individual defendant."
1139
  It has been pointed out that 
most approaches to achieving this kind of balance between victims and defendants have 
been guided by the logic that "the rights of the former could only be enhanced at the 
expense of the latter",
1140
 which may "breach the principle of equality of arms".
1141
  In 
summary, some academics believe that the extension of victim rights in the English and 
Welsh criminal justice process could "cause immense structural and normative problems 
within any adversarial system"
1142
 and, along with the others issues raised here, 
symbolise a continuing "drift into uncharted inquisitorial waters".
1143
 
 
6.2 The Future of Theorising the Role of the Criminal Defence Lawyer 
 
The conclusion that there is a 'gap' between traditional conceptions of the criminal 
defence lawyer's role and its modern form may suggest that change is required.  If one 
concludes that traditional conceptions have been sidelined in modern practice, then this 
can be viewed as either a good thing or a bad thing and one could argue for one of two 
courses of action.  If the decline of theory as an influence on modern practice is 
considered positive, then theorists should instigate a shift towards descriptions of the 
role that are more reflective of modern formal and practical conceptions.  The 
adjustment of theoretical conceptions to more closely reflect modern practice might be 
justified on the basis that it is now detached from reality and simply represents wishful 
thinking on the part of academics.  Since theory exists in academic works, enacting such 
a shift would require modern theorists to generate a new body of literature re-evaluating 
the extent of and importance afforded to the various duties and obligations owed by 
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defence lawyers to their clients, the courts and the public.  In this spirit, the 'zealous 
advocate' model proposed in Chapter 2 would require significant revision.  Below are 
some suggested changes: 
 
The Principle of Protection 
 
Replacing the principle of partisanship, this obligation places more emphasis on the 
defence lawyer's obligation to protect and advance the legitimate, legal rights and best 
interests of a client in a proper and lawful way.  This would exclude doing or saying 
anything for a client, including manipulation of process and exploitation of errors. 
 
Principle of Detachment 
 
This principle would be retained in essentially its current form, requiring that defence 
lawyers accept and represent clients in a non-judgmental and neutral way, regardless of 
their character or the charges levied against them. 
 
Principle of Confidentiality 
 
Again, the principle of confidentiality would remain mostly unchanged, with defence 
lawyers bound to uphold privilege and protect any other confidential information 
provided by the client.  However, this would be limited by disclosure obligations and 
iniquity. 
 
Principle of Assistance 
 
Combining elements of the principles of procedural justice and truth-seeking, this 
obligation would emphasise the amicus curiae aspect of modern practice, informed by 
cooperation and openness.  It would require defence lawyers to actively aid the court in 
case management, comply with extensive disclosure obligations, reduce unnecessary 
delay, refrain from 'ambushes' and avoid misleading the court. 
 
Principle of Professionalism 
 
This principle would combine elements of the principles of morality and truth-seeking, 
 309 
requiring defence lawyers to exercise respect and courtesy towards witnesses in court, 
and conduct the client's case in a fair and honest manner by raising relevant issues, 
identifying all authorities and correcting defence, prosecution or court errors.   
 
Alternatively, if the discrepancy between theoretical conceptions and modern practice is 
viewed as negative, then arguably legislators, regulators and practitioners should 
incorporate more traditional elements of criminal defence practice into their conceptions 
in order to re-establish its relevance.  In essence, theoretical conceptions do not need to 
change - the modern practitioner does.  This could be justified on the basis that 
abandoning traditional theoretical conceptions would represent a defeat for core 
adversarial principles in England and Wales.  As has been highlighted throughout this 
thesis, many academics and practitioners argue that modern formal and practical 
obligations have made inroads into traditional conceptions of the role.  A shift towards 
greater unity of the theoretical, formal and practical conceptions would most obviously 
be facilitated by changes to legislation and professional codes of conduct.  Currently, no 
code of conduct or statute is specifically dedicated to outlining the role of the criminal 
defence lawyer in England and Wales.  A possible remedy might be a 'Criminal 
Defenders Code of Conduct', detailing a clear and accessible set of standards for 
criminal defence work.  This could also be used to directly and comprehensively 
address unresolved ethical conflicts identified in this thesis, and suggest sources of 
guidance and authority in the event of such conflicts.   
 
During the empirical study, the respondents were asked directly about their use of 
formal guidance, in general and when faced with conflicts.  The majority of 
respondents’ primary source of guidance seemed to be their professional colleagues.  
When asked if they consulted their peers, answers included "all the time", "constantly", 
"loads of times", "I’d just ask my boss" and "[I’d] let a senior decide".  They described 
firms and the Bar as being "positive" and "useful" for such issues because they grant 
access to a wide range of experience and disciplines, although one respondent admitted 
this could "perpetuate an internal culture".  The danger of an ‘internal culture’ is a 
potential lack of independent scrutiny of defence lawyers, inconsistent application of 
professional standards and a lack of clarity about what defence lawyers should be doing.  
In essence, referring to colleagues suggests that formal guidance is not sufficiently 
helpful, perhaps requiring revision.  However, several respondents indicated that they 
had referred to formal sources of guidance in the event of an ethical conflict, including 
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the Law Society Ethics and Bar Council phone lines, the Solicitors’ Code and the Bar 
Code.  These answers therefore suggest that the respondents took a more practical 
approach to conflict resolution, consulting fellow defence lawyers and legal ethics 
officials ahead of formal standards of guidance.  Furthermore, the respondents 
frequently mentioned formal guidance (such as the CPR) during the interviews.  This 
suggests that formal regulation, as well as the attitude of the judiciary and the opinions 
of colleagues, were important factors in practitioners' conceptions of their role.  As 
such, one would conclude that a broad sea-change in formal conceptions would filter 
down into practice.   
 
However, it is arguable that to deliberately shift either theoretical or formal conceptions 
to match the other is both unrealistic and undesirable.  Theorists and academics are 
unlikely to totally abandon ancient, entrenched adversarial ideology, whilst the 
government and regulatory authorities will almost certainly press on with the current 
pattern of reform (although the approach of the new coalition government remains to be 
seen).  Moreover, the conclusion that the ideological 'gap' requires correction assumes 
that the core purpose of theorising is purely prescriptive.  This perhaps misses the point 
of academia and theoretical discourse.  Whilst formal regulation, such as codes of 
conduct and legislation, aim to create realistic, concrete standards of conduct, 
theoretical discussion has a normative function.  It seeks to describe ideal models, 
questioning not only the internal logic of academia but the status quo of modern 
practice.  Theorising primarily seeks to shape the future by challenging formal and 
practical conceptions, as well as describing and explaining reality.  Theory works 
outside of the narrow confines of official regulation and accepted practice by presenting 
alternative interpretations of the role of the criminal defence lawyer.  Theorising is thus 
a form of check, anchoring formal and practical conceptions in the adversarial tradition.  
To abandon theoretical conceptions of the role and simply describe reality not only 
appears pointless but might hasten the end of the adversarial criminal justice system as 
we know it.  Whilst remembering that theoretical discourse must have usefulness and 
relevance to justify its existence, it is arguable that academics discussing the role of the 
criminal defence lawyer should embrace the ideological 'gap' between their conceptions 
and the reality of criminal defence.  They should discuss, debate, question and lobby to 
effect the change they believe is required through a natural evolutionary process.  
Perhaps then, a framework like the 'zealous advocate' model will move beyond the 
theoretical and the aspirational, and will come to accurately reflect the role the 21
st
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century criminal defence lawyer. 
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APPENDIX 1 – Breakdown of Target Organisations and Respondents 
 
1. Target Organisations 
 
1.1 Organisation 1 
 
A large firm of solicitors, specialising exclusively in criminal defence work.  
Approximately 25 fee earners. 
 
1.2 Organisation 2 
 
A medium-sized firm of solicitors, specialising exclusively in criminal defence work.  
Approximately 14 fee earners. 
 
1.3 Organisation 3 
 
A medium-sized firm of solicitors, specialising in criminal defence work and some 
mental health work.  Approximately 11 fee earners. 
 
1.4 Organisation 4 
 
A small firm of solicitors, specialising exclusively in criminal defence work.  
Approximately 8 fee earners. 
 
1.5 Organisation 5 
 
A large set of chambers, undertaking some criminal defence work.  Approximately 40 
fee earners. 
 
1.6 Organisation 6 
 
A medium-sized firm of solicitors, specialising exclusively in criminal defence work.  
Approximately 15 fee earners. 
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1.7 Organisation 7 
 
A large firm of solicitors, specialising in criminal defence work.  Approximately 40 fee 
earners. 
 
1.8 Organisation 8 
 
A large set of chambers, undertaking some criminal defence work.  Approximately 50 
fee earners. 
 
2. Respondents 
 
2.1 Accredited Representatives 
 
2.1.1 Respondent A1 
 
Respondent A1 was an accredited representative employed at Organisation 2, with 6 
years of legal experience and 6 years of criminal defence experience.  The respondent 
possessed the Police Station Qualification and was a duty representative at the police 
station.  Respondent A1 had experience of representing suspects at the police station, 
preparing instructions and advice for Crown Court hearings, and instructing counsel. 
 
2.1.2 Respondent A2 
 
Respondent A2 was an accredited representative employed at Organisation 4, with 18 
years of legal experience and 18 years of criminal defence experience.  The respondent 
possessed the Police Station Qualification and was a duty representative at the police 
station.  Respondent A2 had experience of representing various offences, providing 
police station advice, and managing cases at the Crown Court, including instructing 
counsel and liaising with other parties. 
 
2.1.3 Respondent A3 
 
Respondent A3 was an accredited representative employed at Organisation 4, with 4 
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years of legal experience and 4 years of criminal defence experience.  The respondent 
possessed the Police Station Qualification and was a duty representative at the police 
station.  Respondent A3 had experience of police station advice and attendance, 
preparing briefs for Crown Court hearings and relaying client instructions. 
 
2.2 Barristers 
 
2.2.1 Respondent B1 
 
Respondent B1 was a barrister resident at Organisation 5, with 5 years of legal 
experience and 5 years of criminal defence experience.  Respondent B1 had experience 
of representing clients in Crown Court trials, pre-trial hearings, bail and Court of Appeal 
hearings. 
 
2.2.2 Respondent B2 
 
Respondent B2 was a barrister (Queen’s Counsel) resident at Organisation 8, with 28 
years of legal experience (10 as a solicitor) and 26 years of criminal defence experience.  
Respondent B2 had experience of high profile Crown Court trials, conferences in prison 
and chambers, pre-trial hearings, sentencing and Court of Appeal hearings. 
 
2.2.3 Respondent B3 
 
Respondent B3 was a barrister resident at Organisation 8, with 19 years of legal 
experience and 19 years of criminal defence experience.  Respondent B3 had experience 
of Crown Court trials, sentencing, Court of Appeal hearings, conferences with clients 
and visits to crime sites. 
 
2.2.4 Respondent B4 
 
Respondent B4 was a barrister resident at Organisation 8, with 22 years of legal 
experience and 22 years of criminal defence experience.  Respondent B4 had experience 
of representing clients in Crown Court trials, client conferences, and appeals against 
sentencing and conviction. 
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2.3 Solicitors 
 
2.3.1 Respondent S1 
 
Respondent S1 was a solicitor employed at Organisation 1, with 13 years of legal 
experience and 13 years of criminal defence experience.  The respondent possessed the 
Police Station Qualification, and was a duty solicitor at both the police station and the 
Magistrates’ Court.  Respondent S1 had experience of providing telephone advice to 
suspects, attending police interviews, advising before and during court appearances, and 
representing at all courts including, the Magistrates’, Crown and Youth Courts, with 
occasional High Court work. 
 
2.3.2 Respondent S2 
 
Respondent S2 was a solicitor employed at Organisation 2, with 14 years of legal 
experience and 14 years of criminal defence experience.  The respondent possessed the 
Police Station Qualification, and was a duty solicitor at both the police station and the 
Magistrates’ Court.  Respondent S2 had experience of providing police station advice, 
representing at preliminary hearings, and defending in the Magistrates’, Crown and 
Youth Courts. 
 
2.3.3 Respondent S3 
 
Respondent S3 was a solicitor employed at Organisation 2, with 8 years of legal 
experience and 4 years of criminal defence experience.  The respondent possessed the 
Police Station Qualification, and was a duty solicitor at both the police station and the 
Magistrates’ Court.  Respondent S3 had experience of representing clients at the 
Magistrates’ Court and police station, advising clients at firm offices, and a little Crown 
Court work. 
 
2.3.4 Respondent S4 
 
Respondent S4 was a solicitor employed at Organisation 3, with 29 of legal experience 
and 25 years of criminal defence experience.  The respondent possessed the Police 
Station Qualification and had higher rights of audience, and was a duty solicitor at both 
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the police station and the Magistrates’ Court.  Respondent S4 had experience of minor 
Magistrates’ Court matters, summary trials, and trials and sentencing in the Crown 
Court. 
 
2.3.5 Respondent S5 
 
Respondent S5 was a solicitor employed at Organisation 3, with 24 years of legal 
experience and 24 years of criminal defence experience.  The respondent possessed the 
Police Station Qualification and higher rights of audience, and was a duty solicitor at 
both the police station and the Magistrates’ Court.  Respondent S5 had experience of a 
few summary trials, preparation and representation for large Crown Court trials, advice 
in firm offices and police station advice. 
 
2.3.6 Respondent S6 
 
Respondent S6 was a solicitor employed at Organisation 3, with 22 years of legal 
experience (3 as a barrister) and 19 years of criminal defence experience.  The 
respondent possessed the Police Station Qualification, and was a duty solicitor at both 
the police station and the Magistrates’ Court.  Respondent S6 had experience of police 
station advice, representation in the Magistrates’ Court, trials and sentencing in the 
Crown Court, parole hearings and confiscation hearings. 
 
2.3.7 Respondent S7 
 
Respondent S7 was a solicitor employed at Organisation 3, with 12 years of legal 
experience and 12 years of criminal defence experience.  The respondent possessed the 
Police Station Qualification, and was a duty solicitor at both the police station and the 
Magistrates’ Court.  Respondent S7 had experience of trials in all courts, advice and 
sentencing. 
 
2.3.8 Respondent S8 
 
Respondent S8 was a solicitor employed at Organisation 6, with 34 years of legal 
experience and 34 years of criminal defence experience.  The respondent possessed the 
Police Station Qualification, and was a duty solicitor at both the police station and the 
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Magistrates’ Court.  Respondent S8 had experience of trials, sentencing, and pleas in the 
Magistrates’ Court and preparation of Crown Court trials. 
 
2.3.9 Respondent S9 
 
Respondent S9 was a solicitor employed at Organisation 7, with 6 years of legal 
experience and 6 years of criminal defence experience.  The respondent possessed the 
Police Station Qualification, and was a duty solicitor at both the police station and the 
Magistrates’ Court.  Respondent S9 had experience of Magistrates’ Court and Crown 
Court trials. 
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APPENDIX 2 - Coding Framework 
 
Principles and Conflict Points 
 
Zealous Advocacy  
Detachment  
Confidentiality  
Procedural Justice  
Truth-Seeking  
Equality  
Morality  
 
Other Notes 
 
Role?  
“Zealous Advocate”?  
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APPENDIX 3 – Ethics Materials 
 
 
ETHICAL CONSENT CONTRACT: 
INTERVIEWS AND PUBLICATION 
 
This contract governs fieldwork being undertaken on …………………. by Mr Thomas 
Smith (who henceforth shall be referred to as the ‘Researcher’) for the purposes of his 
PhD thesis at the University of the West of England, Bristol. 
 
This contract is applicable to the following people:- 
- The Researcher 
- …………………. (who henceforth shall be referred to as the ‘Respondent’) who 
is employed by …………………. (which henceforth shall be referred to as ‘the 
Firm’)  
 
Obligations & Rights Applicable to the Researcher 
 
The fieldwork:- 
- Will be in the form of a single, semi-structured, one-on-one interview, an hour in 
length.  It will be conducted with the Respondent, by the Researcher. 
- Will be recorded by the Researcher and contemporaneous notes taken by the 
Researcher. 
 
Data obtained from the fieldwork:- 
- Will be published in the Researcher’s thesis, but not in its entirety.   
4. All data obtained from the interview will be “fed back” to the Respondent for 
further comment, if they wish to do so.   
5. The Researcher will then select data that appears relevant to the thesis for 
analysis and eventual publication.   
6. All data published will be cited appropriately. 
- Will be subject to anonymity.  There will be no publication of the name of the 
Respondent, the name of the Firm, any firm clients or geographical locations.  
However, broad descriptions may be used for contextual purposes. 
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The Researcher:- 
- Will send advanced materials to the Respondent to ensure they have adequate 
information prior to the scheduled interviews. 
- Will attach a separate ‘Anonymity Guarantee’ to this contract. 
 
Obligations & Rights Applicable to the Respondent 
 
The Respondent:- 
- Agrees to engage in a single, hour-long, semi-structured interview with the 
Researcher. 
- Accepts that the data obtained will be recorded and noted, and some of the data 
will later be published in the Researcher’s thesis. 
- Will be entitled to “feedback” on all data obtained from the interview before it is 
used for the Researcher’s thesis, and may read the analysed data before 
publication.  
- Is satisfied with the guarantees of anonymity made by the Researcher. 
- Is encouraged to discuss any concerns about the fieldwork with the Researcher 
but if he/she does not wish to continue participating, they may withdraw. 
 
 
 
I, the undersigned, understand and accept all of the terms outlined in this contract. 
 
Signed:  ………………….…………………. (The Respondent) 
 
Print Name:  ………………….…………………. 
 
Signed:  ………………….…………………. (The Researcher) 
 
Print Name:  ………………….…………………. 
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ANONYMITY GUARANTEE 
 
 
- The anonymity and privacy of the Respondent will be respected; personal 
information concerning the Respondent, including name, age and gender, will be 
kept confidential.  The job title of the Respondent (e.g. Solicitor, Barrister) will 
be published. 
 
- The identity of the Respondent’s Firm and the geographical location of the 
Respondent’s Firm will be kept confidential, but may be described in broad 
terms. 
 
- Appropriate and practicable methods for preserving the anonymity of data will 
be used, including the removal of identifiers and the use of pseudonyms. 
 
- Statements attributable to the Respondent may be published in the Researcher’s 
thesis, but will only be attributed to pseudonyms. 
 
- Data provided by the Respondent to the Researcher does not enjoy legal 
privilege, that is it may be liable to subpoena by a court. 
 
- This Anonymity Guarantee is based on standards and principles outlined by the 
Socio-Legal Studies Association (SLSA) in their “Statement of Principles of 
Ethical Research Practice (January 2009)” and the British Sociological 
Association (BSA) in their “Statement of Ethical Practice (March 2002)”. 
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APPENDIX 4 – Interview Pro Forma 
 
 
INTERVIEW PRO-FORMA 
 
Interview Date: 
 
Interview Location: 
 
Name of Interviewer: 
 
Name of Interviewee: 
 
This interview is being conducted with criminal defence lawyers to explore how they 
view their role in the modern criminal justice system of England & Wales.  The 
interview should last approximately an hour and will be split into three parts.   
 
In the first, I will record some basic information about you and your firm.  I will then 
put some general, open-ended questions to you.  In the second part, I will be presenting 
you with ‘Professional Conduct Scenarios’; a series of hypothetical situations which I 
would like you to respond to.  In the third part, I will be asking some further open-ended 
questions.   
 
I will not be asking for you to comment on any individuals or organisations.  Parts of 
the interview may be published as part of my doctoral thesis, which will be on display 
in the UWE library as a public document.  However, no data will be published in a way 
which would allow you, your firm or the location of your firm to be identified.  You also 
be able to feedback on data used before it is published. 
 
Part 1 – General Questions 
 
1.  What is your professional status? e.g. Barrister, Solicitor, Accredited Rep. 
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2.  How long have you been: 
 a) a legal practitioner?  
 
 
 
 b) a criminal defence lawyer? 
 
 
 
3.  What proportion of your work is criminal defence work? 
 
 
 
4.  How many fee earners are employed/resident at your firm/chambers? 
 
 
 
5.  How many of them solely or mostly focus on criminal defence work? 
 
6.  Do you have the Police Station Qualification? 
 
 
 
7.  Are you a duty solicitor at the Police Station/Magistrates' Court? 
 
 
 
 
8.  What kind of criminal defence work do you regularly do?  e.g. bail applications, 
etc. 
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9.  How would you describe your obligations to the following: 
 a)  a client? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 b)  the courts? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 c)  the prosecution? 
 
 
 
 
 d)  the Police? 
 
 
 
 
 e)  the victim(s)? 
 
 
 
 
 343 
 f)  Prosecution witnesses? 
 
 
Part 2 – Professional Conduct Scenarios 
 
Confidentiality v. Truth-Seeking and Procedural Justice 
 
“Your client, Z, has been charged with possession of heroin with intent to supply.  He 
was arrested on North Road, which is a well-known haunt for drug users.  Z claims that 
the heroin found on him was for personal use and that he does not deal.  He pleads not 
guilty and his trial date is set; however, in your last meeting with Z before the trial, he 
says that he won't be able to attend the first day of the trial as he “needs to score on 
North Road after the weekend.”  You warn him he must attend the trial; he responds by 
asking you to explain his absence to the court.  You outline the potential consequences 
of failing to attend, but he insists on his instructions.  On the morning of the trial, Z 
does not appear as expected; you attempt to phone him but receive no answer.  You must 
explain Z's absence to the court.” 
 
 How would you deal with this situation? 
 Would you withhold the information regarding Z’s whereabouts? 
 Do you have an obligation to reveal what you know about Z’s whereabouts? 
 Would you disregard his instructions? 
 Is it your duty to facilitate the process by stating where he is? 
 By refusing to reveal his whereabouts, are you contributing to delay contrary to 
your duties or misleading the court? 
 Do you have duty to disclose that he is buying drugs? 
 
RELEVANT RULES:    
 Rule 1.1(2)(e) (CPR 2005) “efficient and expeditious” 
 S.10(1) and (2) PACE 1984 “Advice and Litigation Privilege”, “furthering a 
criminal  purpose” 
 Bar Code Para. 702 “confidentiality” 
 SCC, Rule 4.01 “confidentiality” 
 Bar Code, 701(a) “avoid unnecessary expense or waste” 
 Rule 3.2(2)(f)(CPR 2005) “discourage delay” 
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 Rule 3.2(2)(a) “identification of real issues” 
 SCC, Rule 11.01(2)(c) “draw court attention to procedural irregularities” 
 
Zealous Advocacy v. Morality 
 
“Your client, A, has been charged with raping B.  A met B in The Dock, a local 
nightclub, and after having drunk a lot, went back to B’s house.  B claimed that A then 
raped her when she refused to have sex with him.  A denies the allegation, claiming that 
B consented at the time and had made it clear she wanted to have sex throughout the 
night.  There were no witnesses to the alleged rape itself.  A claims to have seen B in 
The Dock several times before, behaving flirtatiously and always leaving with different 
men.  He claims others would agree with him that B has a reputation for picking up men 
in The Dock and taking them home to have sex.  She has alleged rape against a man in 
the past, a charge which was dropped due to lack of evidence.  A has an historic 
conviction for sexual assault and witnesses attest to his history of sexual promiscuity.  A 
instructs you to argue that B is lying and that her sexual history backs up this claim.” 
 
 How would you approach the issue of B's previous sexual history? 
 Do you have a duty to question B about her sexual history and behaviour? 
 What issues would you consider when considering whether to question B about 
sexual behaviour? 
 Do you have any obligations to the complainant? 
 
RELEVANT RULES: 
 Bar Code, Para. 303 “promote and protect fearlessly” 
 s.41 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 “no questioning on behalf of 
accused  about sexual behaviour” 
 SCC, Rule 1.04 “act in best interests” 
 Rule 1.1(2)(d) CPR 2005 “interests of witnesses, victims and jurors” 
 Bar Code, Para. 708(g) “vilify or annoy witness” 
 
Detachment v. Morality 
 
“W, a 40 year old male, has been charged with sexually assaulting his 13 year old 
daughter, X, whilst visiting her at her mother's home.  Her mother, Y, had left the house 
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briefly to go to the shop.  W has a string of past convictions for domestic violence 
directed at Y, for which he has spent time in custody and which led to their separation.  
'W' also had a charge of indecent exposure to a minor dropped due to a lack of 
evidence.  He protests his innocence, claiming his daughter is lying and made the 
accusations after he refused to give her money.  W requests your representation in what 
will clearly be a large-scale and potentially lucrative Crown Court trial.” 
 
 What factors would you take into account in deciding whether to represent W? 
 Are there any moral problems in accepting 'W' as a client? 
 Would you refuse to act for W based on moral considerations? 
 Would you express personal opinions about W's previous conduct? 
 
“'W' pleads not guilty, on your advice.  In preparing for trial, you discover that X has 
raised allegations of violence against both of her parents in the past, none of them 
pursued by the Police.  The trial begins and the prosecution call X, who has been given 
special measures to protect her in court.  She claims that W asked her to perform a 
sexual act on him and attacked her when she refused.  She also claims that he has 
sexually abused her several times in the past, but she was too scared to tell anyone.  You 
begin cross-examination of X.” 
 
 What factors would you take into account in deciding on your cross-examination 
strategy? 
 Would you undermine X's credibility by suggesting she has made false claims of 
violence in the past?  Or that she is just blackmailing her father? Or that she is a 
compulsive liar? 
 What would you consider in deciding on such a strategy? 
 Do you have a duty to respect the witness and refrain from using such tactics? 
 Would you pursue the argument that there is purely a lack of evidence?  
 
RELEVANT RULES: 
 Bar Code, Para. 602 “cab rank rule” 
 SCC, Rule 2.01 “generally free to accept clients” 
 SCC, Rule 11.04 “must not withhold services on grounds case or client is 
 objectionable” 
 Ede and Edwards, Criminal Defence “avoid pre-judgment and remain 
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 detached” 
 Plowden - “Ignore your worries” 
 Brougham - “Regardless of consequences” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zealous Advocacy v. Truth-Seeking 
 
“Your client, F, has been charged with driving whilst under the influence of alcohol.  
She was pulled over by a Police Officer who breathalysed and arrested her.  She 
provided a breath sample using an Intoximeter at the Police Station, which gave a 
reading of 50 microgrammes – 15 microgrammes over the limit.  This entitled her to 
choose to replace her breath sample with a blood or urine sample.  However, contrary 
to procedure, an officer said that she must give a blood or urine sample, and she 
complied.  Her samples confirmed she was over the limit and she was charged.  She 
tells you she “was at the pub but didn't drink anything” and on her instructions, you 
enter a plea of not guilty.” 
 
- What are your obligations at this point? 
- Would you keep silent about any favourable information? 
- Would you bring the above facts to the attention of the court immediately? 
- Do you have an obligation to disclose all tactical information to the court? 
- Would you take advantage of technical points to aid the client?  
   
“The trial begins; the arresting officer gives evidence that on arrest F claimed she'd 
“only had one drink”.  In a brief break, F admits to you that she may have drunk 
alcohol at the pub but had just forgotten.  In addition to this, the officer who operated 
the Intoximeter fails to confirm that it was working reliably, as is required.  The 
prosecution case is drawing to a close.” 
 
7. How would you deal with this situation? 
8. Would you remain silent about the prosecution error until a tactically 
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advantageous juncture? 
9. Do you have a duty to the court to correct this omission and ensure all the 
relevant facts are heard? 
10. Do you have a duty to reveal the client's admission? 
 
RELEVANT RULES: 
DPP v. Hughes, R v. Gleeson “no ambushes” 
Rule 3.2(2)(a) “real issues”, Rule 3.10(f) “written evidence to be introduced” 
Khatibi “keep silent about prosecution shortcomings” 
Leeson v. DPP “defence not bound to remind but justice may be done” 
Wakeley v. Hyams [1987] “misinformed of right to replace breath specimens” 
Road Traffic Act 1988 s.8(2) “choice of specimen” 
 
 
Part 3 – Concluding Questions 
 
1.  When presented with an issue of professional conduct, have you ever referred to 
any professional rules of conduct, legislation or case law?  For example, where it 
is unclear whether you are required to disclose tactically useful information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  When presented with an issue of professional conduct, have you ever asked a 
colleague for advice?  If so, do you have any examples? 
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3.  Are you familiar with the Criminal Procedure Rules (2005)?  Do you think that 
these have had any impact on the role of the criminal defence lawyer? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.  What effect do you think the following Criminal Procedure Rules have had on 
the role of the criminal defence lawyer: 
 a)  Pursuing the “Overriding Objective” of the rules by “acquitting the innocent 
and  convicting the guilty” (Rule 1.1(2)(a))? 
 
 
 
 
 b)  Pursuing the “Overriding Objective” of the rules by “respecting the interests 
of  witnesses, victims and jurors” (Rule 1.1(2)(d))? 
 
 
 
 
 
5.  Pursuing the “Overriding Objective” of the rules by “dealing with the case 
efficiently and expeditiously” (Rule 1.1(2)(e))? 
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6.  Since “each party must . . . actively assist the court” (Rule 3.3(a)) in “actively 
managing” (Rule 3.2(1)) a criminal case, have the following elements of case 
management affected the role of the criminal defence lawyer: 
 a)  “the early identification of the real issues” (Rule 3.2(2)(a))? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 b)  “ensuring that evidence . . . is presented in the shortest and 
       clearest way” (Rule 3.2(2)(e))? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       c)  “encouraging the participants to co-operate in the progression of the case”  
(Rule 3.2(2) (g))? 
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7.  How would you describe the role of a criminal defence lawyer? 
 -  Follow up:  Are you familiar with the terms “zealous advocate” and 
“administration of  justice”? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.  In your opinion, how, if at all, has the role of the criminal defence lawyer 
changed in recent years? 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 Thank you for your time!! 
 
